

MEMORANDUM THRU:

COMMANDER, ODB-750, COMPANY B, 2ND BATTALION, 7TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP
(A) FT. BRAGG N.C. 28307

COMMANDER, ODB-740, COMPANY A, 2ND BATTALION, 7TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP
(A) FT. BRAGG N.C. 28307

FOR:

COMMANDER, 2ND BATALLION, 7TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (A) FT. BRAGG N.C.
28307

SUBJECT: AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. TEAM ORGANIZATION:

A. UNIT: OPERATIONAL DETACHMENT 742
(A.K.A. 762 THROUGHOUT OPERATION)
COMPANY A, 2ND BN, 7TH SFG(A)
FT. BRAGG N.C. 28307

B. TEAM COMPOSITION:

	NAME	RANK	DUTY POSITION	MOS
(1)	SEAN M. FLEENOR	CW2	CO	180A
(2)	DANIEL A. ARIAS	MSG	OPNS SGT	18Z
(3)	MARK D. KINCAID	SFC	HVY WPNS LDR	18B
(4)	GARRY HARRINGTON	SSG	MED SUPV	18D
(5)	MAX TYNER	SSG	MED NCO	18D
(6)	DAVID WEIN	SSG	INTEL SGT	18F
(7)	DAVID SCHROER	SSG	LT WPNS LDR	18B
(8)	CHRISTOPHER PSALTIS	SSG	COMMO SUP	18E
(9)	KIRK TOLLIVER	SSG	RAD OP	18E
(10)	CHRISTOPHER PETERSON	SSG	ENG SUPV	18C
(11)	DARYL GREG VAN YUR	SSG	ENG SGT	18C

2. RELEVANT DATES:

A.	ALERTED	20 DEC 89
B.	DEPARTED CONUS	03 JAN 90
C.	ARRIVED OPERATIONAL AREA	05 JAN 90
D.	REORGANIZATION OF OA	12 FEB 90
E.	MAIN BODY DEPARTED OA	12 JUN 90
F.	MAIN BODY ARRIVED CONUS	15 JUN 90
G.	REPLACEMENTS ARRIVED OA	?
H.	STAY BEHIND DEPARTED OA	?
I.	STAY BEHIND ARRIVED CONUS	?

3. MISSION: ODA-762 DEPLOYED TO OA COSTA, CHIRIQUI PROVINCE, REPUBLIC OF PANAMA TO CONDUCT FOREIGN INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS "JUST CAUSE" AND "PROMOTE LIBERTY". KEY ASPECTS OF THE MISSION AS INTERPRETED BY THE DETACHMENT WERE:

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- A. RECOVERY OF MILITARY WEAPONS DISTRIBUTED BY THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT;
- B. INTELLIGENCE GATHERING, REPORTING, AND TARGETING AGAINST POTENTIALLY HOSTILE INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS;
- C. AS APPROPRIATE, ASSIST THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT THROUGHOUT IT'S TRANSITION TO POWER;
- D. OVERSEE THE TRANSITION OF THE PDF TO A CIVILIAN POLICE FORCE;
- E. PROMOTE THE IMAGE AND INTERESTS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

4. LOCATIONS: AOR COSTA CONSISTED OF THE DISTRICTS OF ALANJE, BARU, BOQUERON, AND BUGABA. THEY COMPRISE THE WESTERNMOST DISTRICTS OF THE CHIRIQUI PROVINCE EXCEPTING RENACIMIENTO. THE DETACHMENT MAINTAINED OPERATING BASES AT THE CUARTELS LOCATED IN PUERTO ARMUELLES, PASO CANOAS, AND EL HATO DE VOLCAN.

5. NUMBERS: THE DETACHMENT ASSISTED FOUR DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS AND 32 CORREGIMIENTOS. IT MAINTAINED LIAISON FOR OVERSIGHT, COLLECTION, AND REPORTING WITH 13 POLICIA NACIONAL CUARTELS CONTAINING A TOTAL OF 237 POLICIA.

