

MATURING THE MACOM

1993 – 2001

HISTORY OF THE U.S. ARMY
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, VOLUME II



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Mr. Chris Howard
Mr. Kurt Sisk
Dr. Jared Tracy

Dr. Troy Sacquety, General Editor

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COMMAND HISTORIAN FOREWORD

Maturing the MACOM, 1993-2001: History of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Volume II, is the second volume in an organizational history series produced by the USASOC History Office. The first volume, published in 1996 and reprinted in 2026, was originally titled *Standing Up the MACOM: The U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 1987-1992*. It covered the origins of command in the 1980s through its activation in 1989, and then the three busy years that followed. This second volume picks up where the first left off, covering significant organizational developments within USASOC through 9/11.

During this period, USASOC adjusted to the new realities of the post-Cold War world. Although spared the major force reductions that defined the period for much of the Department of Defense, Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) experienced little net growth. USASOC added one O-6 command, the Special Operations Support Command (SOSCOM), along with several other smaller elements. Internal reorganizations were not uncommon, particularly within Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) headquarters.

ARSOF was well-positioned to support the “preventative defense” strategy that defined the immediate post-Cold War Era due to the regional alignment, cultural and linguistic expertise, experience as trainers, and non-lethal capabilities of its Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and Special Forces units. It maintained a high operational tempo relative to the rest of the Army during this period, gaining valuable experience and enduring losses along the way. While this volume is primarily an organizational history of ARSOF, significant operations will be addressed, primarily through the lens of them being catalysts for structural change.

The volume is organized by echelons of command, starting with Headquarters, USASOC, followed by Major Subordinate Commands and Units (MSCs/MSUs). Each chapter includes an executive summary and information related to mission, organization, key leadership, historical background, and significant activities. Several included appendices supply additional reference information.

Maturing the MACOM ends somewhat abruptly on 10 September 2001, as the horrific events of the following day fundamentally changed both USASOC, the nation it serves, and the world. The post-9/11 period will be covered in subsequent volumes. - *Sine Pari* -

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of stylized, cursive letters that appear to read 'T. J. Sacquety'.

Troy J. Sacquety, Ph.D.
Command Historian

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INTRODUCTION:

A CHANGING WORLD (1993 – 2001)

The 1980s had been a transformative decade for Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF). Capabilities existed by decade's end that few would have imagined ten years earlier, when ARSOF was still reeling from post-Vietnam War downsizing. The 1980s witnessed the birth of dedicated Special Operations Aviation, Support, and Signal units, a new Ranger Regimental headquarters, and new command structures, culminating in the activation of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) as a major Army command (MACOM) on 1 December 1989. During the ensuing decade, ARSOF worked to consolidate the gains of the 1980s while adjusting to the emerging requirements of a post-Cold War world.

The month before USASOC's activation, the Berlin Wall, a physical manifestation of the Iron Curtain that had divided Eastern and Western Europe since the end of World War II, had fallen. The day after the activation ceremony, on 2 December 1989, U.S. President George H.W. Bush and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev met in Malta to discuss the rapidly unfolding events in Europe. During their summit, they declared an end to the Cold War that had dominated both country's and their allies foreign policy, and their military strategy, for more than forty years. Soon after, Eastern Europeans began toppling their ruling communist regimes. The Soviet Union, for so long America's main strategic adversary, disintegrated by the end of 1991, leaving the U.S. as the world's lone superpower.¹

That year, James R. Locher III, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC), likened the sudden end of the Cold War to British General Charles Cornwallis' surrender to General George Washington at Yorktown, when the vanquished British Army band played, "The World Turned Upside Down."² It surely felt that way to those who knew only forty-five years of superpower conflict. It now fell to the victorious U.S. and its leadership to define what the future would look like.

Speaking in Aspen, Colorado, on 2 August 1990, President Bush laid out a post-Cold War defense strategy based on four fundamental

1 The Soviet Union was also known as the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

2 James R. Locher III, address to the Association of Special Operations Professionals at SOFEX '91, November 1991, Fort Bragg, NC, reprinted in *Special Warfare* 5:1 (1 March 1992): 11.

principles: strategic deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and the ability to reconstitute forces when needed. He called for “a policy of peacetime engagement” and cited Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait just hours earlier as evidence that the world “remains a dangerous place with serious threats to important U.S. interests.”³ To counter sudden, unexpected, and unpredictable threats from rogue nations and non-state actors, Bush emphasized the importance of readiness and rapid response. “In an era when threats may emerge with little or no warning,” he said, “our ability to defend our interests will depend on our speed and our agility. And we will need forces that give us a global reach.”⁴ ARSOF was well suited to provide the sort rapidly deployable, agile force that Bush envisioned.

The following month, on 11 September 1990, President Bush shared his vision for “a new world order” in an address to Congress.⁵ As he spoke, thousands of ARSOF soldiers were among the U.S. troops in, or on their way to, Saudi Arabia, for DESERT SHIELD, to deter further Iraqi aggression. During the ensuing DESERT STORM combat operations to liberate Kuwait, lasting from 16 January to 28 February 1991, ARSOF successfully performed a wide range of missions including foreign internal defense (FID), special reconnaissance (SR), combat search and rescue (CSAR), direct action (DA), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), and Civil Affairs (CA). After a ceasefire ended combat operations, ARSOF transitioned to rebuilding Kuwait and supporting the PROVIDE COMFORT relief mission to Iraq’s Kurdish population.

The U.S.-led coalition’s overwhelming victory in DESERT STORM showcased the impact of precision-guided weapons, stealth, and night vision devices. These technologies, in conjunction with the end of the Cold War, helped inspire what was termed a “Revolution in Military Affairs.”⁶ Within the broad context of these discussions, current, former, and future SOF leaders sought to define the role of ARSOF heading into the twenty-first century, specifically in what became known as “military operations other than war” (MOOTW, sometimes shortened

3 Bush, “Remarks at the Aspen Institute Symposium in Aspen, Colorado,” 2 August 1990, <https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/public-papers/2128>, hereafter “Bush remarks at Aspen.”

4 Bush remarks at Aspen.

5 George H.W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit, 11 September 1990, <https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/public-papers/2217>.

6 William S. Cohen, *Report to the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress*, April 1997 (70), https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1997_DoD_AR.pdf?ver=2014-06-24-153256-173.

to OOTW).⁷ The consensus among SOF advocates was that ARSOF's strength in MOOTW lay in its regional orientation, cultural awareness, language skills, and its ability perform a variety of missions in a wide range of environments on short notice and with a minimal footprint.⁸

Within ARSOF, these characteristics were most applicable to Special Forces (SF), CA, and PSYOP. Ironically, although most SOF leaders agreed that CA and PSYOP were important, if not critical, to the success of Bush's engagement-focused strategy, the status of these functions as inherently SOF was a topic of debate, with real world implications on funding and authorities for CA and PSYOP.

PSYOP's formal association with ARSOF began in 1952, with the establishment of the Psychological Warfare Center - now the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) - and CA first came under the ARSOF umbrella in 1971. Most active component CA and PSYOP units were assigned to 1st Special Operations Command (1st SOCOM) when it was provisionally established in 1982, and unity of command for active and reserve component ARSOF, including CA and PSYOP, provided part of the justification for activating USASOC as a MACOM. To this end, USASOC assumed control of CONUS-based active and reserve component CA and PSYOP units soon after its activation. A year later, in November 1990, the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) was activated as a major subordinate command (MSC) under USASOC.⁹ This arrangement implied that CA and PSYOP, which supported both conventional and special operations forces, were SOF, but the status of the functions was not formally resolved until 3 March 1993, when Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Les Aspin officially designated CA and PSYOP as SOF.¹⁰

7 Much of this discussion played out in the pages of *Special Warfare* magazine, a product of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), which featured original and reprinted works by a wide range of contributors, including GEN Henry H. Shelton, GEN Carl W. Stiner, retired Lieutenant General (LTG) William P. Yarborough, Major General (MG) Sidney Shachnow, MG William F. Garrison, MG Kenneth R. Bowra, and then-Major Kenneth Tovo, who would later command USASOC.

8 GEN Carl W. Stiner, "Special Operations Forces: Strategic Potential for the Future," *Special Warfare* 6:2 (May 1993): 2 – 9; GEN Henry H. Shelton, "Special Operations Forces: Key Role in Preventative Defense," *Defense Issues* 12.1 (undated). 1 – 2. GEN Shelton later served as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1997 to 2001.

9 USACAPOC effectively replaced the short-lived U.S. Army Reserve Special Operations Command (USARSOC), which had been formed a year earlier to command all reserve component ARSOF units.

10 Stephen E. Everett and L. Martin Kaplan, *Department of the Army Historical Summary*, Fiscal Year 1993, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2002, 66.

Concurrent with USACAPOC's activation in 1990, the Army activated the U.S. Army Special Forces Command (USASFC) as the higher headquarters for all nine Army Special Forces Groups (five active duty, two U.S. Army Reserve, and two Army National Guard). Together with USAJFKSWCS, these represented USASOC's MSCs. The transition to functionally aligned MSCs strengthened the command and control (C2) of SF, CA, and PSYOP, but it created C2 challenges for other active component ARSOF units formerly assigned to 1st SOCOM. To address this problem for the 75th Ranger Regiment, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, and Army special mission units, USASOC provisionally established the U.S. Army Special Operations Integration Command (USASOIC) in the early 1990s.¹¹ It also activated the Special Operations Support Command (SOSCOM) in late 1995 to improve C2 for its two dedicated ARSOF Support units, the 528th Support Battalion and 112th Signal Battalion.

In the mid-1990s, the administration of President William J. Clinton (1993 – 2001) signaled a minor shift in defense policy. Clinton continued to emphasize the Bush Era theme of engagement, with the goal of enlarging U.S. economic and security partnerships, while placing increased emphasis on the promotion of democratic systems of government and market-oriented economies. The core objectives of Clinton's National Security Strategy remained constant throughout this period:

- 1.** To enhance our security with military forces that are ready to fight.
- 2.** To bolster America's economic revitalization.
- 3.** To promote democracy.¹²

William J. Perry, Clinton's SECDEF from 1994 to 1997, introduced the concept of preventative defense in his March 1996 report to Congress. "Preventive defense," he wrote, "seeks to keep potential dangers to our security from becoming full-blown threats. It is perhaps our most

¹¹ Never formally activated, USASOIC (P) provided administrative control and coordination for assigned units. By the mid-1990s, it was disestablished and its core functions were subsumed by two new USASOC staff directorates, the Army Compartmented Element (ACE) and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Special Operations Aviation (DCSSOA).

¹² <https://history.defense.gov/Historical-Sources/National-Security-Strategy/>. This repository currently includes National Security Strategies from 1987 to 2017.

important tool for protecting American interests from the special dangers that characterize the post-Cold War era. When successful, preventive defense precludes the need to deter or fight a war.”¹³ The approach rested on four pillars:

- Working cooperatively with former Soviet republics to reduce the nuclear legacy of the former Soviet Union and to improve the safety of residual weapons.
- Establishing programs to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
- Encouraging newly independent and newly democratic nations to restructure their defense establishments to emphasize civilian control of their military, transparency in their defense programs and confidence-building measures with their neighbors.
- Establishing cooperative defense-to-defense relationships with nations that are neither full-fledged allies nor adversaries, but who are, nonetheless, important to our security.

Of these four pillars, ARSOF figured most prominently in the fourth, with limited involvement in the second and third. Writing in 1997, General Henry H. Shelton, Commander-in-Chief, USSOCOM, from 1996 to 1997, highlighted the key SOF role in preventative defense, citing SOF’s “traditional core missions and capabilities, forward global presence and employments, regional orientation, unique language skills, and cultural awareness.”¹⁴ Defense Department leaders clearly agreed with his assessment, judging from their extensive employment of ARSOF in many “MOOTW” of the 1990s, from peace support operations, to humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), FID, demining, counternarcotics, and non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO). The list of operations that ARSOF supported during this period is extensive, and specific ARSOF unit contributions are addressed

13 William J. Perry, *Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress*, March 1996, viii, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1996_DoD_AR.pdf?ver=2014-06-24-153009-697

14 Echoing the GEN James Lindsay’s comments at the USASOC activation ceremony, GEN Shelton likened the new approach to “preventive medicine,” noting that it seeks to “forestall dangerous developments before they require drastic remedies.”

throughout this volume. What follows is a brief overview of several of the most significant operations of the period covered herein.

Operations in Somalia began with PROVIDE HOPE, a HA-focused mission initiated in 1992. It expanded into RESTORE HOPE in late 1992, supported by CA, PSYOP, and SF units. In August 1993, Task Force (TF) Ranger, which included elements of the 75th Ranger Regiment, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, and other ARSOF elements, deployed to Somalia to confront the warlord-driven instability that was inhibiting international relief efforts and exacerbating the humanitarian crisis. During their mission, TF Ranger soldiers engaged in some of the fiercest urban combat since the Vietnam War, losing seventeen of their number in the process.

Beyond Somalia, instability on the African continent precipitated multiple NEO missions supported by ARSOF, including two in Liberia (ASSURED RESPONSE and SHADOW EXPRESS). More typical of the engagement-focused, preventative defense approach was the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), which promoted military-to-military exchanges between the U.S. and various African partner nations - an extension of the traditional SF FID mission. ARSOF also contributed to the 2000 flood relief mission in Mozambique, Operation ATLAS RESPONSE.

ARSOF involvement in Haiti, beginning with Operations UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in 1994, was an early foray into peace support operations for CA, PSYOP, and SF. Another such mission began in late 1995, following the breakup of Yugoslavia, which led to ethno-sectarian conflict in the Balkans. U.S. involvement, as part of a larger North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mission, included operations JOINT ENDEAVOR, JOINT GUARD, and JOINT FORGE, the last of which lasted well into the 21st century.

Through these missions, and many others, ARSOF's ability to build partnerships and gain access made it the joint force's "Global Scouts," capable of providing enhanced situational awareness to combatant commanders. This came at a price, as the demand for ARSOF seemed almost limitless. The enduring nature of peace support operations, in particular, took a toll. As early as 1994, USACAPOC was citing high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) among its challenges. Some units were already facing manning and readiness issues. Any doubts that ARSOF would have a prominent role in the post-Cold War world had long since vanished.

Against the backdrop of these steadily increasing operational commitments, USASOC continued to mature as a MACOM. Its headquarters evolved, consistent with the visions of multiple Commanding Generals, to subsume roles previously performed at the MSC level. In turn, the MSCs and Major Subordinate Units (MSUs) focused primarily on their role as force providers, responsible for manning, training, equipping, and validating their subordinate elements. As will be seen throughout this monograph, the organizational changes of the era were noteworthy, though not transformative, and net growth to ARSOF was limited by the general post-Cold War drawdown within the DoD.

It was only with the benefit of hindsight that the 1990s seemed like the calm before the storm for ARSOF, and for the nation. On 11 September 1990, President George H.W. Bush had spoken optimistically of “a new era - freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace.”¹⁵ Eleven years later, with the world turned upside down once again, his son, President George W. Bush, announced the start of the war against terrorism. The impact on ARSOF would be both immediate and far-reaching.

¹⁵ Bush address to Congress, 11 September 1990.

CHAPTER I:

HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Activated 1 December 1989 as the Major Army Command (MACOM) for Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) and the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) for the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), USASOC continued to evolve and mature during the period spanning from the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s to the start of the Global War on Terrorism in late 2001. The leaders guided USASOC through this maturation period had to address organizational and jurisdictional issues left unresolved at the time USASOC's activation, such as how to balance core functions between the MACOM and its Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs) in an increasingly resource constrained environment. This occurred against the backdrop of a rapidly changing post-Cold War world in which "peacetime engagement" missions strained the MACOM's limits as a force provider. By late 2001, many of these challenges and issues had been resolved, just in time for even greater ones to emerge.

KEY PERSONNEL:

COMMANDERS

LTG Wayne A. Downing	AUG 1991 – MAY 1993
LTG James T. Scott	MAY 1993 – AUG 1996
LTG Peter J. Schoomaker	AUG 1996 – OCT 1997
LTG William P. Tangney	MAR 1998 – OCT 2000
LTG Bryan D. Brown	OCT 2000 – AUG 2002

DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERALS


BG Richard Potter	JUL 1992 – NOV 1994
BG William P. Tangney	NOV 1994 – MAY 1995
BG Kenneth Bowra	FEB 1996 – MAY 1996
BG James Parker	JUL 1997 – JUN 1998
BG William J. Leszczynski, Jr	SEP 1998 – JUN 1999

COMMAND SERGEANTS MAJOR


CSM Jimmie W. Spencer	AUG 1991 – AUG 1993
CSM Henry O. Bone	AUG 1993 – AUG 1996
CSM Melvin L. Wick	AUG 1996 – JUN 1997
CSM William H. Rambo, Jr.	JUN 1997 – AUG 1998
CSM Richard A. Efird	AUG 1998 – NOV 2001

ORGANIZATION:

USASOC Organization (1993)



USASOC Organization (2001)



HISTORICAL NARRATIVE:

BACKGROUND

From the establishment of the U.S. Army in 1775 through World War II, what is today considered ARSOF lacked definition, permanence, and unity of command. More enduring ARSOF capabilities, commands, and units began to take shape during the Korean War, under the leadership of Brigadier General (BG) Robert A. McClure, the Army's Chief of the Office of Psychological Warfare. At BG McClure's urging, the

Army moved toward a unified command-and-control structure for ARSOF, at the time consisting of units designed to conduct psychological warfare (Psywar) and unconventional warfare (UW). One early milestone came in April 1952, when the Army established the Psywar Center, now the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, as both the headquarters and proponent for Psywar and UW. This command arrangement endured for thirty years, encompassing the duration of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and adding Army Civil Affairs (CA) to its portfolio in the early 1970s. Throughout the 1970s, a sizeable portion of ARSOF was either inactivated, slated for inactivation, or reallocated to the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR).

In the early 1980s, following the failure of Operation EAGLE CLAW in Iran, the Army, led by Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General (GEN) Edward Meyer, reexamined ARSOF's manning, capabilities, organization, and command structures. With Meyer's endorsement, the Army provisionally established 1st Special Operations Command (1st SOCOM) in October 1982 to provide a higher headquarters for active component Special Forces (SF), Ranger, Psychological Operations (PSYOP), and CA units. By mid-decade, 1st SOCOM had added newly formed Special Operations Aviation and ARSOF Support units, along with an additional Ranger battalion and a Ranger regimental headquarters.

By the late 1980s, Army and SOF leaders acknowledged that the continued expansion of ARSOF had rendered 1st SOCOM, a two-star command, an inadequate command and control solution. In September 1988, GEN Carl E. Vuono, CSA, approved the concept for an ARSOF MACOM to consolidate command of active and reserve component ARSOF units. Accordingly, USASOC was provisionally established on 1 December 1988, marking the start of a year-long process of standing up the command that culminated in its formal activation on 1 December 1989. Its initial mission was to organize, train, equip, and validate ARSOF for worldwide employment, a mission that remained fundamentally the same for the duration of the period covered in this volume.¹⁶

Newly promoted Lieutenant General (LTG) Gary E. Luck took command of USASOC upon activation. At the time, USASOC included 14,000 active duty and 10,000 reserve soldiers assigned to 1st

16 For more information on USASOC's establishment and early history (1987 – 1992), see Dr. Richard Stewart (et.al), *Standing Up the MACOM, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, 1996.*

SOCOM, the new U.S. Army Reserve Special Operations Command (USARSOC), USAJFKSWCS, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Group, and the 75th Ranger Regiment. Initially, USASOC lacked full control of USAJFKSWCS and USAR ARSOF units, a problem that was resolved the following year. The result was a unity of ARSOF command that had not previously existed.

USASOC faced its first test within weeks of activation, helping spearhead Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama and supporting subsequent stability operations in PROMOTE LIBERTY. In late-summer 1990, USASOC rapidly deployed another large contingent to Saudi Arabia for Operation DESERT SHIELD, and ARSOF figured prominently in subsequent DESERT STORM combat operations, which liberated Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in early 1991. ARSOF soldiers would maintain a brisk operational tempo for the remainder of the 1990s in such places as Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans. These and other operations are covered in subsequent chapters.

In August 1991, LTG Wayne A. Downing succeeded LTG Michael Spigelmire to become USASOC's third Commanding General. Unlike many of his peers, who had served with SF in Vietnam, Downing's Vietnam service was with the conventional infantry, and his formative SOF assignments were all with the Rangers. He commanded 2nd Ranger Battalion from 1977 to 1979 and was selected to lead the newly established 75th Ranger Regiment in 1984. After this, he gained exposure to broader ARSOF community during his time as the Deputy Commanding General (DCG), 1st SOCOM, from 1985 to 1987. He later commanded the Joint Special Operations Command during Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM.

EARLY CHALLENGES

One challenge facing the command in the early 1990s was the persistence of the Cold War mindset that had defined ARSOF for 45 years.¹⁷ LTG Downing considered how emerging post-Cold War missions would impact his command, and whether USASOC was properly resourced and structured to perform these missions. This would require restructuring

17 GEN Wayne A. Downing interview with Dr. Richard Stewart, 24 August 1993, copy of transcript in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; hereafter, "Downing interview, 24 August 1993." Downing noted the obsolescence of plans "designed to attack the Soviet Union from 360 degrees with 250 Special Forces Teams," saying "that ain't going to happen."

USASOC Headquarters in order to “facilitate maximum use of scarce manpower and develop a clear division of labor within the MSCs.”¹⁸

As part of this shift in mindset, LTG Downing wanted to “get the Command away from even thinking about deploying.” Instead, he wanted it “oriented on its primary mission...[of] provid[ing] trained and ready ARSOF to the warfighting Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs), to the standing Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), to the ambassadors in the country teams, and to other government agencies.”¹⁹ He saw USASOC’s main functions as resourcing, training, and “marketing SOF.”²⁰

THE RESOURCING DILEMMA

A few months after assuming command, LTG Downing issued a Mission Guidance memorandum in which he articulated “maturing USASOC as a capable MACOM” as one of his goals.²¹ This was necessary because the compromises made to gain Army approval for USASOC’s activation meant that it was not sufficiently manned and resourced to perform all of its MACOM functions.²² Some of these functions had traditionally been performed at the MSC level, particularly by USAJFKSWCS, and realigning these functions within the MACOM staff proved contentious.

Still, Downing recognized the need for a strong, well-resourced MACOM, even if it required unpopular decisions. “If the MACOM [is] unable to articulate its needs and to compete in the resourcing arena,” Downing said, “then the whole Command [will] suffer.” He noted the necessity of the MACOM integrating into the USSOCOM strategic planning and resource allocation processes, as well as the need to speak with “a cogent, rational voice.” His assessment was that this was not the case when he assumed command.²³

Speaking with one voice was challenging because resourcing responsibilities were diffused throughout the command. Downing wanted them concentrated at the MACOM level, and he formed the Force Development and Force Integration Directorate for this purpose.

18 Downing interview, 24 August 1993.

19 Downing interview, 24 August 1993. He added, “That’s what the [Theater Special Operations Commands] are for.”

20 Downing interview, 24 August 1993.

21 LTG Wayne A. Downing, Memorandum for Commanding Generals USASFC, USAJFKSWCS, USACAPOC, and DCG, USASOC, “SUBJ: Mission Guidance,” 12 December 1991, copy in USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC; hereafter, “USASOC Mission Guidance Letter, date.”


22 Downing interview, 24 August 1993.

23 Downing interview, 24 August 1993.

This required transferring some functions traditionally performed by USAJFKSWCS to USASOC, although he noted that it “was very hard to make that happen.”²⁴ During this process, Downing recalled being “well-served by some very innovative people...like [COL] Anthony Normand [his Chief of Staff] and LTC William McMullen, who really worked hard to come up with some good concepts.”²⁵

Downing emphasized gaining buy in from the command’s other General Officers for major changes, versus making the changes by edict, reasoning that the MSCs were going to be responsible for

HQ, USASOC Organization (December 1992)



24 Downing interview, 24 August 1993.

25 Downing interview, 24 August 1993.

implementation. Among these changes was reorienting the USASFC and USACAPOC commanders to focus primarily on combat readiness. Downing remembered telling his subordinate commanders to “live in the field with their troops” and “be hands on with the field activities.” In return, he wanted them to let the MACOM “worry about the resourcing and the personnel functions.”²⁶ Ultimately, Downing acknowledged that it took longer than expected to make these changes happen, but he was content that “everybody got their say.” He described it as “one of the toughest things that I’ve done in a long time.”²⁷

TRAINING AND MARKETING

On the topic of training, Downing expressed satisfaction with existing training and assessment & selection programs, crediting MG Leroy Suddath, a former 1st SOCOM Commander, with instilling the highest expectations for both training and personal conduct. “This business is all about people,” Downing said, [and] “we want to get them the best technology that we can get them, but if we don’t have the right people the best technology is not going to accomplish the mission. On the other hand, if we select the right people, we can give them anything and they’ll find a way to get the job done.”²⁸

Having the right people with the right training supported LTG Downing’s third priority of marketing SOF. He endeavored to “sell SOF” to what he viewed as the four categories of customers: regional CINCs, the standing JSOTF, the ambassadors and their country teams, and other government agencies. “What we had to do,” he said, “was tell them what SOF could do for them and then make it easy for them to employ [SOF].”²⁹

The wide dispersal of ARSOF personnel to more than 100 countries annually presented both opportunities and risks from a marketing standpoint. “Any given day,” Downing said, “we’ve got between 500 and 1500 people gone into 40, 50 countries. And if they send the wrong person, not only is that person going to not do the mission, [but he also] has the potential to embarrass the United States of America.”³⁰

Fortunately, in Downing’s view, ARSOF’s performance in recent and

26 Downing interview, 24 August 1993.

27 Downing interview, 24 August 1993.

28 Downing interview, 24 August 1993.

29 Downing interview, 24 August 1993.

30 Downing interview, 24 August 1993.

ongoing operations including PROVIDE COMFORT in Northern Iraq and RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, had “really enlightened a lot of commanders as to what can be done, especially by SF, CA, and PSYOP.” He also highlighted the performance of the 75th Ranger Regiment, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR), and Special Mission Units. “They don’t have any role in the peacetime business,” Downing said, “but when it [comes] to direct action, and taking this thing to the heart of the enemy, nobody in the world can do what those guys can do.”³¹

Despite ARSOF’s exemplary performance in various real-world operations, the fiscal realities of the post-Cold War era were an ever-present concern. USASOC had fared well in the 1993 Department of Defense’s Bottom-Up Review, avoiding any additional cuts in force structure. Still, LTG Downing recognized the necessity of “doing things smarter with less people” and to “be smart stewards of our resources.”³² Near the end of his command tour, he initiated a series of workshops aimed at improving the way USASOC conducted business.³³ These workshops helped inform the maturation of the command well after his departure.

ORGANIZATIONAL RESTRUCTURING UNDER LTG SCOTT

When LTG Downing passed command to LTG James T. Scott in May 1993, a few key issues remained unresolved. The first was the fate of the provisional U.S. Army Special Operations Integration Command (USASOIC). Established under LTG Downing, this small provisional command existed to “organize, equip, facilitate training, coordinate, and manage resource of the 75th Ranger Regiment, 160th SOAR, Army Special Missions Units, and selected Army Materiel Command and Regional CINC units and activities in support of the warfighting CINCs.”³⁴ Downing had commanded a similar organization in the mid-1980s under 1st SOCOM, and did not consider USASOIC a new command, but rather an existing concept under a new name, and he hoped his successor would retain it.³⁵

31 Downing interview, 24 August 1993.

32 Downing interview, 24 August 1993.

33 Downing interview, 24 August 1993.

34 USASOC Mission Guidance, 12 December 1991.

35 Downing Interview, 24 August 1993. Downing recalled, “It was always a separate command element reporting to the commanding general. Always. And it started on the 13th of December 1985. I got called to DA and I set this thing up in the basement of the Pentagon...and [six months later] I transferred it to some trailers down at the old stockade at Fort Bragg. So, I’m the original commander of that organization. I did not create another command. What I did do was legitimize and revalidate their status as a separate command. So, I know that organization extremely well because I was there from the beginning.”

LTG Scott ultimately directed his DCG, MG William P. Tangney, to transition USASOIC into the MACOM staff, a task that MG Tangney completed by February 1995.³⁶ USASOIC was replaced by the Army Compartmented Element (ACE), a HQ, USASOC staff element that reported directly to the DCG.³⁷ Concurrently, USASOC established a Deputy Chief of Staff for Special Operations Aviation (DCSSOA) to manage 160th SOAR-specific administrative functions formerly belonging to USASOIC.

Another problem that LTG Scott inherited was the command and control of the two dedicated ARSOF support battalions, the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion and the 112th Signal Battalion. Both units had MACOM-wide, and in some cases Army and Joint responsibilities, and yet they fell administratively under USASFC. LTG Downing had recognized the need for a separate command for the 528th, 112th, and the Materiel Maintenance Activity (MMA), but he did not feel comfortable creating another headquarters element, due to the reductions he had leveled on everybody else.³⁸ LTG Scott, after examining the problem, concurred with Downing's recommendation and, on 29 June 1995, USASOC provisionally established the Special Operations Support Command (SOSCOM) as a direct reporting unit.³⁹ It was formally activated on 8 December 1995.

Within the USASOC headquarters, LTG Scott oversaw several significant changes, including the elimination of one of USASOC's two DCG positions. When MG Michael W. Davidson, the Deputy Commanding General for Guard and Reserve Affairs since October 1991, departed for USSOCOM in October 1993, his position was not backfilled. Instead, his responsibilities were divided between a Deputy Chief of Staff for Army Reserves (DCSAR) and a Deputy Chief of Staff, National Guard (DCSNG), both O-6 positions. In 1995, the Command Psychologist, which had formerly fallen under the Deputy Chief of Staff, Surgeon, became a primary staff member. Over time, this would evolve into the Directorate of Psychological Applications.

36 MG William P. Tangney interview with Dr. Joseph R. Fischer, Assistant USASOC Historian, 9 May 1996, copy of transcript in USASOC History Office Files, Fort Bragg, NC; hereafter, Tangney interview, date.

37 USASOC Regulation 10-5, "United States Army Special Operations Command Organization & Functions Manual," October 1995, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, 5 – 18; hereafter USASOC 10-5, page number.


38 Downing interview, 24 August 1993. "They're under housekeeping of SF Command. But all the taskings and everything, they always come out of the MACOM!"

39 Chapter 7 addresses the establishment of SOSCOM in greater detail.

These and other organizational changes were codified into a new USASOC 10-5, *Organization and Functions Manual*, published in October 1995. The organizational chart below, which appears in the new manual, reflects the addition of the aforementioned staff elements (ACE, DCSSOA, DCSAR, DCSNG), as well as the elevation of the Command Psychologist to the Special Staff.

Included in the 1995 rewrite was a revised mission statement, which read: “Organize, train, equip, administer, educate, maintain combat readiness, mobilize, and deploy assigned Active Component and Reserve

USASOC Organization (1995)



Component ARSOF to accomplish the assigned missions in support of the warfighting commanders-in-chief (CINCs) and Joint Special Operations Task Forces (JSOTFs).⁴⁰ The new USASOC 10-5 also provided insight into Headquarters, USASOC, manning authorizations at the time, which are depicted in the table below.

HQ, USASOC Authorizations (1995)⁴¹

	OFFICER	WO	ENLISTED	CIVILIAN	MT	TOTAL
Command Group	7	0	9	8	9	24
Inspector General	3	0	4	2	0	9
Staff Judge Advocate	5	1	1	1	1	9
Chaplain	2	0	2	0	0	4
Command Historian	0	0	0	8	0	8
Internal Review	0	0	0	4	1	5
Director of Human Resources	0	0	7	14	1	22
Public Affairs Office	3	0	3	6	1	13
Safety & Occupational Health	0	0	0	7	0	7
Surgeon	8	0	5	6	1	20
Psychologist	3	0	1	1	0	5
Army Compartmented Element	7	2	1	6	0	16
HHC	2	0	7	1	2	12
DCSPER (G-1)	11	1	18	18	2	50
DCSINT (G-2)	8	2	8	42	2	62
DCSOPS (G-3)	29	0	21	33	1	84
DCSLOG (G-4)	10	2	8	26	5	51
DCSIM (G-6)	6	2	10	38	1	57
DCSENG	5	0	5	8	1	19
DCSAC (Contracting)	0	0	1	6	0	7
DCSAR (Army Reserves)	3	0	4	1	1	9
DCSNG (Army National Guard)	2	0	1	0	0	3
DCSSOA (Aviation)	10	1	1	4	0	16
Force Integration Directorate	55	2	23	116	4	200
TOTAL	179	13	140	356	24	712

⁴⁰ USASOC Regulation 10-5, 2-1.

⁴¹ Per Title 10, United States Code, 10216, a military technician (dual status) is a Federal civilian employee who (A) is employed under section 3101 of title 5 or section 709(b) of title 32; (B) is required as a condition of that employment to maintain membership in the Selected Reserve; and (C) is assigned to a civilian position as a technician in the organizing, administering, instructing, or training of the Selected Reserve or in the maintenance and repair of supplies or equipment issued to the Selected Reserve or the armed forces. [https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=\(title:10%20section:10216%20edition:prelim\)](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:10%20section:10216%20edition:prelim))

A NEW HEADQUARTERS

In 1992, USASOC had broken ground on a new facility that would house USASOC, USASFC, and USACAPOC headquarters, then occupying 16 separate structures across Fort Bragg. More than two years later, construction was completed on the three-story, 157,000 square foot building, at a cost of \$27.7 million. On 9 December 1994, GEN Downing, by then the Commander, USSOCOM, traveled to Fort Bragg to help LTG Scott cut the ribbon on the new headquarters.⁴²

During the same ceremony, GEN Downing and LTG Scott dedicated a new ARSOF Memorial Plaza outside the newly opened headquarters. At the time of its dedication, the Memorial Plaza included a new Memorial Wall, twelve memorial stones, and the Special Forces Statue.⁴³ The statue and nine of the stones were previously located at the John F. Kennedy Memorial Plaza on the USAJFKSWCS campus. The nine existing stones represented OSS Detachment 101, the First Special Service Force, OSS Operational Groups, WWII Ranger Battalions, Merrill's Marauders, Ranger Regiment Association, OSS Jedburgh Teams, Korean War Ranger Infantry Companies (Airborne), and the Special Forces Association. During the 9 December ceremony, additional stones were dedicated in honor of the Alamo Scouts, Civil Affairs, and the Vietnam-era Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRPs) and Ranger Companies.

RESERVE COMPONENT RELATIONS

One challenge that all USASOC CGs of this period dealt with was Reserve Component relations. LTG Downing indicated that his relations with USASOC's RC units were "overall good," although he noted difficulty getting these units into the fight, particularly "peacetime engagement things."⁴⁴ He also acknowledged that, initially, USACAPOC headquarters - activated in November 1990 - did not function that well. LTG Downing infused more active-duty soldiers into the RC-heavy command in the hope of adding stability, and he expressed confidence in the ability of MG Donald Campbell, USACAPOC's second CG, to

42 "ARSOF Memorial Plaza Dedication and USASOC Headquarters Ribbon-Cutting Ceremonies," 9 December 1994, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; hereafter "ARSOF Memorial Plaza Dedication."

