# WAR IN THE LAND OF THE MORNING CALM:
THE KOREAN WAR

by Robert P. Wettemann

The Korean War stalled at the Panmunjom Peace Talks. Beginning in June 1951, representatives from North and South Korea haggled over POWS and territorial concessions before signing an armistice in July 1953.

In the predawn hours of 25 June 1950, more than 100,000 North Korean soldiers crossed the 38th Parallel to invade South Korea. The move by the North Korean People's Army (NKPA), a force possessing tacit and material support from the Soviet Union and combat experience gained during the 1940s Communist takeover of China, instantly turned the Cold War hot. The immediate cause of the 1950 North Korean invasion can be linked to the closing days of WWII, as two emerging superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, struggled to exert their influence over the Far East. The long-term causes of the Korean War, however, have much deeper roots, and are a product of centuries of interaction between Korea and its neighbors – China, Japan and Russia.

A LAND OF CONTRAST

A small but beautiful country, Korea occupies a peninsula separating the Sea of Japan from the Yellow Sea, only twenty-five miles northwest of Japan across the Tsushima Straits. Its northern border with China is the Yalu (Anmok) River, and with the former Soviet Union, the Tuman (Tumen) River. About the size of Utah, Korea shares the same approximate latitude as San Francisco, CA, Wichita, KS, and Philadelphia, PA, but has a much more varied climate. Summers are generally hot and humid, with average July temperatures of 80° F (27° C). Winters are long and bitterly cold, with temperatures in January averaging 17° F (-8° C). Icy winds sweeping down from Manchuria make it feel much colder. The monsoon season, which lasts from late June through mid-August, turns normally dusty lowlands into seas of mobility-hampering mud.[1]

Korea is between 90 and 200 miles wide, and between 525 and 600 miles in length, with a 5,400 mile-long coastline. Over seventy-five percent of the country is mountainous. Most of these mountains are in the northern Nangnim and Hamgyong *sanmaeks* (ranges). The tallest peak, Paektu-San [9,003 feet (2,744 meters)], sits astride the border with China. The Yalu and Tuman Rivers flow north of the northern mountains towards the west and east respectively. In the south, the T'aebaek ("Spine of Korea") *sanmaek* dominates the eastern side of the peninsula, and is bisected by the Sobaek *sanmaek* running northeast to southwest. To the northwest, the watershed slopes towards the coast, and the Han River flows northeast through Seoul. These southern ranges also define the Nakdong River basin, which generally flows through agricultural plains found throughout the south and southeast. The western coast of the Korean peninsula has numerous offshore islands, as well as many natural harbors and waterways. The west coast tides, particularly at Inch'on, vary as much as thirty-two feet and greatly complicate coastal navigation and maritime commerce. In contrast, mountains that reach the very

SOVIET UNION

CHINA

Tumen River

Paektu Mtn

Ch'ongjin

Hamgyong Rng

Hyesanjin

Kanggye

Yalu River

Nangnim Rng

Sinuiju

Hungnam

Sinanju

Taedong

Sea of Japan

P'YONGYANG

Wonsan

Bukhan

Taebaek Rng

38th Parallel

Ongjin

Ch'unch'on

SEOUL

Samch'ok

Yellow Sea

Osan

Namhan

Andong

Taejon

Nakdong

Geum

Taegu

Sobaek Rng

Pusan

Mokp'o

N

and P'yongyang to other regional centers. A branch to the South Manchuria Railway at Sinuiju linked Korea to Asia and the rest of Europe. During WWII, rail traffic supported the external needs of Japan and trade within Korea was nonexistent. After the war, this aging system deteriorated further due to a lack of resources and attention. A sparse road network followed the rail line routes. These narrow, gravel roads with sharp curves and light-duty bridges could not support heavy vehicles, further reducing interregional traffic.[4]

KOREA AND ITS NEIGHBORS: ANCIENT TO MODERN

Discord between Korea and its neighbors, dating back thousands of years, is part of the region's rich history and politics. Korea's close proximity to Japan, and shared borders with China and Russia (later the Soviet Union) made it vulnerable to all three nations. Each left its imprint upon Korea, and all three, coupled with the post-WWII presence of the United States, were linked to the outbreak of war between a divided Korea.

