


To Free From Oppression

A Concise History of U.S. Army Special Forces,
Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations,
and the John F. Kennedy
Special Warfare Center and School

AIRBORNE



UNITED STATES ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
Directorate of History and Museums

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United States Army Special Operations units have a rich and varied heritage stretching back to the birth of our nation. From the woods of New England to the swamps of South Carolina, from the jungles of the Philippines to the hills of Korea and from the darkened skies of Europe to the central highlands of Vietnam, Army Special Operations soldiers have fought their often secret war with quiet valor and deadly skill. The USASOC historical monograph series is dedicated to preserving that heritage and passing it on to a new generation of soldiers; a generation that, like its forebearers, is "SINE PARI" — Without Equal.



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Other titles:

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Produced and Distributed by the United States Army Special
Operations Command, Directorate of History and Museums

1994

By S. Sandler

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AOHS

OUTLINE HISTORY

UNITED STATES ARMY SPECIAL FORCES AND UNITED STATES ARMY JOHN F. KENNEDY SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER AND SCHOOL

June, 1941

BG William Donovan appointed
Coordinator of Information (COI)
by FDR.

July, 1941

Office of Strategic Services (OSS)
established under BG William
Donovan.

1951

Office of Chief of Psychological
Warfare established Psychological
Warfare Department, Fort Riley, KS.
UN Partisans in Korean War

1953

10th SFG(A) Bad Toelz, Germany
Remainder becomes 77th SFG(A),
Fort Bragg.

1956

Psychological Warfare School
redesignated Special Warfare
School.

1960

1st Special Forces(A) activated

1942-45

OSS Detachment 101 operations
begin, OSS Jedburgs and OGS in
France. Other OSS operations
in China, Thailand, Indo-
China, Indonesia, Malaya.
Establishment of U.S. Army
Civil Affairs Division, 1943.

1952

Psychological Warfare Center
established Fort Bragg, NC
(effective, 22 October) 19 May
10th Special Forces Group(A)
Headquarters & Headquarters
Company, Fort Bragg acti-
vated.

1954

SF Team Trains Thai Rangers.

1957

1st SFG(A) activated, Okinawa;
Trains special units in
Korea, RVN, Taiwan, and
Philippines. Special Warfare
School becomes US Army Special
Warfare School. Psychological
Warfare Center becomes US Army
Special Warfare Center.

1959

SF operations in Laos.

1961

JFK authorizes Green Beret.
MATA, Senior Officer

1963
3rd, 6th, and 8th SFG(A)s activated.

1969
USAJFKSWC redesignated US Army John F. Kennedy Institute for Military Assistance.

1974
MATA course becomes Foreign Area Officer Course.

1982
US Army 1st Special Operations Command (SOCOM) formed as FORSCOM component from USAIMA.

1984
Establishment of USAJFKSWCS Inspector General, PAO and Surgeon

1986
Establishment of US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), passage of Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act. USAJFKSWC redesignated USAJFK Center and School, 15 May.

1988
"Q" Course Special Forces Assessment and Selection Phase imple-

Counterinsurgency and Special Warfare courses established. 5th Special Forces Group(A) activated.

1964
USACSW redesignated US Army John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare.

1971
5th SFG(A) returns from RVN to Fort Bragg. US Army School of Civil Affairs transfers from Fort Gordon, GA to Fort Bragg.

1976
CASAS and PSYOPS combined to form School of International Studies.

1983
USAIMA becomes USAJFK Special Warfare Center. SOF in URGENT FURY.

1985
Establishment of six USAJFKSWC training departments and offices of Chief of Staff and Deputy Assistant Commandant

1987
Retroactive Award of SF Tab Crossed Arrows collar insignia approved Secretary of the Army approved SF Branch status (9 April); DA DCSPER approved FA 39 for Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs Officers. Branch color approved.

1989
DA approved Reserve Civil Affairs Regiment, 6 April 1989 US Army Special Operations

mented.

1989-90

U.S. Army Special Forces,
PSYOP and Civil Affairs in
JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE
LIBERTY. USASOC, USASFC and
USACAPOC activated.

Command established. 1st
Special Warfare Training
(Airborne) established.

1991

SOF in Operations DESERT
SHIELD/STORM and PROVIDE
COMFORT. Activation of
3rd SFG(A).

"If you wish for peace, understand war - particularly the
Guerilla or subversive form of war."