43 ARSOF Memorial Plaza Dedication. Early drafts of the ceremony narration indicated that the Special Forces Soldier statue would be referred to as the "Quiet Professional" statue. Dr. Richard Stewart, the USASOC Command Historian, advised his leadership against the effort to shift the unofficial nickname of the statue from "Bronze Bruce", to "Quiet Professional." The ceremony script was changed accordingly.

44 Downing interview, 24 August 1993.

address the issues.⁴⁵ As the MSC for all CA and PSYOP, USACAPOC controlled a significant portion of the overall ARSOF force, including those critical to the success of the often short-notice, but sometimes lengthy, missions of the 1990s.

Secretary of Defense Les Aspin's formal designation of CA and PSYOP forces as Special Operations Forces (SOF) in 1993 did not have much direct impact on USASOC or USACAPOC, as force providers, although it did clarify the legal basis and command authority under which USSOCOM managed these assets.⁴⁶ Indicative of the jurisdictional issues that complicated USASOC's relations with the Reserve Component, the Chief, Army Reserve (CAR), did not concur with the SOF designation of CA and PSYOP. In his view, the designation did not serve the Army's best interests because assignment to USSOCOM would eventually erode their visibility within the Army and affect funding. The CAR also pointed out that CA and PSYOP forces supported conventional operations as well as SOF missions. The Army overruled the CAR's objection, viewing the SOF designation as the best way to "enhance USSOCOM's ability to organize, train, equip, and manage the SOF and eliminated legal ambiguities and institutional misunderstandings."⁴⁷

Like USACAPOC, USASFC was activated in 1990 as a multi-component command with five AC SF Groups (SFGs), two USAR SFGs, and two Army National Guard (ARNG) SFGs. In 1994, the Army inactivated the two USAR SFGs, the 11th and 12th, thus ending more than three decades of SF presence in the USAR. One positive effect of this action was that it allowed the two ARNG SFGs, 19th and 20th SFGs, which absorbed some of the USAR soldiers, to raise the qualification numbers to a respectable 85 percent. In the mid-1990s, USASFC also added a DCG position whose primary job would be to interact with 19th and 20th SFGs and deal with other ARNG affairs.⁴⁸

In early 1995, LTG Scott requested the call-up of ARNG SF companies so that 3rd SFG units currently in Haiti supporting Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY could rotate back to Fort Bragg to prepare

45 Downing interview, 24 August 1993.

46 U.S. Army Center of Military History, *Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1993* (Fort McNair, Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2002), 66 – 67; hereafter "FY93 DAHSUM," page number. The significance of this designation is discussed in greater detail in the USACAPOC chapter of this volume.

47 FY93 DAHSUM, 66.

48 Tangney interview, 9 May 1996.

for other missions and subsequent Haiti rotations supporting Multi-National Force and United Nations operations. Two ARNG SF companies deployed to Haiti alongside two active-duty SF companies from 1st and 5th SFG. It marked the first time that ARNG SF units had been called to active duty and deployed overseas.⁴⁹

While acknowledging that the Haiti mission was a good fit for the ARNG SF, MG Tangney, DCG, USASOC, shared his concern that Reserve and Guard units could not “maintain their edge and proficiency with something like thirty-eight days a year available for training.”⁵⁰ This included maintaining their soldier skills and their conditioning levels. MG Tangney’s concerns about RC readiness would be echoed by future USASOC CGs and would eventually lead to one of the momentous decisions in USASOC’s history.

CTC INTEGRATION

During the 1990s, ARSOF increased its participation in Combined Training Center (CTC) rotations with the goal of greater integration with the Army.⁵¹ The centerpiece of the Army’s training system, the CTC program objective was to provide realistic, tough, and stressful joint, interservice, and combined arms training according to Army and joint doctrine.⁵² The three maneuver CTCs were the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California; the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana; and the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) at Hohenfels, Germany. Of the three, ARSOF enjoyed the most success in integrating into JRTC, which had relocated from Fort Chafee, Arkansas, to Fort Polk in mid-1993.⁵³

During FY93, each standard JRTC rotation included the brigade headquarters, two light infantry battalion task forces, which included SF and Ranger units. An SF battalion (minus) and PSYOP and CA units were present for all rotations, and Ranger battalions and Special Operations Aviation units participated in at least one rotation. JRTC scenarios concentrated on conventional, peacekeeping, and special operations

49 USASOC PAO Release 501-04, 9 January 1995, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC

50 Tangney interview, 9 May 1996.

51 Downing interview, 24 August 1993.

52 U.S. Army Center of Military History, *Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1995* (Fort McNair, Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2004), 43; hereafter “FY95 DAHSUM,” page number.

53 FY93 DAHSUM, 51.

low-to-mid-intensity conflict.⁵⁴ By FY94, each Army corps had a Special Operations Coordination Element to integrate SOF into corps plans and training, including CTC rotations.⁵⁵ As of FY95, the Army's goal was to have all commanders of active component combat maneuver and SOF battalions train at a CTC at least once during their command tours.⁵⁶

FORCE XXI INITIATIVES

Under LTG Scott, USASOC continued to modernize in parallel with the Army's Force XXI Initiative. Writing for Army magazine near the end of his thirty-nine-month command tour at USASOC, LTG Scott expounded on the USASOC's own Force XXI modernization efforts. "To ensure that we are looking long term," he writes, "USASOC has developed its own set of Force XXI initiatives...[that] deal primarily with the structure of the [SFG] and the group's relationship with the units that provide CA and PSYOP support."⁵⁷ Scott noted that he had selected the 7th SFG as the SOF "Force XXI test bed," and that it would begin implementing initiatives in June 1995.⁵⁸

NEW COMMANDERS, NEW VISION

On 29 August 1996, LTG Peter J. Schoomaker assumed command of USASOC, becoming its fifth Commanding General. Soon after, he articulated his command philosophy, starting with his vision. "Our goal is to accomplish any mission assigned," he said. "To accomplish this, we must transition in both thought and action from a focus on what we have been to a focus on what we should be."⁵⁹ It was a call to action from an Operation EAGLE CLAW veteran and future Chief of Staff of the Army. Drawing from his extensive SOF background, LTG Schoomaker placed "special emphasis...on developing adaptive leaders at all echelons...capable of rapid problem solving under stressful and ambiguous operations conditions."⁶⁰

54 FY93 DAHSUM, 52

55 U.S. Army Center of Military History, *Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1996* (Fort McNair, Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2000), 66; hereafter, "FY94 DAHSUM," page number.

56 FY95 DAHSUM, 43.

57 LTG J.T. Scott, "Writing New Chapters in Special Operations History," *Army* (October 1996 ed.): 162.

58 Scott, 162; U.S. Army Center of Military History, *Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1996* (Fort McNair, Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2002), 66; hereafter, "FY96 DAHSUM," page number. **These initiatives are addressed in greater detail in Chapter 4.**

59 LTG Peter J. Schoomaker, "Command Philosophy," 18 October 1996, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.

60 LTG Schoomaker, "Command Philosophy," 1996.

Perhaps the exemplar of an adaptive and supremely composed SOF leader in the mold LTG Schoomaker sought, Major Richard J. Meadows was an iconic figure within the SOF community for his deeds in Vietnam and elsewhere. Following Meadows' death in 1995, H. Ross Perot, a Texas billionaire and U.S. presidential candidate, funded a statue in his honor and, upon completion, donated it to USASOC. On 6 June 1997, LTG Schoomaker presided over the dedication of the MAJ Richard J. Meadows Statue and Field on the east side of the USASOC Headquarters. GEN Henry H. Shelton (CDRUSSOCOM) and GEN (Ret.) Wayne A. Downing attended the ceremony, along with Mr. Perot and members of MAJ Meadows' family.

LTG Schoomaker relinquished command of USASOC on 31 October 1997 and was concurrently promoted to GEN. He assumed command of USSOCOM the following month. Five months passed before LTG William P. Tangney assumed command of USASOC on 3 March 1998.

LTG Tangney's pedigree for the job of CG, USASOC, was impeccable. A Vietnam SF veteran, Tangney had commanded SF from the detachment level up to the 2-star level. During the 1990s alone, he commanded 10th SFG, Special Operations Command - Central (SOCCENT), USASFC, and USAJFKSWCS, in addition to a brief yet productive stint as DCG, USASOC.

In August 2000, LTG Tangney issued a memorandum with an updated mission statement for USASOC, accompanied by an updated list of functions and responsibilities. This document, and the ones concurrently issued to the MSCs, codified changes to mission, functions, and responsibilities as the command entered the second decade of the post-Cold War era. The USASOC mission was:

Organize, train, man, equip, educate, fund, administer, mobilize, maintain combat readiness, sustain and deploy Army Special Operations Forces, Active and Reserve Components, to successfully accomplish Special Operations missions across the range of military operations, in support of the regional combatant commanders, U.S. Ambassadors, and other agencies, as directed.⁶¹

61 Memorandum from LTG William P. Tangney, "Subject: Mission Statement," 7 August 2020, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.

USASOC HEADQUARTERS DEDICATION

On 11 October 2000, LTG Tangney passed command to LTG Bryan D. “Doug” Brown, who became the first Special Operations Aviator to command USASOC. Early in his tenure, LTG Brown presided over the dedication of the USASOC Headquarters building, which had remained nameless since its opening six years earlier. This was rectified on 19 January 2001 when USASOC dedicated the building to MG Robert A. McClure, the “Father of U.S. Army Special Warfare.” LTG (Ret.) Samuel Wilson, a WWII veteran who served in Merrill’s Marauders, was present to review the troops and LTG Brown presented MG McClure’s son, COL (Ret.) Robert McClure, with the USSOCOM Medal.

During the ceremony, COL (Ret.) Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., an SF and PSYOP veteran, as well as a prominent ARSOF historian, read MG McClure’s biography. Through his book, *United States Army Special Warfare: Its Origins*, and in other publications, Paddock had endeavored to raise awareness of the pivotal role MG McClure played in the establishment of permanent Army psychological warfare and unconventional warfare capabilities in the early 1950s. The dedication of the USASOC Headquarters to MG McClure was the fruit of these efforts.

RESOURCING SNAPSHOT


Based on the available information, it appears that USASOC’s resourcing increased gradually during the period 1993 – 2001. In FY01, Major Force Program (MFP) - 11 funding from USSOCOM, by far USASOC’s largest funding source, was \$1.45 billion. This included \$805 million for military pay (MILPAY); \$59 million for research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDTE); \$125 million for procurement; \$432 million for operations and maintenance (O&M); and \$29 million for military construction (MILCON).⁶² The table below provides a comparison between FY92 and FY01. Note that the procurement budget in FY92 reflects \$321 million for upgrades to the MH-47 and MH-60 airframes.

62 USASOC, “FY04 Resourcing Report,” copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, 11.

	FY92 ⁶³	FY01
Procurement	\$417 million	\$125 million
RDTE	\$44 million	\$59 million
O&M	\$223 million	\$432 million
MILPAY	No info	\$805 million
MILCON	No info	\$29 million

In 2001, USASOC looked rather similar to how it did in 1993, with two exceptions. The first was the disestablishment of USASOIC, and the resulting assignment of the 75th Ranger Regiment and 160th SOAR as DRUs to USASOC. The second was the activation of SOSCOM to serve as a higher headquarters for the 528th SOSB and 112th Signal Battalion, and to provide centralized materiel management functions for the command.

Headquarters, USASOC (November 2001)



63 Standing Up the MACOM, 80 – 83.

Likewise, the Headquarters, USASOC organizational structure had not changed much since the adjustments of the mid-1990s, although Special Staff directorates for Equal Opportunity and Equal Employment Opportunity were added in the mid/late 1990s.

CONCLUSION

By mid-2001, USASOC - still barely a decade old - had made great strides in fulfilling LTG Downing's vision of a robust, mature MACOM that could successfully compete for resources at the USSOCOM and Army level. It had consolidated key MACOM functions formerly dispersed among the MSCs at the 3-star level. It had survived the post-Cold War drawdown largely unscathed, fulfilling GEN James Lindsay's prediction, made at USASOC's 1989 activation, that, "while the Army is going to get smaller, Army SOF is going to grow in the years to come."⁶⁴

The events of 11 September 2001 initiated an era of more pronounced growth, and of even higher operational tempo, than what USASOC had witnessed in the 1990s. The MACOM had matured as an organization, but it was about to undergo a trial by fire.

64 GEN Lindsay is quoted in "The Upward Spiral Continues: U.S. Army Special Operations Command Celebrates 35 Years," https://arsof-history.org/articles/24nov_upward_spiral_continues_page_1.html.

CHAPTER II:

U.S. ARMY JOHN F. KENNEDY SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER & SCHOOL

Between 1993 and 2001, the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) underwent gradual organizational evolution. It adjusted incrementally to technological advances and operational demands, including adapting training for Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations. New directorates emphasized technological integration, such as advanced simulation, while training changes reflected post-Cold War operational lessons. By 2000, USAJFKSWCS was producing hundreds of qualified ARSOF soldiers annually through specialized programs, while increasing focus on leadership development and joint operations. At the beginning of the 21st century, SWCS was an efficient and adaptable institution, though producing enough graduates to man the force remained a challenge and post-9/11 experiences and operational demands would prompt significant changes in training and organization.

KEY PERSONNEL:

USAJFKSWCS COMMANDING GENERALS


MG Sidney Shachnow	JUL 1992 – AUG 1994
MG William F. Garrison	AUG 1994 – MAY 1996
MG William P. Tangney	MAY 1996 – MAR 1998
MG Kenneth R. Bowra	MAR 1998 – MAR 2000
MG William G. Boykin	MAR 2000 – JUL 2003

USAJFKSWCS COMMAND SERGEANTS MAJOR


CSM Ivan Ivanov	1989 – 1994
CSM William H. Rambo, Jr.	1994 – 1996
CSM Richard Efirid	1996 – 1997
CSM Paul J. Shedlock, Jr.	1997 – 1998
CSM Ronnie A. McCan	1998 – 2000
CSM Earnest M. Bishop	2000 – 2001

ORGANIZATION:

USAJFKSWCS (1992)



USAJFKSWCS Organization (2000)



HISTORICAL NARRATIVE:

The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (often shortened to SWCS) was initially established as the Psychological Warfare (Psywar Center) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on 10 April 1952. Its primary missions included command of, and individual and unit training for, Psywar and Special Forces (SF), as well as testing equipment and developing Special Warfare doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Key elements assigned to the Center included the 6th Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, the Psywar Board, and the Army's first dedicated unconventional warfare (UW) unit, the 10th SF Group (SFG), activated on 11 June 1952. That October, the Psywar School was added, consisting of Psywar and SF departments. The insignia design for the Center and School was approved on 28 November 1952. In December 1956, the Army renamed the Psywar Center and School as the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS).⁶⁵

In the 1960s, SWCS grew significantly due to the expansion of SF and increasing U.S. involvement in Vietnam, adding counterinsurgency (COIN) courses and developing advanced infiltration and exfiltration techniques, such as military freefall (MFF) at Fort Bragg and underwater operations (UWO) at Key West, Florida. In 1964, the Center was redesignated as the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center to honor the recently deceased president for his support to SF and Special Warfare. In 1969, it was renamed the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance, while the school became the U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance.⁶⁶

In 1986, the Center received its current designation as the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, reorganizing into six specialized training departments: SF; Special Operations Advanced Skills; Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE); Foreign Area Officer; Civil Affairs (CA); and Psychological Operations (PSYOP). It established a Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA) the following year. In 1988, the Center introduced the Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) course to evaluate SF candidates before entering the SF Qualification Course (SFQC). Within months of the activation of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) on 1

65 Christopher E. Howard, "70 Years and Counting: U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School," August 2022, https://arsof-history.org/articles/22aug_usajfkswcs_70years_page_1.html.

66 Howard, "70 Years and Counting."

December 1989, USAJFKSWCS transferred from Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to become a Major Subordinate Command (MSC) under USASOC, thus consolidating all ARSOF units, training, doctrine, and proponency under a single headquarters.⁶⁷

Going into 1993, USAJFKSWCS already had a robust and multifaceted internal organization. It had a Commanding General (CG), Deputy CG (DCG), Command Sergeant Major (CSM) (under whom fell the NCOA), Chief of Staff (CoS), a headquarters and headquarters company (HHC), and various staff sections. It also had a Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOT-D), Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization (DOES), Special Operations Proponency Office (SF-heavy but with smaller PSYOP and CA proponency offices), the Intelligence and Security Office, the CA Integrator, the International Students Office (under the HHC), and the attached Security Assistance Training Management Organization (SATMO).⁶⁸

The main training element under USAJFKSWCS was the 1st Special Warfare Training Group (SWTG), which had been activated on 15 June 1989.⁶⁹ In the early 1990s, it consisted of 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Special Warfare Training Battalions and a Support Battalion. Also activated on 15 June 1989, 1/1st SWTG was primarily responsible for SFAS and SFQC, producing nearly 330 SF active-duty enlisted (ADE) graduates in fiscal year (FY) 1994 alone.⁷⁰ The 1st Special Warfare Training Battalion had an HHC and five training companies, with the following responsibilities (SF medical training covered later):

- Company A: SF Detachment Officer (18A) Qualification Course
- Company B: SF Weapons (18B) and SF Engineer Sergeants (18C) Courses
- Company E: SF Communications Sergeants (18E) Course
- Company F: Phase I (land navigation and small unit tactics) and Phase

67 HQDA, "General Orders 89," 29 December 1989, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; Howard, "70 Years and Counting."

68 USAJFKSWCS Organizational Chart, November 1992, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; USAJFKSWCS, "Permanent Orders 82-1," 25 October 1991, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.

69 TRADOC, "Permanent Orders 70-5," 19 June 1989, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.

70 USAJFKSWCS, "Permanent Orders 68-5," 22 June 1990, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; Thomas M. Joyce, "Special Forces: Ensuring the Quality of Our Future Force," *Special Warfare* 13, no. 4 (Fall 2000): 19.

III (air operations, special operations, mission planning, direct-action pre-mission training, and the UW culmination exercise, Robin Sage)

- Company G: SFAS⁷¹

Activated on 28 June 1989, 2/1st SWTG was responsible for advanced skills, such as MFF, SERE, and UWO.⁷² Meanwhile, 3/1st SWTG, activated on 24 July 1989, was responsible for CA, PSYOP, and language training.⁷³ CA training prepared officers for stability and reconstruction missions with the four-week Civil Affairs Officers Course (CAOC). The CAOC prioritized core CA principles but lacked regional focus; that would be covered in both the Regional Studies Course (RSC) and in language training. These three courses, plus the PSYOP Officers Course (POOC) (discussed below), formed the Functional Area (FA) 39 pipeline. Because CA was a U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) Branch at the time, CA Advanced Individual Training (AIT) was offered only to 38-series USAR enlistees after completion of Basic Combat Training. No such training was available to active-duty soldiers. Instead, CA-trained 18-series NCOs, who already possessed regional and language experience, typically filled respective positions on CA teams in the active force. Significant changes to CA training did not occur until well after 9/11.⁷⁴

Also led by 3/1st SWTG, the six-week PSYOP Officer Course (POOC) prepared officers for division and corps-level assignments, emphasizing PSYOP doctrine, target audience analysis, and joint planning. As mentioned above, the POOC was part of the FA 39 pipeline, alongside the CAOC, RSC, and language training. While FA 39 produced officers specializing in both PSYOP and CA they were usually single-tracked

71 USAJFKSWCS, "Update," *Special Warfare* 11, no. 2 (Spring 1998): 51.

72 USAJFKSWCS, "Permanent Orders 68-3," 22 June 1990, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.

73 USAJFKSWCS, "Permanent Orders 79-2," 20 July 1989, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; USAJFKSWCS, "Update," *Special Warfare* 7, no. 1 (January 1994): 50.

74 John M. Metz, *Training the Way We Fight: Are Tactical Units Prepared for Post-Conflict Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1995); HQDA, FM 41-10: *Civil Affairs Operations* (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2000), 3-45-3-46; Thomas R. Geisinger, "Civil Affairs History and Doctrine: From Military Government to Interagency Partner" (MMAS thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2004); Kurt Sisk, "House Divided: The Splitting of Active-Duty Civil Affairs Forces" (MA thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009); Mark Flynn, "Civil Affairs in the United States Army Reserve: An Analysis of the Policy, Organization, and Training of Modern Army Civil Affairs" (MMAS thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2019).

for one or the other, FA 39B for PSYOP or FA 39C for CA.⁷⁵ In FY92, USAJFKSWCS had a target of accessioning 85 FA 39 officers but actually accessioned 131 from one officer year group alone that year.⁷⁶

Outside of the POOC and FA 39 training, the two-week Joint PSYOP Staff Planners Course prepared personnel to coordinate PSYOP across unified commands and joint elements until its termination in the late 1990s. In addition, forty PSYOP and CA officers were selected each year to attend Troy State University's Master's in International Studies program at SWCS. Meanwhile, enlisted soldiers underwent an 11-week AIT for Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 37F, focusing on tactical PSYOP, product development, and field exercises, including airborne operations.⁷⁷

To support the diverse training responsibilities of the three training battalions, the 1st SWTG Support Battalion (activated on 15 June 1989) handled such functions as transportation, supply, weapons and ammunition issue, and parachute rigging, among others.⁷⁸ In addition, in February 1993, USAJFKSWCS established an ARSOF Warfighting Center, consisting of both military and civilian personnel, "to provide computer-simulations support to the academic programs at [SWCS] and to support operational units" under USASOC.⁷⁹

Not only was USAJFKSWCS responsible for SF, PSYOP and CA training, but it was also the Army proponent for ARSOF doctrine. In early 1993, SWCS published the new Field Manual (FM) 31-20-5: *Special Reconnaissance Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, referred to at the time as "the first field manual focused on one specific SF mission."⁸⁰ This was to be one of many SF doctrinal publications nested under FM 31-20: *Doctrine for Special Forces Operations* (1990). The

75 Email from Alfred E. Lunt to Jared M. Tracy, "SUBJECT: RE: (U) Help w/ 1990s PSYOP Training," 4 December 2025, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Lunt email, 4 December 2025. *Pre-9/11, each of the courses for the FA 39 pipeline were separate in the Army's training system of record, the Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS), and could be collectively called the PSYOP Qualification Course (POQC) or the CA Qualification Course (CAQC). It was not until well after 9/11 that the POQC and the CAQC would become single standalone courses (including the regional and language components) in ATRRS.*

76 USAJFKSWCS, "Annual Historical Review for Calendar Year 1993," USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.

77 Lunt email, 4 December 2025; Jay M. Parker, "Training the PSYOP Force," *Special Warfare* (October 1992): 2 – 5; USAJFKSWCS, "Program of Instruction: Joint Psychological Operations Staff Planning Course, 3A-F53/243-F12," September 1989, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.

78 USAJFKSWCS, "Permanent Orders 68-5," 22 June 1990, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.

79 John Wood, Ken Benway, and Sherry Barnes, "The SOF Warfighting Center: Answering the Challenge of SOF Simulation Support," *Special Warfare* 7, no. 1 (January 1994): 30 – 31.

80 SFC Jim McGill, "FM 31-20-5: New Manual Focuses on Special Reconnaissance," *Special Warfare* 6, no. 1 (February 1993): 12.

PSYOP counterpart to FM 31-20 was FM 33-1: *Psychological Operations*, while the CA counterpart was FM 41-10: *Civil Affairs Operations*, both from 1993. These overarching Branch and Functional Area doctrinal publications fell under the umbrella of FM 100-25: *Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces* (1991), itself nested under Army FM 100-5: *Operations* (1993).⁸¹ USAJFKSWCS provided frequent training and doctrine updates in its professional bulletin, *Special Warfare*.

On 26 July 1994, the Free Ascent Diving Tower at the USAJFKSWCS UWO School at Key West, became operational. It was dedicated to SF Sergeant Major Walter L. Shumate, an early diver who had recommended Key West as a central location for SF Combat Diver training in the mid-1960s. Two months later, on 1 October, the Army authorized the MFF Parachute Badge, further recognition of the advanced skills taught at USAJFKSWCS.⁸² Meanwhile, training programs of instruction continued to evolve. For example, also on 1 October 1994, the first iteration of the new SF Advanced NCO Course (SFANCOC) began at the USAJFKSWCS NCO Academy. This course assimilated content previously taught in the SF Assistant Operations and Intelligence (O&I) Course. This change resulted in the expansion of SFANCOC from eight to eighteen weeks.⁸³

In FY95, 756 ADE soldiers reported for SFAS (with a selection rate of 25%), while 156 ADE soldiers graduated from the SFQC.⁸⁴ Meanwhile, 101 active-duty officers (ADOs) graduated from the SFQC in FY95, roughly 89% of ADO SF selectees.⁸⁵ One notable organizational change within SWCS in 1995 was the provisional activation of the Special Operations Medical Training Battalion (SOMTB), in preparation for the planned opening of the Special Operations Medical Training Center (SOMTC) in July 1996 to handle 18D (SF Medic) and Special Operations Combat Medic (SOCM) courses.⁸⁶

81 Steven E. Cook, "Managing Special Operations Forces Doctrine," *Special Warfare* 7, no. 2 (April 1994): 37.

82 SF Handbook, 36.

83 USAJFKSWCS, "Update," *Special Warfare* 7, no. 3 (July 1994): 54.

84 USAJFKSWCS, "SFQC Graduates, 1995 – 2008," 16 October 2008, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; USAJFKSWCS, "Historical SFQC Graduation Rates," 17 November 2010, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; USAJFKSWCS, "SFAS Starts vs. SFQC Grads: AD Enl Only," 22 August 2012, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.

85 USAJFKSWCS, "SFQC Starts vs. SFQC Grads: AD Officers Only," 10 May 2012, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.

86 USAJFKSWCS, "Evolution of USAJFKSWCS," *Special Warfare* 36, no. 1 (August 2023): 13; USAJFKSWCS, "Update," *Special Warfare* 9, no. 2 (May 1996): 46; USAJFKSWCS, "Update," *Special Warfare* 9, no. 1 (January 1996): 63.

In 1996, SWCS's broad structure included the 1st SWTG (with three training battalions, a support battalion, and the provisional SOMTB), DOT-D, Directorate of Reserve Components (which had been a small reserve cell not long prior), Special Operations Proponency, the SOF Simulations Center, and the NCOA. SATMO remained attached to the Center, along with the Joint SOF Institute. Authorized strength at SWCS stood at 1,127 personnel (124 officers, 28 warrant officers, 680 enlisted, and 295 civilians).⁸⁷ In FY96, 1,274 ADE enlisted soldiers reported for SFAS (with a selection rate 38%), with 247 ADE graduating from the SFQC.⁸⁸ That same year, 122 ADOs out of 164 selectees (74%) graduated from the SFQC.⁸⁹ Among the total number of SF selectees in calendar year 1996 were fourteen U.S. Army Rangers.⁹⁰

Other training and organizational adaptations took place throughout 1996. For example, in January, eighteen hours of negotiations training were added to the CA Officers Course (CAOC), four of which were formal instruction, with the rest being instructor-supervised individual and team negotiations.⁹¹ Concurrently, Company E, 2/1st SWTG, which was responsible for SERE, became Company A.⁹² Between late 1996 and the end of FY99, there were 4,344 ADE soldiers who reported for SFAS, with 1,177 graduating from the SFQC during those three years.⁹³ In that same period, 266 ADOs graduated from the SFQC out of 379 selectees (70%).⁹⁴

PSYOP experienced a key milestone in the late 1990s. Even though PSYOP had been employed in every major operation since World War I, had a sizeable active and USAR force, had been an enlisted MOS since 1985, and had been formally designated as SOF since 1993 (along with CA), it was neither a formal U.S. Army Branch nor Regiment. Progress was made on 15 July 1998, when HQ, Department of the Army, approved the establishment of the PSYOP Regiment, which took effect on 18 November

87 USAJFKSWCS, "Annual Historical Review for Calendar Year 1996," USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC

88 USAJFKSWCS, "SFAS Starts vs. SFQC Grads."

89 USAJFKSWCS, "SFQC Starts vs. SFQC Grads."

90 James H. Johnson, III, "Army Values, SOF Truths, and the Ranger Ethos," *Special Warfare* 10, no. 2 (Spring 1997): 28; USAJFKSWCS, "SFQC Graduates, 1995 – 2008."

91 USAJFKSWCS, "Update," *Special Warfare* 9, no. 2 (May 1996): 47.

92 Blaine Miller, "SERE: Training Soldiers to Survive," *Special Warfare* 13, no. 3 (Summer 2000): 4. **Two years later, in 1998, Company A, 2/1st SWTG, added the Advanced Special Operations Training Detachment. By 2000, it was training 1,500 personnel in SERE, anti-terrorism, and other advanced special operations courses each year.**

93 USAJFKSWCS, "SFQC Starts vs. SFQC Grads."

94 USAJFKSWCS, "SFQC Starts vs. SFQC Grads."

that year.⁹⁵ The CG, USAJFKSWCS, retained proponency for PSYOP after the regimental establishment, in addition to proponency for SF and CA.

The general organizational structure of USAJFKSWCS remained fundamentally the same at the end of the 1990s, though minor, incremental changes continued to be made. At the senior level were the CG, DCG, CSM, NCOA, and Inspector General (IG). Under the CoS were the HHC and various staff elements. Major separate directorates included DOT-D, Special Operations Proponency, the Program Integration Office, and the USAR/U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG) Advisors. The 1st SWTG still had its three training battalions and Support Battalion, while the SOMTB filled out the now-Joint SOMTC (JSOMTC). In recognition of the rapidly changing technological environment, SWCS now had a Directorate of Simulation and Digitization (DOSD) and the ARSOF Battle Lab. SATMO remained attached.⁹⁶

Just before the 1990s drew to a close, there were a couple other noteworthy events impacting USAJFKSWCS. On 15 October 1999, the CGs of both USASOC and USAJFKSWCS directed that SF soldiers assigned to the Center would have their tours shortened from four years to three years. According to *Special Warfare*, “The 36-month tour length will still provide the [1st SWTG] with adequate personnel utilization and will afford more [SF] soldiers the opportunity to experience a tour at SWCS.”⁹⁷

Aside from personnel matters, on 19 November 1999, the Colonel Arthur D. ‘Bull’ Simons statue was dedicated on the USAJFKSWCS campus at the corner of Ardennes and Marion Street.⁹⁸ With an illustrious military career spanning back to World War II, Simons had long been an icon in the ARSOF community. The statue served as a daily reminder to SWCS staff, cadre, and students of ARSOF’s rich heritage. Another example of this was the 2000 dedication of the SWCS NCOA to Master Sergeant David K. Thuma, an SF soldier who died in Kenya while conducting physical fitness two years prior.⁹⁹

95 DAHSUM FY1998, 58.

96 USAJFKSWCS Organizational Chart, 1 August 1999, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.

97 USAJFKSWCS, “Enlisted Career Notes,” *Special Warfare* 13, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 50.

98 Documenting the American South, “Col. Arthur D. ‘Bull’ Simons, Fort Bragg,” n.d., <https://docsouth.unc.edu/commland/monument/910/>.

99 Drew Brooks, “Special operations NCO academy honors anniversary, namesake,” 28 July 2017, <https://www.fayobserver.com/story/news/military/2017/07/29/special-operations-nco-academy-honors-anniversary-namesake/20058993007/>.

The June 2000 edition of USAJFKSWCS' Regulation 10-5: *Organization and Functions Manual* provided a clear snapshot of the command that year. Its mission was, according to the manual:

...to develop doctrine and all related individual and collective training material; develop and maintain the proponent training programs/systems; provide entry level and advanced individual training and education; establish leader development policy and standards of grade authorization for Army Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations forces, both Active and Reserve Components, and act as the specified proponent for Special Operations Army Rangers and Special Operations Aviation.¹⁰⁰

USAJFKSWCS Regulation 10-5 also provided a condensed organizational chart for the command. Reporting to the CG were the DCG, the CSM (who led the NCOA training staff), the CoS, the ARSOF Battle Lab, and the CG's Personal Staff (consisting of the IG and Staff Judge Advocate). Under the DCG were the USAR/ARNG Advisors, Special Operations Proponency, DOT-D, and the 1st SWTG. Under the CoS were the Special Staff, which included the Dean of Special Operations Medical Training, Chaplain, Protocol, Command Historian, Library, JFK Special Warfare Museum, Program Integration Office, and Resource Strategy section. Also under the CoS were the HHC, the School Secretary, and the International Military Student Office.¹⁰¹

On 12 October 2000, the 1st SWTG completed the first iteration of the revamped SFAS program. According to *Special Warfare*, "Although the new curriculum is still in the validation phase, it represents a fundamental shift in SFAS training philosophy and methodology. Under the former SFAS program, a candidate was assessed primarily for his inherent capabilities. Under the new program, a candidate is assessed on his trainability and suitability for service in Special Forces."¹⁰²

Between FY00 and the end of FY01, 3,548 ADE soldiers reported to SFAS, with 743 graduating from the SFQC during that two-year period.¹⁰³ During that same period, 224 ADOs graduated from the SFQC

¹⁰⁰ USAJFKSWCS Regulation 10-5: *Organizations and Functions Manual* (Fort Bragg, NC, 2000), 2-1.

¹⁰¹ USAJFKSWCS Regulation 10-5, Figure 2-1.

¹⁰² Robert W. Marrs, "SFAS Redesign: An Essential Evolution," *Special Warfare* 13, no. 4 (Fall 2000): 22.

¹⁰³ USAJFKSWCS, "SFAS Starts vs. SFQC Grads."

out of 313 selectees.¹⁰⁴ Since FY95, there had been an average selection rate of 38% among ADE SF candidates, while only 25% of enlisted soldiers who started SFAS completed the SFQC.¹⁰⁵ On the officer side, roughly 75% of ADO selectees completed the SFQC.¹⁰⁶ While SF throughput was consistent, it fell short of being able to man the SFGs at full-strength.

Incomplete data prevents a similar assessment and comparison of PSYOP and CA graduation rates and trends. However, USAJFKSWCS' Annual Historical Review for calendar year 2002, while falling just beyond the scope of this study, provides a glimpse of annual PSYOP and CA throughput around this time. That year, 139 active and reserve officers graduated from the POOC and 121 from the CAOC, while 352 soldiers graduated from PSYOP AIT and 279 from CA AIT. Additionally, there were 61 graduates of the RSC and 658 graduates of language training.¹⁰⁷

Between 1993 and 2001, organizational evolution within USAJFKSWCS was incremental and gradual. Technological advances led to greater assimilation of computer hardware and software in SWCS training, communications, and operations, and new directorates focused on technological integration were established. There were constant improvements and adaptations in training throughout this period, as well as continuous research and publication of ARSOF-focused doctrine, papers, and scholarly publications. By 2001, USAJFKSWCS was actively assessing, selecting, and training the elite ARSOF soldiers who would serve at the tip of the spear in the Global War on Terror, though graduation rates could not fully keep pace with ARSOF manning requirements. More significant training and organizational changes within SWCS would be made in the coming years.

