

THE IVANHOE SECURITY FORCE IN KOREA, 1950

by Charles H. Briscoe

The Ivanhoe Security Force (ISF) was a 2nd Infantry Division (2nd ID) counter-guerrilla unit that grew out of necessity shortly after the division arrived in Kyongsan, Korea, in September 1950. Since the 2nd ID was at full strength and fresh from the United States, its three infantry regiments were quickly moved into the defensive lines of the Pusan Perimeter. They replaced the 24th Infantry Division which was woefully understrength (down to 45% strength). But, their newly assigned defensive sector covered some 35 miles. The 2nd ID front stretched from the juncture of the Naktong and Nam Rivers in the south to the town of Hyonpung in the north.¹ Facing them were the 105th Armored as well as the 4th and 8th Infantry Divisions of the North Korea Peoples Army (NKPA).² The 2nd Infantry was spread thin over an area that was plagued by refugees heading south. Enemy infiltrations behind friendly lines disrupted command posts (CPs) as well as resupply routes.

The threat prompted the creation of an American-led counter guerrilla force made up of South Koreans much like U.S. Special Forces (SF) trained and led indigenous Mike Forces in South Vietnam. The purpose of this article is to explain why the 2nd Infantry Division created this ad hoc, “off the books” indigenous counter-guerrilla force, who the American “advisors” were, and what role they had in organizing, manning, equipping, and fighting this element. They were doing what Army special operations forces (ARSOF) soldiers do today in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2 (Intelligence) directed ISF missions, their actions became closely intertwined with the major actions of the 2nd ID from August until late November 1950 during the disastrous withdrawal at Kunu-ri, North Korea. The Ivanhoe Security Force was sent wherever there was trouble in the 2nd Infantry area.³

The first elements of the 2nd Infantry arrived from Fort Lewis, Washington, on 31 July 1950.⁴ Corporal (CPL) Joseph C. Howard, 2nd MP Company and ISF remembered: “Married personnel had little time to move their families. Those who had cars had to sell at half their value. Hundreds of replacements were rushed into the division to bring it up to strength. On the ship over we had to train them on their assigned weapons because replacements came from finance, quartermaster, etc. But, we had plenty of time; the ship took seventeen days.”⁵ The reality of war came quickly.

On 7 August 1950, A Battery, 15th Field Artillery was attacked in the early morning by enemy forces who had infiltrated behind the front lines and gotten into their firing position. It was a “wake up call” for the artillerymen. They drove off the attackers and killed fifteen North Korean soldiers.⁶ Bands of South Korean dissidents and bandits, who had long populated the Taebaek and southwestern mountains, joined four reduced divisions of the NKPA II Corps to conduct limited guerrilla operations above and below the 38th Parallel.⁷



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Displaced South Koreans carrying their most prized possessions fled the North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA) to seek refuge in the Pusan Perimeter.



MPs screen refugees for hidden weapons with mine detectors.

Hordes of white-clothed, steadily plodding peasants moved south along mountain trails and roads to saturate the division area as the infantrymen sought to drive off enemy patrols sent to scout ahead of a major attack. Intermingled among the displaced persons were Communist agents intent on collecting information, harassing, sabotaging, and attacking American forces behind the lines. They were very effective in those early days.⁸

While the burden of controlling the refugees fell to every unit on the front line and in the rear, it was the primary responsibility of the 2nd ID Provost Marshal, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Henry C. Becker, the agents of the 2nd Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) Detachment, and local South Korean police. Posted leaflet notices warned refugees that they would be shot for moving at night and advised them to stay clear of battle areas and unit positions. During daylight, MPs operated refugee screening posts on railroads, roads, and trails conducting cursory searches for weapons with mine detectors. Refugee assembly points were established at fifteen-mile intervals to allow rest and control movement. Food and water was provided before Korean police escorted groups through the division area to Susan-ni on the Naktong River.⁹ However, these control measures proved insufficient as night attacks behind division lines continued.

WWII veteran Major Jack T. Young, the 2nd ID Deputy G-2, volunteered to organize and train a special security force to deal with the refugee problems, collect intelligence, and counter guerrilla activities in the division rear areas.¹⁰ The Chinese-American born in Kona, Hawaii,



MAJ Jack T. Young, Assistant G-2, 2nd Infantry Division and Commander, Ivanhoe Security Force.



(L to R) SGT Emmett V. Parker, NCOIC, and CPL Joseph C. Howard, 2nd MP Company, were the first two American soldiers selected by MAJ Jack Young to cadre the US-led indigenous Ivanhoe Security Force.

was a 1936 graduate of Fudan University, Shanghai, (bachelor's degree in business administration). In 1938 he attended the Kuomintang Military Academy. Then, he led Nationalist Chinese units for General Chiang Kai-shek until 1943. After fighting guerrillas in Shantung Province, Nationalist Chinese Colonel (COL) Jack Young, like American Flying Tigers pilots, was commissioned as a U.S. Army Reserve officer.¹¹ Fluent in Mandarin Chinese, Japanese, Korean and several Asian dialects, Young was commissioned in the Adjutant General Corps and assigned as aide-de-camp to Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell in the China-Burma-India Theater. Afterwards, while serving with the U.S. Military Mission to China, Captain (CPT) Young met the leading Chinese Communists, Mao Zedong, Chou En-lai, and Kim Il-Sung from Korea.¹²

As interpreter/aide for General George C. Marshall during his postwar China mission, Major (MAJ) Young became friendly with COL Laurence B. Keiser, who became 2nd Infantry Division commander.¹³ When war broke out in June 1950 and the 2nd ID was alerted for Korea, Major General (MG) Keiser asked AG Major Young to join his staff as the Deputy G-2. His experiences in Asia, language skills, and cultural background made Young a valuable asset.¹⁴

MAJ Jack Young, after assuming control of the South Korean police, began recruiting. He went looking for ROK soldiers sent home to recover from serious wounds, ex-soldiers and former policemen. Service with the Japanese was not a concern. While screening refugees MAJ Young was on the alert for military age males trying to infiltrate.¹⁵ Two of his early additions were South Korean Assemblymen, Kim Yong Woo, a University of Southern California graduate, and Kei Won Chung, who had a doctorate in literature from Princeton.¹⁶ These men proved to be very helpful with controlling the flow of refugees, assisting with their resettlement and helping to establish law, order, and local government.

On 2 September, Sergeant (SGT) Emmett V. Parker and CPL Joseph C. Howard, 2nd MP Company, working as refugee screeners, were told to abandon their posts if the enemy entered Yongsan. When the North Koreans did enter the city, the two MPs remained on post until the last American



MAJ Jack Young demonstrates silent kill, hand-to-hand combat techniques to Korean trainees in Ivanhoe Security Force.



CPL Joseph Howard (right rear) poses with the first Korean graduates of ISF counter guerrilla training.

vehicle left and then they joined the infantry to help hold a nearby hill overlooking the city. When a counterattack began, the two MPs advanced with the infantry and cleared the area around their posts and returned to duty.¹⁷ SGT Parker was awarded a Silver Star for gallantry in action. This attracted MAJ Jack Young's attention who decided to recruit him and Howard. After that he received a reluctant permission from LTC Becker, the Provost Marshal, to recruit CPLs "Moose" Thompson and Clark from the 2nd MP Company as well.¹⁸

Refugee problems grew steadily worse. More than 97,200 refugees had been collecting in Chang-do and the Division Artillery area. MAJ Young's South Korean police were combined with the 2nd MP Company to clear the sector. A division raider unit (later named the Ivanhoe Security Force) was to be formed to sweep the Chang'ing to Chong road as soon as possible. "Ivanhoe" was the code name for the 2nd Infantry Division.¹⁹ Young commented: "Our main missions were to provide security for the Division Forward Command Post and major supply installations along the Main Supply Route (MSR) and to conduct battlefield surveillance and anti-guerrilla warfare."²⁰

An unusual task force (Headquarters Company, 9th Infantry Regiment, three 72nd Tank Battalion tanks, and B Battery, 2nd AAA Battalion) started patrolling the Yongsan-Chang'ing road the second week of September to eliminate the guerrillas. Simultaneously, the Ivanhoe Security Force conducted Operation SAND FLUSH to clear enemy patrols from behind division lines. Reinforced with two squads of riflemen, six MPs, an 81 mm mortar section, and an M39 armored personnel carrier (APC), the ISF captured a seventeen-man, officer-led patrol reconnoitering the Chang'ing area for an attack.²¹ This operation validated the ISF as an intelligence collecting raider unit.