B. H. Liddel Hart, Strategy, 373.

INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS

No complete, documented history of U.S. Army Special Forces (SF), Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Rangers, let alone the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), has been published to date. Excellent monographs have indeed appeared on such topics as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the founding and early years of U.S. Army Special Forces and on many aspects of Special Operations Forces (SOF), which comprise, in addition to SF, CA and PSYOP, Rangers, Special Operations Aviation and Special Mission Units. This work is an attempt to fill the need for a concise, documented history of Special Forces and its antecedents, as well as PSYOP, CA and the USAJFKSWCS, and has in mind the student as well as the general reader, military or civilian. It should also indicate subjects and resources for researchers.

U.S. Army Special Operations Forces have traditionally labored under some conceptual confusion. U.S. Army Rangers were included in the lineage and honors of the 1st Special Forces (now Special Forces Regiment) until 1986 even though Ranger missions are mostly dissimilar, and several emblematic details from the commando-like 1st Special Service Force are still found in SF insignia. The missions of Detachment 101, the Jedburghs and the Operational Groups of OSS of World War II were considerably closer to those of today's U.S. Army Special Forces. But the OSS was a civilian Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) organization,

and thus not an eligible predecessor of SF. The Army in 1986 did recognize the OSS heritage by authorizing the SF tab retroactively for those who had served in OSS units engaged in guerrilla warfare, and veterans of the 8240th Partisan Unit of the Korean War.

The distinction between Ranger and Special Forces missions was spelled out as early as 1952 by the Special Warfare Center and School's official predecessor, the Army Office of Psychological Warfare:

U.S. Army-trained Ranger units are designated to conduct shallow penetration or infiltration of enemy lines. They remain in the objective area for a limited time only. Primarily, they execute missions of a harassing and raiding nature against targets close to friendly front lines. Ranger missions are performed solely by U.S. personnel; they do not utilize indigenous personnel in their objectives. SF (by contrast) is capable of conducting long-range penetration deep into the objective area to organize, train, equip, and control indigenous forces. ¹

These distinctions were not basically changed in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication #1, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington: 1 January 1986).

U.S. Army Special Forces are]:

Military personnel crosstraining in basic and specialized military skills organized into small, multipurpose detachments with the mission to train, organize, supply, direct, and control indigenous forces in guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency operations, and to conduct unconventional warfare (UW) operations."

¹Orientation material, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, 1952-54, quoted in A.H. Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins: Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-52 (Washington: National Defense University: 1982), 148. Unless otherwise indicated, all documentary material referenced here may be found in the USASOC History Archives.

Psychological Operations are defined as:

Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their motions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives.

The same source gives a somewhat more extensive definition for Civil Affairs:

Those phases of the activities of a commander which embrace the relationship between the military forces and civil authorities and people in a friendly country or area or occupied country or area when military forces are present. Civil affairs include, inter alia: a. matters concerning the relationship between military forces located in a country or area and the civil authorities and people of that country or area involving performance by the military forces of certain functions or the exercise of certain authority normally the responsibility of the local government. This relationship may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to military action in time of hostilities or other emergency and is normally covered by a treaty or other agreement, expressed or implied; and b. military government: the form of administration by which an occupying power exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority over occupied territory.²

These distinctions and definitions are not merely exercises in semantics. A noted authority on unconventional warfare, himself a veteran of United Nations Partisan Infantry operations in the Korean conflict, wrote: "Indeed, how the contemporary conflict spectrum is viewed is, by and large, a function of concepts and interpretations".³

²FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations (Washington: April 1990), glossary-6, 10.

³Comments by Professor S.B. Sarkesian, "Proceedings of the Low Intensity Warfare Conference, 14-15 January 1986. Sponsored by the Secretary of Defense, Honorable Caspar Weinberger, 41.

Finally, green berets are a form of headgear, not a U.S.
Army unit.

Secretary of Defense, 14-15 January 1986 conference on Low
Intensity Warfare" (Washington: 1986).