Ancient Korea was originally comprised of numerous walled town-states. By the third century AD, three kingdoms dominated Korea: Paekche surrounding present-day Seoul, Koguryŏ in the north, and Silla in the central part of the peninsula. An alliance with China's Tang Dynasty allowed Silla to unify the peninsula by 668 and introduce Confucianism and Buddhism to Korea. Under Chinese patrimony, the Silla Dynasty exercised autonomous control for three centuries until its replacement by the Koryŏ Dynasty in 918. Under consistent leadership of the Koryŏ (918-1392) and Chosŏn (1392-1910) dynasties, the consolidated Koreas flourished culturally, repelling attacks from the Khitans (920s), Mongols (1230-1270), Japanese (1592-1598) and Manchus (1620-1630).[5]

China allowed Korea to manage its domestic concerns, but controlled all foreign affairs. With China's gradual decline in the mid-19th century, other nations sought access to trade with Korea. The United States, Great Britain, and Russia secured trade treaties in the 1880's, but Japan remained the greatest threat to Korean autonomy, because it hoped to dominate the entire Yellow Sea region.[6] The Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), effectively demonstrating Japanese martial improvements made since the Meiji Restoration, ended China's dominion over Korea. The Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) granted Korea total independence from China, but opened the way for Japan to gain control.[7]

Czarist Russia challenged Japanese hegemony in Asia. When Chinese nationalists failed to end western

edge of the eastern coast emphasize the importance of ports like Hungnam, Wonsan and Pusan.[2]

Differences between North and South Korea extend beyond geography. There are stark contrasts in regards to resources, industry and agriculture. For much of their history, North and South Korea complemented each other and trade was active. By the end of WWII, the Japanese had concentrated most industry in the north, where hydroelectric dams and power facilities enabled the exploitation of gold, iron, tungsten, copper and graphite deposits. Mineral wealth was absent in the south. There, the population was chiefly agrarian. Rice, wheat, millet, corn, and soybeans were cultivated using centuries-old methods in the "breadbasket" region.[3]

Modern transportation was key to developing the Korean peninsula but the terrain posed a serious challenge. One major rail line, built by the Japanese in 1906, ran north from Sinuiju on the Yalu River, southward through P'yongyang, and eventually to Seoul. A second line joined at Seoul, linking the capital with Pusan on the southern coast. Feeder lines connected Seoul

Korea and its neighbors share a legacy of warfare and cultural exchange that, coupled with the arrival of the United States after WWII, shaped the history of modern North and South Korea.

Theodore Roosevelt, (center) with peace envoys from Russia and Japan at the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth, 1905.

influence during the Boxer Rebellion (1900), Russia moved troops into Manchuria and occupied northern portions of the Korean peninsula. Japan and Russia later agreed to jointly occupy Korea, dividing it along the 38th Parallel. The two unsuccessful invasions of Japan launched from Korea by Kublai Khan in 1274 and 1281, caused the Japanese to regard the peninsula as a "dagger pointed at the heart" of their country. Japan and Russia subsequently came to blows over the joint occupation of Korea in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905).[8] Unable to achieve a decisive land victory at Mukden, the Imperial Japanese Navy delivered a deathblow to the Russian fleet at Tsushima. The Treaty of Portsmouth, brokered by U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt in 1905, forced Russia to abandon Korea and recognize that the entire peninsula lay within a growing Japanese "sphere of influence."[9]

Korea became Tokyo's colony for the next forty years. On 1 March 1919, American-educated Syngman Rhee and other Korean leaders led thousands of their fellow countrymen in peaceful demonstrations against the Japanese. The marchers read a proposed declaration of independence and carried a prohibited Korean flag. Outraged by the overt display of Korean nationalism, Japanese authorities cracked down unmercifully. Hundreds of thousands of Koreans fled the country or joined underground revolutionary movements. Between 1921 and 1937, Korean expatriates tried to secure foreign

United Nations

*I*n 1916, before the United States entered the "War to end all Wars," American President Woodrow Wilson proposed a League of Nations to maintain international stability and prevent future conflict. Designed as a mediating body to prevent war among nations of the world, the League could impose economic sanctions but could not uphold its own mandates with military force. When the victorious European nations punished the Triple Alliance for starting the Great War, support for Wilson's League collapsed in the United States. The Senate subsequently rejected the League's charter, preventing an American role in the organization. Lacking American participation and without any appreciable military power, League sanctions failed to stop the rise of aggressive regimes in Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan in the 1930s.