"Major Jack Young of the Adjutant General Corps carries a burp gun instead of a pencil. He formed his raggle taggle

army, mostly from South Korean policemen, after a full battalion of Korean Reds slipped through the American lines near Changnyong. The Reds had been raiding rear echelon American units. His group subsists on livestock, rice, and vegetables found in the abandoned fields. MAJ Young remarked: 'It is like fighting the Chinese Communists all over again. We have killed thirty Reds and captured twenty so far. Today we killed three and captured seven. We have to keep the supply routes open.'²²

CPL Joseph Howard, one of the original four American non-commissioned officers (NCOs) with the ISF stated: "Our unit was made up of Korean officers and sergeants who were former Japanese soldiers and Imperial Marines.

They believed in strict discipline and severe punishment. We wore assorted clothing. The Chinese jackets and mittens were very warm. We carried an assortment of American and Russian weapons which we had collected from the dead. We drove captured Russian vehicles and 'appropriated' U.S.

Army Jeeps and trucks. Since our diet was heavy on rice, the Americans suffered from dysentery and jaundice. We laughed at the radio commentary of 'Seoul City Sue' as well as Communist loudspeaker broadcasts. We used their propaganda leaflets for toilet paper."²³

In the Eighth U. S. Army (EUSA) main effort (the Taegu-Kumchon-Taejon axis) on 16 September, 2nd ID was to drive directly west from its position. MAJ Young's ISF was to secure Chang'ing and clear all enemy east of the town.²⁴ Unbeknownst to the indigenous counter guerrilla unit the attack supported the Eighth Army breakout from the Pusan Perimeter after the Inch'on landing by the 1st Marine Division succeeded.²⁵

The 2nd ID, having led the breakout and follow-on northward attack, was given a breather on 10 October just as signs of Chinese involvement began to appear. All units of the Indianhead Division were moved into reserve between Suwon and Yongdong-po. Relocation took four days. Personnel and weapons were inspected,

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— CPL Joseph C. Howard

shortages identified and filled, and the training emphasis was to integrate the South Korean KATUSAs (Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army) assigned to the regiments. Critiques of small-unit actions were conducted and tactical training reinstated. For the first time since being alerted for Korea in July 1950, the 2nd Infantry Division could “sit-down” and take stock of itself and its situation. There was much to be done while the EUSA continued the attack. However, the imminent capture of North Korea’s capital produced another mission.²⁶

On 16 October 1950, after the morning staff meeting, MG Keiser met privately with the G-2, LTC Ralph L. Foster, and his deputy, MAJ Young. Far East Command headquarters in Tokyo had ordered Eighth Army to organize an intelligence exploitation task force for P’yongyang “to secure and protect specially selected government buildings and foreign (Russian) compounds, until they could be searched for enemy intelligence materials.” The job was assigned to the 2nd Infantry Division. LTC Foster was to lead Task Force (TF) INDIANHEAD (2nd ID nickname) and leave as soon as possible.²⁷

P’yongyang, the oldest city in Korea, had long been the country’s capital. It was about forty miles northeast of the Yellow Sea. When the war started, the population was approximately 500,000. The Communist capital sat astride the Taedong River, one of the largest in Korea, and which empties into the Yellow Sea. The major part of the city, containing the important government buildings, was on the river’s north side. A large, relatively new industrial suburb sprawled on the south side. The two bridges of the Pusan-Seoul-Mukden Railroad crossed at the industrial area. Two miles upstream from them was the highway bridge. All three bridges had been dropped by Allied bombing. At P’yongyang, the Taedong River was four to five hundred yards in width and the current was very swift, which made it a major obstacle to north-south military movements.²⁸

TF INDIANHEAD elements began assembling on 17 October at Chuoe-Myon where the 2nd Reconnaissance (Recon) Company was bivouacked. A reinforced K Company, 38th Infantry with seven officers was the largest element in seven 2 ½ ton trucks. Five M26 tanks, one M4 Sherman tank, and a halftrack came from the 72nd Tank Battalion. Two M24 tanks and another halftrack came from the 2nd Recon Co. The 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion provided a demolition team (one officer and 14 enlisted men). One doctor was accompanied by two medical aidmen. The 82nd AAA section consisted of one M16 and an M19. The MP Company sent a reinforced squad. CPT Allen Jung headed the Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) agents and

interpreters. ISF completed the motorized element which carried a basic load of ammunition and fuel.²⁹

“I convinced my company commander that I should be assistant driver for CPL Parsons who was slated to drive a 38th Infantry deuce and a half. I really wanted to be part of the Ivanhoe Security Force,” said CPL L. Carl Heesch. “MAJ Young and SGT Parker had warned my patrol about a machinegun nest while we were patrolling near the Naktong River. When I overheard Major Young say something in Chinese, I responded in kind and explained that I had served in Tsingtao and Shanghai in 1948 and 1949. That was enough to convince me that I ought to get in his ‘irregular outfit.’ When we used a bazooka on that machinegun, he was impressed and I was hooked.”³⁰

Second Lieutenant (2LT) John E. Fox, F Company, 38th Infantry explained: “There were six identically structured, platoon-sized (intelligence exploitation) operational elements. Each had a rifle squad, a light machinegun team, a 57 mm recoilless rifle team, and various specialists. My Team, #6, had two Korean guides from P’yongyang, LT Kang and SGT Kang. I had a medic, a radio operator, Nisei CPL Toshio Hasegawa

as my messenger, two CIC agents, Clavin and another Nisei named Azebu, two engineer demolitions men, a Korean translator, LT Oh and a civilian interpreter, Pak II. One of my West Point classmates (Class of ‘50), fellow Texan Harry Dodge, was in charge of another team. The K Company commander, CPT Warden, was the only one that had a map. The

two CIC agents, Clavin and Azebu, jokingly explained that ‘CIC actually stood for ‘Christ, I’m confused.’ They actually ran the operation.”³¹

TF INDIANHEAD left the assembly area in three serials in the late afternoon of 17 October headed north. By 1830 hours, 18 October, two serials were in Sariwon and the other in Sinmak. Bucking traffic, the task force had managed to get ahead of the 5th and 7th Cavalry Regiments until the afternoon of 19 October when MAJ Young’s Jeep was blocked at Hokkyo-ri by one “fuming mad” MG Hobart R. Gay, the 1st Cavalry Division commanding general, who “shook his swagger stick at me demanding to know who we were. He didn’t care if our orders were signed by MacArthur himself. ‘Nobody was going to get ahead of the 1st Cavalry!’” recorded Young.³² The 1st Cavalry’s aggressive drive north had earned them the honor of being the first UN forces into P’yongyang. But, since there were no bridges or suitable crossing sites on the Taedong River for motorized equipment, MG Gay had to wait for his engineer boats.³³

“Momentarily stunned, we halted long enough to gather our wits and plan our next move. While we were doing



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— CPL L. Carl Heesch



38th Infantry Regiment DUI



School building where American POWs were held in P'yongyang. The school blackboard contained dates and names of POWs and the rooms had U.S. newspapers and documents abandoned by POWs. (Permission from Mrs. Tanya Sochurek.)

this, the ISF Koreans and Police scouts who had been dispatched to recon the neighborhood reported that they had encountered the ROK 1st Division preparing to cross the Taedong River to enter P'yongyang from the east. In the pouring rain I led Captain Hoe and a squad of ISF down a narrow, muddy trail, stepping around obvious mines, to see COL Paik Sun-yup, the ROK commander. He gave me a warm welcome. Paik, native to P'yongyang, spoke very good Chinese having served in Manchuria for many years. Some of his elements had already crossed the river and had met no resistance. He told me where the crossing sites were and generously offered me ten assault boats to get across the river. I gave CPT Hoe and his squad an SCR 300 radio, instructing him to cross and establish a base for us. I hurried back to bring SGT Parker and CPL Heesch and their two ISF platoons down to cross the river. By the time I had done this, CPT Hoe radioed that he had crossed with elements of the 15th Regiment, 1st ROK Division and they were outside the compound of Kim Il-Sung in the city," recorded MAJ Jack Young.³⁴

