

We're Asking the Reds to SURRENDER-PLEASE!

By PETER KALISCHER

The UN has opened up with a barrage of propaganda against the Communists in Korea. Our ammunition is words, and we fire a billion rounds a week

Seoul, Korea
A CHINESE Communist soldier who surrendered to an American company on the Korean front recently was asked why he gave himself up. "Four months ago," he told his interrogators, "I heard a woman broadcasting in Chinese from one of your voice-planes. I thought: If the Americans can circle a slow plane over our positions with a female in it, then I am fighting on the losing side."
 The prisoner never explained why it took him four months to surrender, or what the woman had said, or even if her message had been understood. But one way or another, the incident started a delayed-action thought-bomb that achieved, in capsule form, the mission of Psychological Warfare: "To communicate ideas and information intended to affect the beliefs, emotions and actions of the enemy in order to lower his morale, destroy his will to fight and to induce him to take action beneficial to our cause."

Twenty-four hours of every day the United Nations command bombards the enemy on and behind the front lines with ideas and information—by short- and medium-wave radio stations in Japan and Korea; by leaflets dropped from planes and shot out of guns; and by airborne- and front-line loud-speakers. The material for this billion-word-a-week barrage ranges from "get-out-of-town" air-raid warnings to soap operas and disc-jockey shows designed to make a Communist GI homesick.

"Please get one thing straight," said Colonel Kenneth Hansen, new chief of the Far East Command's Psychological Warfare Section. "Nobody in this shop thinks we can win this war with just words. Propaganda is a weapon, like tanks or planes or artillery. But you can't win with tanks or planes alone, and words without something to back them up are—well, just words."

From Colonel Hansen's headquarters in a Tokyo office building to the camouflaged loud-speakers a couple of hundred yards from Communist bunkers in Korea are scattered some 600 "Psywarriors"—GI and civilian planners, writers, directors, actors, artists, printers and technicians.

They include 132 Koreans and Chinese from stage stars to "leaflet kickers"—men who boot 10,000-leaflet bundles out the doors of unarmed planes over enemy territory. (A timed charge scatters the leaflets at 1,000 feet.)

The stage stars belong to "Psywar's" radio stock company in Tokyo. One of them, Miss Kim Bok Cha, played Ophelia in a prewar Korean production of Hamlet. Petite and attractive to the tips of her long red fingernails, Miss Kim acts many roles in propaganda playlets. But she is probably best known throughout North Korea as Mo Ran, a disc

Typical UN surrender leaflets appeal to Reds' emotions from all angles, depict Kremlin as real aggressor. Two million are loosed daily

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The Reds put on a good show, too. But they can't match our advertised-in-

jockey with a 15-minute program of nostalgic platter and chatter reminiscent of Tokyo Rose. (Miss Kim records her program in the same studio Rose once used.) Even to someone who doesn't understand Korean, Miss Kim sounds sexy.

Her Chinese counterpart is an actress whose family still lives in Peiping and who must therefore remain anonymous. On the air she calls herself Lansa—"Flowery Grace" in Mandarin. Both Miss Kim and Lansa earn about \$50 a week as noncitizen Department of the Army civilians, and suffer from artistic frustration. They don't know audience reaction and, of course, there is no fan mail.

Broadcasters Work at the Front

There's too much audience reaction at the other end of Psywar operations—the front-line loud-speaker teams. It was a quiet day on a quiet sector when I talked to Pfc Robert C. Shaw, of Duquesne, Pennsylvania, the American half of one such team. But Shaw can quail as the model for a recent Stars and Stripes cartoon showing two GIs crouching by a loud-speaker while shells rain all about them. "Quit griping," says one, "you mighta been in the infantry."