¹⁰⁴ USAJFKSWCS, "SFAS Starts vs. SFQC Grads."

¹⁰⁵ USAJFKSWCS, "SFAS Starts vs. SFQC Grads."

¹⁰⁶ USAJFKSWCS, "SFAS Starts vs. SFQC Grads."

¹⁰⁷ USAJFKSWCS, "Annual Historical Review for Calendar Year 2002," USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.

CHAPTER III:

U.S. ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS & PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (AIRBORNE)

Activated on 27 November 1990, the United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) Airborne (A), consisting of all active and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units, served as a major subordinate command (MSC) of United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). The mission of USACAPOC was:

Command and control U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Units. Train, validate, and monitor their readiness. Upon Mobilization, assist in deployment of units and individuals as directed by USASOC.¹⁰⁸

As shown below, by the start of the new century, the USACAPOC (A) mission statement had evolved to better capture the full scope of the command's responsibilities. This updated mission statement was a sizable departure from the one established in 1993:

Train, validate, monitor readiness and prepare Active Component (AC), Reserve Component (RC) Civil Affairs (CA), and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) forces for deployment to conduct worldwide special operations, across the range of military operations, in support of regional Combatant Commanders, U.S. Ambassadors, and other agencies, as directed.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ USACAPOC, "Annual Historical Review (AHR) for Calendar Year 1994," n.d., copy in USASOC History Office Fort Bragg, NC.

¹⁰⁹ Memorandum from USASOC to USACAPOC, "Mission Statement," 7 August 2000, page 1, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.

KEY PERSONNEL:

CGs

BG Joseph C. Hurteau 1990 – 93
MG Donald F. Campbell 1993 – 97
BG Bruce B. Bingham 1997 – 2001
MG Herbert L. Altshuler 2001 – 07

CSMs

CSM Steven M. Foust 1990 – 94
CSM Thomas B. Jackson 1994 – 99
CSM Jonathan George 1999– 2005
CSM John Elam 2005 – 2007

ORGANIZATION:

USACAPOC was a multi-component organization commanded by a USAR general officer that functioned as the single-source provider for both CA and PSYOP to the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the Army. This regionally aligned command spanned twenty-six states with approximately 10,000 CA and PSYOP personnel. In the mid-1990s, the USACAPOC reserve force consisted of three Civil Affairs Commands (CACOMs), eight CA Brigades, twenty-four CA Battalions, three Psychological Operations Groups (POGs) and thirteen PSYOP Battalions (POBs). Throughout the 1990s, the structure of USACAPOC did not remain static. For example, in June 1996, five POBs, seventeen companies, and eighteen detachments were redesignated, and eight additional companies were disbanded.¹¹⁰

By 1999, the reserve PSYOP component would consist of eight battalions organized under two POGs.¹¹¹ Within CA, by the end of the decade, the 361st CA Brigade would transition into the 350th CACOM, aligned to the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) area of operations, under which the 358th CA Brigade would now fall. These reserve capabilities accounted for 97 percent of CA and 70 percent of PSYOP structure in the Army.¹¹² The AC 96th CA Battalion (A) and 4th POG (A) remained a constant worldwide asset for USACAPOC and USASOC.¹¹³


110 Memorandum from Department of the Army to USASOC, "Change in Status of Units," 26 April 1996, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Department of the Army, "Change in Status of Units."

111 U.S. Army, "Department of the Army Historical Summary (AHS) for Calendar Year 1999," n.d., U.S. Army Center of Military History, on internet at <https://history.army.mil/Research/Series-and-Collections/Department-of-the-Army-Historical-Summaries/>


112 U.S. Army, "Department of the Army Historical Summary (AHS) for Calendar Year 1994," n.d., U.S. Army Center of Military History, on internet at <https://history.army.mil/Research/Series-and-Collections/Department-of-the-Army-Historical-Summaries/>

113 USACAPOC, CY94 AHR; USACAPOC, "Annual Historical Review (AHR) for Calendar Year 1998," n.d., USASOC History Office Fort Bragg, NC.

Civil Affairs Force Structure (1993)




Civil Affairs Force Structure (1999)




AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY	
 PACOM	 SOUTHCOM
 CENTCOM	 EUCOM
 WORLDWIDE ORIENTATION	 LANTCOM
 COORDINATION & PLANNING	 ACOM
----- CONTINGENCY	

Psychological Operations Force (1994)



Psychological Operations Force Structure (1999)



* Indicates Unit redesignation 1996

HISTORICAL NARRATIVE:

Despite Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Casper Weinberger's decision to place both capabilities under the command of USSOCOM in 1987, neither CA nor PSYOP was designated as Special Operations. This was rectified on 3 March 1993, when then SECDEF Les Aspin formally designated CA and PSYOP as Special Operations Forces (SOF). The designation had no actual impact on day-to-day operations, but it did clear up issues regarding command authority and funding, which had caused conflicting guidance and policies. With this new authority USSOCOM and USASOC could now organize, train, equip and manage CA and PSYOP in relation to SOF mission requirements.¹¹⁴ The SOF designation marked the beginning of immense change for USACAPOC and its operational forces that would carry through to the end of the decade. The era marked a time for maturation, structural refinement, doctrinal change, and high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) for each of the two capabilities.

The USSOCOM mission statement in 1993 was, "Prepare SOF to successfully conduct worldwide special operations, civil affairs, and psychological operations in peace and war in support of the regional combatant commanders, American Ambassadors and their country teams, and other government agencies."¹¹⁵ The subsequent structural, doctrinal, and manning changes were all reflective of this mission statement and needs identified in previous and ongoing operations across the regional combatant commands. The period between 1993 and 9/11 emphasized greater reliance on this newly formed multi-component reserve command for operational deployments and humanitarian missions, including Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR in Bosnia, and worldwide counterdrug efforts. These forces gave USASOC depth and breadth that allowed the command to be globally engaged across diverse missions and conflict scenarios within multiple areas of operation simultaneously.

114 U.S. Army, "Department of the Army Historical Summary (AHS) for Calendar Year 1993" n.d., U.S. Army Center of Military History, on internet at <https://history.army.mil/Research/Series-and-Collections/Department-of-the-Army-Historical-Summaries/>

115 USSOCOM History and Research Office, "History of USSOCOM 1987 – 2007" n.d., <https://archive.org/details/CommandHistory26Feb07webversion>

CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS:

SOMALIA: UNOSOM I, UNITAF/RESTORE HOPE, UNOSOM II 1992 – 93

During United Task Force (UNITAF)/Operation RESTORE HOPE, and lasting from April 1992 to March 1993, the U.S. supported United Nations-sanctioned multinational efforts aimed at establishing a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.¹¹⁶ CA support for Operation RESTORE HOPE was primarily provided by 30 members of Company C, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne), the only active component CA battalion at the time. In addition to the 96th CAB, the 321st Civil Affairs Brigade, a U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) unit, deployed three officers to serve as the 13th Corps Support Command's G5 Civil Affairs staff section.¹¹⁷

The 96th CA BN company structure normally included a 6-member Tactical Headquarters Support Team (THST), six 4-member Civil Affairs Direct Support Teams (CADSTs), and a 13-member Civil Assistance Team. The officers were formally trained in functional area (FA) 39, Civil Affairs, while the NCOs with maneuver, medical, and engineer military occupational specialties received no formal training in CA.¹¹⁸ In late December 1992 the THST established a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) in Mogadishu to coordinate and facilitate requests for security and other assistance from international humanitarian relief organizations (HROs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). CADSTs replicated this role by conducting liaison operations between military forces providing security and HROs providing humanitarian assistance in designated humanitarian relief sectors.¹¹⁹

The CMOC also served as a coordination point for NGOs, preventing overlap and ensuring coverage across the country.¹²⁰ Ultimately, the CMOC took on the added responsibility of verifying all foreign

116 COL (R) Dennis J. Cahill, "Revisiting Civil Affairs Operations in Operation RESTORE HOPE," 2023, <https://www.civilaffairsassociation.com/post/revisiting-civil-affairs-operations-in-operation-restore-hope>

117 96th CA BN, "After Action Report for Operation RESTORE HOPE," 1 July 1993, page 3, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.

118 Cahill, "Revisiting Civil Affairs Operations in Operation RESTORE HOPE."

119 Cahill, "Revisiting Civil Affairs Operations in Operation RESTORE HOPE."

120 Jeremy Patrick White, "Civil Affairs in Somalia," 2009, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/civil-affairs-somalia>; Cahill, "Revisiting Civil Affairs Operations in Operation RESTORE HOPE."

aid workers and issuing them ID cards allowing access to the heavily guarded food storage centers in the Port of Mogadishu. This database tracked all aid workers and food shipment status, a system later adopted in Haiti.¹²¹

Despite the efforts, and the operation reaching a troop strength of nearly 30,000, the CA presence never exceeded more than approximately 30 CA personnel.¹²² Regardless, operations in Somalia succeeded in ending mass starvation and CA elements were able to accomplish their short-term mission of coordinating civilian and military operations. Ultimately, most U.S. and UN forces withdrew by March 1994, and all personnel were completely withdrawn in March 1995.¹²³

NORTHERN IRAQ: OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 1991 – 96

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was initiated in April 1991 following Saddam Hussein's suppression of a Kurdish uprising after Operation DESERT STORM. The primary objective was to prevent Iraqi attacks, create a safe haven for Kurdish refugees, and deliver humanitarian aid to avert mass starvation among Kurds fleeing to northern Iraq and southeastern Turkey. The operation quickly transitioned into Combined Joint Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT, when British and French Forces joined to assist.¹²⁴

In Zakho, Iraq, from April through June the 354th Civil Affairs Brigade, attached to Task Force Bravo, commanded and controlled the 418th, 431st, and 432nd CA Companies. These units ensured the safety and survival of Kurdish refugees near the border region.¹²⁵ Throughout the course of the operation, Civil Affairs units, in conjunction with other SOF elements, spearheaded the humanitarian effort, developing plans for medical assistance, food distribution, and daily camp operations.¹²⁶ By rebuilding civil infrastructure, establishing supply net-

121 Kenneth Allard, "Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned," 1995, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA286816.pdf>; White, "Civil Affairs in Somalia."

122 U.S. Army, CY93 AHS; White, "Civil Affairs in Somalia."

123 Richard W. Stewart, PhD, "The United States Army in Somalia 1992 – 1994," no date, https://history.army.mil/Portals/143/Images/Publications/Publication%20By%20Title%20Images/U%20Pdf/cmhPub_70-81-1.pdf?ver=8i5KW9puoZ550XH6B8j8EA%3D%3D

124 Robert W. Jones, Jr., "A Second Chance: Operation PACIFIC HAVEN," *Veritas: Journal of Army Special Operations History* Vol. 4, no. 3, (2008): 57.

125 Kathryn Roe Coker, "The Indispensable Force: The Post-Cold War Operational Army Reserve, 1990 – 2010," 2013, <https://www.usarmy.mil/Portals/98/Documents/historycorner/IndispensableForce.pdf>

126 USSOCOM History and Research Office, "History of USSOCOM 1987 – 2007."

works, furnishing medical care, and providing for the security of the Kurdish people, SOF was credited with saving countless lives.¹²⁷

THE BALKANS

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR 1995 – 96

This highly complex operation marked NATO's first major peace enforcement operation.¹²⁸ Its principal objectives were to enforce peace, maintain security by creating demilitarized zones and separate warring parties, and support the withdrawal of UN forces.¹²⁹ The Implementation Force (IFOR), comprising 60,000 soldiers (nearly a third from the U.S. Army's 1st Armored Division) from allied and partner countries, was deployed to monitor and implement the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Accords.¹³⁰ Notably, in this operation, American and Russian soldiers operated as allies for the first time since World War II.¹³¹

Initially, Civil Affairs units had limited tasks and capabilities, primarily performed a liaising role, and worked to restore basic services, with a reluctance to engage in long-term reconstruction efforts.¹³² By spring 1996, however, IFOR, with U.S. CA assistance, began establishing greater levels of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Bosnian reconstruction efforts.¹³³ CA units played a major role in these efforts, collaborating with NGOs and foreign ministries. They coordinated the reconstruction of civil infrastructure and organized relief efforts involving over 500 UN, governmental, and non-governmental organizations. They helped restore basic services like public transportation, utilities, and public health, and assisted with elections and setting up new national governments.¹³⁴

127 USSOCOM History and Research Office, "History of USSOCOM 1987 – 2007"

128 Dr. Harold E. Raugh, Jr., "Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR V Corps in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995 – 1996 An Oral History," 2010, <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combats-studies-institute/csi-books/OperationJointEndeavor.pdf>

129 Eric Ridge, "Civil Affairs in Bosnia," 2009, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/civil-affairs-bosnia>

130 Signed in December of 1995, the Dayton Peace Accords ended hostilities, retained Bosnia and Herzegovina's international boundaries, created a multiethnic and democratic government and established the Office of the High Representative to oversee the agreement, <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/bosnia-and-herzegovina/>

131 Ridge, "Civil Affairs in Bosnia."

132 Ridge, "Civil Affairs in Bosnia."

133 Ridge, "Civil Affairs in Bosnia."

134 USSOCOM History and Research Office, "History of USSOCOM 1987 – 2007"

Over the duration of the operation, 2,000 to 2,500 Civil Affairs soldiers (about one-quarter of the total USAR Civil Affairs force) were deployed to Bosnia. The demand for CA reserve forces became so great that, by 1999, the USAR was "literally running out of Civil Affairs units to deploy to Bosnia." CA's efforts throughout the operation were highly praised, with one analyst noting that "Civil Affairs came of age, especially for NATO and the framework of nations" during this period.¹³⁵

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: OPERATION JOINT GUARD 1996 – 98

Operation JOINT GUARD succeeded Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR at the start of 1997, featuring a smaller military force with renewed emphasis on civil implementation.¹³⁶ Its three main missions were to deter hostilities, secure the environment, and establish civil authority throughout the region.¹³⁷ As IFOR transitioned to the Stabilization Force (SFOR) the operation brought a renewed focus on supporting civil organizations for repatriation, reconstruction, capital investment projects, municipal elections, and civil institution building.¹³⁸

The Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF) was established in support of SFOR and provided civil-military capabilities to promote cooperation with the local population and respond to humanitarian, safety, and health emergencies.¹³⁹ U.S. Civil Affairs personnel were integrated into the Multinational Division (North) in Tuzla, Bosnia, alongside active and reserve forces from other nations. CA capabilities were provided through approximately 300 CA soldiers per rotation, which usually lasted approximately 6 months.¹⁴⁰ These decreases in the number of U.S. CA personnel from Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR occurred as more NATO nations began to provide their own CA trained personnel.¹⁴¹

135 Ridge, "Civil Affairs in Bosnia."

136 U.S. Army, "Department of the Army Historical Summary (AHS) for Calendar Year 1997," n.d., U.S. Army Center of Military History, on internet at <https://history.army.mil/Research/Series-and-Collections/Department-of-the-Army-Historical-Summaries/>

137 USSOCOM History and Research Office, "History of USSOCOM 1987 – 2007."

138 Ridge, "Civil Affairs in Bosnia."

139 U.S. Army, CY97, AHS.

140 U.S. Army, CY97, AHS.

141 U.S. Army, CY97, AHS.

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: OPERATION JOINT FORGE

1998 – 04

Operation JOINT FORGE commenced on 20 June 1998 as the follow-on operation to Operation JOINT GUARD.¹⁴² Its primary objective was to maintain peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and sustain the conditions necessary to rebuild the nation.¹⁴³ As SFOR continued to ensure peace, demobilize troops, and prevent the revival of hostilities, U.S. Civil Affairs personnel were crucial in rebuilding civil institutions and provided significant assistance in preparing for elections held in the fall of 1998.¹⁴⁴

The Combined Joint Civil-Military Task Force (CJCMTF) was instrumental in this phase, supporting the SFOR's goal of civil implementation. By 1999, the CJCMTF had assimilated members from 21 countries, with U.S. soldiers comprising 22 percent of the task force.¹⁴⁵ CA officers with technical expertise and staff planning skills were assigned to support key civil implementation tasks of international organizations and entity ministries. Air National Guard Judge Advocate General Corps officers supported these efforts, and CA functional teams specializing in public health, engineering, and business supported Ministry Teams.¹⁴⁶ As of October 2003, 2,691 RC CA personnel had been deployed in support of Operation JOINT FORGE.¹⁴⁷

KOSOVO: OPERATION JOINT GUARDIAN 1999 ONWARDS

Following Operation ALLIED FORCE, a 78-day air campaign which began in March 1999, Operation JOINT GUARDIAN aimed to establish security in Kosovo, verify and enforce the Military Technical Agreement,¹⁴⁸ create a safe environment for the approximately 800,000 refugees and displaced persons, and enable international organizations,

142 Ridge, "Civil Affairs in Bosnia."

143 Ridge, "Civil Affairs in Bosnia;" USSOCOM History and Research Office, "History of USSOCOM 1987 – 2007."

144 Ridge, "Civil Affairs in Bosnia;" USSOCOM History and Research Office, "History of USSOCOM 1987 – 2007."

145 Bruce B. Bingham, Daniel L. Rubini, Michael J. Cleary, "U.S. Army Civil Affairs – The Army's Ounce of Prevention," 2003, <https://www.ansa.org/sites/default/files/LWP-41-US-Army-Civil-Affairs-The-Armys-Ounce-of-Prevention.pdf>

146 Bingham, Rubini, Cleary, "U.S. Army Civil Affairs – The Army's Ounce of Prevention."

147 LTC R. Christon Brewer, "U.S. Civil Affairs and the Fate of Reserve Special Operations Forces in Support of Current and Future Operations," <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA423315.pdf>

148 The Military Technical Agreement was the ceasefire agreement between the International Security Forces and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This agreement mandated the withdrawal of all Yugoslavian forces from Kosovo and allowed for the deployment into Kosovo international security forces and civilian agencies, <https://peacemakerun.org/en/node/9376>

interim administrations, and humanitarian aid delivery.¹⁴⁹ It also sought to support reconstruction and humanitarian efforts.¹⁵⁰ U.S. CA teams and CIMIC forces played a significant role in achieving these mission objectives.¹⁵¹

Following the cessation of hostilities, these forces coordinated large-scale humanitarian assistance efforts with U.S. agencies and NGOs, providing food, water, shelter and medical care for refugees.¹⁵² U.S. CA soldiers helped construct refugee reception areas, refugee camps, and emergency food stations, and dispersed hundreds of tons of humanitarian aid.¹⁵³ They imported fuel for heating, repaired electric grids, organized fertilizer and seed deliveries, and facilitated repairs to telephone systems and utilities.¹⁵⁴ Once immediate needs were met, U.S. CA officers helped facilitate the creation of civil structures for governance and services like firefighting and sanitation.¹⁵⁵ Through 2003, nearly 800 CA personnel had been deployed to JOINT GUARDIAN.¹⁵⁶

HAITI: OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY 1994 – 95

Civil Affairs played an integral role in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, a U.S. Army-led multinational military intervention in Haiti from September 1994 to March 1995. The operation was authorized by the UN to restore the democratically elected government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who had been ousted by a military coup in 1991. A long planning period, combined with lessons learned from the recent intervention in Somalia, allowed U.S. CA planners to formulate a comprehensive plan to restore essential services and rebuild Haiti's government institutions.¹⁵⁷

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was deemed a huge military operational success, achieving its objective of restoring President Aristide to power and transferring authority to the United Nations Mission in Haiti

149 R. Cody Phillips, "Operation JOINT GUARDIAN: The U.S. Army in Kosovo," n.d., <https://history.army.mil/Publications/Publications-Catalog/Operation-Joint-Guardian>

150 Phillips, "Operation JOINT GUARDIAN: The U.S. Army in Kosovo."

151 Ridge, "Civil Affairs in Kosovo."

152 Ridge, "Civil Affairs in Kosovo."

153 Ridge, "Civil Affairs in Kosovo;" USSOCOM History and Research Office, "History of USSOCOM 1987 – 2007."

154 Ridge, "Civil Affairs in Bosnia."

155 Ridge, "Civil Affairs in Bosnia."

156 Brewer, "U.S. Civil Affairs and the Fate of Reserve Special Operations Forces in Support of Current and Future Operations."

157 Jeremy Patrick White, "Civil Affairs in Haiti," 2009, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/civil-affairs-haiti>

(UNMIH) within six months. CA and other SOF elements were vital to the U.S. effort to create conditions for long-term stability and humanitarian assistance. The operation heavily relied on USAR Civil Affairs units. The Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up was used for this operation, mobilizing reservists for the second time since Operation DESERT STORM.¹⁵⁸

A team of thirty-four USAR CA Officers, broken into Ministerial Advisory Teams (MAT), provided advice to Haiti's twelve governmental ministries.¹⁵⁹ This capability from the 358th CA BDE marked the "first large-scale implementation of a civil administration effort since World War II."¹⁶⁰ These advisors worked directly with U.S. Ambassador William Swing and passed their long-term development findings to USAID.¹⁶¹ The MAT missions aimed to mentor Haitian reformers and foster an ethic of "governing for the benefit of the governed."¹⁶²

Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOCs) were established in Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haitien to coordinate civil-military operations. Unlike previous operations, the main CMOC in Port-au-Prince was initially located within a secure military compound, making it inaccessible to civilians without proper clearance. To address this, a Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) was set up outside the Joint Operations Center to interface with NGOs.¹⁶³ CMOCs aimed to instill trust in the Haitian people and facilitated humanitarian assistance, with 90 percent of their activity geared toward NGO requests.¹⁶⁴

Throughout the country CA personnel were deeply involved in rebuilding Haiti's dilapidated infrastructure. This included restoring electric power (e.g., Operation LIGHT SWITCH by Company A, 96th CA Battalion), improving major roads, opening and repairing ports, and reopening/building police stations and schools.¹⁶⁵ Reservists from the 351st, 448th and 407th CA companies coordinated urban reconstruction and reformed government ministries.¹⁶⁶ By October 1995,

158 White, "Civil Affairs in Haiti."

159 Bingham, Rubini, Cleary, "U.S. Army Civil Affairs – The Army's Ounce of Prevention."

160 White, "Civil Affairs in Haiti."

161 White, "Civil Affairs in Haiti."

162 Bingham, Rubini, Cleary, "U.S. Army Civil Affairs – The Army's Ounce of Prevention."

163 White, "Civil Affairs in Haiti."

164 MAJ Aaron L. Wilkins, "The Civil Military Operation Center (CMOC) in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti)," 1997, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA392884>

165 USSOCOM History and Research Office, "History of USSOCOM 1987 – 2007."

166 White, "Civil Affairs in Haiti."

U.S. CA personnel had completed 332 infrastructure restoration projects and initiated 375 more, emphasizing Haitian execution with U.S. support.¹⁶⁷ CA, alongside Special Forces (SF), supported rural security forces and governance by restoring local governments, teaching civics, and organizing communities for repairs.¹⁶⁸

CA served as the crucial bridge between military forces and civilian organizations. They coordinated with relief agencies to distribute aid and aimed to bridge the gap between military intervention and long-term stability until civilian agencies like USAID and NGOs could assume lead roles. The operation saw over 400 NGOs operating in Haiti.¹⁶⁹ Although Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY officially ended in 1995, USAR Civil Affairs units continued to deploy under U.S. Support Group, Haiti, which remained in Haiti until January 2000.¹⁷⁰

NORTHERN IRAQ / GUAM: OPERATION PACIFIC HAVEN 1996 – 97

CA operations played a crucial role in Operation PACIFIC HAVEN, a humanitarian mission conducted from September 1996 to April 1997. The initial response came from nineteen soldiers from Company B, 96th CA BN, acting as the “first CA responder” to help shape the environment for the follow-on Joint Task Force and USAR CA personnel. During this initial phase, Company B personnel reviewed future Joint Task Force (JTF) requirements, established liaison with the Kurdish evacuees and the JTF, managed cultural assimilation, and assisted with the English as a Second Language (ESL) program. They also coordinated the distribution of supplies and resources with local authorities and assisted the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) with asylum-related matters.¹⁷¹

To ensure long-term support for the operation, USAR CA forces were mobilized. These reservists, many of whom volunteered from units across the country, formed a composite USAR CA Detachment.

167 White, “Civil Affairs in Haiti.”

168 Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann, John T. Fishel, “A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY,” 1998, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA528265.pdf>

169 Wilkins, “The Civil Military Operation Center (CMOC) in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti).”

170 U.S. Army, “Department of the Army Historical Summary (AHS) for Calendar Year 2000,” n.d., U.S. Army Center of Military History, on internet at <https://history.army.mil/Research/Series-and-Collections/Department-of-the-Army-Historical-Summaries/>

171 Jones, Jr., “A Second Chance: Operation PACIFIC HAVEN,” 65.

This unit assembled in Hawaii for a mission briefing before deploying to Guam. Their duties were assigned based on their existing CA experience and civilian professional backgrounds. The responsibilities of these CA reservists increased as more refugee lifts arrived, which included managing the ESL program and helping to establish new camps. The composite USAR CA unit remained in Guam until Operation PACIFIC HAVEN concluded in April 1997.¹⁷² Operation PACIFIC HAVEN highlighted the importance of integrating both active and reserve component Civil Affairs capabilities to effectively manage complex humanitarian missions, leveraging their civilian-acquired skills to support military objectives and facilitate civilian needs.¹⁷³

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS:

SOMALIA: UNOSOM I, UNITAF/RESTORE HOPE, UNOSOM II 1992 – 95

During operations in Somalia (April 1992 – March 1995), PSYOP played a pivotal role in facilitating humanitarian efforts and preventing armed conflict. Integrated into all plans and operations from the outset, PSYOP staff from the U.S. Army's 4th POG collaborated with U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) to support the United Task Force (UNITAF), a coalition of 22 countries.¹⁷⁴ UNITAF commander LTG Robert Johnston emphasized PSYOP's importance, forming a Joint PSYOP Task Force (JPOTF) to ensure consistent and responsive messaging. The JPOTF, comprised of 125 personnel, including soldiers and civilians from the 4th POG, one U.S. Navy sailor and a dozen Somali linguists, focused on bridging communication gaps between Somali communities and humanitarian organizations. The 8th POB provided the JPOTF's command and control, while the 9th PSYOP Battalion furnished two Brigade PSYOP Support Elements and eight Tactical PSYOP Loudspeaker Teams.¹⁷⁵

172 Jones, Jr., "A Second Chance: Operation PACIFIC HAVEN," 65.

173 Jones, Jr., "A Second Chance: Operation PACIFIC HAVEN," 65.

174 Lt. Col. Charles P. Borchini, Mari Borstelmann, "PSYOP in Somalia: The Voice of Hope," *Special Warfare* Vol. 7, no. 4 (1994): 2.

175 Eugene G. Plasecki, "If You Liked Beirut, You'll Love Mogadishu: An Introduction to Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) in Somalia," 2007, https://arsof-history.org/articles/v3n2_like_beirut_love_mogadishu_page_1.html.

Key initiatives of the JPOTF included publishing a daily Somali-language newspaper, *Rajo* ("hope"), which covered topics like military operations, humanitarian relief, and reconciliation efforts, distributing over 7 million leaflets and posters addressing themes like mine awareness and discrediting warlord propaganda, and broadcasting Somali-language radio programs via "Radio Rajo." Tactical PSYOP teams used loudspeakers, direct engagement, and even games with children to communicate messages and assess community attitudes.¹⁷⁶

PSYOP proved instrumental in Operation RESTORE HOPE, reducing violence and encouraging Somali gunmen to surrender.¹⁷⁷ While UNITAF leadership recognized its value, PSYOP's effectiveness diminished under UN leadership during the transition to UNOSOM II, highlighting challenges in sustaining its impact. Overall, PSYOP was a critical force multiplier, minimizing conflict and supporting humanitarian efforts in Somalia.¹⁷⁸

THE BALKANS

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR 1995 – 96

PSYOP forces were significantly involved in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR from December 1995 to December 1996. Following the Dayton Peace Agreement, NATO deployed IFOR into Bosnia on 20 December 1995, for a one-year peace enforcement mission. This mission included one of the largest and most comprehensive PSYOP efforts in U.S. history.¹⁷⁹

Deployed at the onset of this operation, PSYOP units were assigned to the Combined Joint Psychological Task Force (CJPOTF) with the important task of disseminating accurate information to the populace inside the area of operations.¹⁸⁰ The PSYOP campaign, sometimes referred to as the "IFOR Information Campaign" due to political sensitivities surrounding the term "psychological operations," was designed to

176 Borchini, Borstelmann, "PSYOP in Somalia: The Voice of Hope," 4.

177 Borchini, Borstelmann, "PSYOP in Somalia: The Voice of Hope," 3.

178 Piasecki, "If You Liked Beirut, You'll Love Mogadishu: An Introduction to Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) in Somalia."

179 LtCol Zbigniew Modrzejewski, "Psychological Operations After the Second World War" 2016, <https://securityanddefence.pl/Psychological-operations-after-the-Second-World-War.103237.0.2.html>.

180 USSOCOM History and Research Office, "History of USSOCOM 1987 – 2007."

influence the local population and former warring factions to cooperate with NATO activities. The core mission was to deter armed resistance and hostile behavior against IFOR troops and operations. Serving as a force protection tool, it aimed to achieve this through a multimedia campaign to elicit desired changes.¹⁸¹

Although eventually overcome, early PSYOP efforts were hampered by issues that would affect their ability to contribute effectively. Security concerns led to an inability to conduct adequate reconnaissance or local media assessment before December 1995, leading to delays in local contracting for media or print products. Then, an unexpected move of IFOR headquarters from Zagreb, Croatia, to Sarajevo, Bosnia, strained nascent logistical and administrative functions. Only authorized five personnel, the CJPOTF had to slowly expand to seventeen and then eventually to one hundred by June 1996 due to infrastructure limitations. Personnel faced difficulties entering Bosnia for coordination and establishing logistics, delaying effective use of indigenous media.¹⁸² Credibility proved difficult to overcome. The official message, repeated by PSYOP, that IFOR would soon withdraw, which proved false, harmed the trustworthiness of PSYOP, IFOR, and later SFOR.¹⁸³

The initial campaign went into operation quickly. PSYOP radio stations were established and a weekly PSYOP newspaper (*Herald of Peace*) was printed in three languages to inform civilians on the status of peace accords and provide mine awareness, while tactical PSYOP soldiers distributed handbills and pamphlets to inform residents of the area.¹⁸⁴ The mine awareness campaign, primarily aimed at children, distributed literature such as coloring books and a 12-page *Superman* comic titled “Deadly Legacy” to emphasize the dangers of land mines and unexploded ordnance.¹⁸⁵

As NATO's Bosnian policy shifted, PSYOP began to assist civilian agencies more vigorously, particularly the Office of the High

181 Pascale Combelles Siegel, “Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations: NATO-Led Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, December 1995 – 1997,” 1998, https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GOV-PUB-D5_400-PURL-LPS1803#:~:text=%2DPURL%2DLPS1803,-Target%20Bosnia:%20Integrating%20Information%20Activities%20in%20Peace%20Operations%20:%20NATO%2D,Content%20Origin

182 Steven Collins, “Army PSYOP in Bosnia: Capabilities and Constraints,” *Parameters* Vol 29, no.2 (1999): 61.

183 Collins, “Army PSYOP in Bosnia: Capabilities and Constraints,” 64.

184 Collins, “Army PSYOP in Bosnia: Capabilities and Constraints,” 77; Coker, “The Indispensable Force: The Post-Cold War Operational Army Reserve, 1990 – 2010.”

185 USSOCOM History and Research Office, “History of USSOCOM 1987 – 2007;” Modrzejewski, “Psychological Operations After the Second World War.”

Representative and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This included providing significant assistance for the 1997 municipal elections and aiding in the destruction of explosives.¹⁸⁶ PSYOP forces also played a role in the implementation of the Open Broadcast Network (OBN), an alternative daily television network.¹⁸⁷ The campaign expanded rapidly, utilizing NATO-owned assets to bypass faction-controlled local media.¹⁸⁸ Over time, IFOR would establish five radio stations in major cities (Sarajevo, Tuzla, Banja-Luka, Mrkonjic Grad, and Mostar), operating at least 18 hours a day with music, news, and messages.¹⁸⁹

Recognizing that Bosnians preferred television and FM radio, and that IFOR's own print and AM radio efforts had limited reach, PSYOP began in the fall of 1996, to rely on domestic media to carry IFOR's messages. They provided finished products (TV programs, music tapes with short messages, and print ads) to local media outlets, which had higher credibility and reach. During this time, over 3 million posters and handbills were disseminated and 51 television spots were produced and provided to local stations.¹⁹⁰

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: OPERATION JOINT GUARD 1996 – 98

As a follow-on to Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, PSYOP continued its involvement in Operation JOINT GUARD, with the mission primarily shifting to peacekeeping operations.¹⁹¹

The POTF headquarters and Product Development Cell became multinational, with French and British liaison officers assigned.¹⁹² U.S. PSYOP Support Elements were largely replaced by troops from

186 Siegel, "Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations: NATO-Led Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, December 1995 – 1997."

187 Siegel, "Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations: NATO-Led Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, December 1995 – 1997."

188 Siegel, "Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations: NATO-Led Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, December 1995 – 1997."

189 Siegel, "Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations: NATO-Led Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, December 1995 – 1997."

190 Siegel, "Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations: NATO-Led Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, December 1995 – 1997."

191 Modrzejewski, "Psychological Operations After the Second World War."

192 Modrzejewski, "Psychological Operations After the Second World War."

contributing nations in the French and UK multinational divisions.¹⁹³ However, PSYOP participation increased with the transition from IFOR to SFOR. By the end of fiscal year 1997, 167 PSYOP soldiers were deployed in support of Operation JOINT GUARD, with anticipated increases in fiscal year 1998.¹⁹⁴ By 10 February 1997, the USAR had deployed 269 PSYOP soldiers for this operation.¹⁹⁵

PSYOP assisted both IFOR and SFOR with treaty implementation, promoting reconciliation, deterring armed resistance, and disposing of unexploded munitions. As the operation matured, the civilian themes component of the campaign grew in importance. SFOR PSYOP aimed to raise the population's expectations of their leaders by explaining how institutions should behave in a democracy, motivating them to vote for leaders who would bring a "brighter future."¹⁹⁶ As Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR transitioned into Operation JOINT FORGE on 20 June 1998, NATO forces continued the peace maintenance and nation-rebuilding efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹⁹⁷ During this transition and throughout the operation, PSYOP focused on sustaining long-term peace and stability, promoting the rule of law and democratic institutions, and using targeted messaging to address lingering ethnic divisions and promote unity.