The rest of TF INDIANHEAD extricated itself from the 1st Cavalry column to go north. MAJ Young found the crossing sites just before dark. It would be 20 October 1950 before the remainder of INDIANHEAD entered the city from the northeast as the 1st Cavalry came in from the southeast.³⁵ Thus, the ROKs and ISF get credit for being the first UN forces into the capital...the day before the 1st Cavalry.³⁶

"The ROKs had no plans to secure the North Korean capitol grounds which encompassed the palace of Kim Il Sung. SGT Parker split our ISF Koreans into two groups and we headed for the capitol grounds, securing police weapons found in abandoned stations. We moved right into the grounds, collected the civilian employees standing about to put them under guard, and then systematically searched the three main buildings. Inside the buildings it was dead quiet and they were rather ghostly. Parker and I each acquired a North Korean flag. There were two large busts in Kim's office: one of himself and the other of Stalin. On the wall along the stairs there was a 'much bigger than life' portrait of Kim Il Sung," said CPL Heesch.³⁷

Locating the whereabouts of American Prisoners of War (POW) was an additional TF INDIANHEAD mission. "After some questioning the civilian workers revealed that the American POWs had been moved the day before. When we asked about MG Dean, (MG William F. Dean, 24th ID commander, had gone missing in action in July 1950), they knew nothing. A third small building in the rear served as a commissary and was filled with booze, six crates of champagne, and cases of caviar and chocolate. It was in there that SGT Parker found six Browning 12-gauge semi-automatic shotguns," said CPL Carl Heesch. "Then, we started roaming around the city."³⁸

"MAJ Young had told us to look for MG Dean and the American POWs that had been moved north to P'yongyang when the Eighth Army broke out. They were allegedly held in a school in the capital. We did find the school and

"...The only evidence of POWs that remained was a blackboard in one of the class rooms that still had a list of American names in chalk..."

— SGT Emmett V. Parker

a caretaker confirmed that the POWs had been held there, but they had been put on railcars a few days prior going north. The only evidence of POWs that remained was a blackboard in one of the class rooms that still had a list of American names in chalk. We

traced the route supposedly used by the POWs but only found a couple of American GIs and an Air Force pilot who had slipped away during the night movement and an elderly sick American priest who had been abandoned because he could not keep up," said SGT Emmett Parker.³⁹

"That's when we found out that the Korean Police had seven to ten Russians in custody. Parker and I headed for the Russian Embassy with its horseshoe driveway out front. We found a six foot tall, blond, blue-eyed, well-dressed diplomat and his wife and bodyguard among several others in partial Soviet uniforms. We put five of them under guard in Kim's air raid shelter that had a barber chair, music room with an organ, and a large liquor stash. We locked the last two in a wooden water tower behind the buildings," stated CPL Heesch.⁴⁰ "Before we crossed the river MAJ Young told us to grab and hide any Russians that we found. CPT Hoe posted guards and CPL Heesch and I took turns checking the guard posts all night," remembered SGT Parker.⁴¹

“When the rest of TF INDIANHEAD showed up the next morning, we told LTC Foster and MAJ Young about our captive Russians. Foster immediately asked us whom we had told. ‘No one’ was our reply. All I know is that at 3:00 a.m. the next morning, we loaded them into a fully-canvassed 2 ½ ton and took them to the P’yongyang airfield. When a blacked-out C-47 landed about 4:00 a.m., we put the seven onboard and the plane allegedly flew straight back to Tokyo,” recounted Heesch.⁴² Boxes of Russian war bonds, propaganda, North Korean documents, and orders were catalogued and air transported to Tokyo daily.⁴³ The seized paperwork included numerous letters in which Mao Tse-tung promised Kim Il-Sung military aid and support for his invasion of South Korea. Some were dated as early as late 1948.⁴⁴



Life magazine photo journalist Howard Sochurek took this picture of Kim Il-Sung’s camouflaged palace with ROK soldiers and truck in front.

Life magazine photo-journalist Howard Sochurek reported: “The evidence of Russian advisement and direction is everywhere in P’yongyang. Proof of the fact that Russian troops not only advised at a high level in the North Korean command is the Russian graveyard at Song Sin Lee. Here, 668 numbered graves, many still newly topped with now browned flower and wreath displays, mark the Russian war losses. There is the grave of the Russian adviser to Chief of Staff Kang Keun. Graves topped by miniature concrete obelisks and red stars mark the burial place of six Russian instructor pilots killed by a bomb at P’yongyang airport on 29 June 1950. There are also graves of Russian anti-aircraft crewmen killed while manning Russian-built AAA guns at the airfield.”⁴⁵



Life photographer Howard Sochurek captured this evidence of Soviet propaganda and influence in P’yongyang.



The arrival of the TF INDIANHEAD vehicles enabled the ISF to expand its search of the city and begin regular patrols. “We checked out the hospitals and collected up weapons while 2nd ID engineers dynamited government and bank vaults. North of the city I discovered an abandoned string of boxcars. That’s where I found the South Korean *won* money plates (stolen from Seoul earlier in the war). One of our ISF patrols helping the 6th ROK Division search for the American POWs was ‘captured’ by the 187th Airborne near Sunch’on. Being mistaken for the enemy was the reason why Major Young never traveled without one of us ‘Americans,’” laughed Parker.⁴⁶ Twenty-plus American POWs managed to survive the Sunch’on-Myongucham massacres. After being examined and treated at the 8036th MASH on P’yongyang airfield (K-23), they were flown to Japan before returning home to the United States.⁴⁷



LTC Ralph L. Foster, the TF INDIANHEAD commander, sits at Kim Il-Sung’s desk in the Communist leader’s palace.

MG Hobart A. Gay established 1st Cavalry headquarters in the granite buildings of the North Korean Military



North Korean B-29 Cigarette pack, NKPA armband, and North Korea military shoulder boards found by CPL L. Carl Heesch, ISF, in Kim Il-Sung's palace in P'yongyang.



COL Marcel B. Crombez, 5th Cavalry Regiment Commander and 1st Cavalry Division Civil Affairs Officer.



Russian "Jeep" captured by ISF vicinity of Naktong.



ISF Korean drivers paint a captured Russian-made Studebaker military truck.

Academy, ten miles southwest of P'yongyang on the Chinnamp'o road. He was responsible for the internal security and order of P'yongyang after its capture. On 23 October, MG Gay appointed COL Marcel B. Crombez, 5th Cavalry Regiment commander, to be his Civil Affairs officer because of the latter's post-WWII service in Korea. His regiment was disposed in the southern outskirts of P'yongyang. The 8th Cavalry Regiment was in the northern suburbs, and the 7th Cavalry Regiment had been dispatched to Chinnamp'o on 22 October.⁴⁸

"I was sent down to Chinnamp'o with 15 to 20 of our ISF Korean soldiers to determine the feasibility of getting prisoners out of the port. While down there we confiscated three truckloads of milled rice which Major Young sold to the ROKs so we could pay our Koreans. While I was at the port, SGT Parker found a stash of American cars, tires, and parts in P'yongyang. He presented a 1950 Chrysler sedan to MAJ Young to serve as his 'command car.' By then, we had accumulated more Russian vehicles to add to the Jeep and truck that we acquired at Naktong and a 1930's Model A Ford panel truck ambulance," chuckled Heesch.⁴⁹ "We painted over the Red Cross markings and used it to transport our six female nurses, but it was also used for prisoner interrogations," remembered SGT Parker. Another chance encounter paid big dividends.

"We were driving down the road one day when Kim Tae-nae, our linguistics professor interpreter, pointed out that a Korean elder in traditional dress was actually a military officer. His posture was too erect. We turned around quickly. I got out, grabbed him, and put him in the Jeep. But, instead of him being treated like a POW, the intrepid major recognized him from his WWII service with the Nationalist Army in China. It turned out that Colonel Lin, the commander of the 94th *Independent Chinese Volunteer Regiment*, wanted to surrender and agreed to work for Jack Young. Realizing how valuable Lin was, Major Young quietly "accepted his surrender" and hired him as another



Chinnamp'o, some forty miles southwest of the capital, P'yongyang, was the major western port for North Korea.