Because of the League's impotency, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill agreed in the 1941 Atlantic Charter that a "permanent system of general security" was needed in the post-WWII world. When Soviet entry into the war threatened the European balance of power, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill secured approval for an international peacekeeping organization from Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin at the Teheran Conference in 1943. Two weeks after President Roosevelt's death in 1945, delegates from fifty nations at war with Germany and Japan met in San Francisco, California to draft the charter for the United Nations (UN). On 25 June 1945, the delegates unanimously approved a UN comprised of a General Assembly (the policy-making body with representatives from all member nations), a Secretariat (the Secretary General and administrative apparatus), and a Security Council (represented permanently by ambassadors from the "Big Five" – U.S., Great Britain, U.S.S.R., France, and China – plus six other nations on rotating two-year terms). Unlike the General Assembly, which met annually, the Security Council remained in constant session to mediate any emerging international dispute, with permanent members possessing the power to veto any council resolution. This new organization represented a significant improvement over the League of Nations because the UN could levy economic and diplomatic sanctions and use military force to settle international disputes.

In 1946, the UN General Assembly held its inaugural session in London. By the end of the first meeting, Cold War attitudes emerged, as both the U.S. and the Soviet Union denounced each other in the General Assembly and the Security Council. The second General Assembly, however, supported Korean independence, creating the UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) to observe future elections in the divided country. While UNTCOK supervised elections in South Korea in February 1948, the Soviets denied access to international commissioners observing elections in the north.

The United Nations General Assembly and Security Council held their first meetings on 10 January 1946 at Westminster Central Hall in London. Representatives from fifty-one nations attended.

During the Korean War, troops from seventeen nations served under the UN flag. Of the 616,000 UN troops that fought in the conflict, 90 percent came from the United States.

At the time of the North Korean invasion in 1950, the U.S. and the Soviet Union were again at odds in the UN. The Soviet Ambassador boycotted the Security Council's meeting because the council refused to seat Communist China. This absence precluded a Soviet veto of the Security Council resolution to stop the invasion of South Korea and name General Douglas A. MacArthur as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC). While subsequent military action in Korea remained a UN mission, the U.S. provided ninety percent of the forces, and command remained wholly in American hands throughout the course of the war. Nonetheless, the conflict marked the first time that the UN mobilized member military forces to mediate an international conflict, establishing a precedent that continues today.

Sources:
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In 1919, Korean protestors in the "March First Movement" opposed the Japanese occupation, marching peacefully after reading their own Declaration of Independence. The Japanese violently suppressed this display of Korean nationalism.

Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at Yalta, February 1945.

support for national independence. In the United States, the future South Korean President Rhee advocated democracy. Others like Kim Song-Ju (later Kim Il Sung) briefly led guerrilla groups against the Japanese in northern Korea before joining with Communists in China, who were supported by the Soviets during WWII.[10]

WORLD WAR II AND ITS AFTERMATH

Japan incorporated Korea into its "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" during WWII. Although the Korean population grew from twenty million to twenty-five million between 1930 and 1944, they suffered terribly during the war. Koreans faced Allied bombings, conscription into the Imperial Japanese Army, or work as forced laborers, as well as economic hardship and psychological strain at the hands of the Japanese. Korea's natural resources, particularly its timber, supplied the Japanese war machine for almost twenty years. [11]

During WWII, the "Big Three" – U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston L. Churchill, and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin – met repeatedly. Korean independence was a regular topic, as was an international organization that possessed the power to maintain peace in the postwar world. Although plans were underway for a United Nations by early 1944, Allied leadership reached no decisions regarding Korea prior to President Roosevelt's death in April 1945. At Yalta in February 1945, Stalin agreed to enter the war against Japan three months after the Allies defeated Nazi Germany. Two new western leaders (President Harry S. Truman and Prime Minister Clement Atlee) joined Stalin at Potsdam in July 1945, but international cooperation was already unraveling.[12]

On 8 August 1945, two days after the United States dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Soviet

Born Kim Sŏng-ju, Kim Il Sung led the Communist movement in Korea from 1946 until his death in 1994. During WWII, he fought against the Japanese with support from the Soviet Union.