KOSOVO: OPERATION ALLIED FORCE 1999

Over the course of the 78-day operation, the newly established JPOTF developed over 40 different leaflets and box-dropped more than 104 million leaflets by MC-130H Combat Talon aircraft or distributed them from F-16 and B-52 aircraft via M-129 leaflet bombs over Serbia and Kosovo.¹⁹⁸ Key messages were to reduce civilian panic during airstrikes and disseminate information about NATO's humanitarian objectives and opposition to ethnic cleansing. It also targeted Serbian leadership to deter further aggression.

The 6th POB formed the core of the JPOTF while personnel from

193 Siegel, "Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations: NATO-Led Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, December 1995 – 1997."

194 U.S. Army, CY97, AHS.

195 Coker, "The Indispensable Force: The Post-Cold War Operational Army Reserve, 1990 – 2010."

196 Siegel, "Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations: NATO-Led Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, December 1995 – 1997."

197 USSOCOM History and Research Office, "History of USSOCOM 1987 – 2007."

198 Modrzejewski, "Psychological Operations After the Second World War."

the 4th POG Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3rd POB, and 9th POB augmented the JPOTF staff and product development. Soldiers from the 9th POB helped develop products and the 3rd POB provided radio, print, television, and communications to the JPOTF. During this operation, the 4th POG validated the concept of reachback, whereby products produced at Fort Bragg and the JPOTF rear in Germany were then transferred via secure means in near real time to the forward deployed elements for use in theater. These products included graphic and text documents as well as audio and visual files.¹⁹⁹

EC-130E Commando Solo aircraft transmitted daily Serbian-language radio and television programs into the area. These daily broadcasts aimed to inform the Serb population about their government's genocidal practices and televised images of Kosovar refugees in Albania and Macedonia. MC-130H aircraft dropped millions of leaflets to describe the Serbs' untenable situation, warning against war crimes and highlighting the negative impacts of Milosevic's policies on their country.²⁰⁰ The Allied Voice Radio and Television blanketing Belgrade, Northern Yugoslavia, Kosovo, and Southern Serbia gave the Supreme Allied Commander Europe an extremely powerful tool to counter heavily censored state-run media. These efforts, combined with other elements of the JTF, saved countless lives and were essential to the success of the operation.²⁰¹

KOSOVO: OPERATION JOINT GUARDIAN 1999 ONWARDS

Following Operation ALLIED FORCE, NATO led the Kosovo Force (KFOR) peacekeeping mission to stabilize Kosovo.²⁰² Operation JOINT GUARDIAN began in June 1999, focusing on enforcing peace, maintaining public security, and providing humanitarian assistance.²⁰³ PSYOP focused on encouraging cooperation between ethnic Albanians and Serbs, promoting the rebuilding of Kosovo's institutions and infrastructure, countering extremist rhetoric, and fostering reconciliation.²⁰⁴

199 4th POG, Psychological Operations Support to operation ALLIED FORCE," n.d., copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter 4th POG, "PSYOP Support to ALLIED FORCE," USSOCOM History and Research Office, "History of USSOCOM 1987 – 2007."

200 USSOCOM History and Research Office, "History of USSOCOM 1987 – 2007."

201 4th POG, "PSYOP Support to ALLIED FORCE."

202 Modrzejewski, "Psychological Operations After the Second World War."

203 USSOCOM History and Research Office, "History of USSOCOM 1987 – 2007."

204 Modrzejewski, "Psychological Operations After the Second World War."

Radio KFOR was established in Pristina. Beyond U.S. efforts, German, French, Belgian, Italian, and Spanish contingents also conducted their own PSYOP activities. The German and French KFOR produced print magazines (*Dritarja/Prozor* and *Bonjour*). The French forces, who had initially lacked PSYOP specialists and facilities in 1994, developed their own capability alongside Spanish and German PSYOP, establishing a French-run PSYOP radio station and print product development in Mostar. Belgian forces installed a PSYOP radio station called "Radio Horizon" in Leposavic, Kosovo. The Italian contingent developed a Bugs Bunny comic strip for mine awareness aimed at children.²⁰⁵

The Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts marked a notable shift in the mediums used for PSYOP, moving from pamphlets and leaflets towards comics and television programs.²⁰⁶ In summary, PSYOP activities in the Balkans from 1993 onwards were extensive, dynamic, and integral to both humanitarian aid and military peacekeeping and enforcement missions. They continuously adapted to the evolving political and media landscape, though they faced persistent challenges related to political sensitivities and command integration throughout this period.

HAITI: OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY 1994 – 95:

The PSYOP campaign for Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti was one of the most meticulously planned and documented operations in PSYOP history. Beginning in March 1993, PSYOP planners integrated into the operational environment to prepare for both permissive and nonpermissive scenarios. This adaptability became crucial when the mission shifted unexpectedly to a non-combat entry at the last moment, requiring PSYOP personnel to demonstrate extraordinary flexibility in reshaping their information campaign.²⁰⁷ Information was packaged modularly to ensure seamless transitions between Joint Task Forces (JTF-180 and JTF-190), accommodating the differing mission requirements of each commander. These efforts supported strategic, operational, and tactical activities, addressing directives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command, and subordinate commands. The foresight

²⁰⁵ Modrzejewski, "Psychological Operations After the Second World War."

²⁰⁶ Modrzejewski, "Psychological Operations After the Second World War."

²⁰⁷ 4th POG, "PSYOP support to Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY," n.d., copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter 4th POG, "PSYOP Support to UPHOLD DEMOCRACY."

and adaptability of the PSYOP team were instrumental in laying the groundwork for the mission's success in Haiti.²⁰⁸

The PSYOP campaign during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY exemplified a highly coordinated and resourceful effort to achieve operational, and tactical objectives amidst significant challenges. Beginning in March 1993, PSYOP planners worked closely with military and interagency organizations, including the NSC, DoD, DoJ, DoS, and the Aristide government-in-exile, using tools such as synchronization matrices and interagency coordination committees to ensure unity of effort and policy coherence. U.S. Atlantic Command's inclusion of PSYOP in all Joint Operations Planning Group (JOPG) meetings further strengthened their role in aligning messages with the commander's objectives and intent.²⁰⁹ These objectives focused on deterring migration, facilitating civil order, reducing violence, disarming the populace, supporting Civil Military Operations (CMO), legitimizing new security forces, and preparing for President Aristide's return and the transition to UNMIH.²¹⁰

Dissemination methods included the distribution of over 20 million leaflets, posters, and handbills, and radio broadcasts via "Radio Democracy." This broadcast was started by the Military Information Support Team (MIST) – a specialized, non-doctrinal element – in June 1994 to convey President Aristide's messages. In addition, "Radio AM 940" was used to deter migration while "Radio Creole" broadcast news and entertainment. To increase the reach of radio messages, 10,000 radios were air dropped into Haiti prior to the intervention.²¹¹ Loudspeaker operations were used for crowd control, and face-to-face engagement by Tactical PSYOP Teams (TPTs). These teams were crucial, inserting by helicopter ahead of ground forces to announce the pending arrival of friendly U.S. personnel and later working with the 16th MP BDE and SF teams in the countryside. Supporting both conventional forces, SOF, and Marine units, these teams conducted more than 760 ground PSYOP missions in support of operations.²¹²

208 4th POG, "PSYOP Support to UPHOLD DEMOCRACY."

209 4th POG, "PSYOP Support to UPHOLD DEMOCRACY."

210 4th POG, "PSYOP Support to UPHOLD DEMOCRACY."

211 4th POG, "PSYOP Support to UPHOLD DEMOCRACY;" Jones, Jr., "A Second Chance: Operation PACIFIC HAVEN;" Kretchik, Baumann, Fishel, "A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY."

212 4th POG, "PSYOP Support to UPHOLD DEMOCRACY."

As seen in many operations during the 1990's, this operation required personnel from both the Active and Reserve components, drawing elements from the 4th POG (A), 1st POB, 9th POB, PSYOP Dissemination Battalion, and the 2nd POG (USAR).²¹³ The transition from active tactical PSYOP elements to reserve component elements was planned and executed through a month-long, phased process (from October to November 1994) without degrading support to maneuver units.²¹⁴ Through their efforts, the operation achieved significant successes, including preventing widespread Haitian-on-Haitian violence, promoting peaceful demonstrations, facilitating high levels of weapon turn-ins, and ensuring the peaceful return of President Aristide.²¹⁵ These outcomes underscored PSYOP's critical role in fostering stability and achieving mission objectives in Haiti.

NORTHERN IRAQ / GUAM: OPERATION PACIFIC HAVEN 1996 – 97

In 1996 – 1997, the U.S. Army embarked on a humanitarian mission known as Operation PACIFIC HAVEN, a critical effort to support nearly 7,000 Kurdish refugees fleeing persecution in northern Iraq.²¹⁶ This operation was the second phase of a broader initiative, following Operation QUICK TRANSIT, which initially moved the refugees to a safe intermediate location for immigration screening. Guam, with its secure and remote location and available housing from Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) processes, was chosen as the staging base for evaluating and processing refugees seeking political asylum.²¹⁷

PSYOP was at the heart of this mission, tasked with easing the refugees' transition, reducing their stress, and preparing them for resettlement in Western society.²¹⁸ The mission was assigned to the 8th POB, a unit oriented towards USCENTCOM and U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM). To meet the unique demands of Operation PACIFIC

213 4th POG, "PSYOP Support to UPHOLD DEMOCRACY."

214 4th POG, "PSYOP Support to UPHOLD DEMOCRACY."

215 Jared M. Tracy, "A True Force Multiplier, Psychological Operations in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, 1994 – 1995," 2015, https://arsof-history.org/articles/v11n1_true_force_page_1.html.

216 U.S. Army, "Department of the Army Historical Summary (AHS) for Calendar Year 1996," n.d., U.S. Army Center of Military History, on internet at <https://history.army.mil/Research/Series-and-Collections/Department-of-the-Army-Historical-Summaries/>.

217 Jones, Jr., "A Second Chance: Operation PACIFIC HAVEN," 58.

218 Jones, Jr., "A Second Chance: Operation PACIFIC HAVEN," 61.

HAVEN, the battalion formed a MIST, designed to provide PSYOP assistance to the JTF overseeing the operation.²¹⁹

The initial MIST was a diverse team of soldiers from the 8th POB, two experienced civilian PSYOP analysts, and personnel from the Product Dissemination Battalion. A second MIST replaced the original team in November 1996 due to other mission requirements. The priority of the MIST was to produce rapid information products to mitigate the culture shock experienced by the refugees. Recognizing the need for simplicity, the team opted for one-page handbills over lengthy pamphlets, which were impractical to translate and distribute on short notice. These handbills became a lifeline for the refugees, offering guidance on camp rules, safety protocols, and how to operate unfamiliar household equipment such as electric stoves and garbage disposals. They also provided practical information on trash pickup schedules, medical clinic hours, and solutions to common problems. In some cases, the handbills warned against dangers such as poisoning risks, bus safety, and food preservation during power outages.²²⁰

However, the mission of the MIST extended far beyond basic information dissemination. A critical gap in the JTF's planning soon became apparent; little consideration had been given to how the refugees would assimilate after leaving Guam. Recognizing this void, the MIST's civilian analysts advocated for and developed an English as a Second Language (ESL) program. Drawing on their expertise in linguistics and teaching, they designed a four-week prototype syllabus to equip the Kurds with practical skills for life in Western society, including such tasks as check cashing and grocery shopping.²²¹ Guam's secure environment allowed the PSYOP personnel to oversee the entire product development process firsthand, offering invaluable cross-training opportunities and practical experience in tactical information operations.²²² By the end of the mission, the MIST had transformed its role from general information support to a vital force for cultural assimilation and resettlement preparation.

Operation PACIFIC HAVEN was a testament to the adaptability and expertise of Army PSYOP units in humanitarian missions. Through

219 Jones, Jr., "A Second Chance: Operation PACIFIC HAVEN," 55.

220 Jones, Jr., "A Second Chance: Operation PACIFIC HAVEN," 62.

221 Jones, Jr., "A Second Chance: Operation PACIFIC HAVEN," 62, 63.

222 Jones, Jr., "A Second Chance: Operation PACIFIC HAVEN," 66.

quick thinking, cultural sensitivity, and innovative solutions, the MIST demonstrated how specialized units could expand their functions to meet the demands of non-combat operations, leaving a lasting impact on the lives of thousands of Kurdish refugees.

The multitude of operations conducted by ARSOF throughout the 1990s facilitated the shaping of doctrine and structure by providing critical lessons to the generating schoolhouse. During this decade, both CA and PSYOP faced complex and dynamic challenges outside the Cold War framework for the first time in decades. The John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School adapted these lessons into updated doctrine and organizational structure to address the demands of the new reality within the post-Cold War era.

For CA, the 1993 version of Field Manual (FM) 41-10: *Civil Affairs Operations*, was updated in February 2000. The new FM reflected the increased SF presence working within the active component CA formations. It also emphasized SOF integration and an evolution towards additional SOF support within the USAR. It highlighted the shift out of the Cold War era into a much more uncertain, complex, and rapidly changing environment. This new doctrine went into much greater detail regarding adapting to new technological capabilities, integration, refining organizational structures, roles, and responsibilities, and provided updated operational terms. For the USAR, some of these changes were codified in Force Design Update (FDU) 00-1, which showed the changes in the identification of the battalions as well as the proposed structural modifications as seen within the operational force.

In stark contrast to their USAR counterparts, active component CA had no branch and contained no enlisted military occupational skill (MOS), only the Functional Area 39 officer Team Leader. However, during this era, the enlisted team composition would be replaced with an SF-qualified Sergeant First Class (SFC) who had graduated from the SF Operations and Intelligence Course (18F) as Team Sergeant, an SF Engineer Sergeant (18C), and an SF Medical Sergeant (18D). All would also be required to be graduates of the Civil Affairs Officer Course (CAOC) and have a minimum of 4-5 years in an SF Group to develop their military skills and regional experience. CA would also replace the dated terminology of direct support companies and direct support teams, instead utilizing Civil Affairs Team – Bravo (CAT-B) and Civil

Affairs Team – Alpha (CAT-A) as outlined in the updated doctrine.²²³

Like their CA counterparts, PSYOP published its first post-Cold War doctrine, FM 33-1: *Psychological Operations*, in February 1993. In June 2000, this was replaced by FM 3-05.30: *Psychological Operations*, a significant evolution in PSYOP doctrine that placed much stronger emphasis on integration, advanced digital technology, and interagency coordination.²²⁴ One example that combined all elements of these changes was the MIST, which became a doctrinal term in FM 3-05.30.

First utilized in Colombia in 1992, this concept would continue to expand globally throughout the remainder of the decade and beyond.²²⁵ A MIST was defined as, “a uniquely trained and organized group of uniformed service members, primarily composed of United States Army Soldiers, who specialize in developing and disseminating information programs in host nations during operations other than war.” However, it was not a fixed deployment platform and could be tailored to specific missions based on objectives and commander’s intent.²²⁶ As seen in Operation PACIFIC HAVEN, this could mean the inclusion of civilian expertise. Usually operating out of the U.S. Embassy and equipped with graphic design stations, print stations, audio-visual production centers, broadcast stations and loudspeakers, the MIST would synchronize information and messaging across the area of responsibility.²²⁷ Their location in-country allowed for coordination to occur across the country team, interagency, U.S. military, and host nation to ensure unity of effort.

Throughout the 1990s, both active and USAR CA and PSYOP units within USACAPOC found themselves deployed globally with a high OPTEMO. In addition to the operations covered here, USACAPOC also provided forces for:

- Operation PROVIDE PROMISE in the former republic of Yugoslavia (1992 – 1996)
- Operation SAFE HAVEN in Cuba (1994)

223 United States Army, FM 41-10, “Civil Affairs Operations,” Department of the Army, 14 February 2000, 3 – 45, 3 – 46.

224 United States Army, FM 3-05.30 “Psychological Operations,” Department of the Army, 19 June 2000, 9 – 17.

225 Robert W. Jones, JR., “U.S. Army Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Colombia,” 2006, https://arsof-history.org/articles/v2n4_psyop_colombia_page_1.html.

226 4th POG, “Annual Historical Review (AHR) for Calendar Year 1996,” n.d., copy in USASOC History Office Fort Bragg, NC.

227 4th POG, CY96, AHR.

- Operation SUPPORT HOPE in Somalia (1994)
- Operation SEA SIGNAL again in Cuba (1994 – 1995)
- Operation ASSURED RESPONSE in Liberia (1996)
- Operation SHINING HOPE in Albania and North Macedonia (1999)
- Operation STABILIZE in East Timor (2000)

These forces were also heavily involved with the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) (1996 – 2002) working in concert with SF building capacity among African militaries to conduct peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations on the continent.²²⁸ In 1997 alone, beyond the specified operations, CA conducted thirteen professional development seminars in eleven South American Countries and supported force protection and antiterrorism activities in Saudi Arabia. That same year, PSYOP forces supported counter-drug operations in Egypt, Cambodia, and Thailand, and in various USSOUTHCOM countries in South America while also conducting demining training in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Yemen, Namibia, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Guatemala.²²⁹ These were the CA and PSYOP forces leading up to September 11, 2001.

The CA and PSYOP units in USACAPOC were prepared for the coming events of 9/11 and the subsequent offensive actions that would take place in its aftermath. USACAPOC and its subordinate units evolved significantly during this period, benefiting from over a decade of deployments prior to 9/11. These experiences helped prepare the operational force and command for the Global War on Terror, ensuring it had the necessary foundation to fulfill the requirements of this critical mission.

²²⁸ USSOCOM History and Research Office, "History of USSOCOM 1987 – 2007:"

²²⁹ U.S. Army, CY97, AHS.

CHAPTER IV:

U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND

Between 1980 and 1990, Army Special Forces (SF) recovered from its post-Vietnam War low point. A renewed DoD and Army-level appreciation for SF capabilities led to the establishment of the SF Branch in 1987, the reactivation of two Vietnam-era SF Groups (SFGs), and the activation of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command (USASFC), a 2-star man, train, equip headquarters for all active and reserve component SFGs. The operational tempo of USASFC units increased dramatically during the 1990s, beginning with Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, and continuing throughout the decade in places such as the Balkans, Haiti, Somalia, Ecuador, and sub-Saharan Africa. The experience gained and lessons learned from these operations proved formative to the generation of SF leaders who would later guide SF during the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

KEY PERSONNEL:

USASFC COMMANDERS

BG Harley C. Davis	JUL 1992 – MAY 1995
MG William P. Tangney	MAY 1995 – MAY 1996
MG Kenneth R. Bowra	MAY 1996 – MAR 1998
BG William G. Boykin	MAR 1998 – MAR 2000
BG John R. Scales (Acting)	MAR 2000 – JUL 2000
BG Frank J. Toney	JUL 2000 – SEP 2001
MG Geoffrey C. Lambert	SEP 2001 – JUL 2003

USASFC COMMAND SERGEANTS MAJOR

CSM Henry O. Bone	OCT 1992 – AUG 1993
CSM Willie E. Weaver	AUG 1993 – JUN 1996
CSM William H. Rambo, Jr.	JUN 1996 – JUN 1997
CSM Richard A. Efird	JUL 1997 – AUG 1998
CSM Earnest M. Bishop	AUG 1998 – JUL 2000

1ST SFG GROUP COMMANDERS

COL Siegfried Hildebrandt JUL 1992 – AUG 1994
COL Russell D. Howard AUG 1994 – JUL 1997
COL Joseph B. McMillan JUL 1997 – JUL 1998
COL Thomas R. Csrnko JUL 1998 – AUG 2000
COL David P. Fridovich AUG 2000 – JUN 2002

3RD SFG GROUP COMMANDERS

COL Philip R. Kensinger, Jr. JUN 1992 – JUL 1994
COL Mark D. Boyatt JUL 1994 – JUL 1996
COL David E. McCracken JUL 1996 – JUL 1998
COL Gary M. Jones JUL 1998 – JUL 2000
COL Mark V. Phelan JUL 2000 – JUL 2002

5TH SFG GROUP COMMANDERS

COL Kenneth R. Bowra AUG 1991 – AUG 1993
COL John W. Noe AUG 1993 – AUG 1995
COL Thomas W. Carlin AUG 1995 – AUG 1997
COL Daniel Brownlee AUG 1997 – 1999
COL Charles W. Paxton 1999 – JUL 2001
COL John F. Mulholland JUL 2001 – JUL 2003

7TH SFG GROUP COMMANDERS

COL James G. Pulley 1991 – 1993
COL James S. Roach 1993 – 1995
COL James W. Parker 1995 – 1997
COL Edward F. Phillips 1997 – 1999
COL Savatore F. Cambria 1999 – 2001
COL Peter J. Dillon 2001 – 2003

10TH SFG GROUP COMMANDERS

COL Frank J. Toney, Jr. JUN 1992 – SEP 1994
COL Geoffrey C. Lambert SEP 1994 – AUG 1996
COL Leslie L. Fuller AUG 1996 – JUN 1998
COL Bruce Hoover JUN 1998 – NOV 1998
COL Michael Kershner NOV 1998 – JAN 1999
COL Richard W. Mills JAN 1999 – JUN 2001
COL Charles T. Cleveland JUN 2001 – JUL 2003

19TH SFG GROUP COMMANDERS


COL Paul R. Waite	1993 – 1995
COL Donald N. Spradling	1995 – 1997
COL Jordan M. Hughes	1997 – 2000
COL Alan J. Walker	2000 – 2002

20TH SFG GROUP COMMANDERS


COL Stewart H. Michelini	1992 – 1996
COL John R. Scales	1996 – 1998
COL James T. Yarborough	1998 – 1999
COL David T. Burford	1999 – 2001
COL James G. Champion	2001 – 2004

ORGANIZATION


U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND (1993)



U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND (2001)



HQ, USASFC Organization (1998)²³⁰



²³⁰ United States Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) Regulation 10-5, *Organization and Functions Manual*, February 1998, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; hereafter "USASFC Reg. 10-5," page number.

SF GROUP ORGANIZATION:

An SFG consisted of a Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHQ), a Group Support Company (GSC), and three SF battalions. The GSC included a Headquarters, Military Intelligence Detachment, Signal Detachment, Service Detachment, and Aviation Platoon.²³¹

SF BATTALION ORGANIZATION:

An SF battalion consisted of a Headquarters Detachment (C Detachment), a Battalion Support Company (BSC), and three Special Forces Companies. The BSC included a Headquarters, Military Intelligence Detachment, Signal Detachment, and Service Detachment.²³²

SF COMPANY ORGANIZATION:

An SF company consisted of a Headquarters Detachment (Operational Detachment – Bravo) and six SF Operational Detachments – Alpha (ODA), including one specializing in combat diving and one specializing in military freefall.²³³

SF DETACHMENT – ALPHA ORGANIZATION:

An SFODA consisted of twelve 18-series (SF) soldiers, including at Commander (O-3/18A), an Executive Officer (WO2/180A), an Operations Sergeant (E-8/18Z), an Operations & Intelligence Sergeant (E-7/18F), two SF Weapons Sergeants (E-7/18B and E-6/18B), two SF Engineer Sergeants (E-7/18C and E-6/18C), two SF Medical Sergeants (E-7/18D and E-6/18D), and two SF Communications Sergeants (E-7/18E and E-6/18E)²³⁴

SFG UNITS, LOCATIONS, AND ALIGNMENT:

1st SFG: Fort Lewis, Washington (1st Battalion, 1st SFG was forward stationed at Torii Station, Okinawa); aligned with United States Pacific Command (USPACOM)

231 Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations*, April 1990, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, 4-2; hereafter, "FM 31-20 (1990)," page number.

232 FM 30-21, 4 – 8.

233 FM 30-21, 4 – 12.

234 FM 31-20, 4 – 12.

3rd SFG: Fort Bragg, North Carolina; aligned with United States Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM/ACOM) and the Africa-focused missions of United States European Command (USEUCOM)

5th SFG: Fort Campbell, Kentucky; aligned with United States Central Command (USCENTCOM)

7th SFG: Fort Bragg, North Carolina; aligned with United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

10th SFG: Fort Devens, Massachusetts; relocated to Fort Carson, Colorado in 1995 (1st Battalion, 10th SFG was forward stationed in Stuttgart, Germany); aligned with USEUCOM


11th SFG (USAR): Headquartered at Fort Meade, Maryland (inactivated in 1994)

12th SFG (USAR): Headquartered at Arlington Heights, Illinois (inactivated in 1994)

19th SFG (ARNG): Headquartered in Salt Lake City, Utah

20th SFG (ARNG): Headquartered in Birmingham, Alabama

US ARMY SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND (AIRBORNE)



HISTORICAL NARRATIVE:

In the early 1980s, the Army staff and the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance (CENMA) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, identified a void in national strategy and force capabilities at the pre-crisis and low-intensity conflict levels. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Edward C. “Shy” Meyer, tasked the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) with studying the problems facing ARSOF and recommending solutions for these areas. With the TRADOC study still ongoing, the Army provisionally established the 1st Special Operations Command (1st SOCOM) at Fort Bragg on 1 October 1982, using CENMA billets. The Army also reorganized CENMA and the Institute for Military Assistance (IMA) under TRADOC, renaming it the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.

Commanded by Brigadier General (BG) Joseph C. Lutz, 1st SOCOM provided the higher headquarters for active-duty ARSOF units, which at the time consisted of three SF groups (5th, 7th, and 10th SFG), two Ranger battalions, one Civil Affairs (CA) battalion, and one Psychological Operations (PSYOP) group. Within a few years, 1st SOCOM added dedicated Special Operations Aviation, Support, and Signal units. A major subordinate command (MSC) of U.S. Army Forces Command, the 1st SOCOM mission was to prepare, provide, and sustain ARSOF.²³⁵ In May 1987, 1st SOCOM was designated as the Army component of the newly activated U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Following the activation of USASOC on 1 December 1989 as a major command (MACOM), 1st SOCOM became one of its two MSCs, alongside the short-lived U.S. Army Reserve Special Operations Command.²³⁶

On 27 November 1990, as part of a major ARSOF realignment, 1st SOCOM was inactivated and replaced by USASFC. Commanded by MG James A. Guest, who had previously commanded 1st SOCOM, USASFC performed the man, train, and equip mission for all nine U.S. Army SFGs then in existence (five active-duty, two Army National Guard, and two U.S. Army Reserve). Additionally, for a brief period in

235 For more information, see Christopher E. Howard, “1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) Reaches a Milestone: The Evolution of the Nation’s Premier Partnership Force,” *Army.mil*, 10 July 2014, https://www.army.mil/article/277890/1st_special_forces_command_airborne_reaches_a_milestone_the_evolution_of_the_nations_premier_partnership_force.

236 This command was replaced by the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) in late 1990.

the early 1990s, USASFC also controlled the 528th Support Battalion (Special Operations) and 112th Signal Battalion.

The mission of USASFC remained consistent for the ensuing decade, with only minor changes in verbiage. Its 2000 mission statement reads:

Train, validate, monitor readiness, prepare forces, and assist/advise Headquarters, U.S. Army Special Operations Command (HQ, USASOC) Commanding General to organize and equip assigned Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) forces for deployment to conduct worldwide special operations, across the range of military operations, in support of regional Combatant Commanders, U.S. Ambassadors, and other agencies, as directed.²³⁷

In the early 1990s, Army Field Manual (FM) 100-25, *Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces*, defined five core SF missions: Unconventional Warfare (UW), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Special Reconnaissance (SR), Combatting Terrorism (CT), and Direct Action (DA).²³⁸ Although USASFC units prepared for and conducted all these missions, FID was the one that best suited the “peacetime engagement” strategy pursued by the U.S. government in the period spanning from the end of the Cold War to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES, 1993 – 2001

On 15 September 1994, as part of its post-Cold War force reductions, the Army formally inactivated USASFC’s two Army Reserve SFGs, the 11th SFG and 12th SFG, both of which had been activated in 1961. Commanded by COL Kenneth P. Berquist, 11th SFG was inactivated at Fort Meade, Maryland. LTC (P) Theodore G. Drier commanded 12th SFG, headquartered at Arlington Heights, Illinois, at the time of its inactivation.

In September 1995, in accordance with the Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1991, 10th SFG relocated CONUS-based elements from Fort Devens, Massachusetts, to Fort Carson, Colorado. 1st Battalion, 10th SFG remained forward stationed in Germany, where it had been since 1952.

237 LTG William P. Tangney, Memorandum for Commander, U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne), “Subject: Mission Statement,” 7 August 2020, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.

238 Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces*, 12 December 1991, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, 7-1. Published in June 2001, FM 3-05.20, *Special Forces Operations*, added Counterproliferation and Information Operations to the list of SF core missions.

USASFC added a Deputy Commanding General (DCG) position to the headquarters TDA in December 1996. The following month, MG Kenneth R. Bowra, USASFC CG, selected COL (P) John Scales, previously the Commander, 20th SFG, to fill this position. As DCG, COL (P) Scales was responsible for “National Guard and Reserve component interface and oversight, and other requirements as deemed necessary by the CG.”²³⁹ In 2000, Chief Warrant Officer 5 Larry Plesser became the first USASFC Command Chief Warrant Officer.

STRENGTH

As of 1996, each SFG was authorized 1,385 soldiers, although actual strength typically fell below the authorized level. This problem was particularly acute in the mid-1990s, when USAJFKSWCS throughput of SF-qualified soldiers could not keep up with the demand. SF manning levels were trending upward heading into the 2000s. As of January 2001, 1st SFG reported an assigned strength of 1,164 soldiers out of a total of 1,195 authorized.²⁴⁰

Headquarters, USASFC, was authorized 108 personnel in 1998, compared to the 712 authorized positions the Headquarters, USASOC, during this same timeframe.²⁴¹ This disparity reflected the consolidation of certain functions and responsibilities, such as force modernization, at the USASOC level in the early and mid-1990s. The table below provides a snapshot of Headquarters, USASFC, authorizations, as of 1998.²⁴²

	OFFICER	WO	ENL	CIV	TOTAL
Command Group	5	0	4	3	13
Inspector General	1	0	0	1	12
Staff Judge Advocate	4	0	3	0	7
Chaplain	1	0	1	0	2
ARNG Advisor	1	0	0	0	1
ACOFs, G-1	1	0	7	1	9
ACOFs, G-2	1	1	5	0	7
ACOFs, G-3	18	2	31	14	65
ACOFs, G-4	1	0	1	0	2
TOTAL	33	3	52	19	108

²³⁹ “U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) Annual Historical Report for Calendar Year 1996,” 30 May 1997, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; hereafter “USASFC CY96 AHR.”

²⁴⁰ 1st SFG (A), “CY01 Annual Historical Report,” copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, 2.

²⁴¹ USASOC Regulation 10-5, “United States Army Special Operations Command Organization & Functions Manual,” October 1995, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.

²⁴² USASFC Reg. 10-5, various pages.

INNOVATION:

FORCE XXI

USASOC selected 7th SFG to test both the Army's Force XXI initiatives and related SOF-specific modernization initiatives in 1995. The first initiative reviewed military intelligence (MI) support to the SFG, then consisting of MI detachments at the group and battalion levels. 7th SFG formed a group-level MI company to test whether it could better support subordinate battalions and improve low-density specialty training.²⁴³ After one year, 7th SFG recommended to USASFC that, pending CG, USASOC approval, this consolidation of MI assets should be codified into the Modified Table of Organization and Equipment.²⁴⁴

Two other Force XXI initiatives involved testing whether the attachment of a CA company (Company A, 96th CA Battalion) and a three-person Brigade PSYOP Support Element (BPSE) to the group would improve responsiveness to the theater commander's requirements. 7th SFG was sufficiently encouraged by the results of both tests that it planned to request CG, USASOC approval for the assignment of both A/96th CAB and a BPSE to the group.²⁴⁵

Another initiative evaluated the maritime and underwater operations requirements. After completing an eight-month test, 7th SFG concluded that three scuba-capable Combat Diving SFOD-As and five Surface Water Infiltration Detachments (WID), combined with a group-level Maritime Operations and Training Detachment, were sufficient to support the USSOUTHCOM mission.²⁴⁶

Lastly, 7th SFG tested the hypothesis that the adoption of the MC-5 Parachute System could lead to a reduction in the number of Military Free Fall (MFF) Teams within the group. This was based on the theory that the MC-5 would provide some, though not all, MFF capabilities via static-line employment. If true, it would allow non-MFF-qualified SF

243 U.S. Army Center of Military History, *Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1995* (Fort McNair, Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2004), 66; hereafter "FY95 DAHSUM," page number.

244 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne), "Special Forces FORCE XXI," 2 July 1996, found in 7th SFG (A), "Annual Historical Report, CY1999: Book 6 of 10," copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; hereafter "Special Forces FORCE XXI presentation."

245 Special Forces FORCE XXI presentation. *The available documentation does not indicate the fate of this recommendation.*

246 7th SFG (A) "Annual Historical Report, CY1999: Book 6 of 10," copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, B-3. *The recommendation was for one Combat Diving SFOD-A per battalion, two WID SFOD-As each for 1st and 2nd Battalion, and one WID SFOD-A for 3rd Battalion.*

soldiers to perform some missions currently reserved for MFF teams. 7th SFG judged the test successful and recommended that USASOC adopt the MC-5, with certain caveats.²⁴⁷

SPECIAL OPERATIONS TRAINING (SOT)

In the late 1990s, USASOC and USASFC leadership recognized the importance of developing ARSOF-specific doctrine, tactics, techniques, and equipment for conducting direct action missions in urban environments. The USASFC commander's end state was for "every SFODA [to] possess the capability to conduct fluid, initiative-based SOT missions, either unilaterally or as part of a larger team." Recognizing that USAJFKSWCS lacked the capacity to accomplish this, he authorized the SFGs to conduct SOT courses at home station. However, the SFGs lacked the resources, and sometimes the facilities, to conduct this training, and looked to USASFC to help bridge the gap.²⁴⁸

DOCTRINE


During the 1990s, SF doctrine was captured in a variety of doctrinal publications that fell under the ARSOF Doctrinal and Training Publications Architecture, codified in FM 100-25, *Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces*. FM 31-20, *Doctrine for Army Special Forces Operations* served as the capstone SF publication. As of 1999, it was supplemented by six additional FMs that addressed major SF missions or capabilities. Additionally, seven training circulars (TC) provided doctrinal guidance on SF topics that did not warrant standalone FMs.

In June 2001, the Army published FM 3-05.20, *Special Forces Operations*, which superseded the 1999 edition of FM 31-20. This was part of a broader restructuring of doctrine that included FM 100-25 being replaced by FM 3-05. Concurrently with this restructuring, SF doctrine converted its existing TCs to FMs, bringing the total of SF doctrinal publications to fifteen.

247 COL James W. Parker, Memorandum Thru Commander, USASFC, For Commander, USASOC, "SUBJECT: Force XXI MC-5 Parachute Final Test Report," 28 June 1996, found in 7th SFG (A), "Annual Historical Report, CY1999: Book 6 of 10," copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.

248 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), "SOT Initiative Update," undated, found in the 5th SFG CY99 Unit History, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.