ISF interpreter. He spoke Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Russian. Mr. Lin later became a platoon leader and then commanded the ISF attack company. It was a strange way to handle a captured enemy officer, but that was typical for Major Young," said SGT Parker, the senior ISF sergeant.⁵⁰

2LT John Fox, 38th Infantry, TF INDIANHEAD explained: "I was overwhelmed by the stacks of propaganda magazines in the post office. They were all in Korean, but many of them were filled with pictures, often in color, depicting scenes and telling stories which were easy to understand. One thing came across loud and clear. The pictures were all chosen to show Communism at its best. Here for the first time, as I paged through the magazines, I began to realize the enormous value and effectiveness of propaganda as a political tool and the extent to which it had been and was being used by the Communist Party of North Korea. As luck would have it, one of the teams found a well-stocked brewery in their sector with more than enough booze to go around. There was no scotch or bourbon, but all six exploitation teams were supplied with all the vodka they could cart away."⁵¹ The Ivanhoe Security Force, slow to discover the brewery,



ISF female interrogator, Lee Sun Duk, was called "Calamity Jane" by the Americans.

found that the hard liquor was long gone.

"The 1st Cav was securing a brewery. MAJ Young persuaded them to share their beer. We carried it off in five-gallon 'Jerry' cans. The NKPA prisoners were initially assembled on an athletic/parade field by Kim's palace, but when the ISF moved to the Military Academy, the 1st Cavalry MPs had a transfer facility down there," said CPL Heesch.⁵² "The Military Academy had a large parade field (fifteen to twenty acres) with a reviewing stand and practical exercise classrooms with sand tables to depict battles and work out tactical problems," remembered 2LT Fox, 38th Infantry, TF INDIANHEAD.⁵³ ISF, 2nd Infantry CIC agents, and 1st Cavalry MPs conducted interrogations of the POWs to collect tactical intelligence.

"One of our female interrogators, Lee Sun Duk, called 'Calamity Jane' by us, spoke Chinese, Korean, and Japanese. She

worked with the 2nd ID CIC agents and the 1st Cav MPs. Asian male prisoners 'lost considerable face' when delivered naked to a female interrogator. Calamity pulled no punches and got results. After interrogation the prisoners were shipped south by train. That was one reason why I was sent down to Chinnamp'o earlier. Almost ten thousand POWs were collected in and around the capital," reported CPL Heesch.⁵⁴

"Calamity also arranged to hire tailors to make all ISF personnel two winter uniforms and greatcoats from Russian cloth found at the academy. The heavy wool overcoats were green with white linings. Worn reversed they provided excellent camouflage in the snow. We even had fur pile caps made," commented Heesch.⁵⁵ MAJ Young and the ISF worked closely with the Civil Affairs personnel of the 1st Cavalry Division and then the UN Civil Assistance team assigned to P'yongyang.

To provide some law and order in the North Korean capital, a UN-supported police force had to be formed, trained, and posted throughout P'yongyang. The UN Civil Assistance team for the Communist capital was led by COL Charles R. Munske. He had to downplay the unification rhetoric of South Korea's President Syngman Rhee

because it was contrary to UN resolutions. "MAJ Young and CPT Goodman, the 2nd MP Company commander (a former WWII POW of the Japanese) trained the first two groups of North Korean police for COL Munske, the official military governor for Pyongdan-Namdo Province. We 'graduated' a hundred and twenty, armed them with Japanese weapons, and had them posted in the city by the time President Rhee got to town," said Heesch.⁵⁶ However, the massive political rallies staged by Rhee in P'yongyang and Wonsan raised major concerns in Washington and New York.⁵⁷

TF INDIANHEAD, facing no opposition, was able to concentrate on collecting and recording the Communist documents found in the city. They did capture the two radio stations which had been rendered inoperable by the North Korean military before they withdrew. On 25 October 1950, having completed all assigned missions, TF INDIANHEAD, minus ISF, returned to division and all elements reverted back to their parent units.⁵⁸ Ivanhoe Security Force remained in the

"...Asian male prisoners 'lost considerable face' when delivered naked to a female interrogator. Calamity pulled no punches and got results..."

— CPL L. Carl Heesch

Communist capital several days longer to train more police for COL Munske and help rebuild one fire truck from three wrecks.⁵⁹ The ISF was in P'yongyang when the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) hit the 1st Cavalry Division.

In three days (1-3 November 1950) the 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, near Ansong was effectively destroyed by the Chinese. Very strong, determined CCF regiments launched furious attacks that separated the battalion units. Then, they systematically destroyed the companies piecemeal. Artillery batteries in transit on roads and rifle companies in foxholes found themselves under devastating small arms, machine gun, mortar, and rocket fire.⁶⁰ After the CCF delivered this ferocious warning by fire to the Americans in early November 1950, there was an enigmatic lull in the fighting which furthered doubts about Chinese intervention. It was another three weeks before a multi-front Chinese assault was delivered with maximum force against the U.S. and ROK divisions that resumed the EUSA offensive.⁶¹ The sidebar reveals how powerful the Chinese warning was in early November 1950.

On 4 November a Chinese POW revealed that fifty thousand CCF troops had crossed the Yalu River into Korea. But, to add confusion and foster more disbelief,



MAJ Jack Young (center) questions NKPA POW in P'yongyang.



COL Charles R. Munske, UN Civil Assistance Team commander for P'yongyang, was really the military governor of the Communist capital.



NKPA POWs were initially brought to the ceremonial field below Kim Il-Sung's government office building in P'yongyang.



The Ivanhoe Security Force trained a P'yongyang police force for COL Charles Munske and the UN Civil Assistance Command.

The CCF Warning, November 1950

“The word of B Company’s successful expulsion of the first blow, a two hundred man effort, had barely reached battalion headquarters before the Communists attacked in earnest. Rockets fired in succession from multiple mass launchers hammered down in a staccato pattern while mortar concentrations fell on the 1st Battalion positions. Then, enemy hordes appeared almost at arm’s length behind their perilously close high trajectory fire. The Reds seemed heedless to their heavy losses. Those attackers that survived their own barrages and the withering fire of the defenders broke into B and C Companies and then charged down a ridge to hit the 3rd Battalion CP in the valley below. As more and more Chinese stormed through the broken defenses, the growing enemy pocket in the 8th Cavalry rear got organized and quickly cut the road to the 5th Regiment. As this was happening, two more Red attacks, equally as strong as those required for the breakthrough, smashed into E and G Companies, 8th Cav and A, B, and C Company of 5th Cav after heavy rocket and mortar barrages. Huge masses of enemy infantry hurled themselves against the American positions. E and G Companies, 8th Cav pulled back to avoid penetration. B and C Companies were surrounded by



8th Cavalry
Regiment DUI




5th Cavalry
Regiment DUI

1st Cavalry
Division SSI

the enemy while A Company had been isolated from the rest of 1st Battalion, 5th Cav. The Chinese turned abandoned 81 mm mortars on the American troops. Receiving fire from all sides, all semblance of a perimeter defense was gone and American dead covered the ground. Those not seriously wounded fought independently. Every position became a separate battlefield. Identification became impossible because the Reds were everywhere and using American weapons. Familiar characteristic gunfire sounds that normally signaled friendly rally points were lost. The noise of battle was deafening as mortar rounds and rockets crashed down in the midst of the close quarters fighting. The screaming of the Chinese in response to bugle calls and whistles added to the din. Organized withdrawal became virtually impossible with the enemy all around.”⁶²



Ivanhoe Security Force leadership. Americans in front row L to R: SGT Emmett Parker, CPL Joseph Howard, Korean, MAJ Jack Young (center), CPL L. Carl Heesch, Korean, CPL “Moose” Thompson with Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR).



This CCF movement direction marker scratched into a rock could not be seen from the air.

the Chinese began disengaging all along the line the next day. When the cold weather came in earnest on 10 November, a lot of troops were caught without winter clothing. Though priority of issue went to the front-line troops, there was not nearly enough to go around. Frigid wind chill and frostbite compounded their misery. Thus,

by the time all 2nd Infantry units had reverted back to division control to prepare for the resumption of the EUSA offensive, reports were prevalent that large Chinese forces had already massed above and below the 2nd ID command post.⁶³ The Ivanhoe Security Force had captured several Chinese soldiers and provided many of those reports.



The assembled Ivanhoe Security Force with its American military cadre seated in the front row: 4th from left CPL Joseph Howard, 5th from left SGT Emmett Parker, 7th from left MAJ Jack Young, 9th from left CPL L. Carl Heesch, 12th from left CPL "Moose" Thompson.