6. INSTALLATIONS: THE POLICIA NACIONAL MAINTAINED THE FOLLOWING INSTALLATIONS WITHIN AOR COSTA:

- A. PUERTO ARMUELLES (KV9514)
- B. PASO CANOAS (KV9743)
- C. PROGRESSO (KV9734)
- D. BREZON (LV0053)
- E. LA CONCEPCION/BUGABA (LV2141)
- F. SAN ANDRES (LV1051)
- G. SANTA MARTA (LV1241)
- H. GOMEZ (LV0847)
- I. VOLCAN (LV1970)
- J. CERRO PUNTA (LV2778)
- K. ALANJE (LV2828)
- L. DIVALA (LV1130)
- M. BOQUERON (LV2740)

7. ADEQUACY: THE FACILITIES OCCUPIED BY THE DETACHMENT DURING THE DEPLOYMENT ARE/WERE ADDEQUATE FOR THEIR PURPOSE.

A. PUERTO ARMUELLES: PRIOR TO OCCUPATION THE FACILITY SERVED AS THE CLINICA DE SALUD MILITAR. THE BUILDING WAS VACATED FOLLOWING THE DEC 20 INTERVENTION AND COMANDEERED BY THE OCCUPYING FORCES FOR USE AS OFFICES AND BILLITING. ODA-762 RECEIVED IT INTACT FROM THE PREVIOUS DETACHMENT AND CONTINUED THE OCCUPATION. ALL MEDICAL EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES WERE DONATED TO THE LOCAL HOSPITAL AND THE BUILDING WAS COMPLETELY CONVERTED TO DETACHMENT USE.

THE FACILITY IS ADDEQUATE FOR LONG TERM OCCUPATION BY FOUR TO SIX PERSONS AND WILL TEMPORARILLY SERVE 10 TO 12 USING THE SANITARY FACILITIES INSIDE THE CUARTEL. THE BUILDING CONSISTS OF A RECEPTION/WAITING AREA, AN OFFICE, THREE AIR CONDITIONED SLEEPING

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AREAS, A KITCHEN/DINING ROOM WITH A SMALL REFRIDGERATOR, A STORAGE ROOM, AND A BATHROOM WITH COMODE AND SHOWER. SECURITY HAS BEEN UPGRADED BY THE INSTALLATION OF EXPANDED METAL MESH SCREENS OVER THE DOOR AND WINDOWS.

THE FACILITY IS SERVICED BY A COMERCIAL PHONE LINE THAT IS PAID FOR BY THE PN AND AN INTERNAL PN PHONE LINE. SPACE ON THE ROOF IS ADEQUATE FOR ANY REASONABLE ANTENNA ARRAY. HF COMMUNICATIONS HAVE NEVER BEEN A PROBLEM; HOWEVER, FM IS LIMITED BY ANTENNA HEIGHT. ELECTRICITY IS 110 VOLT/60 CYCLES AND THERE ARE ADDEQUATE OUTLETS IN EACH ROOM. IT HAS RUNNING WATER; HOWEVER, PRESSURE VARIES GREATLY, OCCASIONALLY CUTTING OFF. SHOWERS ARE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE. (THE RECOMMENDED TEMPORARY SOLUTION IS A FIELD SHOWER SUSPENDED FROM THE CEILING.)

THE LOCAL COMMUNITY IS CAPABLE OF PROVIDING FOR MOST REQUIREMENTS. ANYTHING NOT AVAILABLE IN PUERTO ARMUELLES CAN USUALLY BE ACQUIRED IN DAVID WHICH IS ONE HOUR 15 MINUTES AWAY.

B. PASO CANOAS: PRIOR TO OCCUPATION THE FACILITY SERVED AS THE CLUB DE LOS MILITARES. THE BUILDING WAS VACATED FOLLOWING THE DEC 20 INTERVENTION AND COMANDEERED BY THE OCCUPYING FORCES FOR USE AS OFFICES AND BILLITING. ODA-762 RECEIVED IT INTACT FROM THE PREVIOUS DETACHMENT AND CONTINUED THE OCCUPATION.

THE FACILITY IS ADDEQUATE FOR LONG TERM OCCUPATION BY FOUR PERSONS AND WILL TEMPORARILLY SERVE SIX TO EIGHT. IT CONSISTS OF TWO AIR CONDITIONED ROOMS AND AN ADJOINING LATRINE. SECURITY HAS BEEN UPGRADED BY THE INSTALLATION OF AN EXTERIOR SECURITY DOOR AND THE REPOSITIONING OF AN INTERNAL BARRIER GATE.

THE FACILITY DOES NOT HAVE IT'S OWN PHONE LINE. IT IS SERVICED BY THE PHONES LOCATED AT THE PN FRONT DESK. THEY CONSIST OF A COMERCIAL PHONE LINE AND AN INTERNAL PN PHONE LINE. SPACE ON THE ROOF IS ADEQUATE FOR ANY REASONABLE ANTENNA ARRAY. HF COMMUNICATIONS HAVE NEVER BEEN A PROBLEM; HOWEVER, FM RANGE IS LIMITED BY ANTENNA HEIGHT. ELECTRICITY IS 110 VOLT/60 CYCLES AND THERE ARE ADDEQUATE OUTLETS IN EACH ROOM. IT HAS RUNNING WATER; HOWEVER, THE LATRINE REQUIRES SOME REPLUMBING TO MAKE IT SERVICABLE.