SF DOCTRINAL & TRAINING PUBLICATIONS ARCHITECTURE (1999)



OPERATIONS:

The proliferation of peacetime engagement missions that followed the end of the Cold War greatly increased the demand for ARSOF, including SF. The regional alignment of the five active component SF groups became more solidified (see table below). However, for longer operations, it was common for the primary SFG to be augmented by elements from other SFGs, including the two Army National Guard (ARNG) SFGs (19th and 20th).

SF Unit	PRIMARY AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY²⁴⁹
1st SFG	USPACOM
3rd SFG	ACOM (Caribbean) and USEUCOM (Africa) ²⁵⁰
5th SFG	USCENTCOM
7th SFG	USSOUTHCOM
10th SFG	USEUCOM

²⁴⁹ "U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) Calendar Year 1995 Annual Historical Report," copy in US-ASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; hereafter, "USASFC CY95 AHR."

²⁵⁰ The Caribbean fell within the Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM, later ACOM) AOR, and Africa fell within the USEUCOM AOR.

The operations described below are organized chronologically by start date. They cover the period 1993 – 2001, although some were already underway at the start of this period, and some persisted well into the GWOT, which began in October 2001.

RESTORE HOPE

Operation RESTORE HOPE, lasting from December 1992 to May 1993, was a U.S.-led, multinational, United Nations (UN)-sanctioned mission aimed at establishing a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. 5th SFG supported RESTORE HOPE, and its successor, CONTINUE HOPE.²⁵¹ U.S. operations in Somalia gained worldwide attention after the 3 – 4 October 1993 Battle of Mogadishu, during which 16 ARSOF soldiers were lost, with one additional soldier killed in action three days later. This event precipitated the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia.²⁵²

In 1994, SF participation in joint, multinational, and unilateral exercises increased, as did its participation in the Combat Training Centers and in the Battle Command Training Program. To facilitate SF and other SOF integration into corps-level plans and training, each Army corps had its own SOF coordination element.²⁵³

PROVIDE COMFORT

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT initially began in 1991 to provide humanitarian aid to Iraq's Kurdish refugees fleeing President Saddam Hussein's brutal reprisals in the immediate aftermath of Operation DESERT STORM. Once the British and French joined the effort, the operation transitioned into Combined Joint Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT. Since the mission was based out of Turkey, a USEUCOM country and NATO partner, 10th SFG, provided the bulk of SF manpower to the mission.

By 1994, with PROVIDE COMFORT entering its fourth year, 10th SFG was providing companies on 90-day rotations to the JSOTF at Incerlik, Turkey. It also provided select personnel to the Military Coordination

251 U.S. Army Center of Military History, *Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1993* (Fort McNair, Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2002), 58; hereafter "FY93 DAHSUM," page number.

252 U.S. Army Center of Military History, *Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1994* (Fort McNair, Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2000), 63; hereafter "FY94 DAHSUM," page number.

253 FY94 DAHSUM, 66.

Center at Zahku, Iraq.²⁵⁴ On 14 April 1994, three SF soldiers, COL Jerald L. Thompson, SSG Paul N. Barclay, and SSG Ricky L. Robinson, were killed when the UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter they were travelling in was accidentally shot down after being misidentified by U.S. Air Force fighter aircraft. COL Thompson was the commander of the Fort Bragg-based Security Assistance Training Management Organization (SATMO) and was finishing his six-month tour of duty in Turkey at the time of his death. SSGs Barclay and Robinson were both assigned to 2nd Battalion, 10th SFG, Fort Devens, Massachusetts.²⁵⁵

UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

In Haiti, the U.S., in conjunction with the UN, tried unsuccessfully for more than a year to get the ruling military to restore constitutional government and reinstate the elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. As the negotiations wore on, conditions for Haitian citizens had worsened, a result of government repression and UN sanctions. Acting on UN Resolution 940, the U.S. prepared to invade Haiti. Meanwhile, negotiations continued with the Haitian military, led by LTG Raoul Cedras. With the airborne assault force enroute from Fort Bragg, a negotiating team headed by former President Jimmy Carter and retired GEN Colin Powell successfully persuaded Cedras to step down. Combat was avoided, but a force of over twenty thousand U.S. troops ultimately landed in Haiti.²⁵⁶

3rd SFG was among the first units deployed into Haiti on 19 September 1994, with the mission of restoring security and establishing order in the rural areas. 3rd SFG, augmented by multiple other SFGs, worked to bring stability and security to the Haitian countryside. The Secretary of the Army later awarded 3rd SFG with the Army Superior Unit Award for its performance in Haiti.²⁵⁷

Tragedy struck on 12 January 1995 when SFC Gregory D. Cardott was killed at a checkpoint in Gonaives, Haiti. SFC Cardott was assigned to Company A, 3rd Battalion, 3rd SFG at the time of his

254 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), "1995 Annual Historical Review, Volume 1," copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; hereafter "10th SFG CY95 AHR."

255 10th SFG CY95 AHR; FY94 DAHSUM, 56.

256 FY93 DAHSUM, 61 – 62.

257 USASOC Press Release 503-19, "The 3rd Special Forces Group Receives Unit Award," 31 March 1995, found in USASFC CY95 AHR.

death.²⁵⁸ A week earlier, on 6 January, the DoD announced that it was ordering two ARNG SF companies to active duty for six months to deploy to Haiti and take part in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. Eighty-three soldiers assigned to Company C, 5th Battalion, 19th SFG from Fort Collins, Colorado, reported to Fort Bragg in mid-January to prepare for deployment to Haiti in early February. Eighty-three soldiers assigned to Company A, 1st Battalion, 20th SFG from Auburn, Alabama, soon followed in early March. At Fort Bragg, the two ARNG companies underwent an orientation program focused on Haitian customs, history, politics, and other subjects deemed to be important to the soldiers. Upon arrival in Haiti, they deployed to the countryside and assisted in maintaining a stable and secure environment.²⁵⁹ It was the first time that National Guard SF units had been called to active duty and deployed overseas.

EASTERN EUROPE OPENS TO SF

10th SFG reported that, in late 1994, “the floodgates finally opened for 10th SFG involvement in Eastern Europe, including the first ever joint combined exchange training (JCET) missions to former Communist countries.”²⁶⁰ By year’s end, 10th SFG ODAs conducted missions or other engagements in Slovakia, Albania, and Romania. By early 1995, military leaders from Slovakia, Lithuania, Poland, Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Ukraine had visited 10th SFG. These visits helped form the basis for several deep and enduring partnerships, although ongoing developments in the former Yugoslavia would soon command much of 10th SFG’s attention and capacity.

SAFE BORDER

In 1995, a long-standing border dispute between Ecuador and Peru dating back to 1941 escalated into open combat, resulting in hundreds of deaths on both sides. As the guarantors of the 1941 peace protocols, the U.S., Brazil, Argentina, and Chile joined efforts to resolve the dispute.

258 USASOC Press Release 501-06, “SF Soldier Killed in Haiti,” 17 January 1995, found in USASFC CY95 AHR.

259 USASOC PAO Release 501-04, 9 January 1995, found in USASFC CY95 AHR. *LTG James T. Scott, USASOC CG, had requested the call-up so that 3rd SFG units currently in Haiti could rotate back to Fort Bragg to prepare for other missions and subsequent rotations to Haiti. The two ARNG SF companies deployed to Haiti alongside two active-duty SF companies, one from the 1st SFG at Fort Lewis, WA, and one company from the 5th SFG at Fort Campbell, KY.*

260 10th SFG CY95 AHR, 14.

After the fighting ended on 17 February 1995, peacekeepers and observers moved into the disputed territory, while negotiations took place to resolve the lingering issues.²⁶¹

Originally established for ninety days in March 1995, SAFE BORDER was eventually extended until December 1997. Sixty U.S. soldiers and four UH-60 helicopters continued to provide support to the Military Observer Mission Ecuador and Peru (MOMEP) along the 78 kilometers of the contested border. ARSOF provided critical communications in the rugged mountainous terrain and dense jungle, as well as language skills, cultural knowledge, and interpersonal skills.²⁶²

JOINT ENDEAVOR

Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, the military implementation phase of the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia, began in December 1995. On 11 December 1995, USASOC announced the deployment of elements from 5th SFG, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, and 112th Signal Battalion to Bosnia. Ultimately, over 20,000 U.S. troops would be deployed into the region as part of Task Force Eagle. They joined an international peacekeeping force from eleven other nations to enforce the NATO-imposed Balkan ceasefire. JOINT ENDEAVOR was also NATO's first operational commitment of forces, the first time U.S. Army soldiers had served in Eastern Europe in substantial numbers, the first time since World War II that American and Russian troops had shared a common mission, and the Army's first cold weather combat operation since the Korean War.²⁶³

Before JOINT ENDEAVOR, Army SF soldiers participated in Operation DENY FLIGHT, which enforced a no-fly zone over Bosnia. The SF mission was to assist combat search-and-rescue in the event of downed NATO aircraft. 10th SFG immediately began preparing for liaison with NATO countries and deployed to support the Implementation Force (IFOR) that would soon arrive. As of 4 January 1996, USASOC reported that more than 575 active-duty soldiers had deployed in support

261 FY95 DAHSUM, 47.

262 U.S. Army Center of Military History, *Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1997* (Fort McNair, Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2005), 113; hereafter "FY97 DAHSUM," page number.

263 U.S. Army Center of Military History, *Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1996* (Fort McNair, Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2002), 72; hereafter "FY96 DAHSUM," page number.

of JOINT ENDEAVOR.²⁶⁴ Operations in the Balkans eventually accounted for 75 percent of 10th SFG's deployed forces.

ASSURED RESPONSE

Although the U.S. maintained no bases in Africa in the 1990s, it did participate in a range of operations on the continent, with Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) maintaining forces to support contingency operations. These forces were needed in early April 1996, after factional fighting in Monrovia, Liberia, cut the U.S. Embassy's access to the airport. Following the 6 April closure of the embassy, SOCEUR initiated Operation ASSURED RESPONSE, evacuating 400 U.S. citizens and 1,700 others between 9 and 20 April. SOCEUR forces included soldiers from 1/10th SFG and the 3/160th SOAR.²⁶⁵

OTHER MISSIONS

In the USAPACOM AOR, 1st and 19th SFGs conducted over 40 JCETs, six counterdrug missions, three demining missions, and five Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) exercises, including the first JCETs in Uzbekistan and Mongolia. Forty SOF soldiers deployed to Laos and Cambodia to conduct medical training, leadership courses, community awareness programs, and demining training in a year-long program that began in October 1996.²⁶⁶

3rd SFG maintained a consistently high operations tempo during 1996, including continued support to Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. In December, 3rd SFG sent the first pilot teams into Africa to conduct assessments for what would become the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI).²⁶⁷ 5th SFG also supported UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, in addition to demining missions in Ethiopia and Eritrea. It conducted a total of 11 JCS and 8 JCET exercises during the year.

In USSOUTHCOM, 7th and 20th SFGs combined to conduct 52 JCETs, 36 counterdrug missions, and 3 humanitarian assistance missions, along with 20 other missions. 7th SFG continued its support to

264 USASOC PAO Release 601-01, "USASOC Deployment to Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR," 4 January 1996, found in USASFC CY96 AHR.

265 FY96 DAHSUM, 76.

266 FY97 DAHSUM, 120; 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), "Annual Historical Review for Calendar Year 1995," copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. JCS Exercises included Cobra Gold 95 (Thailand), Foal Eagle 95 (South Korea), and Ulchi Focus Lens 95 (South Korea).

267 USASFC CY96 AHR.

SAFE BORDER. It also provided the cadre for JCS Exercise Cabanas 97, conducted in Panama in October 1996. Sixty-one soldiers from 2/7 SFG trained approximately 700 soldiers from Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay in a variety of UN peacekeeping tasks, to include waterborne operations, human rights issues, and demining procedures.²⁶⁸

Within USASFC, 7th SFG was the lead for the Mexican Training Initiative (MTI), a top DoD counterdrug priority focused on developing a Mexican counterdrug and counternarcotics capability.²⁶⁹ The USASFC Special Projects/Counter-Drug desk continued to monitor and implement the command's involvement in counter-drug operations. Over the course of 1996, SF personnel executed 82 missions in support of counter-drug operations. However, USASFC also implemented a new policy change relating to counter-drug training under Title 10. This new policy stated that USASFC units would no longer teach advanced military training to law enforcement agencies, including fast rope insertion, advanced marksmanship/sniper training, MOUT operations, and close quarters combat.²⁷⁰

As the year drew to a close, the peace enforcement mission in Bosnia, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, transitioned to Operation JOINT GUARD, a stability operations mission. As part of the transition, the implementation force became the stabilization force (SFOR), leading to increased ARSOF involvement. ARSOF in Bosnia were subordinate to the SFOR through the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF). The task force provided a Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE) to each Multinational Division to control SOF Joint Commission Observer Teams, which maintained communications between all factions and SFOR commanders, in the division's sector. The CJSOTF also provided linguist support, secure communications, a rapid response capability, combat search and rescue, personnel recovery, and special reconnaissance.²⁷¹

In FY97, USASFC supported numerous contingency and humanitarian missions around the globe. MG Bowra reported that, in FY97, soldiers from his command deployed to 131 countries and states,

268 USASFC CY96 AHR.

269 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne), "Annual Historical Report, CY1996: Book 1 of 10," copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC. The Mexican partner was the *Grupo Aeromovil Fuerzas Especiales*.

270 USASFC CY96 AHR.

271 FY97 DAHSUM, 118 – 119.

completing more than 2,100 missions. He noted a 440 percent increase in the number of missions since 1992.²⁷² This was part of a broader trend in SOF employment. In 1997, the Army reported that ARSOF deployed to 144 countries, with a weekly average of 4,690 personnel on 303 missions to 69 countries.²⁷³

During the 1990s, U.S. ambassadors and country teams increasingly relied on SOF expertise. USASFC personnel supported embassy objectives with partner force training, humanitarian assistance, civic actions, demining programs, counterdrug programs, counterterrorism, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), and military liaison teams. An FY97 survey of 65 embassies indicated strong satisfaction with the performance of SOF personnel.²⁷⁴

In May 1997, following a military coup in Sierra Leone, an SF team supported Operation NOBLE OBELISK by providing regional expertise and security for U.S. citizens before evacuation. A total of 2,509 persons, including 454 American citizens, were ultimately evacuated.²⁷⁵ The following month, ARSOF soldiers assisted in the evacuation of 57 noncombatants from the Congo.

SF, along with PSYOP and CA, continued to support the U.S. Support Group-Haiti and the U.S. Embassy following the end of UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.²⁷⁶ Meanwhile, in the USCENTCOM AOR, one SF company from USASFC supported the IRIS GOLD exercise series in Kuwait.²⁷⁷ This, along with the EARLY VICTOR exercise in Jordan, helped 5th SFG maintain a persistent presence in the Middle East during the 1990s.

ACRI

Training missions intensified in Africa in 1997 under the auspices of the ACRI. 3rd SFG Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) supporting the ACRI consisted of approximately 60 personnel, commanded by an SF

272 *The Rucksack* (Winter 1998), found in "PAO Input to USASFC Annual Historical Report for Calendar Year 1997," 8 May 1998, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.

273 FY97 DAHSUM, 208.

274 FY97 DAHSUM, 119. One embassy objective in the USPACOM area of responsibility was JTF BEVEL EDGE, an exercise designed to plan for a NEO from Cambodia. With one SF company and one Special Operations Aviation platoon deployed to Thailand, the Army provided 72 personnel to BEVEL EDGE in July 1997.

275 FY97 DAHSUM, 113.

276 FY97 DAHSUM, 119 – 120.

277 FY97 DAHSUM, 119.

major. These teams included one company headquarters (Operational Detachment – Bravo, or ODB), three ODAs, and one combat support detachment that included CA and PSYOP personnel.²⁷⁸

Special Forces were the backbone of the ACRI training program, conducting multi-echelon training and mentoring African battalions. Training initially focused on individual soldier skills such as basic rifle marksmanship, land navigation, first aid, and casualty evacuation. Partner forces then progressed to collective training, or small-unit tactics, including convoy operations, checkpoint management, patrolling, and area security. A train-the-trainer approach was implemented to ensure sustainability of skills within partner units.

Command-post exercises (CPXs) were used to train battalion and brigade leadership, and comprehensive FTXs tested the skills of African battalions. These exercises simulated real-world peacekeeping and humanitarian-relief scenarios, such as managing refugee camps, securing convoys, and interacting with local populations. Local civilians often participated as role players, adding realism to the exercises.

SF teams also helped African units integrate new equipment, such as portable water-purification systems, lightweight mine detectors, and interoperable communications systems. They provided uniforms, rucksacks, and other gear to ensure uniformity and readiness for peacekeeping missions.

Senegal, Uganda, Malawi, and Mali were the most involved African partner nations in the ACRI, with Ethiopia, Ghana, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire participating to a lesser degree. Their participation demonstrated their commitment to regional stability and their ability to integrate peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and civil-military operations into their military capabilities.

A year and a half after the initiative's launch, COL David E. McCracken, 3rd SFG Commander, concluded, "the ACRI is working. During the first series of sustainment exercises, conducted in Senegal, Malawi and Uganda six months after their initial training, each of those nations' soldiers demonstrated proficiency in critical company-level tasks." He added, "moreover, all equipment was accounted for, and goals for the retention of trained personnel were met."²⁷⁹

278 COL David E. McCracken, "ACRI: Establishing a New African Paradigm," *Special Warfare* 11:3 (Summer 1998): 10; FY97 DAHSUM, 118.

279 McCracken, 13.

In 1998, 7th SFG supported demining operations in Central America, as part of Mision Asistencia Para la Remocion de Minas en Centro America (MOMENCA). In Bosnia, 10th SFG continued to support JOINT GUARD, which transitioned to JOINT FORGE in June 1998.

SF personnel deployed to 120 countries on operations and training exercises in FY99.²⁸⁰ Operations in the Balkans expanded into Kosovo (JOINT GUARDIAN), and the ACRI continued to expand in Africa. 1st, 3rd, and 5th SFGs, in conjunction with the U.S. Army Military Police School, trained 1,778 local drug law enforcement agency (DLEA) personnel.²⁸¹ JCS exercises and JCET commitments absorbed much of SF's remaining bandwidth. The graphic below, from 5th SFG, provides a snapshot of one SF group's operations during this year.



In December 1999, 7th SFG deployed in support of Operation FUNDAMENTAL RESPONSE, the U.S. response to flooding in Venezuela. Alongside elements of the 160th SOAR and various conventional support/

²⁸⁰ U.S. Army Center of Military History, *Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1999* (Fort McNair, Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2006), 54 – 55; hereafter “FY99 DAHSUM,” page number.

²⁸¹ FY99 DAHSUM, 53.

sustainment personnel, the SF soldiers conducted search and rescue and humanitarian assistance. The mission lasted until March 2000.²⁸²

In FY00, An ACRI MTT in Ivory Coast trained some 800 soldiers of the Ivorian Army in peace support and humanitarian operations. This included more than seventy soldiers from 3rd SFG, 21st Theater Support Command, and V Corps. In Senegal, an ACRI MTT trained 400 Senegalese officers and soldiers in peace support operations from June to November 2000.²⁸³ In Operation FOCUS RELIEF, 3rd SFG also trained security forces from Nigeria, Senegal and Ghana in the tactics and techniques necessary to interdict the illicit diamond trade that warlords were using to finance their armies.

In USSOUTHCOM, 7th and 20th SFG provided planning assistance and analytical support to a variety of regional partners. 7th SFG conducted JCETs in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela. At the same time, the 7th and the 20th SFGs, together with the 204th Military Intelligence Battalion, conducted counterdrug training with USSOUTHCOM and Caribbean partner nations. In addition, the 7th SFG also conducted demining training in Nicaragua, Peru, and Ecuador.²⁸⁴

CONCLUSION:

Army Special Forces assigned to USASFC were critical to the U.S. government's peacetime engagement strategy between 1993 and 2001, while also proving their value during a variety of contingency operations. Their combination of technical and tactical proficiency, language and cultural expertise, and training focus made them a weapon of choice during this period. Although these specialties would continue to benefit SF in the years to come, SF's expertise in unconventional warfare, direct action, and counterterrorism was about to become far more important.

282 U.S. Army Center of Military History, *Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 2000* (Fort McNair, Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2011), 59; hereafter "FY00 DAHSUM," page number.

283 FY00 DAHSUM, 57.

284 FY00 DAHSUM, 58.

CHAPTER V:

75TH RANGER REGIMENT

Between 1993 and 2001, the 75th Ranger Regiment upheld its reputation as the Army's premier light infantry unit through extensive training and deployment in critical operations. In 1993, Rangers were involved in Somalia during the Battle of Mogadishu, showcasing their adaptability in urban combat despite significant challenges. Throughout the remainder of the decade, the Regiment carried out demanding training exercises globally, emphasizing readiness through its philosophy, "Training is everything and everything is training." In 2000, the Regiment deployed to Kosovo, conducting reconnaissance and quick-reaction missions during an extended combat deployment. The Regiment's continuous training and high OPTEMPO throughout the 1990s honed their capabilities and prepared them for the Global War on Terror after 9/11.

KEY PERSONNEL:

REGIMENTAL COMMANDING OFFICERS (RCOs)


COL James T. Jackson	JUL 1993 – JUL 1995
COL William J. Leszczynski	JUL 1995 – JUN 1997
COL Stanley A. McChrystal	JUN 1997 – JUL 1999
COL Purl K. Keen	JUL 1999 – JUL 2001
COL Joseph L. Votel	JUL 2001 – AUG 2003

REGIMENTAL COMMAND SERGEANTS MAJOR (RCSMs)

CSM Jesse Laye	NOV 1992 – JUN 1994
CSM George D. Ponder	JUN 1994 – JUL 1996
CSM Michael T. Hall	JUL 1996 – APR 2000
CSM Walter E. Rakow	APR 2000 – JUL 2002

ORGANIZATION:

75th RANGER REGIMENT (1993)



HISTORICAL NARRATIVE:

The lineage of the U.S. Army Rangers can be traced back to the Second World War when six Ranger battalions were activated, starting with the 1st Ranger Battalion, on 19 June 1942, in Northern Ireland. These battalions conducted daring operations around the world, including North Africa, Sicily, Italy, Normandy, and the Philippines. Other units that would contribute to the Ranger lineage were formed, including the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), commonly known as Merrill's Marauders, organized on 3 October 1943, in the China-Burma-India Theater. Before the dissolution of Merrill's Marauders in August 1944, remaining members transferred to the 475th Infantry, which in turn served as an element of the 5332nd Brigade (Provisional), also known as the MARS Task Force. All World War II-era Ranger units were disbanded by the end of 1945.²⁸⁵

During the Korean War, various Ranger units were established to provide their supported commands with an elite light infantry capability. These included the GHQ Raider Company, the Eighth U.S. Army Ranger Company, and multiple Ranger Infantry Companies (Airborne) (RICAs). While these units were short-lived, the war gave rise to what became the permanent U.S. Army Ranger School. After the Armistice, the 75th Infantry Regiment, drawing its lineage from Merrill's Marauders and the

285 USASOC History Office, "ARSOF Timeline," n.d., https://arsof-history.org/arsof_timeline/index.html; Kenneth Finlayson and Robert W. Jones, Jr., "Rangers in WWII, Part I: The Formation and Early Days," 2006, https://arsof-history.org/articles/v2n3_rangers_wwii_page_1.html; Kenneth Finlayson and Robert W. Jones, Jr., "Rangers in WWII, Part II: Sicily and Italy," 2007, https://arsof-history.org/articles/v3n1_rangers_wwii_page_1.html; Cheryl A. Walley, "From Ledo to Leeches: The 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional)," 2006, https://arsof-history.org/articles/v2n1_ledo_to_leeches_page_1.html; Troy J. Sacquety, "Over the Hills and Far Away: The MARS Task Force, the Ultimate Model for Long Range Penetration Warfare," 2009, https://arsof-history.org/articles/v5n4_over_the_hills_page_1.html; Troy J. Sacquety, "The 75th Ranger Regiment Distinctive Unit Insignia," 2022, https://arsof-history.org/articles/22jan_75th_ranger_dui_page_1.html.

475th Infantry, was activated on 20 November 1954, on Okinawa, though it was inactivated again by March 1956. During the Vietnam War, the 75th Infantry Regiment was reorganized on 1 January 1969, as a parent regiment for long-range patrol units and several companies. While the 75th Infantry remained on the rolls as a parent regiment under the Combat Arms Regimental System, Ranger elements were inactivated in the early 1970s.²⁸⁶

To ensure that the Army had an elite light infantry unit to set the highest standard for the entire force, U.S. Army Chief of Staff General (GEN) Creighton W. Abrams, Jr. directed the activation of 1st and 2nd Ranger Battalions, 75th Infantry, on 1 July and 1 October 1974, respectively. In April 1980, Army Rangers participated in the ill-fated rescue attempt of American hostages in Iran, known as Operation EAGLE CLAW. In October 1983, as part of Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada, 1st and 2nd battalions conducted a parachute assault on Point Salinas airfield.²⁸⁷

A year later, on 2 October 1984, 3rd Battalion, 75th Infantry, was activated. This was preceded by another crucial milestone earlier that year, which was the formal activation of the 75th Infantry (Ranger) regimental headquarters on 1 July. Almost two years later, on 3 February 1986, the Army redesignated the 75th Infantry as the 75th Ranger Regiment. This administrative action consolidated the 75th Infantry's lineage (from Merrill's Marauders) with the lineage of the former World War II Ranger Battalions, effectively uniting these two distinct Ranger predecessors under a single regiment. Over the next few years, Ranger units supported combat operations in Panama during Operation JUST CAUSE in 1989 and in the Middle East during Operation DESERT STORM in 1991.²⁸⁸

286 USASOC History Office, "ARSOF Timeline"; Sacquety, "The 75th Ranger Regiment DUI"; Eugene G. Piasecki, "GHQ Raider Monument," 2010, https://arsof-history.org/articles/v6n2_ghq_raider_page_1.html; Eugene G. Piasecki, "Eighth Army Rangers: First in Korea" 2010, https://arsof-history.org/articles/v6n1_8th_rangers_page_1.html; Kenneth Finlayson, "A Highly Praised Luxury: The Ranger Infantry Companies in Korea, 1950–1951," 2010, https://arsof-history.org/articles/v6n2_highly_praised_luxury_page_1.html; Kenneth Finlayson, "Rebirth of The Rangers: The Ranger Infantry Companies in Korea," 2010, https://arsof-history.org/articles/v6n2_rebirth_of_rangers_page_1.html.

287 USASOC History Office, "ARSOF Timeline."

288 See, generally, Ronald H. Cole, Joint History Office, *Operation URGENT FURY: Grenada* (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Monographs/URGENT_Fury.pdf; Ronald H. Cole, Joint History Office, *Operation URGENT JUST CAUSE: Panama* (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Monographs/Just_Cause.pdf; Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus, *The Whirlwind War: The United States Army in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1995); USASOC History Office, "ARSOF Timeline"; Christopher E. Howard, "1st Special Operations Command (1st SOCOM): A Brief History," n.d., <https://arsof-history.org/1stsocom/index.html>; Kenneth Finlayson, "Task Force 160 in Operation URGENT FURY," 2006, https://arsof-history.org/articles/v2n2_tf160_page_1.html; USASOC History Office, "Lineage and Honors," n.d., https://arsof-history.org/lineage_and_honors/index.html; USASOC History Office, "ARSOF in Panama," n.d., https://arsof-history.org/arsof_in_panama/index.html.

By 1993, the organizational structure of the 75th Ranger Regiment, a Major Subordinate Unit (MSU) of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, had essentially been set in stone for nearly seven years and would remain so for the remainder of the decade. Located at Fort Benning, Georgia, Headquarters (HQ), 75th Ranger Regiment was authorized 123 soldiers. The Regimental mission was simply, “to plan and conduct special operations in support of U.S. policies and objectives.”²⁸⁹ Elsewhere, the 75th Ranger Regiment was described as having “special-ly trained, light infantrymen who are experts in quick-reaction, small-scale operations,” such as raids, personnel and equipment recovery operations, interdiction of key areas, and airfield seizure.²⁹⁰ The Regiment had an assortment of weapons to accomplish its missions, to include the M-16A2, M60 and M240 machine guns, M-249 squad automatic weapons (SAWs), 60mm mortars, and the 84mm recoilless rifle system (also known as the Ranger Anti-Armor Weapons System, or RAAWS).²⁹¹

Entry standards for the Regiment remained high. In addition to Basic Combat Training, Advanced Individual Training, and airborne school, one had to complete the three-week Ranger Indoctrination Program (RIP). The RIP process involved the Army Physical Fitness Test, a water survival test, a five-mile run in less than 40 minutes, a 12-mile road march with weapon and rucksack in under three hours, and other evaluated events, with a 30 – 40 percent attrition rate. Those successfully completing the RIP could advance to the Regiment. Those who had not yet gone to U.S. Army Ranger School were required to do so (and pass) within their first year of joining the Regiment. Ranger School was a 72-day leadership and patrolling course that pushed candidates to their mental and physical limits. Not all Ranger School graduates would serve in the 75th Ranger Regiment, but all members of the 75th Ranger Regiment were expected to be Ranger School graduates.²⁹²

The Ranger Regiment had three battalions: 1/75th at Hunter Army Airfield (HAAF), Georgia; 2/75th at Fort Lewis, Washington; and

289 75th Ranger Regiment, “Annual Historical Review (AHR) for Calendar Year 1993,” n.d., USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.


290 Public Affairs Office, “SUBJECT: Query from Gannett News Service Report Kirk Spitzer,” 24 August 1993, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.

291 PAO, “SUBJECT: Query from Gannett News Service Report Kirk Spitzer”; 75th Ranger Regiment, CY93 AHR. According to the Regiment’s 1993 AHR, it had fifty-one 84 mm RAAWS, eighteen 60mm mortars, eighty-three M240Gs, and 162 SAWs at the time.


292 PAO, “SUBJECT: Query from Gannett News Service Report Kirk Spitzer.” It should be noted that one was only considered a “Ranger” if he served in the 75th Ranger Regiment, not by virtue of graduating from U.S. Army Ranger School.

3/75th at Fort Benning. Each battalion was authorized 580 soldiers, for a total authorization of some 1,900 in the Regiment (including regimental HQ). A typical Ranger battalion consisted of three rifle companies and a Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC). The HHC consisted of around 23 officers, 2 warrant officers, and approximately 100 enlisted and non-commissioned officers (NCOs). Each rifle company consisted of one CPT (Commanding Officer), one 1LT (Executive Officer), four 1LTs (Platoon Leaders), and approximately 145 enlisted and NCOs organized into a Company HQ, three rifle platoons, and a weapons platoon. The Ranger battalions were seldom, if ever, below authorized strength, and in fact were usually significantly overstrength. For example, on 1 January 1993, 1/75th had 925 assigned soldiers (159%) and 633 soldiers (109%) on 31 December, while 3/75th had 693 (119%) at the beginning of the year and 624 (108%) at the end.²⁹³

STANDARD RIFLE COMPANY ORGANIZATION



STANDARD RANGER BATTALION ORGANIZATION



The Ranger Regiment maintained a constant and intense training schedule throughout 1993. To name just a few examples:

- From 8 to 21 March, 3/75th and Regimental HQ deployed to Korea for TEAM SPIRIT.
- From 12 to 26 April, 1/75th deployed to Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, for Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotation 93-6.
- In May, Company B, 3/75th deployed to Thailand for COBRA GOLD while 2/75th and Regimental HQ deployed to Puerto Rico for OCEAN VENTURE.
- In August, 1/75th, 3/75th, and Regimental HQ participated in Command Post Exercise (CPX) KRAFTY KAPER at Fort Bliss, Texas.
- In September, a Regimental HQ element supported CPX ULCHI FOCUS LENS in Korea.
- From 7 to 17 November, 3/75th and Regimental HQ participated in BRIGHT STAR in Egypt.

The Regiment strove to live out its oft-cited Ranger Training Philosophy, “Training is everything and everything is training.”²⁹⁴

By far, the most consequential event for the Rangers in 1993 was the deployment of a HQ element, a platoon of Company A, and all of

²⁹⁴ 75th Ranger Regiment, CY93 AHR.

Company B, 3/75th Ranger Regiment, to Mogadishu, Somalia, in late August. There, as part of a joint special operations task force called TF Ranger, they would support United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) “in bringing order to a desperately chaotic and starving nation. Their mission was to capture key leaders,” namely Somali National Alliance leader Mohamed Farrah Aideed and his inner circle, “in order to end clan fighting in and around the city of Mogadishu.” TF Ranger conducted six raids between 29 August and 21 September 1993. While these operations resulted in the disruption of Aideed’s network and operations, Aideed himself eluded capture.²⁹⁵

TF Ranger launched a seventh mission against SNA leadership on 3 October 1993. The plan was for Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) soldiers to “snatch and grab” and exfiltrate several of Aideed’s key lieutenants. These special operators would be covered on the ground by Rangers and from the air by MH-60 Black Hawk and A/MH-6 “Little Bird” helicopters of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR). Supposed to last an hour, the operation devolved into an 18-hour-long fight for survival after hundreds of Somali militia mounted a fierce resistance and two Black Hawks were shot down. While the TF fought valiantly and ultimately achieved its objectives, it came at a heavy toll. Sixteen TF Ranger soldiers, including six Rangers, lost their lives, and dozens more were wounded on 3 – 4 October (another TF Ranger soldier was killed three days later). After the battle, the remainder of Company A, 3/75th Ranger Regiment, deployed to reinforce Company B, though the entire TF was withdrawn from Somalia by the end of October.²⁹⁶

The recent example of Ranger heroism and sacrifice in Somalia set a solemn yet inspirational tone when the Ranger Memorial was dedicated at Fort Benning, Georgia, on 25 August 1994, almost exactly one year after the deployment of TF Ranger. Designed, constructed, maintained, and funded by private entities, the memorial featured a large Fairbairn-Sykes fighting knife positioned between two marble pillars. Flanked by

295 75th Ranger Regiment, *75th Ranger Regiment Information Booklet* (n.p., n.d.), 31, 42; Richard W. Stewart, *The United States Army in Somalia, 1992 – 1994* (Fort McNair, Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History); Eugene G. Piasecki, “If You Liked Beirut, You’ll Love Mogadishu: An Introduction to Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) in Somalia,” 2007, https://arsof-history.org/articles/v3n2_like_beirut_love_mogadishu_page_1.html; Jared M. Tracy, “Based on an Actual Event: The Battle of Mogadishu in Popular Culture,” September 2023, https://arsof-history.org/articles/23sept_based_on_an_actual_event_page_1.html.

296 75th Ranger Regiment, *75th Ranger Regiment Information Booklet*, 31, 42 – 43; Stewart, *The United States Army in Somalia*; Piasecki, “If You Liked Beirut, You’ll Love Mogadishu”; Tracy, “Based on an Actual Event.”

two more pillars on either side that were connected by a stone Ranger tab, the walkway leading to the monument was paved with nearly 2,500 purchased stones honoring former and current Rangers.²⁹⁷ The Ranger Memorial expanded over the years and continued to serve as a fitting tribute to Rangers past, present, and future.