Typical assembly area in and around 2nd ID forward command post.



MG Laurence B. Keiser, CG, 2nd Infantry Division.

The Communist Chinese were employing an old mobile defense strategy to counter a superior force. The doctrine was not built around holding key terrain, but in destroying enemy forces with violent, brief actions. The underlying strategy was to invite attack by conducting delaying actions. When the attackers, moving in an offensive formation, had penetrated deep, the CCF would launch a massive counterattack where and when the enemy was least prepared to deal with the assault... normally at night after a long day's march.⁶⁴

Since the Chinese had infiltrated the preponderance of its forces well behind screening units, patrols from EUSA in the east and from X Corps in the west had only encountered outposts after mid-November. A combination of superb fieldcraft and camouflage, non-use of radios, movement after dark, no vehicles, and a lack of supply dumps blinded Far East Command (FECOM), EUSA, and X Corps commanders as to CCF intentions and locations.⁶⁵ Showing little knowledge of Chinese military strategy, UN leaders had assumed that the light contact after early November meant that the CCF intervention was small scale because the

CPL Carl Heesch, ISF, wearing his reversible Russian greatcoat and holding the "requisitioned" chickens lost to the Communist Chinese later that evening near Kunu-ri.

Chinese had voluntarily withdrawn north into static defenses. With unwarranted optimism, both EUSA and X Corps began attacking north towards the Yalu River on 24 November.⁶⁶

This optimism was not held by LTC Ralph Foster, the 2nd ID G-2 and ex-TF INDIANHEAD commander. The Ivanhoe Security Force had captured and interrogated numerous CCF soldiers in November and his anxiety had grown daily. MG "Dutch" Keiser did not share the fears of his G-2. It was only a matter





After darkness Chinese soldiers boldly stabbed rifle bayonets through the seat slats of the American 2 ½ truck beds as the 2nd Infantry Division ran the seven mile long “gauntlet” of fire ambushes south of Kunu-ri, North Korea, 30 November 1950. (Illustration by Mariano Santillan)

of time before something terrible happened.⁶⁷

All hell broke loose the night of 25 November. Three CCF regiments slammed into the offensive-oriented 2nd ID infantry regiments. Simultaneously the major Chinese force hit the II ROK Corps on the 2nd Infantry’s right causing withdrawals the next morning that exposed that flank. While the division staff struggled to close gaps, regroup, and pull exposed units back, the attacks continued. After battalion command posts (CPs) were overrun, the 9th Infantry Regiment began pulling back with heavy losses of personnel and equipment.⁶⁸

Radio communications broke down and the extraordinary intensity of the enemy attacks stunned 2nd Infantry commanders from division to platoon who struggled to rouse and organize tired troops to meet a major threat. Along the length of the Ch’ong ch’on River valley, American soldiers in sleeping bags were awakened by a terrifying cacophony of bugles, drums, rattles, and whistles that was quickly followed by a heavy volume of small arms fire and grenades, and then waves of screaming Chinese Communists flooding at them. Again and again, Chinese assault elements smashed through ill-prepared front line perimeters and broke into vehicle parks, rear areas, and CPs after overrunning infantry and artillery gun positions.⁶⁹

CPL Carl Heesch, Ivanhoe Security Force, recalled: “We were positioned on the left forward flank of the 38th Infantry and the right flank of the 9th Infantry. Having just gotten my mail from my old unit, G Company, 38th Infantry, I was trying to figure out where to hide three small chickens that I had ‘requisitioned’ for the next day’s meal. While I was doing that, we were hit very hard by hordes of Chinese—they came fast-stepping down the road like they were passing in review. It seemed like thousands of them. First, we engaged the Chinese columns as they came by. Then, we broke contact to avoid being surrounded. It was a running gunfight until we pulled back to a point about a half mile from the pass at Kunu-ri, which was just

“...we were hit very hard by hordes of Chinese... It seemed like thousands of them... It was a running gunfight until we pulled back to a point about a half mile from the pass at Kunu-ri...”

— CPL L. Carl Heesch

south of the road junction and the Division CP. They must have gotten my chickens,” regretted Heesch.⁷⁰ As IX Corps units pulled back across the partially frozen Ch’ong ch’on River, the CCF again struck hard, causing the three-division ROK II Corps to collapse and fall back in disorder, leaving guns, vehicles, and equipment behind.⁷¹

As the haggard remains of units moved exhausted into their new positions they found the enemy already upon them. The frozen ground prevented digging in even if there had been time, so there was little cover and no concealment. The 2nd Division CP came under small arms fire on the 29th and it displaced for the third time in nineteen hours, six miles south of Kunu-ri. Communications were lost with the regiments. Unbeknownst to EUSA and IX Corps, the CCF had committed eighteen divisions to their offensive.⁷² At 1630 hours, MG Keiser relayed a message to IX Corps for help: “Serious roadblock [*in reality, a series of fire block/ambushes*] to South. Estimate enemy battalion or more [*woefully inaccurate*]. Air strikes, artillery and infantry company attacks have failed. Road jammed with vehicles prevents movement North or South. Request immediate assistance from the South to relieve situation [*not realizing that he was surrounded*]. Please notify action taken as all infantry elements definitely [*decisively would have been more accurate*] engaged.”⁷³ A CCF fireblock consisted of men firing small arms and automatic weapons from dug-in positions on both sides of the road. There were no physical roadblocks on the road itself, but the Chinese were reinforcing the defensive fighting positions by directing highly accurate mortar and heavy machine gun fire on the road separating them.⁷⁴

During the night of 29-30 November an attack on the 2nd ID command post was repulsed by ISF and other division elements.⁷⁵ 1LT Chew-Mon Lee, H Company,



9th Infantry Regiment, succeeded in rallying his unit after his company commander was killed at Kunu-ri. The unit had suffered heavy casualties during several enemy human wave assaults, but they managed to repel all attacks. LT Lee led a successful counterattack against an enemy sniper and he climbed atop a tank to man its .50 cal machinegun and direct tank fire on the enemy to break up another attack. A badly wounded LT Lee was lying on a stretcher beside the road, covered by a padded Chinese jacket when he called out to MAJ Young nearby, "Please, help me. I'm an American." Young recognized the Chinese-American lieutenant and loaded him aboard a vehicle that carried him to safety. LT Lee was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC) for extraordinary heroism.⁷⁶

By then the situation was desperate. By noon the haggard remains of the division, minus the 23rd Infantry were fighting near the Division CP or attacking the *fireblocks*. Sniper fire was harassing soldiers in assembly areas when the Division moved out to run the "roadblocks." The 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion and A Battery, 503rd Field Artillery, firing its 155 mm howitzers point blank, covered the withdrawal.⁷⁷

The lead vehicles had moved less than a mile when heavy enemy fire from both sides of the road halted the column. Men riding in the trucks fired their weapons at the Chinese as they swarmed down from the hills. Burning, disabled trucks halted progress until they were pushed aside by tanks in the column. The CCF fired mortars, machineguns, and small arms to create a seven-mile systematic *fire ambush* or *fireblock*. Airstrikes along the ridges flanking the single lane road in a defile provided some relief for the column.⁷⁸ "The accuracy of the Chinese and North Korean mortars was phenomenal," said CPL Joe Howard, ISF.⁷⁹

Committed, the division had no choice but to press forward. Automatic weapons fire at point blank range tore through the packed trucks. Dead either fell off or got pushed overboard from the trucks. Wounded were held aboard by others. Displaced passengers sought shelter in ditches and then tried to clamber aboard anything moving. Some headed off towards the hills, hoping to evade the enemy and walk to safety. Unit cohesion collapsed. Command and control by division was nonexistent.⁸⁰ The 2nd Infantry Division's senior leadership appeared to be in a daze, paralyzed by the intensity and size of the CCF.

Map shows the seven mile long "gauntlet of *fire ambushes*" on the road going south from Kunu-ri, where the 2nd Recon Company was stopped, where ISF CPL Heesch ran his Jeep into that of BG Joseph S. Bradley, the 2nd ID Artillery commander, and the combat patrol route of the Ivanhoe Security Force to clear the left flank of the convoy; Map depicts the routes of the ISF combat patrols sent forward to clear the *fire blocks* on the left flank of the column and escape routes. The CCF (red) positioned their mortars and heavy machineguns behind the infantry positions on the left side of the road to strengthen the *fireblock* positions on both sides of the road with accurate indirect fire and to extend the weapons fire fan coverage.