Shrewd, personable and twenty-three years old, Shaw has been "on call" with his loud-speaker unit—one of a dozen on the Eighth Army front—for the past several months. His partner and "voice" is Kim Myong Kwan, an ex-student who lived in Shanghai and speaks Korean, Chinese, English, Japanese and a smattering of Russian. Kim often plays the harmonica to sweeten his "commercials" prepared by higher headquarters or written on the spot by Shaw.

Shaw stashes the speaker at an advanced position at night (it can be heard clearly for 2,000 yards) and then retires with Kim, the generator and the microphone to a bunker a short distance away.

"Welcome, men of the 340th Regiment," Kim will broadcast following a rendition of Turkey in the Straw or a Korean folk tune. "After only 30 days in reserve your Communist masters have moved you to the front for the winter months . . ."

On the theory that direct appeals to surrender are wasted during a static war, Shaw likes Kim to needle the Communists on their enforced political indoctrination.

"Did you enjoy having your brains washed?"

Kim asks. "How was your self-criticism hour?"

Sentimental references to home and family are better left to women, and two South Korean WACs, whom Shaw calls "the bravest girls I ever met," do front-line broadcasts called Operation Heartache.

In Korea and Japan, most Psywar officers were agreed on two points: Communist psychological warfare is pretty good and both we and the enemy make plenty of blunders.

With their front-line loud-speakers and leaflets, the Reds concentrate on the "rich man's war," the rigors of another Korean winter away from home and a "will rotation come too late?" theme. Their mistakes include broadcasting to a Dutch battalion

raids. Once a North Korean town for example—is marked for bombing following treatment:

Months beforehand leaflet-planes hung and other towns with a general warning. "This is a military target likely to be hit. We advise civilians to leave immediately." Seoul broadcasts spot announcements. "The UN command will hit communications centers and military stations. We want to protect civilians. 10 to two days before the actual bombing is showered with map leaflets other towns in the immediate area are next."

Thirty minutes before the bombing, the radio goes on with a specific warning: "UN bombers are coming—minutes before bombs-away, a B-29 roars over the town broadcasting the Then come the bombers. The final warning: "You were warned."

Reports trickling out of North Korea that, weeks before the bombers strike, soldiers have to keep the citizenry under guard.

Leaflet Production Is

For the seesaw land fighting, Eighth Army headquarters in Seoul has no gimmick. It has mobile radio units, propaganda mill geared to turn out voice-cast scripts on demand. It can deliver a special leaflet on the spot after it is requested.

(Line units are stocked in advance to cover standard situations.)

"If it just took leaflets to win the war," said the operations officer and Kleckner, of Los Angeles. "We over about 2,000,000 a day—enough to fill every house the Air Force is in. The point is—are they doing it?"

Kleckner, who has been with the Army since 1943, is convinced that most of what we learned during World War II.

"Truth is our strongest weapon. We say it suspect—we're the enemy."

The art of applying psychological as well as physical force against a military opponent has become an accepted element of modern warfare.

As a support weapon, psychological warfare has taken its place with the tank, the gun and the airplane. Its mission is to reduce the cost in man power and matériel necessary to obtain an objective. It is here to stay.

Frank Pace, Jr.
 Secretary of the Army

in bad German and to a Spanish-speaking Puerto Rican regiment in English—which 90 per cent of the men couldn't understand. On one sector, they sought to entice GIs with promises of good food and left surrender leaflets wrapped around cans of powdered eggs—the bane of chow halls—as proof of their good faith. At other times, on the theory that GIs are more sex-starved than hungry, they promise girls to men who surrender. Their sharpest leaflet came two days after General MacArthur made his "fade away" speech before Congress. "Old soldiers never die," the leaflet said, "but young ones do!"