THE LOCAL COMMUNITY IS CAPABLE OF PROVIDING FOR MOST REQUIREMENTS. ANYTHING NOT AVAILABLE IN PASO CANOAS CAN USUALLY BE ACQUIRED IN DAVID WHICH IS 45 MINUTES AWAY.

GIVEN THE DRASTIC REDUCTIONS IN THE FORCE STRUCTURE SUPPORTING THE FID MISSION AND THE CONSEQUENT DE-EMPHASIS OF THE AMERICAN PRESENCE/INFLUENCE WE RECOMMEND THAT THIS FACILITY BE RETURNED TO THE POLICIA NACIONAL.

B. EL HATO DEL VOLCAN: PRIOR TO OCCUPATION THE FACILITY SERVED AS THE QUARTERS FOR THE OFFICER ASSIGNED TO THE CUARTEL. THE ROOMS WERE COMANDEERED BY THE OCCUPYING FORCES FOLLOWING THE DEC 20 INTERVENTION FOR USE AS OFFICES AND BILLITING. ODA-762 RECEIVED IT INTACT FROM THE PREVIOUS DETACHMENT AND CONTINUED THE OCCUPATION.

THE FACILITY IS ADDEQUATE FOR LONG TERM OCCUPATION BY THREE TO FOUR PERSONS AND WILL TEMPORARILLY SERVE FIVE TO SIX. IT CONSISTS OF A RECEPTION/WAITING AREA, TWO AIR CONDITIONED ROOMS AND AN ADJOINING

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LATRINE. EXTERIOR SECURITY HAS BEEN UPGRADED BY THE INSTALLATION OF AN EXTERIOR SECURITY DOOR. AN INSIDE PASSAGE CONNECTING THE FACILITY TO THE REST OF THE CUARTEL WAS SEALED BY THE INSTALLATION OF A PLYWOOD BARRIER.

THE FACILITY DOES NOT HAVE IT'S OWN PHONE LINE. A COMERCIAL LINE WAS INSTALLED BUT PROBLEMS CONCERNING PAYMENT OF THE BILL RENDERED IT IMPRACTICAL. IT IS SERVICED BY THE PHONES LOCATED AT THE PN FRONT DESK. THEY CONSIST OF A COMERCIAL PHONE LINE AND AN INTERNAL PN PHONE LINE. SPACE OUTSIDE IS ADEQUATE FOR ANY REASONABLE ANTENNA ARRAY. HF COMMUNICATIONS HAVE NEVER BEEN A PROBLEM; HOWEVER, FM RANGE IS LIMITED BY ANTENNA HEIGHT. ELECTRICITY IS 110 VOLT/60 CYCLES AND THERE ARE ADEQUATE OUTLETS IN EACH ROOM. IT HAS CONTINUOUS POTABLE WATER IN THE LATRINE.

THE LOCAL COMMUNITY IS CAPABLE OF PROVIDING FOR MOST REQUIREMENTS. ANYTHING NOT AVAILABLE IN VOLCAN CAN USUALLY BE ACQUIRED IN LA CONCEPCION (30 MINUTE DRIVE) OR DAVID (ONE HOUR DRIVE).

GIVEN THE DRASTIC REDUCTIONS IN THE FORCE STRUCTURE SUPPORTING THE FID MISSION AND THE CONSEQUENT DE-EMPHASIS OF THE AMERICAN PRESENCE/INFLUENCE WE RECOMMEND THAT THIS FACILITY BE RETURNED TO THE POLICIA NACIONAL.

8. MATERIAL: THE DETACHMENT RECEIVED MOST MATERIAL SUPPORT AND SSSC FROM THE ODB. THOSE ITEMS NOT AVAILABLE THROUGH NORMAL SUPPLY CHANNELS WERE PURCHASED USING AN OPFUND ACQUIRED FROM 3RD BN 7TH SFG(A). THE INITIAL LARGE TICKET EXPENSES WERE FOR SECURITY UPGRADES OF THE FACILITIES OCCUPIED BY THE TEAM. RECURRING EXPENSES INCLUDED POL, VEHICLE MAINTENANCE, COPIER RENTAL, AND COPIER MAINTENANCE. THE GREATEST OPERATIONAL EXPENSE WAS FUEL FOR THE VEHICLES. BECAUSE OF THE MILAGE REQUIRED TO SERVICE THE AOR THE DETACHMENT SPENT AN AVERAGE OF \$250.00 PER WEEK THROUGHOUT THE DEPLOYMENT. TOTAL OPFUND RECEIVED WAS \$15,000.