All that remained after those fateful days when the 2nd Infantry Division ran the “gauntlet” of fire blocks at Kunu-ri were those abandoned and destroyed vehicles that the Chinese could not “cannibalize.”

Despite having fought the Chinese almost five days, the intelligence picture was pathetic.⁸¹

“Since we had to bolt when the Chinese smashed into the 9th Infantry, our food supplies got left behind. Just before the column got halted, I spotted a house about a half mile away on the right. When we had worked the area before, MAJ Young had us bury some C-rations under the fire hearth. Despite the enemy gunfire all around I made a beeline for the house in my Jeep, parking it nose out. We all ran inside and started digging for those rations. Just when we started to leave, Chinese appeared at the open windows and began firing inside. We grabbed the cases of C-rations and jumped into our Jeep, escaping in a cloud of dust. Miraculously, none of us were hit. Then, I heard someone yelling ‘Parker, Parker! Wait! Wait!’ I turned to look over my shoulder and saw Mr. Lin running full tilt after us. I slowed down just long enough to pull him aboard, and raced off,” related SGT Parker. “It was one of those crazy things you do in war, but we were really hungry.”⁸² When the sergeant passed out the rations among the ISF, he was the hero of the moment when things were looking really bad for the 2nd ID.

With his command Jeep disabled, MG Keiser had begun fighting like a rifleman, engaging the enemy with his M1903 Springfield rifle and urging his men forward. The rear of the 2nd ID column, composed of towed artillery pieces and anti-aircraft assets, was particularly hard hit, but the half-track-mounted quad-fifties and twin 40 mms were life savers, keeping the Chinese at bay. Still, they were not enough to break the *fire ambushes*. They had to be counter-attacked to relieve the pressure in the “gauntlet.”

“After CPT Kydland was badly wounded, the 2nd Recon Company attempt to clear the flanks of the ‘gauntlet’ ground to a halt. MG Keiser ordered MAJ Young to attack along the left flank with the Ivanhoe Security Force. The ISF consisted of a half-dozen Americans, about 120 Korean troops, and a few attached Turkish

stragglers. The major organized us into two large combat patrols to clear the left flank south to the pass. SGT Parker, CPL Parsons and I, along with CPT Underwood, were to lead the first group along the higher east side ridge while MAJ Young, SGT ‘Moose’ Thompson, and CPL Joe Howard trailed behind us in a second group. They were following a lower finger that paralleled the left side of the road. Though we couldn’t see each other, we both had clear views of the road from our positions. As I approached the first crest, I dropped down and belly-crawled up. What I saw was enough to ruin one’s perfectly new underwear. Stretched out below me were more Chinese than I had seen in eighteen months in Shanghai! Everyone was busy setting up mortars and crew-served weapons or digging in.

They had to know we were near, but they were simply ignoring us. Their weapons were spread as far as we could see,” said CPL Carl Heesch.⁸³

“Just as we got ready to engage them, an MP lieutenant down below in the rice paddy, shouted to clear the hill because an air strike was coming in,” said CPL Heesch. “As I glanced skyward I saw the planes were already lined up to make their runs. The warning shout also got the attention of some Chinese hiding behind us in some scrub bushes that we had walked right by. Needless to say, we bailed out immediately. Some took off straight down the hill towards a tank providing covering fire. The rest ran back north down another finger. SGT Parker, Parsons and I ran towards the tank at the base of the hill as some Chinese troops, twenty meters away, began moving towards us. The strafing runs and the napalm just made them increase their fire. My rifle got hit and would not work. Parker gave me his .45 pistol because his M1 with sniper scope was still good. By then the sun had gone down behind the hill. We were hiding in some brush. Then, the tank started backing up to get away from the mortar fire. The Chinese were almost on us. It was obvious that we were going to be KIA or POWs if we didn’t make a break for that tank. On the count of ‘Three,’ we all were going to make a run for the tank about 150 meters away. As I jumped up and began running, I noticed that I was so close to a startled Chinese soldier that I could have shook hands with him!” stated CPL Heesch.⁸⁴

“I ran for my life, zig-zagging and high stepping as bullets, buzzing like bees, zipped by my head. As I jumped for cover behind the tank, I noticed that I was alone. I looked around the tank track and saw neither of my comrades in the open. I grabbed the tank intercom and asked if they could see anyone. A crewman said that I was the only one who made it. A thought occurred to me that maybe they had stopped or fallen in the ditch, so I asked the tankers to cover me with fire so I

could go back and check on them. But, the mortar fire had bracketed the tank again and they had to pull back or risk losing the tank and crew. When we reached the bridge I discovered MAJ Young and some of his patrol down in a ditch," said Heesch.⁸⁵

"I told MAJ Young what happened and told him we had to go back and get our guys. The major said it was impossible. We had to assemble on the right side of the road. After that night's staff meeting at the Division CP, I learned that we were going to run the 'gauntlet' again the next morning," remembered CPL Heesch.⁸⁶

"The ISF was to join the column behind BG Joseph S. Bradley [the Division Artillery commander]. I was to drive, MAJ Young was in the right passenger seat, and CPL Joe Howard was to ride 'shotgun' in the back seat. In the midst of the ear-piercing noise [of enemy small arms & mortar fire nearby], and chokingly thick dust, I re-entered the stopped general's Jeep. It put ours out of action. As I sputtered an apology, the general said, 'For *!#!*! sake, forget the Jeep. Get it off the road so we can keep moving!'" said Heesch.⁸⁷

"We did just that and then the three of us ran to catch up with BG Bradley, Joe Howard on one side and me on the other. He walked upright and straight with bullets flying all around, as if passing in review. He never flinched, ducked, or broke step except to talk with and encourage the soldiers. Howard and I scrambled to pick up wounded and load them aboard any vehicle we could find. When we caught up to MG Keiser, we continued our task, protecting the generals by firing on Chinese attackers that got too close until MAJ Young and Joe Howard were wounded," remembered Heesch. "SGT 'Moose' Thompson was shot in the neck by a sniper when he ran to pick up a combat photographer's camera that he had dropped. We loaded the dead Thompson on a truck and kept moving."⁸⁸

"MAJ Young and CPL Howard finally gave up trying to ride aboard a tank; it was too uncomfortable. The major was 'butt shot' and Howard had a leg wound. I dog-trotted and the two of them hobbled along until dusk when we reached the first British tank. The 2nd ID salute given the Brits was a raised middle finger. Our American KIAs were Parsons and Thompson; Parker was MIA," recounted Heesch.⁸⁹

By the time the 2d Infantry Division fought its way to safety on 1 December, it had lost a third of its troops (five thousand officers and men), sixty-four pieces of artillery, hundreds of trucks and tractors, almost all engineer equipment, and much of its signal equipment. The Indianhead Division was rated "combat ineffective."⁹⁰ MG Keiser continued to move what remained of his command towards Chunghwa, south of P'yongyang.⁹¹

Thus, the Ivanhoe Security Force, a specially-trained, lightly-armed *ad hoc* indigenous long-range patrol and counter guerrilla unit created to combat enemy infiltrations, keep supply routes open, collect intelligence, and to protect the division CP, like the GHQ Raider and the Ranger companies in Korea, was employed as conventional

light infantry in desperation. Unfortunately for this predominantly Korean element, these "friendly indigenous" were often mistaken for enemy by U.S. ground and allied air forces. While the fighting in the Kunu-ri area devastated the 2nd Infantry Division, rendering it combat ineffective, the combat-depleted ISF would be expanded and employed as an independent light infantry battalion that specialized in counter guerrilla missions. It was the effective employment of the ISF South Koreans against the North Korean and Chinese Communist Forces that made them invaluable to 2nd Infantry Division in the Korean War.