At the outset of 1994, HHC, 75th Ranger Regiment, had 128 authorized personnel, 1/75th Ranger Regiment had 633 assigned soldiers, 2/75th had 685, and 3/75th had 615.²⁹⁸ Notably, 1/75th and 2/75th celebrated their twentieth anniversaries on 1 June and 1 October 1994, respectively, while 3/75th celebrated its tenth anniversary on 2 October, almost one year to the day after the start of the Battle of Mogadishu.²⁹⁹ The Regiment remained dedicated to continuous, intensive training, as evidenced, for example, by 2/75th, 3/75th, and Regimental HQ participating in JRTC 94-3 at Fort Polk, Louisiana, in January; all battalions plus Regimental HQ participating in KNIGHTLY ROGUE at Eglin AFB, Florida, from April to May; the rest of the Regiment joining 1/75th at HAAF for Joint Readiness Training between July and September; and Regimental HQ participating in ULCHI FOCUS LENS in Korea and ATLANTIC RESOLVE in Germany in August and from October to November, respectively.³⁰⁰

Less than a year removed from the Battle of Mogadishu, Rangers were again called for a real-world mission, this time in the Western Hemisphere. With UN authorization, the U.S. decided to intervene in Haiti in 1994 to resolve a longstanding political crisis and restore the legitimate government following a military coup. On 10 September, the 75th Ranger Regiment was alerted for Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti. The Regiment positioned its battalions at different staging bases at HAAF, onboard the USS *America* (CV-66), and Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, in the ten days prior to D-Day. On 20 September, the invasion was cancelled due to last-minute diplomacy, and the situation transitioned to a permissive entry scenario. The

297 National Ranger Memorial Foundation, "The Monument," n.d., <https://rangermemorial.org/the-monument/>; National Ranger Memorial Foundation, "A Message to Fellow Rangers," n.d., <https://rangermemorial.org/>; Kristin Molinaro, "Rangers remembered," 21 October 2010, https://www.army.mil/article/46954/rangers_remembered; "Ranger Memorial Ceremony: Honoring West Point's Army Rangers Killed in Action," 15 October 2010, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.

298 75th Ranger Regiment, "Annual Historical Review (AHR) for Calendar Year 1994," n.d., USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.

299 USASOC History Office, "ARSOF Timeline."

300 75th Ranger Regiment, CY94 AHR.

3/75th and select regimental elements returned to Fort Benning, 2/75th remained in Cuba for a time, and 1st Battalion and the Regimental HQ (-) remained on board the USS *America* as the Joint Task Force (JTF) Reserve until 20 October.³⁰¹

It was not long before the Rangers were called for another real-world mission called Operation SAFE HAVEN, a humanitarian assistance military operation conducted by a U.S. JTF in Panama from 8 September 1994 to 15 March 1995. The operation involved sheltering, feeding, securing, and providing medical care to some 10,000 Cuban migrants who had attempted to enter the U.S. illegally. It was complicated by significant disturbances and riots in December 1994 due to Cubans' uncertainty about their future. In response, 2/75th Ranger Regiment was deployed to the camps, joining Military Police and other units to reestablish control, contain more than one thousand fleeing migrants, and arrest instigators after more than 200 U.S. military personnel had been injured. With a busy year behind it, the Regiment stood strong at the end of 1994 with 1/75th having 704 soldiers assigned, 2/75th having 698 assigned, and 3/75th having 711 assigned.³⁰²

The Rangers maintained a high training tempo in 1995 but did not participate in combat operations that year. Tragically, in February, four soldiers attending U.S. Army Ranger School training in Florida died of hypothermia. This event made Ranger trainees a priority in the fielding of new medical technology, by which a person's individual blood pressure, pulse, temperature, and other vitals could be monitored and potential issues could be addressed before a serious incident occurred. This was just one example of Rangers leading the way by employing new tactics, equipment, and capabilities.³⁰³ In 1996, there were more than a hundred documented training events across the 75th Ranger Regiment. In terms of personnel, the Regiment remained overstrength throughout the year, with Regimental HQ having around 175 soldiers assigned, 1/75th averaging 680 soldiers, 2/75th going from 766 to 674 soldiers by year's end, and 3/75th going from 713 to 649.³⁰⁴

301 75th Ranger Regiment, 75th Ranger Regiment Information Booklet, 39; USASOC History Office, "ARSOF Timeline"; 75th Ranger Regiment, CY94 AHR.

302 75th Ranger Regiment, 75th Ranger Regiment Information Booklet, 39; 75th Ranger Regiment, CY94 AHR.

303 U.S. Army Center of Military History, *Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1996* (Fort McNair, Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2002), 124.

304 75th Ranger Regiment, "Annual Historical Review (AHR) for Calendar Year 1996," n.d., USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.

While the Regiment continued its intensive training through the rest of the 1990s, it did not have any real-world missions until 24 November 2000, when it deployed Regimental Reconnaissance Detachment (RRD) Team 2 and a command element to Operation JOINT GUARDIAN in Kosovo as part of Task Force (TF) Falcon, the name for U.S. forces assigned to the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). TF Falcon's mission was to provide a secure environment in the U.S. sector in southeastern Kosovo, while bolstering KFOR's broader goals of deterring hostilities, demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army, and bolstering the international humanitarian effort.³⁰⁵

The Rangers' mission was to conduct combat reconnaissance missions and serve as a Quick Reaction Force for other SOF elements. RRD Team 2 conducted seven combat recon missions, providing reliable imagery and reports from the area of operations. On 8 April 2001, those Rangers deployed to Kosovo returned after 135 days, marking "the longest combat deployment of a Ranger unit since the activation of the modern Ranger Battalions in 1974."³⁰⁶ As it turned out, it would be the last combat operation before a major terrorist attack on the U.S. five months later would alter the course of history and lead to significant changes for the 75th Ranger Regiment.

In 2001, the Regiment looked fundamentally the same as it had eight years earlier. It also remained healthy in personnel strength, with roughly 2,050 soldiers assigned throughout the year. Perhaps the most notable change in 2001 (prior to 9/11) came when, in conjunction with the change of command from COL Purl K. Keen to COL Joseph L. Votel in July, the 75th Ranger Regiment retired the black beret and donned the tan beret.³⁰⁷ This change resulted from a decision by U.S. Army Chief of Staff GEN Erik Shinseki the previous October to make the black beret the standard headgear for the entire Army, regardless of unit or military occupational specialty. The Rangers successfully argued that if they could not be the sole wearers of the black beret, then they should have a different color. "The decision to adopt the Ranger tan beret is based upon maintaining a distinctive beret for our Rangers,"

305 75th Ranger Regiment, 75th Ranger Regiment Information Booklet, 31; USASOC History Office, "ARSOF Timeline"; NATO, "NATO's Role in Kosovo," 25 April 2025, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48818.htm.

306 75th Ranger Regiment, 75th Ranger Regiment Information Booklet, 31.

307 75th Ranger Regiment, "Annual Historical Review (AHR) for Calendar Year 2001," n.d., USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.

Keen said. “The Ranger tan beret will represent for the Ranger of the 21st century what the black beret represented - a unit that leads the way in our conventional and special operations forces.”³⁰⁸ He was right. For the next 20 years, U.S. Army Rangers would continually serve on the front lines and the cutting edge of America’s longest war.

³⁰⁸CBS News, “Color Compromise in Beret Battle,” 16 March 2001, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/color-compromise-in-beret-battle/>.

CHAPTER VI:

160TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION REGIMENT (AIRBORNE)

Between 1993 and 2001, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) retained its place as the U.S. Army's most advanced rotary wing unit, providing dedicated support to U.S. Special Operations Forces. Headquartered at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, the regiment was structured into three line battalions and various other elements, and operated a diverse fleet consisting of nearly 150 A/MH-6 Little Birds, MH-47 Chinooks, and MH-60 Black Hawks. Embodying a spirit of excellence and innovation, the Regiment continuously improved training, tested and fielded cutting-edge equipment, and maintained a high state of preparedness to meet all operational contingencies.

KEY PERSONNEL:

REGIMENTAL COMMANDING OFFICERS (RCOs)


COL Bryan D. Brown	OCT 1992 – NOV 1994
COL Dell L. Dailey	NOV 1994 – OCT 1996
COL Richard A. Cody	OCT 1996 – NOV 1997
COL Howard W. Yellen	DEC 1997 – DEC 1999
COL Richard B. Bowman	DEC 1999 – SEP 2001

REGIMENTAL COMMAND SERGEANTS MAJOR (RCSMs)


CSM Robert Page	JAN 1992 – JUN 1994
CSM Mark A. Ruiz	JUN 1994 – MAY 1996
CSM Clifton P. O'Brien	JUN 1996 – MAR 1999
CSM Donnie D. Calvery, Jr.	MAR 1999 – AUG 2003

ORGANIZATION:

160th SOAR (EARLY 1990s)



160th SOAR (ca. 2000 - 2001)



HISTORICAL NARRATIVE:

Initially constituted from elements of the 101st Airborne Division in April 1982 and widely known as Task Force 160 (TF-160), the 160th Aviation Battalion immediately began pioneering specialized tactics and night-flying techniques. Its combat debut came during Operation

URGENT FURY in Grenada in October 1983, where it faced heavy fire and suffered casualties, leading to the creation of a dedicated training element known as “Green Platoon.” In 1985, the 160th was reassigned to the 1st Special Operations Command. In an odd administrative twist, in October 1986, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Group (SOAG) was activated but it did not replace the 160th Aviation Battalion; rather, the two coexisted simultaneously on paper. In January 1988, the battalion was reorganized into the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) (Airborne)³⁰⁹ to place it under the U.S. Army Regimental System. As before, the 160th SOAG and 160th SOAR represented two names for the same unit.³¹⁰

The 160th demonstrated its cutting-edge equipment and capabilities in Operation EARNEST WILL/PRIME CHANCE in the Persian Gulf from 1987 to 1989; Operation MOUNT HOPE III in Chad in 1988; and Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama in 1989. The Regiment also provided extensive support during Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM from 1990 to 1991. In June 1990, just prior to the Persian Gulf War, the 160th SOAG had been administratively consolidated with the 160th SOAR, leaving the unit solely as the 160th SOAR from that point forward.³¹¹

By 1993, the 160th SOAR consisted of a Headquarters and Headquarters Company (approximately 130 personnel), located at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, three line battalions, various other elements, and roughly 145 operational aircraft. The Regimental mission was to “organize, equip, train, resource, and validate Army [SOA] forces for worldwide employment in support of contingency missions and warfighting CINCS [and] support the full range of SOF missions across the continuum through clandestine penetration of hostile or denied airspace.”³¹² Headquartered at

³⁰⁹ Hereafter 160th SOAR.

³¹⁰ USASOC History Office, *160th SOAR: A Brief History* (Fort Bragg, NC: USASOC), 29 – 35; USASOC History Office, “ARSOF Timeline,” n.d., https://arsof-history.org/arsof_timeline/index.html; Kenneth Finlayson, “Task Force 160 in Operation URGENT FURY,” 2006, https://arsof-history.org/articles/v2n2_tf160_page_1.html; Jared M. Tracy and Joshua D. Esposito, “The First Step in Night Stalking: A History of U.S. Army Special Operations Aviation Training,” September 2019, https://arsof-history.org/articles/19sept_history_soa_training_page_1.html.

³¹¹ HQ, USASOC, “Permanent Orders 49-1,” 13 July 1990, U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), Fort McNair, Washington, DC; USASOC History Office, *160th SOAR: A Brief History* (Fort Bragg, NC: USASOC), 35 – 39; USASOC History Office, “ARSOF Timeline”; Jared M. Tracy, Info Paper, “SUBJECT: Special Operations Forces in the Persian Gulf during Operation EARNEST WILL,” 3 September 2024, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; Troy J. Sacquety, “Triumph in the Desert: Recovering a Cold War Prize,” March 2022, https://arsof-history.org/articles/21dec_triumph_in_the_desert_page_1.html.

³¹² 160th SOAR, “Annual Historical Review for Calendar Year 1993,” n.d., USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter 160th SOAR 1993 AHR. CINCs were Commanders-in-Chief of the unified commands, later known as Geographic Combatant Commanders.

Fort Campbell, 1/160th consisted of roughly 520 personnel organized into a Headquarters Company, Company A (MH-6 assault/transport “Little Birds”), Company B (AH-6 attack “Little Birds”), Company C (MH-60 Black Hawks), Company D (MH-60s), and a Maintenance Company. Its mission was to “rapidly deploy as part of a joint special operations task force to conduct precision air assault and armed helicopter operations in all environments throughout the operational continuum.”³¹³

Also headquartered at Fort Campbell, 2/160th consisted of about 330 personnel organized into a Headquarters Company, Company A (MH-47 Chinooks), Company B (MH-47s), and a Maintenance Company. Its mission was to “provide special mission medium lift helicopter support in response to . . . directed operations and contingencies on a worldwide basis.”³¹⁴ Headquartered at Hunter Army Airfield (HAAF), Georgia, and consisting of roughly 290 personnel organized into an Headquarters Company, Company A (MH-60s), Company B (MH-47s), and a Maintenance Company, 3/160th’s mission was to “provide short and medium range rotary wing support to special operations forces worldwide.”³¹⁵

Relatively new to the SOAR was the Special Operations Aviation Training Company (SOATC), which had been formally established on 11 September 1992, replacing the former Selection and Training (S&T) Detachment that had been created four years earlier. Consisting of 95 military and civilian personnel, organized into five functional detachments, and adopting the traditional name of “Green Platoon,” SOATC served as the regiment’s leading training institution for incoming members of the unit. Joining SOATC at the 160th SOAR headquarters level was the Systems Integration Management Office (SIMO). Consisting of 22 military and civilian personnel organized into an Aircraft Support Cell, A/MH-6 Cell, MH-60 Cell, and MH-47 Cell, SIMO was “responsible for the integration, operational testing, and acquisition of new aircraft equipment in support of executing worldwide special operations missions.”³¹⁶ Alongside

313 160th SOAR, “Current Task Organization,” n.d., copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; 160th SOAR 1993 AHR; Patrick H. O’Hara, III, telephonic conversation with Jared M. Tracy, 4 September 2025.

314 160th SOAR, “Current Task Organization”; 160th SOAR 1993 AHR.

315 USASOC History Office, *160th SOAR: A Brief History* (Fort Bragg, NC: USASOC), 35 – 39; USASOC History Office, “ARSOFT Timeline”; 3/160th SOAR, “3/160 Task Organization,” n.d., copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; 160th SOAR 1993 AHR.

316 USASOC History Office, *160th SOAR: A Brief History*, 67 – 68; USASOC History Office, “ARSOFT Timeline”; Tracy and Esposito, “The First Step in Night Stalking”; 160th SOAR, “Special Operations Aviation Training Company (SOATC),” n.d., copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; 160th SOAR, “Systems Integration and Maintenance Office (SIMO),” n.d., copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; 160th SOAR, “Systems Integration and Maintenance Office (SIMO) Mission Statement,” n.d., copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.

SIMO was the Tactical Operations Program Office (TAPO), established in 1983 to oversee the development, testing, and procurement of specialized aviation technologies, including modifications to helicopters for enhanced range, survivability, and mission-specific capabilities.

Under the administrative control of 3/160th SOAR but operational control of U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) was the 617th Special Operations Aviation Detachment (SOAD), which had been activated on 21 June 1987, at Howard Air Force Base (AFB), Panama. The 617th had derived from the 129th Combat Aviation Company, which had been assigned to the 160th on 1 October 1986, and provided personnel, equipment, and training for the 617th until March 1989, when the 617th became self-sustaining.³¹⁷ In 1993, the SOAD had five MH-60s, and its mission was to “assemble designated forces and forward deploy for the execution of short-duration, special reconnaissance (SR), direct action (DA), foreign internal defense (FID), or collateral missions in the USSOUTHCOM AOR.”³¹⁸

The SOAR also had a close annual training relationship with the 1st Battalion, 245th Aviation, of the Oklahoma Army National Guard. Organized into an HHC, three flight companies with UH-60 Iroquois ‘Huey’ helicopters, and a Maintenance Company, the 1/245th trained and prepared to support ARSOF.³¹⁹ Its mission in 1993 was threefold: “deploy the battalion to Clark Air Base, Republic of the Philippines, in support of Special Operations Command, Pacific; on order, deploy to establish a SOF air component command (ACC), conduct combat operations, sustain combat operations”; and, “on order, deploy the battalion in support of state directives.”³²⁰

In August 1993, during the international humanitarian operation in Somalia known as United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), formerly RESTORE HOPE, the 160th SOAR deployed

317 USASOC History Office, *160th SOAR: A Brief History*, 33, 36; USASOC History Office, “ARSOF Timeline”; Kenneth Finlayson, “A Tale of Two Units: The 129th Assault Helicopter Company,” 2007, https://arsof-history.org/articles/v3n1_129th_helicopter_co_page_1.html; Joshua D. Esposito, “Absolute Confidence: The 617th SOAD and 3rd Battalion, 7th SFG in Panama, 1989 – 1990,” 2019, https://arsof-history.org/articles/19oct_absolute_confidence_page_1.html.

318 160th SOAR, “Current Task Organization”; 160th SOAR 1993 AHR; O’Hara, 4 September 2025.

319 USASOC History Office, *160th SOAR: A Brief History*, 31; USASOC History Office, “ARSOF Timeline”; 160th SOAR, “Current Task Organization”; Kenneth Finlayson, “The Lords of Darkness,” 2007, https://arsof-history.org/articles/v3n4_lords_darkness_page_1.html. Another organizational chart slightly before this time lists 1/245th as only having a Headquarters Company, two line companies, a maintenance company, and only MH-60s and UH-1 Iroquois “Hueys.”

320 160th SOAR 1993 AHR.

eight MH-60s, four AH-6s, four MH-6s, crews, and ground support personnel to that country as part of Task Force Ranger, a joint special operations task force. TF Ranger's primary mission was to capture Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed and his key leaders in order to end clan fighting in Mogadishu, following violence against UN forces, including the killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers on 5 June 1993. TF Ranger conducted six attempts to capture Aideed between 29 August and 21 September 1993. While several of his lieutenants were captured and his operations were disrupted, Aideed himself eluded capture.³²¹

The deployment culminated in the Battle of Mogadishu on 3 – 4 October 1993. Intended to last an hour, the operation devolved into an 18-hour firefight, the most intense urban combat for the U.S. military since Vietnam. During the battle, two MH-60s were shot down, and their crews were wounded, killed, or captured, as was the case for Chief Warrant Officer 3 Michael J. Durant, the pilot of MH-60 "Super 64." Defending Durant's crash site were ARSOF soldiers Master Sergeant Gary I. Gordon and Sergeant First Class Randall D. Shughart, who posthumously received the Medal of Honor for their heroic actions. TF Ranger, supported by a 10th Mountain Division battalion with Pakistani and Malaysian armored vehicles, eventually broke contact. During its deployment, TF Ranger suffered seventeen killed, five of them 160th Night Stalkers, and dozens wounded. On presidential order, the task force redeployed roughly two weeks later, followed by all U.S. forces within six months and the end of the UN mission in March 1995.³²²

By 1994, the 160th SOAR had a newly modernized fleet. Its advanced MH-60K aircraft featured a fully integrated glass cockpit with enhanced sensors, improved aircraft survivability equipment, M-134 miniguns, a Fast Rope Insertion/Extraction System (FRIES), and internal auxiliary fuel tanks. They were also equipped with an aerial refueling probe and terrain-following and terrain-avoidance radar, providing enhanced long-range capabilities in adverse weather conditions.

321 USASOC History Office, *160th SOAR: A Brief History*, 40; USASOC History Office, "ARSOF Timeline"; Eugene Piasecki, "If you liked Beirut, you'll love Mogadishu: An Introduction to Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) in Somalia," 2007, https://arsof-history.org/articles/v3n2_like_beirut_love_mogadishu_page_1.html; Jared M. Tracy, "Based on an Actual Event: The Battle of Mogadishu in Popular Culture," September 2023, https://arsof-history.org/articles/23sept_based_on_an_actual_event_page_1.html.

322 USASOC History Office, *160th SOAR: A Brief History*, 40; USASOC History Office, "ARSOF Timeline"; USASOC History Office, "MSG Gary I. Gordon," n.d., https://arsof-history.org/medal_of_honor/recipient_gordon.html; USASOC History Office, "SFC Randall D. Shughart," n.d., https://arsof-history.org/medal_of_honor/recipient_shughart.html; Piasecki, "If you liked Beirut, you'll love Mogadishu"; Tracy, "Based on an Actual Event: The Battle of Mogadishu in Popular Culture."

The 160th SOAR also had modified MH-47E helicopters, further demonstrating the unit's commitment to testing and implementing cutting-edge aviation technologies. These aircraft were fielded with two full-motion, high-fidelity flight simulators.³²³

As the SOAR adapted to new technologies, its longtime training partner, the 1/245th Aviation, was inactivated on 1 September 1994 in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Since 1990, the 1/245th Aviation had supported 22 ARSOF Joint Readiness Training Center rotations; conducted overseas training and operations in Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Australia; and had supported the 160th SOAR with A/MH-6 instructor pilots and by assisting with aircraft maintenance.³²⁴ Shortly after the 1/245th was inactivated, 1st and 2nd Battalions, 160th SOAR, deployed to the aircraft carrier USS *America* from September to October 1994, prepared to support impending combat operations in Haiti. With the planned invasion ultimately called off due to successful diplomatic efforts, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY became a peacekeeping mission, and 160th aircrews and support personnel relocated to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to serve as a contingency force.³²⁵

The following year, on 16 June 1995, Company D, 160th SOAR, was created at Howard AFB, Panama, replacing the former 617th SOAD. Like its predecessor, the newly minted Company D was a forward-based ARSOA unit, further paving the way for other overseas organizations. The company's mission was to provide direct action, special reconnaissance, aviation foreign internal defense (AvFID), and direct support to ground and maritime SOF units.³²⁶ The Regiment deployed for the third time in three years, this time in support of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR in Bosnia. In November, 3/160th SOAR was alerted for potential deployment, and proceeded to conduct an extensive training exercise in Fallon, Nevada. On 15 December, 3rd Battalion deployed four MH-60L aircraft and 55 personnel to Bosnia to support U.S. and NATO missions through April 1996. During this deployment, 3/160th SOAR flew 408 accident-free hours, 112 under Night-Vision Goggles (NVGs); assisted NATO forces with a direct-action raid; and aided the

323 USASOC History Office, *160th SOAR: A Brief History*, 39 – 40; USASOC History Office, "ARSOF Timeline."

324 Finlayson, "The Lords of Darkness."

325 USASOC History Office, *160th SOAR: A Brief History*, 42; USASOC History Office, "ARSOF Timeline."

326 HQ, USASOC, "Permanent Orders 107-2," 17 April 1995, CMH; USASOC History Office, *160th SOAR: A Brief History*, 42; USASOC History Office, "ARSOF Timeline"; Joshua D. Esposito, "Night Stalker Ingenuity: Taking the 'Bad Guy' off the Battlefield without Black Helicopters," 2018, https://arsof-history.org/articles/v14n3_night_stalker_page_1.html.

recovery of a crashed U.S. Air Force (USAF) aircraft carrying Secretary of Commerce Ronald H. Brown.³²⁷

Beyond JOINT ENDEAVOR, 3/160th SOAR remained busy in other ways in 1996. It conducted training and operational missions across five continents, accumulating more than 4,800 flight hours, half under NVGs. It conducted four rotations to Combat Training Centers (CTCs), where the Night Stalkers rehearsed infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply of ground SOF. In April 1996, with only 24 hours' notice, 3rd Battalion rapidly deployed four MH-47D aircraft for Operation ASSURED RESPONSE, a Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) in Liberia. For its exemplary support to SOF worldwide and efforts in Bosnia and Liberia, the 3/160th SOAR later received the Army Superior Unit Award in April 1997. Also in 1996, planning for a provisional 4th Battalion for support began. On paper, this battalion would consist of a Headquarters Company and three companies. However, while efforts were made to man the unit over the next couple of years, this version of 4/160th would prove to be a false start; it never got the personnel authorizations needed to formally stand up and would fade away before 9/11.³²⁸

Organizationally, 1997 looked much like the year prior for the 160th SOAR. It had no combat deployments but maintained an aggressive training schedule. For example, from September to October, 2/160th deployed four MH-47E helicopters to Egypt to participate in the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) exercise BRIGHT STAR 97. The battalion refined an 18-hour process for tearing down and rebuilding aircraft, utilizing USAF strategic airlift assets. Despite the challenging desert environment, 2/160th completed over 150 flight hours without missing missions due to mechanical issues, earning commendations from U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and Special Operations Command, Central (SOCCENT).³²⁹

In 1998, USASOC renewed 4/160th's provisional status for one more year, but it would not last beyond that.³³⁰ Company D, 160th SOAR, still

327 USASOC History Office, *160th SOAR: A Brief History*, 42; USASOC History Office, "ARSOF Timeline."

328 Department of the Army Superior Unit Award Packet for 3rd Battalion, 160th SOAR, CMH; USASOC History Office, *160th SOAR: A Brief History*, 42; USASOC History Office, "ARSOF Timeline"; O'Hara, 4 September 2025. See also, generally, John W. Partin and Rob Rhoden, Operation ASSURED RESPONSE: SOCEUR's NEO in Liberia (MacDill AFB: USSOCOM, 1997), <https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/api/collection/p4013coll11/id/1329/download>.

329 Department of the Army Superior Unit Award Packet for 2nd Battalion, 160th SOAR, CMH.

330 HQ, USASOC, "Permanent Orders 190-1," 9 July 1998, CMH.

forward-based in Panama, notably conducted two Search and Rescue (SAR) missions for Costa Rican citizens. The 2/160th SOAR received the Army Superior Unit Award for its meritorious performance from 1 September 1997 through 1 December 1998. During that time, it had completed over 6,100 accident and incident-free flight hours and maintained a 98 percent fully mission capable rate during a rapid deployment to Kuwait in support of SOCCENT. The battalion consistently met demanding “time-on-target +/- 30 seconds” standards. Perhaps the most significant organizational change around this time was the transfer of Company D, 160th SOAR, from Fort Kobbe, Panama, to Naval Station Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, effective 1 June 1999. From there, the company continued its primary mission of supporting USSOUTHCOM.³³¹

Starting in late 2000, the 160th SOAR, along with other U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) elements, provided extensive support to what became the critically acclaimed film *Black Hawk Down* about the Battle of Mogadishu. Unit members reviewed the draft script and offered familiarization and training to actors to ensure accurate representation of the units and their fallen soldiers. For filming in Rabat, Morocco, from March to June 2001, the 160th sent four MH-60s and four A/MH-6s, along with pilots and crewmembers, which were among the roughly 150 ARSOF soldiers who took part. The SOAR handled all aviation scenes shown in the film, to include fast-rope insertions by actual Rangers from Company B, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment.³³² The one notable organizational change to the 160th SOAR in 2001 was the activation of Company E, 160th SOAR, on 16 March, at Fort Campbell. Within months, Company E relocated to Taegu, Korea, to replace the USAF 31st Special Operations Squadron and provide MH-47E support in the Republic of Korea (ROK) and around the Pacific.³³³

It bears mentioning that between 1993 and 2001, the Regiment was a Major Subordinate Unit (MSU) of USASOC. In effect, the O-6 Regimental Commanding Officer (RCO) reported directly to the three-star commanding general (CG) of USASOC. This did not mean that there

331 Army Superior Unit Award Packet for 2/160th; HQ, USASOC, “Permanent Orders 42-1,” 11 February 2009, CMH; USASOC History Office, *160th SOAR: A Brief History*, 42; USASOC History Office, “ARSOF Timeline”; Esposito, “Night Stalker Ingenuity.”

332 Tracy, “Based on an Actual Event: The Battle of Mogadishu in Popular Culture.”

333 USASOC History Office, *160th SOAR: A Brief History*, 42; USASOC History Office, “ARSOF Timeline”; Kenneth Finlayson, “Night Stalkers in the Philippines: Tragedy and Triumph in Balikpapan 02-1,” 2006, https://arsof-history.org/articles/v2n1_nightstalkers_page_1.html.

was nothing at the intermediate level between them. First, in late 1991, USASOC provisionally established the U.S. Army Special Operations Integration Command (USASOIC), to facilitate resourcing and integration of ARSOF air and ground elements, namely the 160th SOAR and the 75th Ranger Regiment. Led by the dual-hatted Deputy CG, USASOC, the USASOIC was never formally activated, however, remaining in provisional status until its disestablishment in the mid-1990s.³³⁴

Additionally, around 1995, USASOC established an aviation section under its G-3. This arrangement was short-lived, as that section soon became a standalone division, known as the Deputy Chief of Staff, Special Operations Aviation (DCSSOA), or simply DSOA. This staff division, led by an O-5 or an O-6 and never to exceed about 20 military and civilian personnel, represented ARSOA's interests and handled administrative matters related to SOF aviation at the three-star level, thus removing some of that burden from the RCO's plate. The DSOA remained in existence until replaced by the one-star U.S. Army Special Operations Aviation Command (USASOAC) on 25 March 2011.³³⁵

In sum, on the eve of 9/11, the 160th SOAR did not look drastically different than what it had eight years earlier. It had a Regimental headquarters, three line battalions, SOATC ("Green Platoon"), Company D in Puerto Rico, and Company E in the Republic of Korea. Perhaps the most noticeable differences between these two periods were the evolution of the 617th SOAD into Company D and the absence of the SOAR's longtime training counterpart, the 1/245th Aviation. Company E was new but not exactly novel, as the SOAR's internal organization had been characterized by changes, activations, inactivations, redesignations, and attached elements, since the 1980s. USASOIC did not last beyond the mid-1990s and DSOA remained a relevant but limited staff element under HQ, USASOC (which, by late 2000, was commanded by Lieutenant General Bryan D. Brown, former 160th RCO). This was the ARSOA structure that would go war after that fateful morning in September 2001.

334 Christopher E. Howard, Info Paper, "SUBJECT: The U.S. Army Special Operations Integration Command," 20 March 2025, USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.

335 Patrick H. O'Hara, III, telephonic conversation with Jared M. Tracy, 30 June 2025.

CHAPTER VII:

ARSOF SUPPORT

Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) Support units activated in the mid-1980s proved their value in combat operations in Panama and the Middle East. These missions, though successful, highlighted the need for more robust ARSOF Combat Service Support (CSS) capabilities and a more effective command and control (C2) structure. During the 1990s, USASOC and the Army took steps to address both issues, first by more than doubling the size of its dedicated ARSOF CSS battalion, the 528th Support Battalion, and then by activating the Special Operations Support Command (SOSCOM) as the higher headquarters for the 528th Support Battalion and the 112th Signal Battalion. Under the SOSCOM, the 528th reorganized into multifunctional support companies that allowed it to better support its ARSOF customers. These arrangements, augmented by new theater-level Special Operations Theater Support Elements and Signal Detachments, enhanced responsiveness. They persisted into the early 21st century.

KEY PERSONNEL:

SOSCOM COMMANDERS

COL Laney M. Pankey	JUN 1995 – NOV 1996
COL Brian I. Geehan	NOV 1996 – JAN 1999
COL Yves J. Fontaine	JAN 1999 – JUN 2001
COL Kevin A. Leonard	JUN 2001 – JUN 2003

SOSCOM COMMAND SERGEANTS MAJOR

CSM Robert L. Thompson	NOV 1995 – JUL 1996
CSM Paul J. Shedlock	JUL 1996 – MAY 1997
CSM Thomas C. Rupert	MA 1997 – NOV 1999
CSM Michael T. Moore	NOV 1999 – NOV 2001

528th SOSB BATTALION COMMANDERS

LTC Donald E. Plater	JUL 1992 – 1994
LTC Richard C. Burmood	1994 – JUL 1996


LTC Albert E. Ballard, Jr. JUL 1996 – JUL 1998
 LTC Keith McMillin JUL 1998 – JUL 2000
 LTC Richard Burns JUL 2000 – JUL 2002

112th SIGNAL BATTALION COMMANDERS


LTC Donald Kropp 1992 – JUL 1994
 LTC William E. Lane JUL 1994 – JUL 1996
 LTC Howard I. Cohen JUL 1996 – JUN 1998
 LTC Michael J. Flynn JUN 1998 – JUL 2000
 LTC Robert T. Bell JUL 2000 – JUL 2002

ORGANIZATION:

ARSOF SUPPORT (1993)



ARSOF SUPPORT (2001)



HISTORICAL NARRATIVE:

BACKGROUND

Modern ARSOF Support capabilities emerged from the broader ARSOF revitalization in the 1980s. Two forward-thinking 1st Special Operations Command (1st SOCOM) staff officers, LTC Louis G. Mason (G-4) and MAJ James D. Bryan (G-6), leveraged existing Army requirements for ARSOF support and communications elements, respectively, to propose new ARSOF Support and Signal battalions. Their efforts resulted in the activation of the 13th Support Battalion on 2 June 1986, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, under Mason's command. This was followed by the activation of the 112th Signal Battalion, also at Fort Bragg, on 17 September 1986, commanded by now-LTC Bryan. The 13th Support Battalion was reflagged the following May as the 528th Support Battalion, though it was more commonly known as the 528th SOSB, for "Special Operations Support Battalion."³³⁶

Organized into a Headquarters Company and three small, functionally organized companies, the 528th SOSB mission was to provide direct support to the deployable elements of the 1st SOCOM headquarters. Most immediately, this meant improving the materiel readiness of 1st SOCOM units, starting with those stationed at Fort Bragg. It did not take long for the battalion to find new ARSOF customers, including the nascent 75th Ranger Regiment.³³⁷

The 112th Signal Battalion consisted of a Headquarters Company and two signal companies. Its mission was to provide communications to Special Operations Command, South (SOCSOUTH) and Special Operations Command, Europe (SOCEUR) when those headquarters were deployed, with a secondary mission to provide communications to other ARSOF, as directed.³³⁸ Both the 528th and 112th reported directly to 1st SOCOM but, for practical reasons, both were placed under the administrative oversight of the 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG) until November 1990, when they were assigned to the newly activated U.S. Army Special Forces Command (USASFC). Though

336 Robert W. Jones, Jr., "A Legacy of Support: The 528th Sustainment Brigade," https://arsof-history.org/articles/v5n3_528th_sustain_brigade_page_1.html.

337 Christopher E. Howard, "Almost a Footnote: The Special Operations Support Battalion, 1986 – 1989," https://arsof-history.org/articles/20oct_almost_a_footnote_page_1.html.

338 Christopher E. Howard, "No Ordinary Signal Unit: The 112th Signal Battalion in Panama," https://arsof-history.org/articles/19dec_no_ordinary_signal_unit_page_1.html.

reassigned to USASOC in 1992, USASFC retained administrative oversight until 1995.