9. INTERPRETER SUPPORT: INTERPRETER SUPPORT WAS NOT USED. THE DETACHMENT HAD TWO FLUENT SPANISH SPEAKERS. THREE OTHER INDIVIDUALS HAD A WORKING KNOWLEDGE OF THE LANGUAGE. BECAUSE OF THE INTENSE PERSONAL CONTACT REQUIRED BY THE MISSION THE DETACHMENT WAS SOMEWHAT HANDICAPPED. IF FUNDING HAD BEEN AVAILABLE INTERPRETOR SUPPORT COULD HAVE BEEN OBTAINED IN THE OPERATIONAL AREA. INCREASED EMPHASIS ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE TRAINING WOULD ELEMIMATE THE NECESSITY TO RELY ON EXTERNAL INTERPRETER ASSETS AND WOULD ALSO GREATLY ENHANCE THE MISSION CAPABILITIES OF SPECIAL FORCES PERSONNEL.

10. TRAINING CONDITIONS: LOCAL CONDITIONS AS THEY EXISTED FOLLOWING THE DETACHMENTS ARRIVAL IN THE AOR WERE EXTREMENLY TURBULENT. ATTITUDES RANGED FROM ENTHUSIASTIC WELCOMING COMMITTEES TO OVERT HOSTILITY. THE LOCAL POPULACE WAS VERY APPRECIATIVE OF OUR PRESENCE. VARIOUS EX-DIGNIDAD GROUPS AND LOCAL COMMUNIST LEADERS WERE ACTIVELY CONSPIRING TO SUBVERT THE NEW GOVERNMENT. THE FUERZAS DE DEFENSA EXPRESSED GUARDED HOSTILITY/RESENTMENT TOWARDS OUR PRESENCE. BECAUSE OF THE REDESIGNATION OF THE F.F. D.D. TO POLICIA NACIONAL, U.S. LAW PROHIBITED THE DETACHMENT FROM CONDUCTING ANY TRAINING FOR OR WITH

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THEM. IF THE DETACHMENT HAD BEEN ALLOWED TO CONDUCT SOME TYPE OF TRAINING WITH THE FF DD IT MIGHT HAVE ENABLED US TO ESTABLISH RAPPORT MORE EFFECTIVELY AND RAPIDLY. IN ANY EVENT, FACILITIES FOR CONDUCTING TRAINING WERE LIMITED AND WOULD HAVE REQUIRED EXTENSIVE WORK TO MAKE THEM USABLE.

11. EFFECTIVENESS: GIVEN THE BROAD NATURE OF THE MISSION STATEMENT AND THE LIMITATIONS IMPOSED ON THE TEAM BY THE POLITICAL SITUATION AND THE LACK OF LANGUAGE TRAINED PERSONNEL, THE DETACHMENT ACHIEVED A SURPRISING DEGREE OF SUCCESS. THE TEAM WAS VERY EFFECTIVE IN THE RECOVERY OF MILITARY WEAPONS DISTRIBUTED BY THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT. THE DETACHMENT COLLECTED MORE THAN 360 AK-47S, 1000 MAGAZINES, AND 15,000 ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION USING A COMBINATION OF RAIDS, CACHE RECOVERY, AND "MONEY FOR GUNS". OUR SUCCESS WAS ATTRIBUTED TO DILIGENT HARD WORK AND FOLLOWING UP ON EVERY LEAD. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT THE RAPPORT THE DETACHMENT ESTABLISHED WITH THE LOCAL COMMUNITY. THE TRUST GAINED WITH THE PEOPLE ENCOURAGED THEM TO COME FORWARD AND PROVIDE THE INFORMATION THAT ASSISTED THE TEAM IN THE RECOVERY OF WEAPONS.

THE SAME RAPPORT WAS DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INFORMATION THE DETACHMENT RECEIVED TO SUPPORT INTELLIGENCE GATHERING, REPORTING, AND TARGETING AGAINST POTENTIALLY HOSTILE INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS. AS A RESULT OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE LOCAL COMMUNITIES THE DETACHMENT WAS ABLE TO COLLECT INTELLIGENCE AGAINST THREE DIGNIDAD BATTALIONS AND THEIR POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, AS WELL AS MORE THAN 400 INDIVIDUALS ASSOCIATED WITH THEM.