troops attacked Japanese forces in Manchuria and Korea to gain increased political leverage in Asia. Despite the Soviets' delayed entry into the Pacific War, President Truman offered to share the occupation of Korea, dividing the country along the 38th Parallel. When Allied foreign ministers met in Moscow six months after implementing this plan, they agreed that Korea would be reunited after a five-year UN trusteeship.[13] Although both the United States and the Soviet Union accepted the idea of a unified and independent Korea, numerous obstacles became apparent in the wake of the complicated post-war economic reconstruction and attempted social and political reconciliation.[14]

After the Japanese surrender on 2 September 1944, General Douglas A. MacArthur became Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP), overseeing the

creation of a democratic Japan for the next six years.[15] In the southern half of Korea, Lieutenant General (LTG) John R. Hodge, XXIV Corps commander, directed the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK), following orders from Washington to carry out a Korean reconstruction program.[16]

From the outset, the U.S. Department of State desired a democratic South Korea while the Soviets organized a Communist government in North Korea. Meanwhile, the recently organized nine-member United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) announced countrywide elections of a National Assembly in Korea, a preliminary step towards unification. Soviet officials countered by announcing that UNTCOK would not be permitted to visit North Korea in early January 1948.[17]

Highlighting the ideological clash between the superpowers, democratically-minded Koreans competed with the Communists for control of the country. The result was two Korean governments, one north and one south, both seeking dominion over the entire peninsula. In May 1948 elections observed by UNTCOK, South Koreans voted in a two-hundred-member National Assembly chaired by Syngman Rhee. This Assembly adopted a constitution to institute a Republic of South Korea, and elected Rhee president. At this point, LTG Hodge announced the end of the U.S. occupation and initiated troop withdrawals. President Rhee soon stated his desire to reunify the peninsula under one flag.[18] In July 1948, Communist supporters of Kim Il Sung formed the North Korean People's Council and drafted a resolution calling for the formation of the Supreme People's Assembly of Korea. Convened in August, this Communist-supported body adopted its own constitution and selected Kim Il Sung to be the Premier of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.[19] Neither Korean leader was satisfied. Local


British Prime Minister Clement Atlee, President Harry S. Truman, and Premier Joseph Stalin at Potsdam, July 1945.

Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) General Douglas A. MacArthur greets South Korean President Syngman Rhee upon his first visit to Korea in August, 1944.

An anti-Communist demonstration in South Korea, July 1948.

Containment

The "Truman Doctrine" pledged U.S assistance for "free peoples . . . resisting subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures."

Writing as "Mr. X," George Kennan advocated limiting the spread of Communism, a policy that would dominate U.S. conduct throughout the Cold War.

Following Mao Zedong's takeover of China, most Americans believed all Communists took orders from Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin. Soviet support for North Korea and the Chinese intervention in the Korean War did little to allay these fears.

*I*n the aftermath of WWII, the ideological conflict between the Communist Soviet Union and American free-market Democracy evolved into an all-or-nothing political competition for global dominance. After former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill pronounced in 1946 that an "Iron Curtain," had descended across Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union entered into a Cold War that lasted until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.[1] Central to the Cold War was the American desire to expand capitalism and democracy and limit the spread of Communism, particularly in Europe.

In the wake of a growing Soviet involvement in Turkey, Greece and Iran, President Harry S. Truman announced his "Truman Doctrine" in 1947, eventually providing $400 million in aid to "support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures."[2] Shortly thereafter, U.S. State Department Soviet expert George Kennan, writing under the pseudonym "Mr. X", gave a name to this policy that lasted throughout the remainder of the Cold War. In an article published in *Foreign Affairs*, Kennan, the former deputy head of the American mission in Moscow, advocated a "long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." Kennan explained that the Soviets were essentially paranoid, and would never be able to convince themselves that the West did not threaten their way of life. To protect themselves, the Communists probed into areas of perceived weakness, hoping to establish a new Communist cell and perpetuate the worldwide revolution. To counter these threats, Kennan believed that the United States (and by implication, the West), should be prepared to make the appropriate "application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points," thus "containing" Communism.[3] Americans generally considered "containment" in a European context. Beginning in 1948, the United States provided more than