EPILOGUE-IVANHOE SECURITY FORCE

By the end of January 1951, the Ivanhoe Security Force had been reconstituted. There were twenty-five Americans assigned to lead eight hundred KATUSAs and one hundred Korean Service Corps troops. The Force was organized into a Combat Company, a Security Company, and a Headquarters and Service Company. Radios were manned twenty-four hours a day. The unit was wired into the Korean Police telephone network. ISF became a tactical intelligence unit for 2nd ID, tracking road and bridge conditions, capturing enemy prisoners, conducting prisoner and refugee interrogations, and supporting "line crosser" operations until the end of the war.⁹² On 16 May 1951 as part of Task Force ZEBRA, the 35th ROK Regiment at Oron-ni and the ISF in a nearby blocking position on Hill 625 were both overrun. The 23rd Infantry Regiment assumed the TF ZEBRA mission and control of the Ivanhoe Security Force.⁹³ When ISF was reconstituted again, Lieutenant William H. Cole and several sergeants from 1st Ranger Infantry Company (Airborne) spent a week in July 1951 training them in the care and handling of Soviet, Chinese, and Japanese weapons.⁹⁴

EPILOGUE II- SGT EMMETT V. PARKER, ISF, MIA

SGT Emmett V. Parker was taken prisoner at daybreak 30 November. Wounded and unconscious, Parker had lain on the battlefield overnight. He was jolted awake by excruciating pain in his left hand as a Chinese soldier tried to cut a finger off with a bayonet in order to free his gold wedding band. Parker's scream caused the enemy soldier to jump back, giving him just enough time to pull the ring free and hold it out for his life. As he sat up the American sergeant noticed CPL Parsons lying dead nearby and realized that his own rifle, web belt and ammunition, and dog tags were gone.⁹⁵

Mrs. Edi Guliana Pressello Parker, Route #3, O'Donnell, Texas, was notified on 3 and 9 January 1951 that her husband, Sergeant Emmett V. Parker, missing in action on 29 November 1950, was actually killed in action on that date. By then, SGT Parker and a Turk were prisoners of war; first of the North Koreans, and then the Communist Chinese. He joined sixteen other American and British sergeants, branded as "Reactionaries," to be isolated totally apart from all other UN POWs at Camp 2. The "Reactionaries" would be held until Allied

negotiators, having learned that some POWs had been separated from the others, demanded their immediate release. On 2 September 1953, seventeen “Reactionary” survivors were turned over to UN officials. They became the final helicopter lift of Operation BIG SWITCH.⁹⁶

It would be almost twenty years later that two soldiers, then first sergeants supervising police call at the Presidio of Monterey, California, would bump into one another again. First Sergeant (1SG) Carl Heesch could not believe his eyes as he recognized that 1SG Emmett Parker, Ivanhoe Security Force, MIA 29 November 1950, presumed dead, was actually alive...and like himself, still in the Army! ♣

Charles H. Briscoe has been the USASOC Command Historian since 2000. A graduate of The Citadel, this retired Army special operations officer earned his PhD from the University of South Carolina. Current research interests include Army special operations during the Korean War, in El Salvador, and the Lodge Act.

Endnotes

- 1 LT Clark C. Munroe, *Second United States Infantry Division in Korea, 1950-1951* and “2nd Infantry Division during the Korean War: Battle Indoctrination,” <http://www.2id.org/indoctrination.htm> dated 16 March 2010.
- 2 Retired Colonel Jack T. Young, unpublished “History of Ivanhoe Security Force,” excerpts furnished by June Young, 4 April 2006, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Young, “History of ISF.”
- 3 Joseph C. Howard, Korean War Veterans Survey. Archives Building 950, Bay 5, Row 159, Face G, Shelf 7, Box 207, Folder 197 Restricted Circulation. U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Howard survey.
- 4 Munroe, *Second United States Infantry Division in Korea, 1950-1951* (Tokyo: Toppan Printing Co., 1950) and “2nd Infantry Division during the Korean War: Battle Indoctrination,” <http://www.2id.org/indoctrination.htm> dated 16 March 2010.
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- 8 Munroe, *Second United States Infantry Division in Korea, 1950-1951* and “The 2nd Infantry Division during the Korean War: Terrain Sketch – Naktong River,” <http://www.2id.org/naktongriver.htm> dated 16 March 2010.
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- 11 Department of Defense. DD Form 214: Armed Forces of the United States Report of Transfer or Discharge for USAR COL Jack Theodore Young, AGC, dated 31 May 1968 and June B. Young, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 4 April 2006, Ft Bragg, NC, digital recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date.
- 12 Retired 1SG Emmett V. Parker, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 30 January 2006, Ft Bragg, NC, tape recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date, Stan Swinton, “S.F. Officer’s Private Army Winning Own War in Korea,” *San Francisco Examiner*, 23 September 1950 and Michael Kiefer, *Chasing the Panda* (NY: Four Walls Four Windows, 2002), 185-186.
- 13 Parker interview, 30 January 2006 and Kiefer, *Chasing the Panda*, 185-186.
- 14 Parker interview, 30 January 2006 and Kiefer, *Chasing the Panda*, 185-186.
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- 18 Parker interviews, 22 July 2005 and 30 January 2006.
- 19 Munroe, *Second United States Infantry Division in Korea, 1950-1951* and “The 2nd Infantry Division during the Korean War: Terrain Sketch – Naktong River,” <http://www.2id.org/naktongriver.htm> dated 16 March 2010.
- 20 Young, “History of ISF.”
- 21 Munroe, *Second United States Infantry Division in Korea, 1950-1951* and “The 2nd Infantry Division during the Korean War: Terrain Sketch – Naktong River,” <http://www.2id.org/naktongriver.htm> dated 16 March 2010.
- 22 Swinton, “S.F. Officer’s Private Army Winning Own War in Korea.”
- 23 Howard survey. **CPL Joseph Howard was awarded the Silver Star and Purple Heart for his valorous actions at Kunu-ri. The badly wounded corporal spent 41 months in military hospitals.**
- 24 Munroe, *Second United States Infantry Division in Korea, 1950-1951* and “The 2nd Infantry Division during the Korean War: Terrain Sketch – Naktong River,” <http://www.2id.org/naktongriver.htm> dated 16 March 2010.
- 25 Munroe, *Second United States Infantry Division in Korea, 1950-1951* and “2nd Infantry Division in the Korean War: Breakout,” <http://www.2id.org/breakout.htm> dated 16 March 2010.
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- 30 Retired MSG L. Carl Heesch, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 15 December 2005, Ft Bragg, NC, digital recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC., hereafter cited by name and date.
- 31 Retired Colonel John E. Fox, unpublished memoirs courtesy of L. Carl Heesch, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. **In Korea, LT John E. Fox was wounded twice and was awarded two Silver Stars and a Bronze Star for Valor** from <http://www.usma1950.com/1950/memorials/FoxJE.html> dated 29 March 2010.
- 32 Young, “History of ISF” and EUSAK, Office of the Commanding General letter 17 October 1950, SUBJECT: Special Task Force, TO: All Commanders of Eighth Army and Republic of Korea Troops, BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALKER and signed by MG Levin C. Allen, Chief of Staff.
- 33 Munroe, *Second United States Infantry Division in Korea, 1950-1951* and “2nd Infantry Division during the Korean War: Busy Interlude,” <http://www.2id.org/interlude.htm> dated 16 March 2010.
- 34 Young, “History of ISF.”
- 35 Heesch interview, 15 December 2005, Parker interview, 30 January 2006, and CPT Robert F. Doolin, Korea Military Assistance Group, “Language Problems,” in John C. Westover, *Combat Support in Korea* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1987), 221-222. **A frequent failing among ROK officers was their refusal to use a common language. Almost all senior Korean officers (majors and above) could speak Chinese and Japanese. Chinese was the sign of a good education. Consequently, an officer who understood Chinese would write his messages in that language and have them translated to Korean to be understood by the radio operators. At the other end the message was again rendered to Chinese before it was delivered.**
- 36 Parker interview, 22 July 2005, Heesch, “The Ivanhoe Security Force,” *The 2nd Infantry Bulletin* (July 2003), 13, *The First Team: The First Cavalry Division in Korea, 18 July 1950 – 18 January 1952* (Tokyo, Toppan Press, 1952). **“By nightfall (19 October 1950) the ROK 1st Division had captured the center of the city; the ROK 7th Division held Kim Il Sung University in the northern outskirts. Thus, with the help of Growdon’s (LTC John S. “Red” Growdon, 6th Tank Battalion, 24th ID) tanks, the ROKs ‘won’ the race for P’yongyang after all.”** Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-1953* (NY: Times Books, 1987), 357.
- 37 Heesch interviews, 15 December 2005 and 17 April 2006, Parker interview, 30 January 2006 and Fox memoirs.
- 38 Heesch interviews, 15 December 2005 and 17 April 2006, Parker, interview, 30 January 2006, and Fox memoirs.
- 39 Parker interview, 30 January 2006, Parker letter to Dr. Briscoe, 31 July 2005, and Charles H. Briscoe, “The Sunch’on/Myongucham Massacre” sidebar in “The UN Occupation of P’yongyang,” *Veritas*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 30-31.
- 40 Heesch interview, 15 December 2005, Parker interview, 30 January 2006, Parker letter, 31 July 2005, and Young, “History of ISF.”
- 41 Parker interview, 30 January 2006.