Operationally, both the 528th SOSB and 112th Signal Battalion made noteworthy contributions to Operation JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY in Panama (1989 – 1990) and to Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM in the Middle East (1990 – 1991). The 528th's timely contributions to JUST CAUSE spared it from inactivation and led to a comprehensive ARSOF CSS review that recommended increasing its strength from 162 to 724 personnel. Its growth was eventually capped at 400 personnel, due to post-Cold War downsizing.³³⁹

To further enhance the ARSOF logistical infrastructure, USASOC established the Materiel Management Activity (MMA) in 1991 to consolidate all active-duty ARSOF under a single property book management system. Later renamed the Materiel Management Center (MMC), it was administratively assigned to the 528th SOSB but reported directly to the USASOC G-4.

STANDING UP THE SOSCOM

In the mid-1990s, as USASOC continued to evolve and mature, so did its approach to combat support and CSS. In April 1994, COL John Dunnigan, USASOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG), issued a report on ARSOF CSS based on input from USAJFKSWCS, subordinate unit G-4s, the 528th SOSB, and members of the USASOC staff. The study contended that USASOC's "Force Projection" strategy required logistics units that were as mobile as the supported unit, and ones positioned close enough to provide responsive support.³⁴⁰ Dunnigan concluded that the 528th SOSB was the only reliable direct support CSS asset within ARSOF, and he endorsed its expansion.

To deal with the longstanding C2 issues facing ARSOF Support, Dunnigan recommended the establishment of an O-6-level Special Operations Support Command (SOSCOM) to exercise command and control the 528th SOSB, 112th Signal, and MMC. This proposal complemented a broader USASOC redesign as part of the Army's "Force

339 Christopher E. Howard, "Proving the Concept: The 528th Support Battalion in Panama," https://arsof-history.org/articles/19_aug_support_in_panama_page_1.html; Christopher E. Howard, "Beyond the Numbers: The 528th Support Battalion in Operations DESERT SHIELD & DESERT STORM," https://arsof-history.org/articles/21may_beyond_the_numbers_page_1.html; Howard, "No Ordinary Signal Unit."

340 COL John P. Dunnigan, *Army Special Operations Forces CSS In Progress Review*, prepared for the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, USASOC, Fort Bragg, NC, 1 April 1994, 1, hereafter "Dunnigan," page number.

XXI” initiative.³⁴¹ Convinced of the benefits of an overarching ARSOF Support headquarters, LTG James T. Scott, Commanding General, USASOC, endorsed Dunnigan’s proposal.³⁴² The next challenge would be determining how to man it in a “no growth” environment.

For this, USASOC looked to the five Theater Army Special Operations Support Commands (TASOSCs), which were established in 1989–1990 to coordinate SOF support between forward-deployed ARSOF elements, Theater Army CSS, and the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs). Manned by USASOC but assigned to their respective Theater Army, each TASOSC was authorized approximately 100 personnel, although most were significantly understrength. USASOC proposed converting these commands to significantly smaller “Special Operations Theater Support Elements (SOTSEs)” capable of providing the same theater-level staff coordination and integration without the command overhead of the TASOSC. Between the TASOSC conversion and proposed 528th SOSB restructuring, USASOC could establish the SOSCOM without any net growth.³⁴³

USASOC concurrently proposed changes to both the 528th SOSB and the 112th Signal Battalion. These included adding two Reserve Component (RC) support companies to the 528th SOSB, and four theater signal detachments (SIGDETS) to the 112th Signal Battalion. The latter would be forward-stationed to increase responsiveness to TSOCs requirements, particularly in times of crisis. The revised Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) of the 112th Signal Battalion and 528th SOSB were forwarded to the Army for review in January 1995.

The Army approved the 112th Signal Battalion TOE, but the proposed 528th SOSB TOE met opposition from the Office of the Chief of Army Reserves. The Reserves did not object to allocating the requested units to the 528th SOSB, but they non-concurred with the USASOC plan for resourcing these two companies.³⁴⁴ Unable to reach a compromise, USASOC withdrew its request for the RC companies

341 BG David Grange, *Minutes from the Army Special Operations Force Readiness and Integration Steering Committee Meeting*, 17 January 1996, Office of the Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Washington, DC, 16 February 1996, hereafter, “Grange,” page number

342 Jones, “A Legacy of Support;” Scott R. Gourley, “US Army Special Operations,” *Army* (March 1996): 23–24.

343 Dunnigan, 4.

344 COL David H. Johnson, *US Army Special Operations Command Combat Support/CSS Reorganization*, Office of the Chief Army Reserve, Washington, DC, 10 March 1995.

in September 1995 and the requirement went unfilled until it was eventually withdrawn.³⁴⁵

While this was playing out, both ARSOF Support battalions participated in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. 112th Signal Battalion soldiers, in support of 3rd SFG, were among the earliest forces to land in Port au Prince, Haiti, on 19 September 1994, and it ultimately deployed most of the battalion to provide communications support to the Army Special Operations Task Force. Concurrently, Bravo Forward Support Company (FSC), 528th SOSB, supported ARSOF in multiple locations, establishing Fuel System Supply Points at the Port-au-Prince airport and at the Guantanamo Naval Air Station. The Army recognized the 112th Signal Battalion's outstanding performance with the Army Superior Unit Award, and the 528th SOSB received a Joint Meritorious Unit streamer for its efforts.

In March 1995, the Army approved the SOSCOM proposal, by which point an activation cell had already been established to handle all the administrative and facility issues involved in standing up the new command. The plan called for the provisional SOSCOM to begin operations in July 1995 and formal activation in November 1995. In the interim, the five TASOSCs would be inactivated and their functions transferred to the new SOTSEs.³⁴⁶

Although SOSCOM's activation was proceeding on schedule, it would be 1996 before the new command could be worked into the Army's command selection program. In the interim, SOSCOM needed a commander with a strong logistics background. Fortunately, COL Laney M. Pankey, an Ordnance Officer currently commanding the 82nd Airborne Division Support Command, was about to transition out of command and wished to remain at Fort Bragg. LTG Scott tapped Pankey to be the first SOSCOM commander.

With SOSCOM's provisional activation on 29 June 1995, LTG Scott made it clear that he expected the new command "to align ARSOF sustainment organizations and activities with the US Army's concept for force projection."³⁴⁷ On 8 December 1995, SOSCOM was officially activated in a

345 Grange, 3.

346 "USASOC Reorganization Briefing, 15 February 1995;" COL Laney M. Pankey, interview by A. Dwayne Aaron, 24 June 2003, quoted in *SOSCOM History Book* (unpublished), USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter "Pankey interview."

347 LTG James T. Scott, remarks made at the provisional activation of the Special Operations Support Command, 29 June 1995, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.

formal ceremony in the USASOC Plaza, with a mission of assuring CSS, Health Service Support, and Signal Support to ARSOF supporting the war-fighting CINCs [Theater-level Commanders-in-Chief] during deliberate and crisis action.³⁴⁸ The operational requirement was to support two major regional conflicts and one small contingency operation simultaneously.

OFF AND RUNNING

As the first SOSCOM commander, COL Pankey wanted to get the organization established and producing for its customers, while avoiding any major new initiatives.³⁴⁹ The demand for ARSOF Support, and the resulting operational tempo (OPTEMPO), continued to increase. Just days after the SOSCOM activation ceremony, elements of both the 112th Signal Battalion and the 528th SOSB deployed to Bosnia in support of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, the military implementation phase of the Dayton Peace Accords, intended to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia.³⁵⁰

On 10 December 1995, the 112th Signal Battalion deployed to an intermediate staging base in San Vito, Italy, where it established communications for the Special Operations Command Implementation Force Commander. The battalion continued to provide signal support from Italy, as well as from forward locations in Bosnia and Croatia, until April 1996, after which a Signal Company Task Force provided signal support to SOF, while the remainder of the battalion redeployed.³⁵¹

A 528th SOSB Task Force departed Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, on 15 December 1995, bound for Germany and Bosnia to support 10th SFG operations in Bosnia. The SOSB element included supply specialists to assist with requisitions, wheeled vehicle and generator mechanics, and a transportation team. They also assisted 10th SFG with warehouse operations, organizational level maintenance, and ground transportation.³⁵²

348 CPT Mark A. Ferris, "Special Operations Support Command Exercise/Operations Listing for the period 1 July 1995 – 31 December 1995," SOSCOM S2/3 Office, Fort Bragg, NC.


349 Pankey interview.

350 U.S. Army Center of Military History Publication 70-97-1, Bosnia-Herzegovina: The U.S. Army's Role in Peace Enforcement Operations, 1995 – 2004 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, no date): 19. Ultimately, over 20,000 U.S. troops would be deployed into the region as part of Task Force Eagle, joining an international peacekeeping force from eleven other nations to enforce the NATO-imposed Balkan cease-fire.

351 "112th Signal Battalion: Annual Historical Report for Calendar Year 1996," copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.

352 "528th Support Battalion: Calendar Year 1996 Annual Historical Report," copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.

Meanwhile, both battalions were transitioning to new TOEs, with the 528th's being particularly noteworthy, as it became the Army's first support battalion to feature multi-functional companies. COL Pankey recognized that the multifunctional construct was unique and ran counter to Combined Arms Support Command standards for similar units, which were typically organized around a particular logistics function, such as transportation, supply, or maintenance. However, he also recognized that these multifunctional companies would allow the 528th SOSB to train as it would fight, instead of having to task-organize for each mission. Additionally, the commander of the unit was to be a field grade officer with greater experience and maturity than a company grade officer. Such traits were essential for supporting the type of independent operations ARSOF performed. Pankey considered the multifunctional concept to be groundbreaking.³⁵³ The graphic below depicts the multifunctional organization of the 528th SOSB.



353 Pankey interview.

The high OPTEMPO continued in 1996, as the 528th SOSB supported ARSOF during five rotations to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and four other joint exercises. Additionally, the battalion sent teams to Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) exercises Internal Look, Cobra Gold, Natural Fire, Cabanas, and Foal Eagle.³⁵⁴ The battalion's most frequent customers included Army SF units, Rangers, and the 160th SOAR.

The 112th Signal Battalion was equally engaged in 1996. In addition to existing JOINT GUARDIAN commitments, it deployed teams to Liberia in April 1996 after civil unrest prompted the U.S. government to order a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO), known as Operation ASSURED RESPONSE.³⁵⁵ 112th Signal Battalion signal teams provided vital communications links for SOF conducting the mission. For its outstanding performance in the Balkans and Liberia from 4 March 1995 through 25 April 1996, the Army awarded the 112th Signal Battalion another Army Superior Unit Award in June 1997.³⁵⁶ The reputation of SOSCOM and its battalions continued to improve with every successful mission they completed.³⁵⁷

NEW LEADERS, NEW PRIORITIES

In November 1996, COL Brian I. Geehan became the first centrally selected SOSCOM commander. One of the first things Geehan recognized was the need for closer command oversight of property accountability, which he deemed “a mess.”³⁵⁸ To address the situation, he quickly brought in CW5 Jimmy W. Tiner, who had previously served with Geehan in the 82nd Airborne Division, as his new Property Book Officer.³⁵⁹

COL Geehan was also convinced that the SOSCOM had to do the operational-level planning for the 112th Signal Battalion and the 528th SOSB that doctrinally belonged to the new SOTSEs, which had replaced

354 “528th Support Battalion: Calendar Year 1996 Annual Historical Report.”

355 Dr. John W. Partin and Capt. Rob Rhoden, *Operation Assured Response: SOCEUR's NEO in Liberia, April 1996*, United States Special Operations Command History and Research Office, September 1997, 1.

356 112th Signal Battalion, CY96 AHR.

357 COL Albert E. Ballard Jr., interview by A. Dwayne Aaron, 31 May 2003, quoted in *SOSCOM History Book* (unpublished), USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter, “Ballard interview.”

358 COL Brian I. Geehan, interview by A. Dwayne Aaron, 24 February 2003, quoted in *SOSCOM History Book* (unpublished), USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter, “Geehan interview.”

359 CW5 Jimmy W. Tiner, interview by A. Dwayne Aaron, 7 April 2003, quoted in *SOSCOM History Book* (unpublished), USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.; Geehan interview.

the TASOSCs. This was complicated by the fact that, in return for agreeing to the SOTSE concept, the CINCs insisted that each Theater Army be allowed to create its own Memorandum of Understanding with USASOC concerning the use, assignment, and task management of their respective SOTSE. As a result, each CINC used the SOTSEs differently and embedded them in different sections within the staffs.³⁶⁰ This lack of standardization complicated the very process the SOTSEs were supposed to streamline, leading to mixed reviews from ARSOF Support commanders and other SOF customers.³⁶¹ Unfortunately for COL Geehan, he lacked the leverage to successfully negotiate the change in SOTSE status with the four-star CINCs and three-star Theater Army commanders that currently owned them.

When LTG Peter J. Schoomaker assumed command of USASOC in 1996, he took a somewhat different approach to employment of the SOSCOM. With a strong background in Joint SOF, Schoomaker wanted SOSCOM to be able to support any SOF unit, including the full range of units assigned to USASOC and those assigned to his former command, the Joint Special Operations Command. This support included deploying with these units during training exercises. The increased expectations caused SOSCOM to examine adding a third FSC to the 528th, thus allowing it to better fit within the “Green-Amber-Red” Joint Operational Readiness Training System (JORTS) used by supported units. This additional company never materialized due to resource constraints.

Over the next year, SOSCOM soldiers supported annual training exercises such as Cobra Gold, Bright Star, Early Victor, Flintlock, Ulchi-Focus Lens, Foal Eagle and more. SOSCOM also supported several JRTC rotations, which were particularly valuable to its soldiers because, while combat troops were exercising their capabilities within a canned scenario against an opposing force (OPFOR), the mission for the sustainers was real. Feeding, supplying, and providing medical support to thousands of ARSOF soldiers under field conditions did not require live fire to be stressful, nor did the “hot refueling” of 160th SOAR helicopters by 528th SOSB fuel handlers.³⁶²

360 Geehan interview.

361 COL William E. Lane, interview by A. Dwayne Aaron, 6 April 2003, quoted in *SOSCOM History Book* (unpublished), USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC; Ballard interview.

362 Typical of a JRTC rotation for the 528th SOSB was the three-week exercise in July 1997. Bravo FSC and elements from the MSC, supported more than 3000 soldiers, including those from the 75th Ranger Regiment, the 160th SOAR, 1st SFG, 4th POG, and the 96th CA Battalion.

On the materiel front, the 112th Signal Battalion made significant improvements in its communications components in 1997, fielding smaller, lighter, and more capable equipment and systems.³⁶³ The battalion tested many of these enhancements during the Total Integration training exercise in September 1997, providing signal support to 3rd SFG, 7th SFG, and 4th POG, and establishing links to communications units in New Jersey, Virginia, and Florida. Simulating its wartime mission, the 112th was able to test out its satellite communications terminals, digital switching vans, automated message handling systems, internet systems, and transit case satellite systems.

By the summer of 1997, it was clear that mission changes, support priorities, compliance with JORTS, and new equipment would require additional changes in the SOSCOM organization. Force projection doctrine, global apportionment, and the declining overseas theater support assets increased demand for nearly everything in the SOSCOM inventory, including manpower.

SOSCOM proposed changes that would impact nearly every aspect of the command. COL Geehan wanted to organize his own Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment (HHD) capable of handling readiness and administrative issues among his staff members – a role currently performed by HHC, USASOC. He also wanted to consolidate the SOSCOM S-3 and his Logistics Operations section and create a single focal point for all plans and operations. Geehan further proposed moving the MMC and all contracting officer positions from the 528th SOSB to SOSCOM headquarters. Within the MMC, the increased number of automated systems used to manage supply actions required more personnel. By 1997, the MMC Automation Management Office had five different programs to manage with 321 terminals and only two people to do the job.³⁶⁴

For its part, the 112th Signal Battalion proposed to organize its two signal companies so that they would both have the same capabilities, and each could provide the necessary signal support for a JSOTF. The 112th also planned to establish an All Theater Signal Office (ATSO) that would be the single point of contact for coordinating signal support for deployed SOF units. The ATSO would be a 112th asset, but it would be

363 LTC Howard I. Cohen, "112th Signal Battalion: Calendar Year 1997 Annual Historical Report," Fort Bragg, NC. Among other enhancements, the battalion installed FCC-100 multiplexers into the GMF satellite terminals for both the van-mounted and transit case sets, providing more flexibility in partitioning available bandwidth and likely doubling the amount of bandwidth provided.

364 "USASOC CSS Reengineering In-Process Review Briefing," 6 August 1997.

collocated with the SOSCOM headquarters to better facilitate the integration of signal planning with current and planned operations. The new organization would also manage the fielding of multiple new systems coming to the battalion.³⁶⁵

Operationally, the forward-deployed SIGDETs, established in 1995 to provide TSOCs with a quick response, over-the-horizon, communications capability, were starting to prove their value. The SOCSOUTH detachment provided communications support for three missions in 1997 – 1998: the Venezuelan kidnapping recovery mission; the Japanese Embassy hostage situation in Peru; and a Costa Rican search and rescue mission. The SOCPAC detachment also provided communications for NEOs in Cambodia, Thailand, and Indonesia.³⁶⁶

The 528th SOSB recognized the need to innovate organizationally. Its configuration of two FSCs and a Headquarters and Main Support Company (HMSC) was sufficient for short-duration missions but lacked the depth to support more enduring commitments. The existing TOE, approved in 1995, included two Army Reserve companies that were never resourced. The 528th proposed to consolidate most of the base support assets at the HMSC, and organize three smaller, identical FSCs to provide an immediate ready response. It was also proposed that two Reserve companies, a FSC and MSC, be added to the battalion to provide depth and additional capability for longer missions. Each of the FSCs would be capable of supporting an SFG or equivalent, with augmentation as necessary from the HMSC. The main benefits of the reorganization were that it met the mission criteria, allowed the battalion to support JORTS, and was easily task-organized for specific missions.³⁶⁷

The 528th SOSB was also involved in various modernization projects throughout 1997. The battalion began swapping out their M293A2 5-ton trucks for the new Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTVs). They also looked at ways to reduce their logistical footprint with commercial equipment that was smaller, lighter, and required fewer people to operate than standard Army equipment. In the fall of 1998, it became the first

365 112th Signal Battalion. "Operational Concept for Reorganization of the 112th Signal Battalion (Airborne) Briefing," 5 June 1997.

366 Cohen, 112th Signal Battalion Annual Historical Report, CY97.

367 USASOC CSS Reengineering In-Process Review Briefing, 6 August 1997.

Army unit to field the new All-Terrain Lifter Army System (ATLAS).³⁶⁸ In addition to its lighter weight and greater comfort for the operator, the new forklifts were also configured for air movement in a C-130 cargo plane.

On 22 October 1997, construction started on a state-of-the-art Special Operations Logistics Area on Fort Bragg.³⁶⁹ Completed in August 1999, the facility included seven structures totaling 83,000 square feet of covered space, housing the 528th's three company-level headquarters, direct support maintenance facilities, a supply support activity warehouse, storage facilities, and motor pool areas. The facility was officially opened on 16 August 1999 and was dedicated to SF Medal of Honor recipient, MSG Roy P. Benevidez.³⁷⁰

During COL Geehan's tenure, SOSCOM's reputation continued to grow. Plans were in motion to adjust the force structure, and the SOSCOM staff had taken the lead in logistics and support planning. For two years, COL Geehan had expended a great deal of effort selling SOSCOM and its capabilities to the SOF community, while also being straightforward about his command's limitations.

A MODULAR APPROACH TO ARSOF SUPPORT

COL Yves J. Fontaine assumed command of SOSCOM in January 1999. Like his predecessors, he possessed a wealth of experience and knowledge in conventional Army logistics. USASOC Commander LTG William P. Tangney charged Fontaine with making SOSCOM even more agile and responsive.³⁷¹ Accordingly, Fontaine endeavored to make SOSCOM a direct support "911 Force" with a flyaway capability that could support SOF until the Theater Army could pick up the mission.³⁷²

The cornerstone of this vision was what COL Fontaine called modular support. Knowing that battalion and company-sized deployments were uncommon for ARSOF Support units, he wanted to design support modules that could be combined with a small C2 element to fit the specific requirements of a mission. The resulting support task force

368 "Special Operations Support Unit First to field New Forklift," *Army Logistician Magazine*, March – April 1999, <http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/MARAPR99/NEWSMA.htm>, accessed 20 July 2003.

369 Major Mark Ferris, "Supporting Special Operations Forces," *Army Logistician* (September – October 1998), <http://www.almc.army.mil/alog>

370 USASOC Engineer Office, "Facilities Inventory," December 2000, 6 – 7.

371 COL Yves J. Fontaine, interview by A. Dwayne Aaron, 6 March 2003, quoted in *SOSCOM History Book* (unpublished), USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter "Fontaine interview."

372 Fontaine interview.

needed to be capable of meeting the basic requirements of the supported SOF unit, while presenting the smallest logistical footprint possible. Historically, the availability of strategic airlift was a critical limiting factor in the deployment of SOF, making it important to fit as much capability as possible into each airframe.³⁷³

The 112th Signal Battalion already possessed a modular support system in what they called a “crashout package,” designed to provide maximum capability per airframe. The battalion configured basic ARSOF communications packages for transport on C-130 and C-141 cargo aircraft. The C-130 package consisted of a multichannel tactical satellite unit, a switchboard, communications center, and two Special Operations Communications Assemblage (SOCA) teams. This allowed voice and data messaging, combat net radio (HF/UHF/SATCOM), as well as secure and non-secure telephones with voice, data, and fax. The 3-man SOCA teams were equipped with portable single-channel satellite and line-of-site combat net radio systems.³⁷⁴ The C-141, being the larger of the two airframes, added a signal maintenance team to the C-130 package.

To provide the same sort of flexible, quick response options as the 112th, the 528th SOSB developed an Initial Deployment Package that could be ready for movement in eighteen hours. Designed to sustain a force of up to fifteen hundred personnel, the package included a water team, fuel team, ammunition team, food service team, maintenance support team, material management team, and a transportation team. If required, a follow-on package could be available within ninety-six hours. The actual package sent would be tailored to mission requirements.³⁷⁵

During COL Fontaine’s command, the SOSCOM had many opportunities to test and validate the modular support concept, including annual JCS exercises, JRTC rotations, and other stateside training. In the spring of 2000, the 528th SOSB (-) supported 3rd SFG at JRTC with food service, transportation, maintenance and water modules.³⁷⁶ During Cobra Gold, the 112th and 528th supported 1st SFG with a signal package, and water, transportation, engineer and maintenance support modules.

373 Fontaine interview.

374 SSG David Heredia Jr. “112th Signal Battalion (Airborne) Information Brief,” ca 1997.

375 “SOSCOM Command Briefing,” 15 October 2002.

376 “528th Support Battalion (Special Operations) (Airborne): Executive Summary of Unit History CY2000,” Fort Bragg, NC.

In early September, SOSCOM was called upon to support 3rd SFG in a State Department-sponsored humanitarian demining mission in the Republic of Georgia. The exercise was billed as a peacetime engagement mission for the U.S. and a confidence-building operation for the three partner forces.³⁷⁷ The SF soldiers were to establish a demining training program for soldiers from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Republic of Georgia. From 7 September to 10 November 2000, SOSCOM provided a support package of approximately thirty-five personnel, including food, fuel, medical, movement control, engineering, transportation and maintenance specialists. The 112th Signal Support package provided 3rd SFG with secure and nonsecure telephone, internet, fax, and data transmission.

SOSCOM also supported 3rd SFG during Operation FOCUS RELIEF in Nigeria, which began in September 2000 and lasted until late 2001. This primary mission was to train partner security forces from Nigeria, Senegal, and Ghana, in the techniques and tactics necessary to interdict the illicit diamond trade, which regional warlords were exploiting to finance their armies and promote regional instability. A communication package from the 112th Signal Battalion rotated every 90 – 120 days. They were joined by 528th SOSB medics who provided Combat Lifesaver training to partner nation soldiers.³⁷⁸

Back at Fort Bragg, every section in the MMC made a significant contribution to the overall logistical health of USASOC in 2000. Notably, the MMC's Storefront reduced customer wait time from twenty-four to three days and answered no fewer than 168 inquiries.³⁷⁹ A USSOCOM initiative under GEN Schoemaker, the Storefront was intended as a one-stop shop for repair, maintenance, and sustainment of SOF-unique items. Its role was to connect units with the resource providers, versus being a provider itself. SOF customers could reach the Storefront 24/7 via telephone and email, and also had access to the SOF Sustainment Asset Visibility and Exchange (SSAVE) website, which included a listing of equipment available for loan at the SOF Support Activity in Lexington, Kentucky.³⁸⁰ In 2000 alone, USASOC credited the Storefront

377 *SOSCOM History Book* (unpublished), USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.

378 112th Signal Battalion, CY96 AHR.

379 "SOSCOM: Executive Summary of Unit History, CY2000," Fort Bragg, NC.

380 Winston Jacobs, interview by A. Dwayne, 4 June 2003, quoted in *SOSCOM History Book* (unpublished), USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.

with providing an estimated \$322,940 in savings or cost avoidance.³⁸¹

In 2001, SOSCOM units supported several training and readiness exercises for 3rd SFG, 5th SFG, 7th SFG and the 3rd Ranger Battalion. The 112th Signal Battalion continued to rotate signal teams into the Republic of Georgia, Colombia, and Nigeria. It also restructured its training programs to align with the JORTS training cycle, despite only having two companies to work into the three-cycle system. The battalion conducted a series of training validations and “signal strikes” to make sure that the Green cycle elements were trained and ready for deployment.³⁸²

During his command, COL Fontaine had accomplished his primary objective of making SOSCOM a more responsive operational unit, thanks to the adoption of a modular approach. He also felt the pain of the Army’s “no growth” directive, which kept SOSCOM from adding the necessary personnel to fully support the mission. Like his predecessor, COL Geehan, he tried unsuccessfully to bring the SOTSEs under SOSCOM, finding their current C2 arrangement unable to reliably meet SOF requirements.³⁸³ COL Fontaine passed command of SOSCOM to COL Kevin A. Leonard, the outgoing USASOC G-4, on 15 July 2001.

CONCLUSION

In the 1990s, SOSCOM evolved from a vague concept to robust command that was an integral part of the ARSOF enterprise. As of 2001, the SOSCOM mission was:

Plan, coordinate and provide CSS and Combat Health Support to ARSOF in the full spectrum of conflict, MOOTW to war, in two theaters simultaneously. To plan, coordinate and provide operational and tactical communications for Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) Commanders in support of up to two Regional Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) simultaneously. To provide Signal Force Packages in support of ARSOF, as directed/available.³⁸⁴

381 “SOSCOM: Executive Summary of Unit History, CY2000.”

382 “112th Signal Battalion (Airborne): Executive Summary of Unit History, CY2000.” Fort Bragg, NC.

383 Fontaine interview. *The problem, as Fontaine saw it, was that the SOTSEs became embedded in the theater staffs and were used as regular staff officers instead of focused on SOF specific issues. The CINCs would not relinquish control of what they perceived as their assets.*

384 Special Operations Support Command, “Annual History Report for Calendar Year 2001,” copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.

The missions of SOSCOM's two battalions had not changed substantially during the preceding decade. The 528th SOSB mission in 2001 was, "to provide rapidly deployable CSS and limited Level II combat health support to ARSOF worldwide." The 112th Signal Battalion mission was, "to provide operational and tactical communications for JSOTF in support of regional CINC's deliberate plans and crisis action operations in up to two theaters simultaneously...[and] to provide signal force packages in support of ARSOF, as directed and available."³⁸⁵

The two months following COL Leonard's assumption of command in July 2001 were business as usual for SOSCOM. Equipment upgrades progressed. The 112th and 528th battalions fulfilled a steady stream of commitments, including 3rd SFG's Flintlock exercise in Mali and 7th SFG's Exercise Cabanas in Argentina.³⁸⁶ Preparations were underway for Early Victor in Jordan, in support of 5th SFG. The most significant organizational development was the 112th Signal Battalion's provisional establishment of its long-awaited Company C. It had so far been a relatively quiet year.

385 SOSCOM CY01 AHR.

386 CPT Rick Allbritton, "528th Support Battalion Unit History (FY01)," Fort Bragg, NC, 12 February 2002.

CONCLUSION:

At Fort Bragg, NC, home of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Tuesday, 11 September 2001 started much like any other day. It was slightly overcast though mild in the mid-70s.³⁸⁷ Soldiers were going about their morning routines and were on their way to report for duty. However, business-as-usual ceased soon after 0846 hours when, some 500 miles north in New York City, al-Qaeda-hijacked American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center. More hijackings and attacks followed, and by the end of the day, a stunned nation was mourning the loss of nearly 3,000 of their fellow Americans. The world would never be the same.³⁸⁸

Shocking as this event was, the preceding decade had neither been dull nor uneventful for ARSOF units and soldiers. The end of the Cold War had brought numerous challenges and ARSOF had been the force of choice in an uncertain world. They executed direct action missions, conducted humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations, bolstered international demining efforts, helped counter narcoterrorism, and continued to train and advise partners and allies around the world. USAJFKSWCS continued preparing soldiers to serve in SF, PSYOP, and CA formations while all ARSOF units trained intensively and were prepared to react on short notice to real-world situations. The 1990s were a period of near-continuous activity, punctuated by several crises for which ARSOF were ideally suited.

From an organizational standpoint, the decade before 9/11 was not characterized by significant growth or transformation for ARSOF. Instead, it had been an era of maturation and refinement, defined by adaptations and incremental changes to force structures. While ARSOF did not look dramatically different in 2001 than it had in 1993, ARSOF soldiers who went to war following that fateful day in September 2001 were trained, equipped, accustomed to deployment, and some were combat-experienced. However, the Global War on Terror and other post-9/11 commitments would usher in a new era, characterized by major changes for ARSOF. The transformation of the MACOM will be the focus of the next study.

387 Weather Underground, "Spring Lake, NC Weather History," n.d., <https://www.underground.com/history/daily/KPOB/date/2001-9-11>.

388 9/11 Memorial and Museum, "September 11 Attack Timeline," n.d., <https://timeline.911memorial.org/timeline/10681>.

APPENDIX A:

COMMANDING GENERALS, U.S. ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND



LTG WAYNE A. DOWNING

CG, USASOC AUG 1991 – MAY 1993

Lieutenant General Wayne A. Downing was born and raised in Peoria, Illinois. He was commissioned an Infantry second lieutenant from the United States Military Academy. He also holds a Master's Degree from Tulane University. His military education includes the basic and advanced officer courses of the Infantry School, the Armed Forces Staff College, and the Air War College.

He has held a wide variety of command and staff positions culminating in his current assignment as Commander of the United States Army Special Operation Command, Fort Bragg, NC, in August 1991. Past assignments include: Commander, Joint Special Operations Command; Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command; Director of the Washington Office, United States Special Operations Command; Deputy Commanding General, 1st Special Operations Command (Airborne); Commander, 75th Ranger Regiment; Commander, 3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division, and Secretary of the Joint Staff of the United States European Command, Stuttgart, Germany.

As a junior officer, he served with the 173d Airborne Brigade in Okinawa and Vietnam. He served a second combat tour in Vietnam with the 25th Infantry Division. Following duty as an analyst in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, he served with the 1st Ranger Battalion, Fort Stewart, Georgia, and then commanded the 2d Ranger Battalion at Fort Lewis, Washington. Lt. Gen. Downing commanded the Special Operations Forces of all Services during Operation Just Cause in Panama and commanded a Joint Special Operations Task Force assigned to the United States Central Command during Operation DESERT STORM.

Lt. Gen. Downing's awards and decorations include: the Defense Distinguished Service Medal; the Sliver Star (with Oak Leaf Cluster); the Defense Superior Service Medal; the Legion of Merit (with three Oak Leaf Clusters); the Soldier's Medal; the Bronze Star Medal with "V" Device (with five Oak Leaf Clusters); the Purple Heart; the Defense Meritorious Service Medal; the Meritorious Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters); and the Army Commendation Medal with "V" Device (with three Oak Leaf Clusters). Lt. Gen. Downing has also earned the Combat Infantryman Badge, the Master Parachutist Badge, the Ranger Tab, and the Pathfinder Badge.

USASOC Change of Command Ceremony Program (1991)



LTG JAMES T. SCOTT

CG, USASOC MAY 1993 – AUG 1996

Lieutenant General J. T. Scott became Commanding General of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command on May 20, 1993. In this position, he is responsible for all Army Special Operations Forces, both active and reserve. Prior to his current assignment, Lt. Gen. Scott served as Commanding General, 2nd Infantry Division from July 1991 to May 1993. He was promoted to his present rank of lieutenant general on June 1, 1993.

Born in Stephenville, Texas, Lt. Gen. Scott graduated from Texas A&M University in 1964 and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Infantry through the Reserve Officers' Training Corps. He received a Master's of Business Administration magna cum laude from Fairleigh-Dickinson University in 1973. His military education includes the Infantry Officer Advanced Course, the Army Command and General Staff College and the Army War College.

Lt. Gen. Scott's troop service includes five combat tours, three of which were in Vietnam. He has commanded at all levels, from platoon through division. In addition to his present command duties, Lt. Gen. Scott's recent Special Operations experience includes command of a Ranger battalion and service as Commanding General, Special Operations Command Europe. He has served in six foreign countries:

Vietnam, Korea, Grenada, Germany, Saudi Arabia and Iraq.

Initially assigned to the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii, he deployed to Vietnam in 1965 as a platoon leader in the 145th Aviation Battalion. Shortly after returning to Hawaii, he again deployed to Vietnam serving as a platoon leader, liaison officer, company executive officer and company commander in the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division. After a year at the Infantry School, he returned to Vietnam in 1968 where his key assignments included Operations Officer, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division; and Operations Officer, 3d Brigade, 45th Infantry Division.

From 1970 to 1973, he was a member of the West Point faculty assigned to the Department of Tactics. He served with the 25th Infantry Division from 1974 to 1977 as the Personnel Officer, 2nd Brigade, and the Executive Officer, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry. He then commanded the 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry, 2nd Infantry Division in Korea and served as the Division's Operations Officer. Following a tour as a Speechwriter and Editor in the Office of the Chief of Staff, Army, he commanded the 1st Battalion (Ranger), 75th Infantry from 1981 to 1983. In the two succeeding years, he commanded the 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, participating in the Grenada Operation in 1983.

From 1985 to 1987, he served in Hawaii as the Chief of Staff, 25th Infantry Division and Deputy Director, Plans and Policies, J-5, U.S. Pacific Command. In 1987, he assumed duties as Commanding General, Special Operations Command Europe with responsibility for all Joint Special Operations in Europe and Africa. In September 1989, he joined the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Stewart, Ga., as the Assistant Division Commander. He served in that position throughout Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM in Saudi Arabia and Iraq and the Division's subsequent redeployment to Fort Stewart.

Lt. Gen. Scott is married to the former Carol Wilson of Coleman, Texas. They have two daughters: Amanda and Lisa. Lisa is a student at Texas A&M University.