ALTHOUGH THE DETACHMENT OPERATED WITHOUT CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT OR GUIDANCE IT WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH A POSITIVE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. THE DETACHMENT SERVICED FOUR DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS AND 32 CORREGIMIENTOS THEREBY PROVIDING THEM WITH A LIAISON TO U.S. SUPPORT CHANNELS. THE DETACHMENT ACHIEVED THE WILLING COOPERATION OF THE LOCAL COMMUNITIES. THEIR COLABORATION WAS INVALUABLE IN THE COLLECTION AND REPORTING OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE ONGOING TRANSITION TOWARDS DEMOCRACY WITHIN THE AOR. THE DETACHMENT COORDINATED CIVIC ACTION REQUESTS FROM THE COMMUNITIES, AS WELL AS PROJECTS PERFORMED BY U.S. ENGINEERS THROUGHOUT THE AOR. OTHER SUCCESSES INCLUDED THE ORCHESTRATED SUBORDINATION OF THE FUERZAS PUBLICAS WITHIN AOR COSTA TO THE CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES.

THE DETACHMENT ESTABLISHED AN OVERT PRESENCE THAT ALLOWED IT TO OVERSEE THE INITIAL PHASES OF THE TRANSITION OF THE PDF TO A CIVILIAN POLICE FORCE. THE TEAM WAS ABLE TO OBSERVE, INFLUENCE, AND REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF 12 POLICE DETACHMENTS CONTAINING A TOTAL OF 233 OFFICERS. THE TEAM FORCED THE TRANSFER OF UNFIT POLICE PERSONNEL FROM FOUR DIFFERENT SITES, AND TRACKED PERSONNEL ROTATIONS THROUGHOUT THE AOR. THE DETACHMENT ALSO ESTABLISHED A DATA BASE ON THE POLICIA THAT HAS BEEN USED TO PROJECT REQUIREMENTS AND TRACK IMPROVEMENTS IN POLICE STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS.

THROUGH IT'S HIGH PROFILE APPROACH TO COMMUNITY RELATIONS AND POLICE INVOLVEMENT THE DETACHMENT ACTIVELY PROMOTED THE IMAGE AND INTERESTS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. BY OBSERVING THE "HEARTS AND MINDS" TENENTS OF SPECIAL FORCES DOCTRINE THE DETACHMENT ACTIVELY

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PROJECTED ITSELF INTO THE LOCAL COMMUNITY. THE TEAM FOSTERED AN AWARENESS OF U.S. GOALS AND INTENT, PROMOTING AMERICAN IDEALS OF DEMOCRACY, ECONOMIC PROGRESS, AND CLOSE SOCIAL TIES WITH THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. THE DETACHMENT'S PROACTIVE COMMUNITY RELATIONS PROGRAM ALSO SUCCEEDED IN CALMING UNFOUNDED FEARS OF COLONIALISM AND INTERVENCIONISM .

12. PROBLEMS/DISCUSSION/RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. LACK OF LANGUAGE QUALIFIED PERSONNEL.

THE DETACHMENT DEPLOYED ON THE MISSION WITH TWO FLUENT SPANISH SPEAKERS; THE TEAM LEADER, AND THE TEAM SERGEANT. FOUR OTHER TEAM MEMBERS HAD A MINIMAL KNOWLEDGE OF SPANISH ADEQUATE ONLY FOR BRIEF SOCIAL CONTACT IN A FORGIVING ENVIRONMENT. THE REMAINDER OF THE DETACHMENT WAS SEVERELY HANDICAPPED BY THEIR INABILITY TO INTERACT WITH THE LOCAL COMMUNITY.

THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT REQUIRED COMPLETE IMMERSION IN A FOREIGN LANGUAGE/SOCIETY WITH INHERENT CROSS CULTURAL COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEMS. THESE PROBLEMS WERE INTENSIFIED BY THE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ORIENTATION OF THE MISSION. PERSONNEL WERE REQUIRED TO EXTRACT AND ANALYZE LARGE QUANTITIES OF SPANISH LANGUAGE INFORMATION FROM HUMINT SOURCES AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS. THE COMPLEXITY OF THE TASKS REQUIRED THE EXCLUSIVE ATTENTION OF THE TWO LEADERS, BECAUSE OF THEIR LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY. THIS REDUCED THEIR EFFECTIVENESS BY OCCUPYING A DISPROPORTIONATE AMMOUNT OF ATTENTION/TIME AND FORCED OTHER TEAM MEMBERS TO COVER OTHER MISSION RESPONSIBILITIES AS BEST THEY COULD. THEIR LACK OF LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY FREQUENTLY RESULTED IN MISUNDERSTANDINGS, CONFUSION, AND OCCASIONAL WASTED EFFORT.