- 42 Heesch interview, 15 December 2005.
- 43 Heesch interview, 15 December 2005 and Parker interview, 30 January 2006.
- 44 Young, "History of ISF."
- 45 Unpublished Howard Sochurek dispatch to Don Burke, *Life* magazine, from Tokyo, 2 November 1950, courtesy of Mrs. Tanya Sochurek, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Sochurek dispatch with date.
- 46 Parker interview, 30 January 2006 and Parker letter dated 31 July 2005.
- 47 Briscoe, "The Sunch'on/Myongucham Massacre" sidebar in "The UN Occupation of P'yongyang," *Veritas*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 30-31. **The POWs had been housed in a P'yongyang school for about a week when they saw flares at night over the city. They knew that meant the UN forces were close by. The North Koreans quickly herded the prisoners out of the school house. At least a third of the prisoners were killed outright—the invalids. The rest were marched to a train and loaded aboard. They traveled only at night, hiding from UN aircraft in tunnels during the day. On the morning of 20 October, the steam engine was stoked to the maximum in the tunnel in an effort to asphyxiate the prisoners with smoke. When that effort proved too slow, the guards began taking groups of forty off the train to execute them with their machine guns.** Lloyd Kreider, "Into the Tunnel," in Rudy Tomedi, *No Bugles, No Drums: An Oral History of the Korean War* (NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1993), 57-59.
- 48 Roy E. Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June-November 1950)*, United States Army in the Korean War (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2000), 652-653.
- 49 Heesch interview, 15 December 2005 and Parker interview, 30 January 2006.
- 50 Parker interviews, 30 January 2006 and 22 March 2010 and Heesch interview, 17 April 2006.
- 51 Fox memoirs.
- 52 Heesch interview, 15 December 2005. **When the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (Rakasans) was ordered to P'yongyang on 23 October 1950 they had accumulated more than thirty-eight hundred prisoners of war.** Hoyt, *On to the Yalu*, 242-243.
- 53 Fox memoirs. **The Academy parade ground was also used as the 44th Ordnance Company's collection point for disabled vehicles, artillery, and tanks.** Roy E. Appleman, *Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2009, Second Printing), 327.
- 54 Heesch interview, 15 December 2005.
- 55 Heesch interview, 15 December 2005.
- 56 Heesch interview, 15 December 2005.
- 57 Briscoe, "The UN Occupation of P'yongyang," 21 and Heesch interview, 15 December 2005.
- 58 Munroe, *Second United States Infantry Division in Korea, 1950-1951* and "2nd Infantry Division during the Korean War: Busy Interlude," <http://www.2id.org/interlude.htm> dated 16 March 2010. **Two officers from the Psywar Division, G-2, EUSA, Seoul, MAJ Tom O. Matthews and CPT Max W. Dolcater, managed to get one radio station operational in P'yongyang. It was rendered inoperable when EUSA forces withdrew in December 1950.** Briscoe, "UN Occupation of P'yongyang," 34.
- 59 Parker interview, 30 January 2006 and Heesch interview, 15 December 2005.
- 60 Max Hastings, *The Korean War* (New York: Simon & Schuster Inc., 1987): 129-130, 137 and *The First Team: The First Cavalry Division in Korea, 18 July 1950 – 18 January 1952*.
- 61 Hastings, *The Korean War*, 129-130, 137, *The First Team: The First Cavalry Division in Korea, 18 July 1950 – 18 January 1952*.
- 62 *The First Team: The First Cavalry Division in Korea, 18 July 1950 – 18 January 1952*.
- 63 Munroe, *Second United States Infantry Division in Korea, 1950-1951* and "2nd Infantry Division during the Korean War: Busy Interlude," <http://www.2id.org/interlude.htm> dated 16 March 2010.
- 64 Mossman, *Ebb and Flow*, 59-60.
- 65 Hastings, *The Korean War*, 137.
- 66 Mossman, *Ebb and Flow*, 59-60.
- 67 Howard survey and David Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War* (NY: Hyperion, 2007), 398.
- 68 Munroe, *Second United States Infantry Division in Korea, 1950-1951* and "2nd Infantry Division during the Korean War: Busy Interlude," <http://www.2id.org/interlude.htm> dated 16 March 2010.
- 69 Hastings, *The Korean War*, 140.
- 70 Heesch, "The Ivanhoe Security Force," 13.
- 71 Hastings, *The Korean War*, 141.
- 72 Hastings, *The Korean War*, 141-142.
- 73 Munroe, *Second United States Infantry Division in Korea, 1950-1951* and "2nd Infantry Division during the Korean War: Busy Interlude," <http://www.2id.org/interlude.htm> dated 16 March 2010.
- 74 Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, 225.
- 75 Russell A. Gugeler, "Artillery at Kunu-ri," in *Combat Actions in Korea* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1987): 49.
- 76 Young, Munroe, *Second United States Infantry Division in Korea, 1950-1951*, and "2nd Infantry Division during the Korean War: Busy Interlude," <http://www.2id.org/interlude.htm> dated 16 March 2010.
- 77 Munroe, *Second United States Infantry Division in Korea, 1950-1951* and "2nd Infantry Division during the Korean War: Busy Interlude," <http://www.2id.org/interlude.htm> dated 16 March 2010.
- 78 Munroe, *Second United States Infantry Division in Korea, 1950-1951* and "2nd Infantry Division during the Korean War: Busy Interlude," <http://www.2id.org/interlude.htm> dated 16 March 2010.
- 79 Howard survey.
- 80 John Patrick Finnegan, *The U.S. Army in the Korean War, 1950-1953: Operations and Intelligence Support* (Fort Belvoir, VA: U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, May 2001): 18.
- 81 Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter*, 422-423.
- 82 Parker interview, 22 March 2010.
- 83 Parker interview, 22 July 2005 and Heesch, "The Ivanhoe Security Force," 13.
- 84 Parker interview, 22 March 2010 and Heesch, "The Ivanhoe Security Force," 13.
- 85 Heesch, "The Ivanhoe Security Force," 13. **MAJ Jack T. Young received the Silver Star for his gallantry in action at Kunu-ri on 30 November 1950.** HQ, 2d Infantry Division, APO 248, San Francisco, General Orders No. 96 dated 4 May 1951 and "Major Jack Young Wins Silver Star," *San Francisco Examiner*, January 1951.
- 86 Heesch, "The Ivanhoe Security Force," 13.
- 87 Heesch, "The Ivanhoe Security Force," 13.
- 88 Heesch, "The Ivanhoe Security Force," 13.
- 89 Heesch, "The Ivanhoe Security Force," 13.
- 90 Finnegan, *The U.S. Army in the Korean War, 1950-1953*, 18.
- 91 J. Lawton Collins, *War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969): 223-224.
- 92 Heesch, "The Ivanhoe Security Force," 13.
- 93 EUSAK Command Report. Section IV: After-Action Interviews Book 4: Battle of Soyang, June 1951.
- 94 Heesch interview, 15 December 2005.
- 95 Parker interview, 22 July 2005 and Heesch, "The Ivanhoe Security Force," 13.
- 96 GHQ, UN Command, Office of the Commander-in-Chief letter dated 3 January 1951 to Mrs. Emmett V. Parker, Department of Army, Office of the Adjutant General letter dated 9 January 1951 to Mrs. Edi J. Parker, and Parker, unpublished memoirs, copies in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. **ISG Parker's experiences as a North Korean and Chinese Communist POW will be chronicled in a future *Veritas*.**



Korean CPT Hoe, ISF, briefs attack platoon leaders before a patrol.