

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 22446-01168 (00040), submitted by 528TH SOSB, CPT ROBERTSON, 236-6206, () -.

2. (U) Operation JUST CAUSE conducted by USCINCSO on 12/20/89.

3. (U) KEYWORDS: No keywords..

4. (U) TITLE: LATE DEPLOYMENT OF FARRP TEAM

5. (U) OBSERVATION: THE FORWARD ARMING AND REFUELING POINT (FARP) WAS NOT OPERATIONAL IN THE TIME FRAME REQUIRED.

6. (U) DISCUSSION: THE FARP WAS NOT OPERATIONAL IN THE TIME REQUIRED FOR TWO REASONS, (1) THE LATE DEPLOYMENT OF THE TEAM AND (2) CHANGES TO THE PLAN. WHILE THE TEAM WAS NOTIFIED ON 17 DEC 89 TO REPORT TO JSOTF READY TO DEPLOY AT 1400 HRS ON 18 DEC, IT DID NOT DEPLOY UNTIL THE NEXT DAY, AT 0900 HRS, 19 DEC 89. THIS CAUSED THEM TO ARRIVE IN PANAMA AT 1400 HRS, 19 DEC 89. THIS WAS EIGHT HOURS BEFORE THE FARP WAS REQUIRED TO BE OPERATIONAL. UPON ARRIVAL THEY WERE INFORMED THAT THE PLAN HAD BEEN CHANGED AND THAT NOW OUR FUEL SYSTEM WOULD BE FILLED BY AIR FORCE 4-9 FLIGHT LINE FUEL TRUCKS INSTEAD OF BY ARMY TACTICAL HEMMETS. THIS CAUSED PROBLEMS IN THAT THE AIR FORCE TRUCKS' DISCHARGE NOZZLES DO NOT MATCH THE RECEIVING COUPLING ON THE FUEL SYSTEM SUPPLY POINT (FSSP) EQUIPMENT. THE AIR FORCE HAD TO FIND A D-1 RECEIVING COUPLING BEFORE WE COULD RECEIVE FUEL. THIS DELAY IN RECEIVING FUEL DID NOT ALLOW US ANY TIME TO PRIME THE 350 CPM PUMPS, PACK THE SYSTEM'S LINES AND TEST THE OVERALL SYSTEM BEFORE THE REQUIRED TIME TO BE OPERATIONAL.

7. (U) LESSON LEARNED: ARRIVING ONLY EIGHT (8) HOURS PRIOR TO THE OPERATION DOES NOT ALLOW ADEQUATE TIME TO SET UP AND TEST THE FUEL SYSTEM, AS WELL AS ADAPT TO ANY CHANGES IN THE SITUATION/PLAN.

8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: INCLUDE THE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS IN THE EARLY AIRFLOW TO THE OPERATIONAL SITE.

--- (U) SUBJECT: DEPLOYMENT

--- (U) INTEROPERABILITY: JTTP

--- (U) Action managed by: JCS RAP, action worked by: , RAP number: . Lesson distributed by: JCLL.

Folder - ussocom / JSOTF AAR, 16 MAR 1990
B22, Yeter, MARC
Page - 46

JULLS LONG REPORT

1. (U) JULLS NUMBER: 22445-25064 (00039), submitted by 528TH SOSB, CPT ROBERTSON, 236-6206, () -.
 2. (U) Operation JUST CAUSE conducted by USCINCSO on 12/20/89.
 3. (U) KEYWORDS: No keywords..
 4. (U) TITLE: COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (CSS) SHORTFALLS
 5. (U) OBSERVATION: THERE WAS A LACK OF AVAILABLE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT TO SUSTAIN ARSOF UNITS.
 6. (U) DISCUSSION: PRIOR TO OPERATION JUST CAUSE THE 528TH SUPPORT BATTALION HAD CONDUCTED A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT AVAILABLE WITHIN SOUTHERN COMMAND TO SUPPORT DEPLOYED SOF UNITS. IT CONCLUDED THAT A LACK OF CSS EXISTED. THIS WAS IN FACT SUPPORTED BY THE CINCS OWN ASSESSMENT AS ADDRESSED IN HIS CSPAR. THIS DOCUMENT STATES THAT FORCES DEPLOYING TO THE THEATER SHOULD DEPLOY WITH THEIR OWN CSS. WITH THIS IN MIND, EARLY ARRIVAL OF ADDITIONAL CSS UNITS WERE REQUIRED. WHEN THE 1ST PSYOPS BN AND 96TH CA BN ARRIVED THERE WERE NO CSS PLANNERS ON THE GROUND TO MAKE THINGS HAPPEN IN SUPPORT OF THE ARSOF UNITS AND HUMANITARIAN MISSIONS. THEATER CSS WAS STRETCHED IN SUPPORTING THE WAR FIGHTING FORCES. ADDITIONALLY, THIS SITUATION WAS COMPOUNDED BY THE UNDERMANNED BATTALION S-4 SECTIONS WHICH SOME UNITS DEPLOYED.
 7. (U) LESSON LEARNED: PROPER PRIOR PLANNING AND TRAINING FOR THE LOGISTICAL WAR MUST BE MADE AT ALL LEVELS. THE ROUTINE ROLE OF THE BATTALION S-4 BECOMES OF KEY IMPORTANCE TO THE UNIT'S ABILITY TO SUSTAIN ITS MISSIONS.
 8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION: INCLUDE THE ORGANIC SUPPORT CAPABILITY OF THE 528TH SPT BN IN THE EARLY FLOW OF ARSOF UNIT DEPLOYMENTS TO ENSURE TIMELY SUPPORT FOR THESE UNITS AND FOR HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS.
- (U) SUBJECT: LOGISTICS
- (U) INTEROPERABILITY: DOCTRINE
- (U) Action managed by: ARAP, action worked by: , RAP number:
. Lesson distributed by: JCLL.