Our hardest-hitting propaganda, and one the Reds can't match, is the advertised-in-advance air



Two Psywar artists, S/Sgt. Rudolph Prefontaine, Winnipeg, Manitoba, (L.), Pfc Richard Zayac, Detroit, sketch propaganda leaflet layouts



In Tokyo Rose tradition, Kim Bok Cha, known as Mo Ran, records 15-minute record show in Korean. She emphasizes nostalgic

First Lieutenant (1LT) Ivan G. Worrell, the Loudspeaker Platoon leader, 1st Loudspeaker & Leaflet Company, Eighth U.S. Army, Korea, flew seven Psywar broadcast missions to P'yongyang in 1952 aboard a B-26 *Invader*. "The Voice," a specially-equipped WWII-era C-47 *Skytrain* with permanently-mounted loudspeakers, had gotten badly shot up and was undergoing repairs. 1LT Worrell and his radio mechanic installed a portable loudspeaker in the bomb bay. Since the Army equipment electrical system was not compatible with that of the Air Force aircraft, they fitted a gasoline-powered electrical generator into the radio section to power the microphone and loudspeaker. A 'jerry-rigged'

flexible hose vented exhaust fumes through an antenna 'well' in the top of the fuselage. A female Republic of Korea (ROK) soldier, riding in the bombardier seat, constantly read the Psywar script aloud. Since the doors of the bomb bay had to be kept open during these missions, everyone dressed warmly. All missions were night, low level. When given the opportunity to earn an Air Medal by flying three more missions aboard the repaired C-47, 1LT Worrell declined. Originally, there had been two C-47 Psywar planes; one of the slow-flying aircraft was shot down over enemy lines.¹

Endnotes

¹ Retired MAJ Ivan G. Worrell, interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 22 March 2012, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

advance air

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aturate Yong- neral warning: o be bombed. ately." Radio ts to all North bomb all com- pply installa- Leave!" From bombing, Yong- showing it and marked: "You

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Ran, conducts gic talk of home

raids that begin softening up the enemy's will to resist months ahead of bombing dates 17

Kleckner continued. "It takes time for events to prove we're right, and results aren't always tangible. By the time results are proved, if you ask the average American combat man what effect our leaflets have, he'll tell you that a 25-pound bundle dropped from 5,000 feet will drive a Communist three feet into the ground if it hits him on the head."

Kleckner ruefully recalled how the 45th Division had alerted a platoon of MPs to be ready to take charge of the crowds of prisoners expected from one night's loud-speaker broadcasts. None came in and the MPs were disgusted. On another occasion, three Chinese surrendered to a Turkish brigade outpost. Only two of them held UN surrender leaflets. The Turks sent those two prisoners to the rear and wanted to shoot the third.


Everything in Psywar is keyed to what enemy troops think and feel at the moment. This goal calls for close work with Intelligence, and leaflets are often submitted to prisoners for criticism. The "surrender, please" theme is not the most important one. There was, for instance, Psywar's victory over the Chinese rockets.

The Reds Use a Secret Weapon

"We were catching rockets along the I Corps front," Kleckner recalled, "and while they weren't doing much damage, a few prisoners we picked up were cocky as hell—seemed to think they had a secret weapon from the Russians."

"It was the old Katusha, an obsolete rocket launcher the Russians used in the last war. We printed a leaflet showing we knew all about their secret weapon and had passed it up as old-fashioned. We said the Russians were peddling junk they couldn't use in exchange for good Chinese grain and cash. The reaction was sensational. In one week, the Chinese GIs gave their political commissars such a bad time the rockets disappeared from I Corps and have never showed up to any degree since."

Kleckner was called away for a conference over what to do with a voluntary testimonial to Allied good treatment from a Chinese prisoner. The testimonial was in the form of a letter to three of the prisoner's wavering buddies. It was argued that if we scattered leaflets, with the letter, on the prisoner's old unit, the names of these men would make the leaflet undeniably authentic. Use of their



Lansa, anonymous actress, conducts Chinese program with Col. Homer Shields, Indianapolis *Callier's* for December 13, 1952

Sound of women's voices at front have proved sure-fire surrender lure. UN uses Korean WACs, one of whom is shown here with copilot of loud-speaker-equipped voice-plane, set for flight