Born of Desperation

“They were desperate times and every headquarters was ready to try anything,” —Lieutenant (j.g.) George Atcheson.

The initial efforts of the South Korean military and General Douglas A. MacArthur, Supreme Commander, Allied Forces Pacific (SCAP) and Commander-in-Chief, Far East Command (FECOM) to halt the June 1950 invasion from the north were unsuccessful. The Russian-equipped, trained, and advised North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) routed the poorly-led Republic of Korea (ROK) ground forces across a wide front. After Seoul fell to the enemy juggernaut, South Korean units conducted delaying actions southward. General MacArthur, plagued by limited naval assets and airlift, committed piecemeal under-strength (two regiment divisions with two battalion regiments), poorly trained U.S. occupation troops from Japan to bolster ROK forces. When Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) commander, decided to form a defensive bastion around the southeastern port of Pusan, enemy pressure had to be reduced on the ROK and American forces to enable them to withdraw into that sanctuary.

In late July 1950, after continual setbacks in South Korea, desperation drove General MacArthur to order the formation of commando/raider forces from FECOM headquarters, to solicit British Royal Navy Far East support, and to press U.S. Commander, Naval Forces Far East (COMNAVFE) “to conduct harassing and demolition raids against selected North Korean military objectives and execute deceptive operations in Korean coastal areas” to disrupt enemy lines of communications and supply and to deceive the enemy.1 “They were desperate times and every headquarters was ready to try anything,” said Lieutenant (junior grade) George Atcheson, after his Underwater Demolition Team 3 (UDT-3) element was pulled off a beach survey mission in Japan to successfully destroy a railroad bridge on the south coast of Korea on 6 August 1950.2 While this was happening, the FECOM Adjutant General (AG) screened records for candidates to organize a “Raider Company” from General Headquarters (GHQ) volunteers.

The Pentagon was no better prepared to deal with a conventional war in Asia than was General MacArthur’s Far East Command in 1950. The Russians had gotten the A-Bomb. Mao Zedong’s Red Army had pushed Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Chinese Army from the mainland to Taiwan (Formosa), but the defense of Europe against postwar Soviet expansion was the primary U.S. military mission. Most of the Army’s WWII special operations forces (six Ranger Battalions, the First Special Service Force, Merrill’s Marauders, MARS Task Force, Alamo Scouts, and the Mobile Radio Broadcasting companies) had been deactivated in the massive demobilization that followed V-J Day in 1945.

On 6 August 1950, the Commanding General (CG), Headquarters and Service Group, GHQ organized a provisional unit consisting of six officers and one hundred enlisted men as part of a Raiding Forces Group. Organizational equipment was to be provided from station and/or depot stocks, the HQ & Service Group and/or Eighth Army.3 The Provisional Raider Company was to be organized into three ten-man squads per platoon and three platoons in the company. Unit armament varied with the mission but was light, basically M-2 .30 cal. carbines and M1911A1 .45 cal. automatic pistols, with a M-1 .30-06 cal. Garand rifle, a M1918 .30-06 cal. BAR (Browning Automatic Rifle), and a M1919A2 .30-06 cal. light machinegun or 60 mm mortar per squad. A special Raider Company weapons platoon (4 officers and 56 soldiers) was to be trained and equipped, depending on the mission, with either M1A1 75 mm pack howitzers, 81 mm mortars, or 60 mm mortars.4

The GHQ Raiders trained at the EUSA amphibious training center. It had been established in the spring of 1950 at Camp McGill, near Otawa, on the east coast of Sagami Bay, sixty miles southwest of Tokyo. Nearby Chigasaki Beach was suitable for landing exercises.5 U.S.M.C. Mobile Training Team (MTT) Able [First Lieutenant (1st Lt.) James A. MacDonald, Jr., Technical Sergeant (TSgt) H.C. Mitchell, and Staff Sergeant (SSgt) Marlan A. Knobbs], augmented by additional Marine sergeants and unit officers for weapons instruction and marksmanship, began training the Raider candidates on 9 August 1950 at Camp McGill, three days after the first UDT demolitions raid.6

MTT Able trained the Raiders on day and night rubber boat operations from submarine and naval vessels, demolitions, and amphibious reconnaissance techniques.7 U.S. Navy UDT-1 officers [Lt. Shutler and Lt. (j.g.) Smith] taught surf launching and landings with the large ten-man rubber boats (RB-10s), tactical open water formations, and surf swimming before conducting practice day and night amphibious raids on Nagai Beach with live munitions, 7-8 August 1950.8 Tough physical conditioning, particularly long distance open water swims, and constant mental stress were a part of the culling process to select the best soldiers and to eliminate those not suited for special operations combat missions. Critical infantry skills, small unit tactics, and hand-to-hand combat were taught by the WWII veteran officers.9