USASOC Change of Command Ceremony Program (1993)



LTG PETER J. SCHOOMAKER

CG, USASOC AUG 1996 – OCT 1997

Lieutenant General Peter J. Schoomaker is the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, headquartered at Fort Bragg, NC. He is responsible for all active and reserve component Army Special Operations Forces, consisting of Special Forces, Rangers, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Special Operations Aviation, Special Operations Support and the Special Warfare Center and School.

Lt. Gen. Schoomaker was born February 12, 1946, in Michigan and was raised in an Army family. He was commissioned a second lieutenant on June 1, 1969, upon graduation from the University of Wyoming. He served in a variety of conventional company and field grade assignments in Germany, Korea and the United States to include: infantry reconnaissance platoon leader and rifle company commander; armored cavalry troop commander; squadron S4, squadron executive officer, and squadron commander; armor battalion S3; Inspector General; and Armor Branch Assignment Officer in the Department of the Army Military Personnel Center.

From January 1978 through June 1992, he served in special operations assignments to include detachment, company, battalion and group level commands, and Army Special Operations Officer, J3, Joint Special Operations Command. His general officer assignments include Assistant Division Commander, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas; and Deputy Director for Operations, Readiness and Mobilization, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. Lt. Gen. Schoomaker served as the Commanding General, Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, from July 1994 to August 1996. He has participated in numerous contingency operations including: Desert One, 1979 – 80; Grenada 1983; Lebanon 1983 – 85; Panama 1989 – 90; Persian Gulf 1990 – 91; and Haiti 1994.

He is a graduate of the Marine Amphibious Warfare School, the Command and General Staff College, the National War College, and the John F. Kennedy School of Government Program for Senior Executives in National and International Security Management. Lt. Gen.

Schoomaker's military awards and decorations include: Defense Superior Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters; Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters; Bronze Star Medal with one oak leaf cluster; Defense Meritorious Service Medal with one oak leaf cluster; Meritorious Service Medal; Joint Service Commendation Medal; Joint Service Achievement Medal; Combat Infantryman Badge; Master Parachutist Badge; Military Free Fall Badge; Ranger Tab; Special Forces Tab.

Lt. Gen. Schoomaker is married to the former Cindy Petroski and has two daughters, Wendy and Lara, and one son, Andrew.

USASOC Change of Command Ceremony Program (1996)



LTG WILLIAM P. TANGNEY

CG, USASOC MAR 1998 – AUG 2000

Lieutenant General William P. Tangney was born Oct. 7, 1945, in Worcester, Mass. He graduated from The Citadel in 1967 with a Bachelor's Degree in Political Science and was commissioned a second lieutenant in January 1968. Upon completion of the Field Artillery Officer Basic Course and the Ranger Course, he was assigned to 2nd Battalion, 9th Artillery, 4th Infantry Division, U.S. Army Vietnam. In December 1969, following graduation from the Special Forces Officer Course, he was assigned as a company operations officer and later as a detachment commander with the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Fort Devens, Mass.

Lt. Gen. Tangney returned to Vietnam in August 1970 to serve as Operations Officer and Senior Launch Site Commander, Command and Control Detachment South, 5th SFG (A), U.S. Army Vietnam. In 1971, he served as an instructor at the Ranger Course, U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga. After Graduating from the Infantry Officer Advanced Course, he served as an operations officer in the 7th SFG (A) and at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance. Lt. Gen. Tangney served as an instructor and later assistant professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, from 1977 to 1980.

He returned to Fort Bragg in 1981 to serve with both the 5th

SFG (A) and 1st Special Operations Command. He took command of the 3rd Battalion, 5th SFG (A) in 1985. In 1987, he transferred to Washington, D.C. and served in various assignments over a three-year period to include Chief of the Special Forces Officer Branch in the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center and Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. He returned to Fort Devens as Commander of 10th SFG (A) in 1990 and to Fort Bragg as Deputy Chief of Staff for Force Development and Integration, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, in 1992.

Promoted to brigadier general in December 1992, he served as Commanding General of the Special Operations Command, U.S. Central Command. In October 1994, he became the Deputy Commanding General and Chief of Staff of U.S. Army Special Operations Command and was promoted to major general on November 1, 1995. Lt. Gen. Tangney assumed command of U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) in May 1995, where he served until assuming the dual appointment as the Commanding General of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School and the Commandant of the Joint Special Operations Forces Institute on May 29, 1996. His most recent assignment was as Commanding General of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, a position he had held since March 3, 1998.

Lt. Gen. Tangney has a Master's Degree in Anthropology from Syracuse University and is a graduate of the Naval Command and Staff College and the Army War College. His awards and decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal with one oak leaf cluster, Legion of Merit with one oak leaf cluster, Bronze Star with "V" Device and two oak leaf clusters, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters, Combat Infantryman Badge, Master Parachutist Badge, Ranger Tab, and the Special Forces Tab. Lt. Gen. Tangney is married to the former Katherine Gaydos of Rockaway, N.J. They have one daughter, Patricia.

USASOC Change of Command Ceremony Program (2000)



LTG BRYAN D. BROWN

CG, USASOC SEP 2000 – SEP 2002

Lieutenant General Bryan D. Brown is a native of Fort Meade, Md. He has a Bachelor's Degree in History from Cameron University, and a Master's Degree in Business from Webster University.

He entered the Army in 1967 as a private in the Infantry. Upon completion of Airborne School and the Special Forces Qualification Course, he served on a Special Forces "A Team" at Fort Bragg, NC. As a general officer, he served as Director of Plans, Policy and Strategic Assessments (J5/J7) at the U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill AFB, Fla. His combat tours include Vietnam as well as Operations Urgent Fury (Grenada) and Desert Shield/Storm.

Lt. Gen. Brown's assignments include: 129th Aviation Company, Republic of Vietnam; Commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 2/17th Field Artillery, Camp Pelham, Republic of Korea; Commander, C Company 158th Aviation Battalion, Fort Campbell, Ky.; the Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, NC. He spent time at Fort Campbell, Ky., serving as Commander, C Company and Deputy Commander for Operations, 160th Special Operations Aviation Group (Airborne); Commander 5/101st Aviation Battalion, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault); Commander, 1st Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne); and Commander, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne). Lt. Gen. Brown was also the Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver), 1st Infantry Division (Mech), Fort Riley, Kan.

His military education includes the Field Artillery Officer Advance Course, United States Army Command and General Staff College, and the Army War College. His awards and decorations include the Legion of Merit, Distinguished Flying Cross, Bronze Star Medal, Air Medal with "V" Device, Joint Service Commendation Medal and the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal. He also wears the Special Forces Tab, Master Army Aviator Badge, Parachutists Badge, and the Air Assault Badge.

Lt. Gen. Brown is married to the former Penny Whightsil of Fayetteville, NC. They have two daughters, Tracy and Shannon.

USASOC Change of Command Ceremony Program (2000)

APPENDIX B:

ARSOF FALLEN (1993 – 2001 [Pre-9/11])

DATE	NAME	LOCATION	OPERATION	UNIT
3 MAR 93	SFC Deeks, Jr., Robert H.	Somalia	RESTORE HOPE	5th SFG
3 OCT 93	CW3 Briley, Donovan L.	Somalia	CONTINUE HOPE	160th SOAR
3 OCT 93	SSG Busch, Daniel D.	Somalia	CONTINUE HOPE	HQ, USASOC
3 OCT 93	CPL Cavaco, James M.	Somalia	CONTINUE HOPE	3-75th RR
3 OCT 93	SSG Cleveland, Jr., William D.	Somalia	CONTINUE HOPE	160th SOAR
3 OCT 93	SGT Field, Thomas J.	Somalia	CONTINUE HOPE	160th SOAR
3 OCT 93	SFC Fillmore, Earl R.	Somalia	CONTINUE HOPE	HQ, USASOC
3 OCT 93	CW4 Frank, Raymond A.	Somalia	CONTINUE HOPE	160th SOAR
3 OCT 93	MSG Gordon, Gary I	Somalia	CONTINUE HOPE	HQ, USASOC
3 OCT 93	SGT Joyce, James C.	Somalia	CONTINUE HOPE	3-75th RR
3 OCT 93	SPC Kowalewski, Jr., Richard W.	Somalia	CONTINUE HOPE	3-75th RR
3 OCT 93	MSG Martin, Timothy L.	Somalia	CONTINUE HOPE	HQ, USASOC
3 OCT 93	SPC Pilla, Dominick M.	Somalia	CONTINUE HOPE	3-75th RR
3 OCT 93	SGT Ruiz, Lorenzo M.	Somalia	CONTINUE HOPE	3-75th RR
3 OCT 93	SFC Shughart, Randall D.	Somalia	CONTINUE HOPE	HQ, USASOC
3 OCT 93	SPC Smith, James E.	Somalia	CONTINUE HOPE	3-75th RR
3 OCT 93	CW4 Wolcott, Clifton P.	Somalia	CONTINUE HOPE	160th SOAR
6 OCT 93	SFC Rierson, Matthew L.	Somalia	CONTINUE HOPE	HQ, USASOC
14 APR 94	SSG Barclay, Paul N.	Iraq	PROVIDE COMFORT	10th SFG
14 APR 94	SSG Robinson, Ricky L.	Iraq	PROVIDE COMFORT	10th SFG
14 APR 94	COL Thompson, Jerald L.	Iraq	PROVIDE COMFORT	SATMO
12 JAN 95	SFC Cardott, Gregory D.	Haiti	UPHOLD DEMOCRACY	3rd SFG
12 FEB 96	SSG Bolin, Neal L.	Panama	In Service of Nation	7th SFG
16 DEC 99	SSG Suponic, Joseph E.	Kosovo	JOINT GUARDIAN	10th SFG
12 MAR 01	SSG Westberg, Troy J.	Kuwait	In Service of Nation	3rd SFG

APPENDIX C:

ARSOF TIMELINE

(1 January 1993 – 10 September 2001)

1993

3 MAR

A 5th SFG soldier was killed in Somalia when his vehicle struck a landmine.

3 MAR

The Secretary of Defense designated all CA and PSYOP forces assigned to USSOCOM as Special Operations Forces.

2 MAY

In command since December 1989, BG Joseph C. Hurteau relinquished command of USACAPOC to MG Donald F. Campbell.

4 MAY

Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia concluded and transitioned to UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II).

19 MAY

In command since August 1991, LTG Wayne A. Downing relinquished command of USASOC to LTG James T. Scott.

22 AUG

Secretary of Defense Leslie Aspin, Jr., directed the formation of Task Force Ranger in Somalia as a result of attacks made by Somali warlords on U.S. and UN forces and installations conducting humanitarian assistance missions. All elements of Task Force Ranger arrived in Somalia by 28 August.

3 OCT

TF Ranger's mission in Mogadishu, Somalia, to capture leaders of Aideed's forces ended badly when two MH-60 helicopters were shot down and sixteen ARSOF soldiers were killed during the battle. MSG Gary I. Gordon and SFG Randall D. Shughart posthumously re-

ceived the Medal of Honor for their defense of the crew of one of the Black Hawks. After surviving the battle, one HQ, USASOC soldier was killed by indirect fire three days later.

1994

14 APR

Three SF soldiers were killed in a friendly fire incident during the fourth year of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in northern Iraq.

26 JUL

Free Ascent Diving Tower at the SF Underwater Warfare Operations School in Key West, Florida, became operational, and was dedicated to Sergeant Major Walter L. Shumate.

AUG

MG William F. Garrison assumed command of USAJFKSWCS from MG Sidney Shachnow.

15 SEP

USAR 11th and 12th SFGs were inactivated, leaving the U.S. Army with five active-duty and two National Guard SF Groups.

19 SEP

1st, 2nd and 3rd Ranger Battalions, elements of the 160th SOAR, and other SOF elements prepared to launch from the aircraft carrier USS *America* as part of an invasion of Haiti. The invasion was cancelled and replaced by a peacekeeping mission. In Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, 3rd SFG formed the ARSOTF and, along with CA and PSYOP elements, aided in securing a peaceful transition back to Aristide.

SEP – MAR 1995

Operation SAFE HAVEN aimed to relieve overcrowded migrant camps at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by opening additional camps in Cuba. 2/75th Ranger Regiment deployed to the camps when disturbances and riots broke out in December 1994.

25 SEP

The Ranger Memorial was dedicated at Fort Benning, Georgia, commemorating the regiment's heritage and sacrifices.

1 OCT

Army approved the Military Freefall Parachutist Badge. Initially only for qualified soldiers assigned to USASOC, unrestricted wear was authorized on 7 July 1997.

9 DEC

LTG Scott presided over the dedication of a new USASOC headquarters building, which also housed the USASFC and USACAPOC headquarters. A new USASOC Memorial Plaza was also dedicated during the same ceremony.

1995

6 JAN

Bomb-making materials and plans for "Operation Bojinka," the downing of a dozen jetliners by terrorists linked to Al-Qaeda, were discovered in Manila, Philippines.

12 JAN

While manning a security checkpoint near Gonaives, Haiti, during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, a 3rd SFG soldier was mortally wounded by small arms fire.

MAR

Operation SAFE BORDER initiated in Ecuador and Peru to monitor and assist in resolving a border conflict. SF soldiers provided training in communications and other skills.

MAY

MG William P. Tangney assumed command of USASFC from MG Harley C. Davis, who had commanded since July 1992.

16 JUN

The 617th SOAD in Panama was replaced with Company D, 160th SOAR, headquartered at Howard Air Force Base, Panama.

15 SEP

Headquarters, 10th SFG, relocated from Fort Devens, Massachusetts, to Fort Carson, Colorado, along with 2/10 SFG and 3/10 SFG. 1/10 SFG remained forward-stationed in Germany.

16 NOV

112th Signal Battalion fielded five forward-deployed signal detachments, to provide an enhanced communications capability to the overseas Theater Special Operations Commands.

16 NOV

3rd PSYOP Battalion was activated at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Personnel came from the former PSYOP Dissemination Battalion.

8 DEC

U.S. Army Special Operations Support Command was activated at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Subordinate units included the 528th Support Battalion and the 112th Signal Battalion.

14 DEC

The Dayton Agreement ended the war in Bosnia. ARSOF soldiers were called to support Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, a peace enforcement mission, beginning years of involvement in the Balkans.

1996

12 FEB

A 7th SFG soldier died from injuries sustained during a search and rescue mission in Panama.

9 APR

Operation ASSURED RESPONSE, a Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) in Liberia, began. Special Operations Command, Eu-

rope (SOCEUR) launched the evacuation operation to rescue 400 U.S. citizens and 1,700 foreign nationals. ARSOF soldiers came from 10th SFG, 160th SOAR, 4th PSYOP Group, and other elements.

MAY

MG Tangney assumed command of USAJFKSWCS from MG Garrison. MG Kenneth R. Bowra assumed command of USASFC from MG Tangney.

25 JUN

Khobar Towers bombed by terrorists in Saudi Arabia, killing 19 U.S. servicemen.

JUL

Activation of the Special Operations Medical Training Battalion (SOMTB) at USAJFKSWCS for dedicated training of 18D Special Forces medics.

29 AUG

LTG Scott relinquished command of USASOC to LTG Peter J. Schoomaker.

15 SEP

Supported by PSYOP and CA soldiers, Operation PACIFIC HAVEN in Guam helped transition Kurdish refugees for life in the U.S. The mission lasted until April 1997.

26 SEP

Taliban stormed the presidential palace, and the Afghan government withdrew from capital city, Kabul. Taliban occupied the city the following day.

OCT

Forty SF personnel deployed to Laos and Cambodia for humanitarian missions, including demining and community awareness training.

OCT

The U.S. launched the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) to work with international partners and African nations to enhance African peacekeeping and humanitarian relief capacity. ARSOF personnel directly supported ACRI initiatives.

2 DEC

CA and PSYOP units deployed to support the United Nations humanitarian efforts in Rwanda and Zaire.

21 DEC

Operation JOINT GUARD replaced JOINT ENDEAVOR in Bosnia.

1997

MAY

MG Campbell relinquished command of USACAPOC to BG Bruce B. Bingham.

MAY

Operation NOBLE OBELISK in Sierra Leone supported the evacuation of U.S. citizens following a military coup.

6 JUN

LTG Schoomaker presided over the dedication of the MAJ Richard A. Meadows statue and field. MAJ Meadows was a distinguished Army Special Forces veteran who had passed away two years prior. The statue was donated to the command by H. Ross Perot.

31 OCT

LTG Schoomaker relinquished command of USASOC. He was concurrently promoted to the rank of GEN and assumed command of USSO-COM soon after.

4 DEC

133 countries signed a UN prohibition on the use of land mines, underpinning ARSOF demining efforts around the globe.

1998

MAR

MG Bowra assumed command of USAJFKSWCS from MG Tangney. BG William G. Boykin assumed command of USASFC from MG Bowra.

2 MAR

LTG Tangney assumed command of USASOC.

20 JUN

Operation JOINT FORGE commenced in Bosnia as a follow-on to JOINT GUARD, focusing on long-term stabilization and rebuilding civil institutions. ARSOF soldiers remained involved.

7 AUG

Terrorists linked to Al Qaeda bombed U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224, including 12 Americans, and injuring over 4,500.

31 OCT

President William J. Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 into law, making regime change in Iraq official U.S. policy.

18 NOV

PSYOP Regiment established.

16 DEC

President Clinton ordered airstrikes against Iraq in response to Saddam Hussein's failure to comply with UN weapons inspectors.

1999

24 MAR – 10 JUN

NATO conducted a campaign of air strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, leading to Yugoslav withdrawal from Kosovo, and the establishment of a NATO peacekeeping force. JPOTF deployed for PSYOP coordination and messaging.

1 JUN

Transfer of Company D, 160th SOAR, from Panama to Naval Station Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, to support USSOUTHCOM missions. This was part of the relocation of HQ, SOCSOUTH, which also included the relocation of Company C, 3-7th SFG.

11 JUN

Operation JOINT GUARDIAN initiated in Kosovo, focusing on peace enforcement and humanitarian aid following hostilities. A 10th SFG soldier was killed in December that year.

16 AUG

MG Boykin presided over the dedication of the MSG Roy P. Benavidez Special Operations Logistics Complex on Fort Bragg, NC. MSG Benevitez, who passed away in 1998, received the Medal of Honor for valorous actions during the Vietnam War.

19 NOV

MG Bowra presided over the dedication of the COL Arthur D. “Bull” Simons Statue on the USAJFKSWCS campus. COL Simons was a decorated WWII Ranger and SF veteran who received the Distinguished Service Cross for his role in the 1970 raid on the Son Tay Prison Camp in North Vietnam.

16 DEC

While serving as a liaison interpreter in Kosovo during Operation JOINT GUARDIAN, a 10th SFG soldier was killed when his vehicle struck a landmine.

2000

MAR

MG Boykin assumed command of USAJFKSWCS from MG Bowra and commanded until July 2003.

JUL

BG Frank J. Toney, Jr., assumed command of USASFC.

SEP – OCT

As part of Operation FOCUS RELIEF, ARSOF trained West African forces to combat instability linked to illicit diamond trading, particularly in Nigeria, Senegal, and Ghana.

11 OCT

LTG Tangney relinquished command of USASOC to LTG Bryan D. Brown, who commanded until August 2002.

12 OCT

Al Qaeda suicide bombers detonated a small boat alongside the USS *Cole*, harbored in Yemen, killing 17 U.S. sailors and wounding 39.

24 NOV

The 75th Ranger Regiment elements deployed to Kosovo as part of Task Force FALCON under Operation JOINT GUARDIAN. The mission involved combat reconnaissance and Quick Reaction Force responsibilities within NATO support zones.

2000 – 2001

USASOC supported the production of the film *Black Hawk Down* with script review, training and familiarization for actors, and assistance to filming in Rabat, Morocco, ensuring an authentic portrayal of events in Mogadishu.

2001

19 JAN

USASOC Headquarters building (E-2929) dedicated in memory of MG Robert A. McClure, considered by many the “Father of U.S. Army Special Warfare.”

12 MAR

A 3rd SFG soldier was among six personnel killed in a training accident in Kuwait.

16 MAR

Activation of Company E, 160th SOAR, and relocation to Taegu, South Korea, providing MH-47 helicopter support in the Pacific.

22 APR

BG Bingham relinquished command of USACAPOC to MG Herbert L. Altshuler, who commanded until 2007.

27 MAY

The Abu Sayyaf Group, a Philippine terrorist organization, captured three Americans. The incident sped up Operation FREEDOM EAGLE, a Special Operations Command, Pacific (SOCPAC) initiative in which 1st SFG units deployed to train Philippine Army troops.

JUN

The Army published FM 3-05.20: *Special Forces Operations*, enhancing SF doctrine to emphasize counterproliferation and integration of advanced technologies.

JUL

Following the Army's decision to adopt the black beret as its default headgear, the 75th Ranger Regiment transitioned from its traditional black beret to the tan beret, thus retaining a symbol of the Rangers' unique role as the Army's elite light infantry force.

7 SEP

BG Toney relinquished command of USASFC to MG Geoffrey C. Lambert, who commanded until June 2004.

APPENDIX D:

USACAPOC RC CA AND RC PSYOP UNITS AND LOCATION

USACAPOC RC CA UNITS:

350th CACOM, formerly the 361st BRIGADE (Pensacola, Florida), oriented toward Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)

SUBORDINATE UNITS:

- 478th CA Battalion (Perrine, Florida) Foreign Internal Defense (FID) / Unconventional Warfare (UW) Battalion³⁸⁹
- **358th CA Brigade** (Norristown, PA / moved to Riverside, CA 2008)
 - 413th CA Battalion (Lubbock, Texas)
 - 416th CA Battalion, dual oriented toward SOUTHCOM and Pacific Commands (PACOM) (moved to San Diego, CA 2006)
 - 431st CA Battalion, dual oriented toward SOUTHCOM and PACOM (Little Rock, Arkansas)
 - 486th CA Battalion, dual oriented toward SOUTHCOM and PACOM (Tulsa, Oklahoma)

351st CACOM (Mountain View, California), oriented toward PACOM

SUBORDINATE UNITS:

- 426th CA Battalion (Upland, CA) FID / UW Battalion
- **364th CA Brigade** (Portland Oregon)

³⁸⁹ The mission of the CA FID/UW battalion is to plan, organize and conduct CA operations in support of FID or UW missions, pg 4-7, FM 41-10 Civil Affairs Operations, 1993. Within the February 2000 FM 41-10 the term would be replaced with CA BN (Special Operations [SO]), although the mission would remain the same.

- 407th CA Battalion (Fort Snelling, Minnesota)
- 425th CA Battalion (Encino, California)
- 445th CA Battalion (Mountain View, California)
- 448th CA Battalion (Fort Lewis, Washington)
- **321st CA Brigade** (San Antonio, Texas) reoriented from European Command (EUCOM) toward PACOM 2002
- 418th CA Battalion (Belton, Missouri)
- 422nd CA Battalion (Greensboro, North Carolina)
- 451st CA Battalion (Pasadena, Texas) became a subordinate unit 2002
- 490th CA Battalion (Abilene, Texas) reoriented from EUCOM toward PACOM 2002
- 492nd CA Battalion (Phoenix, Arizona) became a subordinate unit 2005

352nd CACOM (Riverdale, Maryland), oriented toward Central Command (CENTCOM)

SUBORDINATE UNITS:

- 412th CA Battalion (Whitehall, Ohio) activated 2002 FID / UW Battalion
- **360th CA Brigade** (Columbia, South Carolina)
 - 401st CA Battalion (Webster, New York)
 - 450th CA Battalion (Riverdale, Maryland) dual oriented toward PACOM and CENTCOM

- 489th CA Battalion (Knoxville, Tennessee)

- **354th CA Brigade** (Riverdale, Maryland)

- 402nd CA Battalion (Tonawanda, New York - moved to Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico 2008)
- 403rd CA Battalion (Mattydale, New York)
- 414th CA Battalion (Utica, New York)

353rd CACOM (Staten Island, New York), oriented toward EUCOM

SUBORDINATE UNITS:

- 404th CA Battalion (Fort Dix, New Jersey) FID / UW Battalion, dual oriented toward EUCOM and CENTCOM

- **304th CA Brigade** (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania)

- 411th CA Battalion (Danbury Connecticut) dual oriented toward EUCOM and CENTCOM
- 443rd CA Battalion (Warwick, Rhode Island) dual oriented toward EUCOM and CENTCOM

- **308th CA Brigade** (Homewood Illinois) dual oriented toward EUCOM and CENTCOM

- 405th CA Battalion (Pleasant Grove, Utah) activated 2005
- 415th CA Battalion (Kalamazoo, Michigan) dual oriented toward EUCOM and CENTCOM
- 432nd CA Battalion (Green Bay, Wisconsin) dual oriented toward EUCOM and CENTCOM

- **322nd CA Brigade** (Fort Shafter, Hawaii): a subordinate unit of IX Corps, which later would become the 9th Mission Support Command is aligned to USACAPOC for coordination and information only.

USACAPOC RC PSYOP Units:³⁹⁰

2nd POG (Twinsburg, Ohio)

SUBORDINATE UNITS:

- 13th PSYOP Battalion (moved to Arden Hills, Minnesota 1996)
 - 19th PSYOP Company (Arden Hills, Minnesota), redesignated 319th PSYOP Company in 1996
 - 39th PSYOP Company (moved to Arden Hills, Minnesota 1996) redesignated 339th PSYOP Company in 1996
 - 93rd PSYOP Company (location changed to Joliet, Illinois 1996), inactivated and redesignated 393rd PSYOP Company in 1996
- 14th PSYOP Battalion (Mountain View, California), oriented toward Pacific Command
 - 1st PSYOP Company (San Diego, California), redesignated 301st PSYOP Company in 1996
 - 4th PSYOP Company (Sacramento, California), redesignated 304th PSYOP Company in 1996
 - 20th PSYOP Company (Portland, Oregon), redesignated 320th PSYOP Company in 1996
 - 24th PSYOP Company (Aurora, Colorado), redesignated 324th PSYOP Company in 1996

³⁹⁰Department of the Army, "Change in Status of Units."

- 362nd PSYOP Company (Fayetteville, Arkansas)
- 15th PSYOP Battalion (moves to Cincinnati, Ohio 2000) oriented toward Atlantic Command
 - 3rd PSYOP Company (Pittsburg, Pennsylvania), redesignated 303rd PSYOP Company in 1996
 - 21st PSYOP Company (Cleveland, Ohio), redesignated 321st PSYOP Company in 1996
 - 16th PSYOP Company (Morgantown, West Virginia), inactivated 1994, redesignated 316th PSYOP Company in 1996
 - 246th PSYOP Company (Blacklick, Ohio), redesignated 346th PSYOP Company in 1996
 - 350th PSYOP Company (Cleveland, Ohio)
- 305th PSYOP Battalion (Arlington Heights, Illinois) oriented worldwide, redesignated 16th PSYOP Battalion in 1996
 - 10th PSYOP Company (Forest Park, Georgia), redesignated 310th PSYOP Company in 1996
 - 244th PSYOP Company, inactivated 1993, redesignated 344th in 1996
 - 245th PSYOP Company (Dallas, Texas), redesignated 345th PSYOP Company in 1996
 - 308th PSYOP Company (Belton, Missouri)

5th POG Deactivated 1994

SUBORDINATE UNITS:

- 7th PSYOP Battalion (Washington, DC) oriented toward Atlantic Command, redesignated 11th PSYOP Battalion in 1996

- 12th PSYOP Company (Washington, DC), redesignated 312th PSYOP Company in 1996
- 305th PSYOP Battalion (Evanston, Illinois), reorganized and redesignated 16th PSYOP Battalion in 1996
- 360th PSYOP Company inactivated in 1993

7th POG (Moffett Field)

SUBORDINATE UNITS:

- 10th PSYOP Battalion (St Louis, Missouri) oriented world-wide
 - 18th PSYOP Company (St Louis, Missouri), redesignated 318th PSYOP Company in 1996
 - 307th PSYOP Company (St Louis, Missouri)
 - 349th PSYOP Company inactivated in 1995
- 353rd PSYOP Battalion (San Francisco, California) oriented toward Pacific Command, reorganized and redesignated 12th PSYOP Battalion in 1996
 - 15th PSYOP Company (Upland, California), redesignated 315th PSYOP Company in 1996
- 306th PSYOP Battalion (Los Alamitos, California), reorganized and
- Redesignated 17th PSYOP Battalion in 1996 (relocated to Joliet, Illinois)
 - 353rd PSYOP Company inactivated in 1995
 - 361st PSYOP Company (Bothell, Washington)

APPENDIX E:

ACRONYM LIST

AAR - After Action Review

AC - Active Component

ADCON - Administrative Control

ADE - Active-Duty Enlisted

ADO - Active-Duty Officer

AIT - Advanced Individual Training

AOR - Area of Responsibility

AR - Army Regulation

ARNG - Army National Guard

ARSOA - Army Special Operations Aviation

ARSOF - Army Special Operations Forces

ARSOTF - Army Special Operations Task Force

ASCC - Army Service Component Command

BCT - Basic Combat Training

CA - Civil Affairs

CACOM - Civil Affairs Command

CADST - Civil Affairs Direct Support Team

CAOC - Civil Affairs Officers Course

CAT-A - Civil Affairs TEAM-Alpha

CDR - Commander

CG - Commanding General

CINC - Commander-in-Chief

CJCS - Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CJTF - Combined Joint Task Force

CJSOTF - Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force

CMOC - Civil-Military Operations Center

COIN - Counterinsurgency

CONUS - Continental United States
CoS - Chief of Staff
CPX - Command Post Exercise
CSA - Chief of Staff of the Army
CSC - Component Subordinate Command
CSM - Command Sergeant Major
CSU - Component Subordinate Unit
CT - Counterterrorism
CWO - Chief Warrant Officer
CY - Calendar Year
DA - Direct Action; also Department of the Army
DCG - Deputy Commanding General
DCO - Deputy Commanding Officer
DCSCMP - Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller
DCSENG - Deputy Chief of Staff, Engineer
DCSOPS - Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations
DCSSOA - Deputy Chief of Staff, Special Operations Aviation
(see also “DSOA”)
DoD - Department of Defense
DSOA - Directorate of Special Operations Aviation (see also “DCSSOA”)
DUI - Distinctive Unit Insignia
FA - Functional Area; also Field Artillery
FM - Field Manual
FY - Fiscal Year
GO - General Officer
GSC - Group Support Company
GWOT - Global War on Terrorism
HA - Humanitarian Assistance
HAAF - Hunter Army Airfield
HHC - Headquarters and Headquarters Company

HN - Host Nation
HQ - Headquarters
HQDA - Headquarters, Department of the Army
HRC - U.S. Army Human Resources Command
IFOR - Implementation Force
IG - Inspector General
JCET - Joint Combined Exchange Training
JCMOTF - Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force
JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff
JPOTF - Joint Psychological Operations Task Force
JRTC - Joint Readiness Training Center
JSOC - Joint Special Operations Command
JSOMTC - Joint Special Operations Medical Training Center
JSOTF - Joint Special Operations Task Force
JSOU - Joint Special Operations University
JTF - Joint Task Force
KFOR - Kosovo Force
LNO - Liaison Officer
LOE - Line of Effort
LOO - Line of Operation
MACOM - Major Command
METL - Mission Essential Task List
MFF - Military Free Fall
MoE - Measures of Effectiveness
MoP - Measures of Performance
MOS - Military Occupational Specialty
MSC - Major Subordinate Command
MSU - Major Subordinate Unit
MTOE - Modified Table of Organization and Equipment
MTT - Mobile Training Team

NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO - Non-Commissioned Officer
NCOA - Non-Commissioned Officer Academy
NDAA - National Defense Authorization Act
NDS - National Defense Strategy
NEO - Non-combatant Evacuation Operation
NGO - Non-Governmental Organization
NTC - National Training Center
OCONUS - Outside the Contiguous United States
ODA - Special Forces Operational Detachment - Alpha
OPCON - Operational Control
OPLAN - Operations Plan
OPORD - Operations Order
OPTEMPO - Operational Tempo
OSD - Office of Secretary of Defense
PCS - Permanent Change of Station
PO - Psychological Operations (see also “PSYOP”)
POB - Psychological Operations Battalion
POG - Psychological Operations Group
POOC - Psychological Operations Officers Course
PSYOP - Psychological Operations
RAAWS - Ranger Anti-Armor/Anti-Personnel Weapon System
RC - Reserve Component
RCO - Regimental Commanding Officer
RCSM - Regimental Command Sergeant Major
RIP - Ranger Indoctrination Program
ROK - Republic of Korea
RSC - Regional Studies Course
SATMO - Security Assistance Training Management Organization
SECDEF - Secretary of Defense

SERE - Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape
SF - Special Forces
SFAS - Special Forces Assessment and Selection
SFG - Special Forces Group
SFQC - Special Forces Qualification Course
SFOR - Stabilization Force
SIMO - Systems Integration Management Office
SJA - Staff Judge Advocate
SMU - Special Mission Unit
SNA - Somali National Alliance
SOA - Special Operations Aviation
SOAD - Special Operations Aviation Detachment
SOAG - Special Operations Aviation Group
SOAR - Special Operations Aviation Regiment
SOATC - Special Operations Aviation Training Company
SOCAF - Special Operations Command, Africa
SOCM - Special Operations Combat Medic
SOCCE - Special Operations Command and Control Element
SOCCENT - Special Operations Command, Central
SOCEUR - Special Operations Command, Europe
SOCPAC - Special Operations Command, Pacific
SOCSOUTH - Special Operations Command, South
SOF - Special Operations Forces
SOMTB - Special Operations Medical Training Battalion
SOMTC - Special Operations Medical Training Center
SOSB - Special Operations Support Battalion
SOSCOM - Special Operations Support Command
SSI - Shoulder Sleeve Insignia
SWCS - Special Warfare Center and School (see also “USAJFKSWCS”)
SWTG - Special Warfare Training Group

TACON - Tactical Control
TDA - Table of Distribution and Allowances
TF - Task Force
TRADOC - U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
TSOC - Theater Special Operations Command
UN - United Nations
UNOSOM - United Nations Operation in Somalia
USAF - U.S. Air Force
USAFRICOM - U.S. Africa Command (“AFRICOM”)
USACAPOC - U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations
Command
USAJFKSWCS - U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center
and School (see also “SWCS,” pronounced “swick”)
USAR - U.S. Army Reserve
USASFC - U.S. Army Special Forces Command
USASOAC - U.S. Army Special Operations Aviation Command
USASOC - U.S. Army Special Operations Command
USASOIC - U.S. Army Special Operations Integration Command
USCENTCOM - U.S. Central Command (“CENTCOM”)
USEUCOM - U.S. European Command (“EUCOM”)
USLANTCOM - United States Atlantic Command (“ACOM,” “LANTCOM”)
USPACOM - U.S. Pacific Command (“PACOM”)
USSOCOM - U.S. Special Operations Command (“SOCOM”)
USSOUTHCOM - U.S. Southern Command (“SOUTHCOM”)
UW - Unconventional Warfare
WMD - Weapons of Mass Destruction
XO - Executive Officer

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