RECOMMENDATIONS: RECOMMEND THAT THE COMMAND RE-EXAMINE THE LANGUAGE TRAINING POLICIES. IT IS THE EXPERIENCE OF THIS DETACHMENT THAT SFLIC DOES NOT PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE KNOWLEDGE OF A FOREIGN LANGUAGE, ESPECIALLY IN AN ENVIRONMENT WHERE THE SOLDIER IS EXPECTED TO SURVIVE IN A FOREIGN SOCIETY WITHOUT A SUPPORTING AMERICAN COMMUNITY. THE SKILLS WHICH PROVED CRITICAL WERE BASIC GRAMMER AND A SOCIAL VOCABULARY. GIVEN A SOLID GROUNDING IN GRAMMER AND AN ADEQUATE SOCIAL VOCABULARY TEACHING MILITARY SKILLS REQUIRES NOTHING MORE THAN EXPANDING THE EXISTING VOCABULARY WITH SPECIFIC TERMINOLOGY.

MINIMUM LANGUAGE TRAINING SHOULD BE A THREE MONTH COURSE MODELED ON A EXPANDED HEADSTART FORMAT. THE RECOMMENDED TRAINING SHOULD BE A SIX MONTH COURSE BASED ON THE DLI FORMAT. THE COMMAND SHOULD CONSIDER SUPPORTING LANGUAGE TRAINING BY RELEASING INDIVIDUALS IN SCHOOL FROM ALL UNIT INTERFERENCE SO THAT THEY CAN DEDICATE THEMSELVES TO LEARNING. SENDING ENTIRE DETACHMENTS TO LANGUAGE TRAINING TOGETHER WOULD ENSURE COMMAND INTEREST, EMPHASIS, AND PARTICIPATION, AND AFFORD THE OPPORTUNITY TO USE PEER PRESSURE AS A MOTIVE FOR EXCELLING.

LANGUAGE TRAINING MUST BE CONSIDERED MANDATORY FOR ALL PERSONNEL. IN ORDER FOR AN INDIVIDUAL TO BE PRODUCTIVE ON A MISSION HE MUST BE PROFICIENT IN THE TARGET LANGUAGE. TEAMS SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED DEPLOYABLE UNTIL ALL MEMBERS HAVE RECEIVED AT LEAST A MINIMUM OF

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FORMAL LANGUAGE TRAINING. PROFICIENCY MUST BE TIED TO ACCEPTABLE DLPT TEST SCORES.

B. THE DETACHMENT WAS NOT TRAINED FOR THE FOREIGN INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT MISSION. DETACHMENT ORIENTATION PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT ON OPERATION "JUST CAUSE" WAS FOR DIRECT ACTION AND STRATEGIC RECON IN A MARITIME OPERATIONS ENVIRONMENT TO SUPPORT LANTCOM OBJECTIVES. THE TEAM LACKED THE REQUISITE BACKGROUND TRAINING IN FID TO EFFECTIVELY OPERATE IN AN ADVISORY ROLE TO A CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT AND POLICE FORCE.

TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE NO DOCTRINE EXISTS TO DEFINE THE DETACHMENT'S ROLE IN A FID ENVIRONMENT. AS A RESULT THE DETACHMENT FREQUENTLY FOUND ITSELF OVEREXTENDED TRYING TO COVER ALL THE REQUIREMENTS OF A FID/STABILITY OPERATION. BECAUSE OF PERCEIVED SHORTCOMINGS IN THE DETACHMENT'S ABILITY TO ACCOMPLISH THE FULL SPECTRUM OF IMPLIED MISSIONS, THE DETACHMENT COMMANDER REQUESTED AUGMENTATION BY CIVIL AFFAIRS, PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, AND MILITARY POLICE SPECIALISTS. THE REQUESTED AUGMENTATIONS WERE UNAVAILABLE FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS AND THE DETACHMENT WAS LEFT TO PERFORM AS BEST IT COULD.

C. THE DETACHMENT'S MISSION WAS INADEQUATELY DEFINED. THE MISSION STATEMENT THAT THE DETACHMENT OPERATED WITH FROM THE BEGINNING WAS EXTRAPOLATED FROM COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE AND THE PERCEIVED REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE DETACHMENT'S AOR. THE FIRST WRITTEN GUIDANCE THE TEAM RECEIVED CAME IN MID FEBRUARY.

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E. THE DETACHMENT'S AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY WAS TOO LARGE. THE ODA WAS REQUIRED TO OPERATE AS SPLIT TEAMS IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN EVEN THE ILLUSION OF AN ACTIVE AMERICAN PRESENCE THROUGHOUT THE AREA. WITH TOO FEW PEOPLE COVERING TOO MUCH AREA PERSONAL SECURITY AND OPERATIONAL INTENSITY SUFFERED. IF THE DETACHMENT HAD RECEIVED THE REQUESTED AUGMENTATION OR THE AOR HAD BEEN REDUCED THESE PROBLEMS WOULD HAVE BEEN ALIVIATED.