The United Kingdom (UK) Volunteers (eleven enlisted naval ratings and three Royal Marines from the British Fleet in the Far East) joined the Raider training.10 Simultaneously, the 41 Independent Commando (225 personnel) was formed at Camp McGill with Royal Marines from England and Hong Kong.11 In EUSA G-3 Operations, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) John Hugh McGee, an escaped WWII POW and guerrilla leader in the Philippines, and Pacific theater regimental commander (169th Infantry Regiment, 43rd Infantry Division) proposed guerrilla operations in North Korea. He was given the mission to recruit a WWII-style Alamo Scout or Ranger Company. EUSA General Order No. 237, dated 24 August 1950, authorized the formation of the seventy-six man (three officers and seventy-three enlisted men) Eighth Army Ranger Company.12

After an intense 30-day training regimen, MTT Able rated the GHQ (Provisional) Raider Company “operationally ready” on 10 September 1950. The UK Volunteer Force led by Captain E.G.D. Pounds was qualified four days later as an independent unit capable of carrying out small amphibious raids, demolition missions, and reconnaissance raids. Raiders referred to the fourteen-man British element as “Pounds’ Force.”13

In the meantime, General MacArthur’s orders to conduct harassing and interdiction raids behind North Korean lines along the coasts led to unilateral action by the services and the United Kingdom. Coordination was minimal as the U.S. Navy commenced to launch special operations. The combined, joint Raiding Force Group of GHQ Raiders, 1st Marine Division Reconnaissance Company, UDT-1, United Kingdom (UK) Volunteer Force, and the 41 Independent Commando Royal Marines fell apart before it could be assembled. But, South Korea supported the concept of carrying the fight behind enemy lines. Three hundred specially-selected ROK military and policemen were sent to Camp McGill on 19 September 1950, to receive thirty days of raider and guerrilla training. A U.S. Army advisory team, led by LTC William G. “Mike” White, was assigned and they became the Special Attack Battalion (SAB) of the Special Activities Group (SAG), the name selected for MacArthur’s Raiding Force Group.14

The Special Operations Group (SOG) of Amphibious Group One (PhibGruOne) that had the USS Bass, Begor, Diachenko, and Wantuck [(APDs 124, 127, 123, and 125), UDT-1, and the U.S. Marine 1st Recon Company (-) assigned conducted a series of demolition raids against railroad targets (tracks, bridges, and tunnels) along the east coast of Korea, 12-15 August 1950.15 The PhibGruOne staff operations officer, most recently the Officer in Charge (OIC) of the Navy’s Amphibious Reconnaissance School, Coronado, California, USMC Major Edward P. Dupras, was a WWII Raider Battalion veteran. The APDs (by U.S. Navy Hull classification AP = transport and D = destroyer) had been specially modified to support Raider operations during WWII and operational UDT elements were already in Japan for the EUSA amphibious training program.16

In reference to the PhibGruOne SOG, “We were ready to do what nobody else could do, and what nobody else wanted to do,” said Lt. Teddy Roosevelt Fielding, the Executive Officer of the UDT-1 detachment.17 Still, attempting to destroy railroad tunnels with explosives proved to be an exercise in futility, though the explosion at night was “a sight to behold” according to Lt. (j.g.) K.J. Christoph, UDT-1. The tunnels remained intact even when an ammunition train found hiding inside added to the explosive power. “It simply blew a huge fart out both ends,” clarified Lt. (j.g.) George Atcheson.18 Part of the deception plan to mask General MacArthur’s counter-offensive against the North Korean Army was a subsequent mission assigned to the PhibGruOne SOG.

Rear Admiral James H. Doyle (PhibGruOne) tasked the SOG to carry out several beach recons on the west coast to locate possible alternative landing sites for Inch’on. Doyle and Major General (MG) Oliver P. “O.P.” Smith, the 1st Marine Division commander, were leery of the dangerous tidal ranges and flat beach gradients at Inch’on. During darkness on 21 August 1950 the USS Bass, carrying the UDTs and Recon Marines, arrived just off the first objective, a beach at the opening of a narrow bay 60 miles south of Inch’on. Two other destroyers accompanied the Bass to provide fire support if needed. To take advantage of high tide the beach landing party had to operate under an almost full moon. But, everything went as planned. The Bass recovered all personnel and moved further south to Kunsan, the second objective.19

The next beach reconnoitered had an airstrip nearby guarded by North Korean troops living in a barracks to the north. This beach was protected by a centrally-located machinegun bunker above the sand dunes. The Marines landed after receiving an “all clear” signal from the scout swimmers and scattered to establish a defensive perimeter. While the UDT teams prepared to make depth soundings and measure beach gradients, an enemy patrol was spotted approaching the Marine perimeter. A loud warning shout in English triggered the enemy machinegun team to rake the beach with heavy fire, badly wounding the Marine sergeant who sounded the alarm. With the recon compromised, an immediate withdrawal was ordered. Because loaded rubber boats created bigger targets in the moonlight, everyone slipped overboard to swim them out of small arms range. Some of the boats, hit by the gunfire, were barely usable. In the confusion of breaking contact, men were left behind.20