$13 billion in aid and loans under the terms of the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan), transported more than 2.3 million tons of food and other supplies into Berlin during the Soviet blockade of the city, and helped found the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The 1949 success of Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communists over Chiang Kai-Shek and the Nationalist *Kuomintang* complicated this Euro-centrism, though most analysts continued to maintain that Communists worldwide took their marching orders from Moscow. The invasion of South Korea by the North Korean Communists supported by the Soviet Union helped validate this monolithic view of Communism. The Chinese intervention launched on 25 November 1950 provided further evidence of the supposed connection between P'yongyang, Beijing, and Moscow. Efforts to rollback the spread of Communism on the Korean peninsula, however, soon foundered on fears that the regional conflict might become a global conflagration between the United States and the Soviet Union. Always conscious of the threat to allies in Europe after 1951, the U.S. limited the conflict in Korea to stabilizing the border between North and South Korea along the 38th Parallel. By the time both sides agreed to the 1953 armistice, containment was an institutionalized cornerstone of American foreign and defense policy, and would be applied in Europe, South America and Asia until 1991.

Endnotes

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3   X, "Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* 25 (July 1947), 566-82; "Kennan and Containment," http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/17601.htm, accessed 22 February 2010. The content of Mr. X's article did not come as a surprise to the Truman Administration. A year earlier, Kennan had sent his "Long Telegram" to Secretary of State James Byrnes, examined the roots of Russian policy and outlined a recommended American response. The content of Kennan's earlier "Long Telegram" provided much of the justification for the Truman Doctrine.

violence erupted, but the U.S. continued its unilateral military withdrawal from the peninsula as Washington's focus shifted to Europe.

A Simmering Cauldron

The United States repeatedly demonstrated its resolve to limit Communist influence in Europe with the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, and response to the Soviet blockade of Berlin. American commitment to the Far East seemed to be diminishing except for the occupation of Japan. During WWII, the United States supported Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Chinese, despite General Joseph W. "Vinegar Joe" Stillwell's belief that the Nationalists were more interested in fighting Mao Zedong and his Communists than they were the Japanese. Concurrent with the U.S. occupation of Korea, Washington provided more than three billion dollars in aid to Chiang Kai-shek, now totally focused on his Communist rivals. North Korean army units supported the Chinese Communist forces, in the process gaining valuable combat experience against the Nationalist *Kuomintang* (KMT). By 1949, Chiang and his Nationalists were fighting a losing battle.[20]

In December 1949 the defeated KMT fled to Formosa (Taiwan), and Mao established the People's Republic of China. Two months later, Mao and Stalin signed a Sino-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance, establishing what appeared to be a monolithic Communist bloc that, in American eyes, would promulgate Communism worldwide. The Cold War now divided Asia into two camps, one aligned with the Soviet Union, the other with the United States, a political reality best demonstrated on the Korean peninsula.[21] When China fell to the Communists, it appeared that democracy was losing the Cold War in the Far East.

KMAG SSI

To add to a growing sense of power loss, the United States' atomic energy monopoly gained during WWII soon ended. In late 1949, atmospheric readings revealed that the Soviets had detonated a nuclear weapon. The fall of China, coupled with Russia's acquisition of the bomb caused the United States' government to rethink its global strategic commitments, and strengthen its atrophied conventional forces.[22]

In a January 1950 speech before the National Press Club in Washington, DC, Secretary of State Dean Acheson implied that South Korea lay outside the American "defensive perimeter," a sweeping Pacific ring that included Alaska, the Ryukyu Islands, Japan, and the Philippines.[23] Given the rise of Communist China on the Asian mainland, the necessity for a significant United States military presence in the Pacific appeared reasonable. At the time of Acheson's speech, however, only the United States Military Advisory Group to the

Republic of Korea (KMAG), a 241-man element attached to the U.S. Embassy and tasked with training, logistical support and advising the young Republic of Korea Army (ROKA), remained on the peninsula. Aside from this small force, the principal U.S. contingent in Asia, the Eighth Army (EUSA) remained in Japan in an understrength post-war organization (See Troy J. Sacquety, *25 July 1950: Three Combat Forces*).[24]

Anticipating a U.S. strategic realignment, the National Security Council (NSC) took steps to overcome the post-WWII deterioration of American military power. NSC Memorandum 68 (NSC-68) called for a massive increase in conventional military assets. While NSC-68 did not specifically address South Korea, the document made it clear that the containment of Communism dominated American foreign policy.[25]