F. THE DETACHMENT WAS TOLD TO MAINTAIN A HIGH STATE OF ALLERTNESS AND EXPECT A PROBABLE HOSTILE RESPONSE TO OUR PRESENCE IN THE AOR YET WE WERE FORWARD DEPLOYED WITH ONLY THE BASIC LOAD OF 5.56MM AND 9MM. WE WERE ON SITE FOR ALMOST THREE WEEKS BEFORE ADDITIONAL ORDINANCE WAS PROVIDED DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF OVERTLY HOSTILE ELEMENTS IN THE LOCAL POPULATION AND THE RECEIPT OF SEVERAL TELEPHONED DEATH THREATS.

G. DETACHMENT OPERATIONS WERE FREQUENTLY HANDICAPPED BY THE LACK OF ADDEQUATE TRANSPORTATION. COVERING THE DETACHMENT'S AOR AND EXECUTING THE VARIOUS MISSIONS REQUIRED AN EXCEPTIONAL DEGREE OF MOBILITY. MAINTAINING AN APPROPRIATE SECURITY AND SAFETY POSTURE REQUIRED CONVOYING AT LEAST TWO VEHICLES. THE PROBLEM WAS COMPOUNDED BY THE FREQUENT MEETINGS IN DAVID WHICH EFFECTIVELY STRANDED THE REMAINDER OF THE TEAM WITHOUT TRANSPORTATION. THE DETACHMENT SURVIVED FOR THE FIRST TWO WEEKS USING CONFISCATED OR BORROWED VEHICLES. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY A SERIES OF UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM, INCLUDING THE USE OF 1008S ASSIGNED TO THE BN. COMMO SECTION. FOLLOWING THE THIRD WEEK OF OPERATIONS THE DETACHMENT WAS ASSIGNED TWO CONTRACTED RENTAL TRUCKS, ONE FOR EACH SPLIT TEAM. THESE PROBLEMS WERE NOT RESOLVED UNTIL EARLY MAY WHEN THE TEAM USED IT'S INITIATIVE TO ACQUIRE TWO TMP M880S PAINTED WITH PN COLORS. THESE VEHICLES ALSO PROVED INADEQUATE MAINLY BECAUSE OF THEIR HIGH VISIBILITY PROFILE, THEIR POOR MECHANICAL RECORD, THE INABILITY TO FIX THEM IN THE AOR, AND THEIR EXCESSIVE FUEL CONSUMPTION.

H. INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT WAS LIMITED TO WHAT THE DETACHMENT OBSERVED ON CNN. COMPLETE MAP COVERAGE OF THE DETACHMENTS AOR WAS NOT AVAILABLE/ISSUED UNTIL AFTER THE DETACHMENT HAD BEEN IN PANAMA FOR FOUR WEEKS. (TEAM DID RECEIVE PARTIAL COVERAGE WHILE AT ALBROOK 04 JAN 90.) INFORMATION THAT SHOULD/COULD HAVE BEEN COLLECTED PRIOR TO HOSTILITIES WAS NEVER MADE AVAILABLE TO THE TEAM. PRIORITIES FOR THE COLLECTION AND REPORTING OF INFORMATION WERE NOT COORDINATED, NOR WERE THEY TIED TO OPERATIONAL NECESSITIES. URGENT NECESSITIES THROUGH THE END OF JANUARY WERE THE RECOVERY OF WEAPONS AND TRACKING SUBVERSIVES; YET THE TEAM WAS TASKED TO PROVIDE AREA ASSESMENT INFORMATION THAT COULD HAVE WAITED UNTIL AFTER THE SITUATION HAD STABILIZED. THE TEAM FREQUENTLY RECEIVED FOUR AND FIVE REQUESTS, DIFFERING ONLY IN FORMAT, FOR THE SAME INFORMATION, AS THOUGH NOBODY WAS READING OUR OUTGOING MESSAGES. FIRS WERE NOT ISSUED UNTIL THE THIRD WEEK OF JANUARY. THE INFORMATION REQUIRED WAS RARELY APPLICABLE TO THE LOCAL SITUATION. THE DETACHMENT NEVER RECEIVED A REPLY TO REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION PASSED TO HIGHER. REQUESTS FOR FOLLOWUPS ON CAPTURED PRISONERS, INTERROGATION REPORTS, AND F.F. D.D. ORDER OF BATTLE WENT UNANSWERED. THE DETACHMENT NEVER RECEIVED THE BENEFIT OF ANY INTEL ANALYSIS THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN DONE WITH INFORMATION SENT HIGHER.