A rescue party had to be launched from the Bass to recover nine Marines and a UDT-3 seaman, Mack Boynton. Rifle and machinegun fire greeted the rescue force, but the Marines, including two wounded, were recovered. Finding his boat deflated by gunfire, Boynton swam the two miles back to the APD. Luckily, he got to the vessel shortly after the rescue party was recovered. He was pulled aboard after shouting, “Ahoy the Bass.”21 Three weeks later the GHQ Raider Company and Pounds’ Force returned to reconnoiter the Kunsan beaches.22

The last major feint to distract the North Koreans from the Allied invasion site at Inch’on was done by Army and British Raiders of General MacArthur’s Special Activities Group. The GHQ Raider Company (106 personnel) and the 14 men of the UK Volunteer Force (Pounds’ Force) received the 13 September 1950 mission. This combined raiding element, attached to COMNAVFE for operations effective 7 September and “chopped” to X Corps on 9 September were led by Major James H. Wear, a WWII combat infantryman. The new SAG commander, artillery Colonel Louis B. Ely, accompanied them.23

The Royal Navy frigate, HMS Whitesand Bay, carried the two elements just below Kunsan, about 100 miles south of Inch’on, where the raiding force disembarked in ten-man rubber boats to reconnoiter four separate beach sites. The northern element, the 3rd Platoon (1LT Louie W. Donoho) GHQ Raiders led by MAJ Wear, the central force (1LT Albert T. Noreen, Jr., 2nd Platoon), and the smallest, LT Pounds’ Force (accompanied by MAJ D.L.S.M. Aldridge, executive officer, 41 Commando, observing) headed to their assigned beaches on the mainland while 1LT Daryl G. Robb, accompanied by COL Ely and escorted by 1LT James W. Clance, a battlefield-commissioned WWII paratrooper, headed toward Sokae-do to secure that island and cover the withdrawal from the Kunsan beaches. MAJ Wear with 3rd Platoon (north) was separated from the center beach site (LT Noreen and 2nd Platoon) by a promontory on the mainland. Pounds proceeded with his force to investigate the southernmost beach.24

Pounds’ Force encountered no resistance, but the Raider force on the northern beach began receiving heavy enemy machinegun fire shortly after the flotilla of RB-10s grounded ashore. “When we hit the beach, we did all the right things. We grabbed the rubber boats and went up about fifteen yards, all the while stomping on small rocks. It sounded like Headquarters and Service Battalion parading down the street from the Dai Ichi building. When the machinegun opened up, I remember green and orange flashes [tracer] and the sound of air being lost from the rubber boats,” said Sergeant First Class (SFC) Patrick T. Gannon, Sr.25 The first burst of .61 cal machinegun fire seriously wounded Corporal (CPL) Raymond E. Puttin, crouching near MAJ Wear.

Unbeknownst to the Kunsan beach recon elements, CPL John W. Maines was killed and 1LT Clance seriously wounded on Sokae-do after scouting the island. Hearing the firing on the mainland, Robb’s platoon began returning to their boats where COL Ely and some guards were waiting.26 The lightly armed Raiders and Forcemen held their fire when the enemy opened up on the northern beach recon party. “I was in a prone position with the bolt pulled back on my Thompson [sub-machinegun], but no orders came to fire – so, I didn’t. I was happy that we had the discipline we did, because I had no way of knowing that those dim, fast-moving figures [on Kunsan beach] were our own people,” recalled SFC Gannon.27

Having been discovered, MAJ Wear and the other commanders ordered an immediate withdrawal. Since they were not carrying hand grenades and had no radio to call for covering fire to break contact, the withdrawal and escape in the rubber boats proved chaotic. In the confusion CPL Puttin, treated and being sheltered by Raider medic CPL Billy D. Oneyear, was evacuated to the boats.28

However, the dead Maines and mortally wounded Clance were left behind on the island of Sokae-do. COL Ely who was trailing behind the island recon force seemed to have been the only one to fire his weapon. He claimed afterwards to have “killed a few g----” in the darkness.29 When the colonel turned on a flashlight and began calling the roster to account for everyone, its beam served as a magnet for enemy fire. A Raider put an end to that by knocking the flashlight into the sea. The enemy fire was so intense that PFC Robert Bach, BAR ammo bearer for PFC Delmer E. Davis, 3rd Squad, 3rd Platoon had his paddle shattered by machinegun fire.30