Korea Boils Over

Communist forces prepared to test the American policy of containment before NSC-68 affected the status quo in the Far East. While critics cited Secretary Acheson's January 1950 speech as encouragement for Kim Il Sung to launch an attack, the North had invasion plans in place well before June 1950. Kim Il Sung met repeatedly with Stalin, who had furnished Soviet military aid to the NKPA as early as November 1949. On Sunday, 25 June 1950, thirty minutes of preparatory artillery fire broke the pre-dawn stillness, paving the way for the North Korean invasion south.[26] The NKPA targeted ROKA troop concentrations that protected road or secondary rail junctions at Ongjin, Yonan, Kaesong, Tongduch'on-ni, and P'ach'on (north of Seoul), Ch'uch'on (in central Korea), and Kangnung (along the eastern coast). NKPA infantry and armor shocked ROKA troops and their KMAG advisors, who had discounted reports dating as early as 12 June that the NKPA was massing troops along the border.[27]

The attack caught the United States and most of the world totally unaware. As the Communist forces drove southward, the United Nations (at the urging of the U.S. government) responded. In the absence of the Soviet Ambassador, the Security Council passed a resolution authorizing member states to "repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security to the region." To halt the North Korean advance General MacArthur, now Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), ordered elements of the 24th Infantry Division into South Korea. Task Force SMITH, named for Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Charles B. Smith and comprised of 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment and augmented by a section of 75 mm Recoilless Rifles (two guns), two heavy mortar platoons from the regiment, and a battery of artillery (52nd Field Artillery Battalion), was ferried across the Tsushima Strait to delay the Communists at Osan.[28]

Lacking an effective command and control network and logistical support, unable to communicate with ROK forces, and with no way to coordinate air support, Task Force SMITH was little more than a "speed bump" for the North Korean juggernaut. When additional Eighth

U.S. Army (EUSA) units failed to stop the Communist offensive and MacArthur made plans to establish a defensive "toe hold" around the port at Pusan, there was no doubt that the Korean situation was far more critical than previously believed. Within five weeks, the Communists drove shattered ROKA elements and LTG Walton H. Walker's remaining EUSA forces across the Naktong River and into the Pusan Perimeter.[29] Realizing that units in theater lacked the cohesion and capability to counter the NKPA advance, General MacArthur hoped to save the withdrawing forces by reducing pressure on what remained by interdicting the enemy's supply line. The CINC, familiar with the Alamo Scouts and 6th Ranger Battalion from his South West Pacific command during WWII, supported the creation of the GHQ Raider Company and the Eighth Army Ranger Company from other GHQ assets.[30] Largely out of a sense of desperation, MacArthur's decisions renewed the Army's interest in Special Operations. From June 1950 until April 1951, the U.S. Army mobilized a wide variety of Army SOF to fight in Korea against Communism. These units formed a legacy for today's ARSOF elements. ♠

Robert P. Wettemann is a graduate of Oklahoma State University who earned his Ph.D. from Texas A&M University. After instructing at McMurry University (Abilene, Texas), for six years, Dr. Wettemann spent two years as a visiting professor at the United States Air Force Academy. Research interests include special operations training and the field adaptation of technology to meet mission goals.

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4 Billy C. Mossman, *Ebb and Flow: November 1950-July 1951* (Washington: G.P.O., 1990), 7.

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22 Patterson, *Grand Expectations*, 169-78.

23 Levering, *The Cold War*, 40.

24 Millett, *The War for Korea*, 189-90. Between 1945 and 1950 Eighth Army was comprised of four infantry divisions: 7th, 24th, 25th, and 1st Cavalry. Aside from the 25th, which fielded 13,000 men, all were below their authorized peacetime strength of 12,500, though this authorized strength was well below the wartime standard of 18,900 men.

25 Levering, *The Cold War*, 41-42; http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/82209.htm, accessed 16 November 2009; http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm, accessed 16 November 2009.

26 Millett, *The War in Korea*, 193-98, 241-46; Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, 9.

27 Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, 19-22.

28 Roy K. Flint, "Task Force Smith and the 24th Division: Delay and Withdrawal, 5-9 July 1950," in Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, *America's First Battles, 1776-1965* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1986), 266-75, (hereafter Flint, "Task Force Smith").

29 Flint, "Task Force Smith," 275-99.

30 Kenneth Finlayson, "Alamo Scouts Diary," *Veritas* 4 (3 2008), 3-17.