INITIALLY M1 PERSONNEL OPERATING IN THE DETACHMENT'S AOR MADE NO ATTEMPTS TO COORDINATE THEIR ACTIVITIES. THIS RESULTED IN FREQUENT

DUPLICATION OF INFORMANTS/SOURCES AND HAD A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON DETACHMENT EFFORTS, CREATING CONSIDERABLE CONFUSION, ESPECIALLY WHEN MI PERSONNEL WOULD NOT PROPERLY IDENTIFY THEMSELVES TO THE INFORMANTS.

THE DETACHMENT COLLECTED COPIOUS QUANTITIES OF INFORMATION FROM A VARIETY OF HUMAN AND DOCUMENT SOURCES. DETACHMENT INTEL PERSONNEL DID NOT HAVE AN ADEQUATE LANGUAGE CAPABILITY, NOR WERE THEY TRAINED FOR THE HUMINT INTENSIVE ENVIRONMENT. DETACHMENT MEMBERS WERE UNSKILLED IN INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES. EVEN EFFORTS TO ELICITE INFORMATION FROM COOPERATIVE SOURCES WERE HANDICAPPED BY AN UNFAMILIARITY WITH TECHNIQUES. TEAM MEMBERS WERE ALSO UNFAMILIAR WITH OR UNPRACTICED IN THE BASIC TRADECRAFT NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE IDENTITY OF SOURCES WHO FOR VARIOUS REASONS WOULD/COULD NOT APPROACH THE DETACHMENT OPENLY.

I. THE DETACHMENTS WERE NOT WELL SUPPORTED BY THE ADMIN SECTIONS. MAIL WAS A CONTINUAL PROBLEM THROUGHOUT THE DEPLOYMENT. LES' WERE NEVER ON TIME. ANY PERSONNEL ACTIONS HAD TO BE RETURNED TO FT. BRAGG.

J. THE DETACHMENT NEEDED ADDITIONAL CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT. CIVIL AFFAIRS PERSONNEL VISITED THE DETACHMENT THREE TIMES DURING THE SIX MONTH MISSION. TWO OF THE VISITS CONDUCTED MINIMUM SURVEYS OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT SITUATION CONCENTRATING THEIR EFFORTS ON THE POLICE AND JUDICIAL PROCESSES. THE OTHER MET WITH A LOCAL PLANNING COMMITTEE TO DETERMINE THE FEASIBILITY OF CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS IN THE DISTRICT. THE ONLY RESOURCE AVAILABLE TO THE DETACHMENT FOR ADVISING CIVIL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY WAS A SPANISH TRANSLATION OF A VIET NAM ERA FIELD MANUAL.

K. THE TEAM DID NOT HAVE THE TRAINING OR BACKGROUND TO EXPLOIT PSYOP OPPORTUNITIES. THE DETACHMENT RECEIVED FOUR VISITS FROM PSYOP TEAMS IN SIX MONTHS. THE VISITS HAD AN AVERAGE DURATION OF TWO HOURS AND SERVED ONLY TO DISTRIBUTE PRE-PRINTED MATERIAL TARGETED AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL. REPEATED REQUESTS FOR PSYOP ADVISORS AND/OR PRODUCTION TARGETING LOCAL ISSUES WENT UNANSWERED. FORTUNATELY THE DETACHMENT WAS ABLE TO FUNCTION AT A MINIMAL LEVEL USING A RECENT COPY OF THE PSYOP FM AND CONTACTS WE DEVELOPED IN THE LOCAL RADIO AND PRINT MEDIA.

L. THE DETACHMENT WAS REQUIRED TO OBSERVE AND REPORT ON THE FUERZAS PUBLICAS WITHOUT TRAINING OR BACKGROUND IN POLICE OPERATIONS. REPEATED REQUESTS FOR MILITARY POLICE SKILL MANUALS WENT UNANSWERED. THE MISSION DEMANDED THAT THE TEAM ESTABLISH A RAPPORT WITH THE FN YET WE WERE DENIED AN OPPORTUNITY TO TRAIN THEM, SOMETHING THEY NEEDED THAT HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN THE MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS OF GAINING RAPPORT.

M. THE DETACHMENT WAS RUSHED TO IT'S OPERATIONAL AREA WITHOUT A ~~SBM~~ ~~ACANON~~ REPORT ODA-742 (762) OPERATIONS "JUST CAUSE" AND "PROMOTE LIBERTY" 03 JAN-29 JUN 90