After the elements assembled they paddled back to the Whitesand Bay. Later that night a valiant attempt to recover the two Raiders left behind on Sokae-do island was scrubbed when the volunteers discovered the shore swarming with NKPA soldiers.31 Aboard ship CPL Puttin died before the Whitesand Bay could meet a naval vessel with a surgeon. The Raider was buried at sea late the next afternoon as the SAG forces proceeded north for their next mission.32

During the Inch’on invasion planning, Major General Edward M. Almond, Chief of Staff, UN Command, and COL Ely had conjured up another mission to follow the Kunsan feint. The HMS Whitesand Bay would carry SAG forces to a transfer point between the two UN coastal blockade screening stations, 26 and 27. While at sea, they were to transfer to ROK naval vessels which would ferry them to a point off Changbong-sudo. Then, the SAG elements were to unload their RB-10s and paddle three miles on the evening tide of D-Day (15 September 1950) to land at Koajan-ni. From there, the reinforced Raider company was to move overland (twelve miles) and seize Kimpo Airfield by D+1 and hold it until relieved by 1st Marine Division. The airfield was reputedly guarded by a battalion-sized NKPA force.33

Even though the 1st Marine Division commander, MG O.P. Smith, had convinced MG Almond to cancel the airfield assault, COL Ely chose to ignore the decision and continued on with the mission. However, transloading personnel and equipment from vessel to vessel at sea proved extremely difficult and time consuming (because it had never been practiced). Hence, by the time the ROK vessels reached the drop off point in the Han River estuary, the outgoing tide was at its peak. The current was too strong to launch the rubber assault boats. Crossing two miles of mud flats at low tide after the RB-10s grounded was still another impossible challenge for the combined raiding force.34

While it was a good thing in retrospect, the Raiders’ failure to get ashore caused them to be stranded aboard APA-27, USS George Clymer, until D+4. APA-27 had carried elements of the 1st Marine Division from Japan for the Inch’on invasion. Afterwards, it steamed offshore serving as the alternate amphibious command and control vessel and hospital ship. The upper deck was rigged up as an emergency evacuation center that had “operating and recovery rooms as well as small surgical and medical wards.”35 The aborted Kimpo mission was the end of the Raiders’ amphibious raiding role and COL Ely as the SAG commander.36 However, “we had a ringside seat, just like General MacArthur did on the USS Mount McKinley for the Inch’on invasion,” said PFC Delmer E. Davis, BAR man, 3rd Squad, 3rd Platoon of the GHQ Raiders.37

“The Provisional Raider Company and the Royal Navy Volunteer Group were successfully employed in the Kunsan, Korea area on D-1 and 2 in implementation of the Cover and Deception Plan for the Inch’on invasion. They were successfully withdrawn from this area and moved to the objective area on D-Day to be debarked with objective of capturing Kimpo Airfield. This latter operation was cancelled due to inability to launch the small boats.” These were General MacArthur’s comments in his message to Army Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, after the successful landings at Inch’on.38

BG E.W. Piburn, the CG of Headquarters and Service Command, GHQ cited the Raider Company for its significant role in the Inch’on invasion (Operation CHROMITE): “The Raider Company, particularly the diversionary attack [at Kunsan], materially aided in the success of the Inch’on invasion.”39 Thus, they were included in a Navy Presidential Unit Citation (as the Army Special Operations Company) awarded to 1st Marine Division, Reinforced for exemplary service from 15 September to 11 October 1950 by the Secretary of the Navy.40

General MacArthur’s FECOM Chief of Staff and newly appointed X Corps commander, MG Almond, realized the value added (intelligence collection and counter-guerrilla operations) that SAG could provide to his corps in North Korea. And, supporting ground SOF missions was much simpler than coordinating naval assets to conduct coastal raiding. The X Corps Raiders and the ROK Special Attack Battalion of SAG performed superbly in North and South Korea for MG Almond.

Special operations during the Korean War were primarily shaped by weather, moon phases (tides and illumination) and driven by availability of transport for delivery, recovery, resupply, level of unit training, service branch and/or Allied contingent support. The absence of unified command and control added to the confusion and competition for scarce delivery means. Strategic employment of special operations forces was largely ignored. Critical tactical situations at regiment and battalion level regularly caused them to be used as assault elements for infantry attacks, armor force protection, reaction forces to recapture key terrain, to “plug gaps,” or simply to blunt enemy penetrations in static defensive lines.41

It was the availability of transportation that most determined what was done by special operations units in Korea. The American Raiders and Rangers in Korea shared three things in common: Both did a lot of walking; both did very little truck riding; and, they fought with distinction until their deactivations in late July and early August 1951. The GHQ/X Corps Raiders, the EUSA Ranger Company, and the six Ranger Infantry (Airborne Companies (trained at Fort Benning, Georgia) that served in Korea faded from Army rolls without fanfare less than a year after being created.42