Beginnings

The roots of U.S. Army Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations go back to the earliest years of this nation. Here, in a "New World," conventional military powers faced "new" methods of warfare. Yet, in truth, these could be said to be new only in that they had been forgotten or ignored by formalized 18th century armies. The biblically and classically literate 18th century had every reason to know that Gideon had stampeded the numerically-overwhelming Midianites to win a splendid victory for Israel, and that David, in his unconventional war against King Saul, attracted "everyone that was in distress and everyone that was in debt, and everyone that was discontented".⁴ The classic guerrilla campaign of classical Roman times was most successfully waged by Fabius Maximus, who harried Hannibal out of Italy after a series of conventional Roman armies using conventional strategy had suffered a string of disastrous defeats. And a few centuries later, Roman cohorts had to practice antiterrorism and secure the peace in Rome's restive province of Judea; zealots/terrorists (who may have included the disciple Simon Zelotes) assassinated "collaborators," ambushed unwary centurions, and tried to rally the oppressed Jewish people to their side.⁵

⁴I Samuel 22: 2. (KJV)

⁵For extensive discussion of the history of guerrilla warfare, see Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla: A Historical and Analytical Study (Boston: 1976); L. Gann, Guerrillas in History

But by the 18th century A.D., the formal, quadrille-like, movements of armies on the battlefield had become thoroughly stereotyped. Reality, however, has a way of eventually intruding even into the most elaborated of doctrines, and with the American War for Independence, the forces of the British Crown found themselves facing a people (then as now) "numerous and armed."

Quite early in that conflict, "energetic and expert psychological warfare" was conducted against British and Hessian troops. One patriot leaflet, distributed throughout the Bunker Hill area, contrasted "Prospect Hill...Seven Dollars a Month...freedom, ease affluence and good farm" [with] "Bunker Hill...Slavery, Beggary and Want." Thousands of British and Hessian troops responded positively to this type of message throughout the war.⁶ General Washington himself called for:

A small traveling Press to follow headquarters [which] would be productive of many eminent advantages. It would enable us to give speedy and exact information of any Military transactions that take place with proper comments upon them; and thereby frustrate the pernicious tendency to falsehood and misrepresentation, which, in my opinion of whatever they maybe, are in the main, detrimental to our Cause. If the People had a Channel of Intelligence, that from its usual authenticity they could look up to with confidence, they might often be

(Stanford: 1971); John Ellis, A Short History of Guerrilla Warfare (New York: 1976); Irwin Blacker, ed., Irregulars, Partisans, Guerrillas (New York: 1954); Arthur Campbell, ed., Guerrillas: A History and Analysis (New York: 1988).

⁶Paul M. Linebarger, Psychological Warfare (Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1954), 213; Lyman Butterfield, "Psychological Warfare in 1776: The Jefferson-Franklin Plan to Cause Hessian Desertions," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, vol. 94 (1950).

preserved from that despondency, what they are apt to fall into from the exaggerated pictures [of] our Enemies.⁷

With the emergence of a military stalemate in the northern states by 1778, the British turned south, pursuing that beckoning will-o-the-wisp, a supposedly large body of Tories, yearning to turn upon their patriot tormentors. It started out well enough for the British with the surrender of Charleston in May 1780, the greatest American military defeat until the capitulation at Bataan early in World War II. Worse was to follow: on 16 August, Gen. Horatio Gates, the commander of the last sizable patriot Army in the South, blundered into the Battle of Camden, one of the most thoroughgoing defeats ever suffered by an American Army.

But the worst of times sometimes produces the best of men. Out of this grave situation emerged Francis Marion, "The Swamp Fox," a frail, limping 48-year old South Carolina aristocrat, but probably America's foremost "partizan." Marion had learned irregular warfare in the school of battle, against the Cherokee Indians in the campaigns of 1759-61. He was not a charismatic figure like the later T. E. Lawrence or Orde Wingate, both of whom better fitted the mold of the English eccentric. (A presumably un-eccentric contemporary English commander complained that Marion would "not come out and fight like a Christian"!) Further, Marion's abstinence and strict discipline did not endear him to his rowdy frontier militiamen. Yet, his mobile force, never numbering

⁷J. M. Dederer, Making Bricks Without Straw: Nathanael Greene's Southern Campaign and Mao Tse Tung's Mobile War (Manhattan, KS: 1983), 24.

more than a few hundred mounted men, could strike swiftly and unexpectedly, using ambush, counterattack and pursuit. Marion also had a fine eye for terrain, an appreciation of military intelligence reinforced by aggressive patrolling, and the ability to win the confidence of the local inhabitants. He knew when to fight and when to slip deeper into the Carolina backcountry.

He also kept the patriot cause alive by remaining as much as possible in the disputed areas, encouraging the Whigs and suppressing the Tories. By releasing his men when possible for the recurrent rounds of farm chores and by keeping those farms relatively safe from Tory and British depredations Marion also protected the rural economy, a consideration usually lost on conventional commanders.

Here was a classic use of unconventional warfare: bold, mobile forces, operating amongst a possibly sympathetic population which was offered security and the means to strike back. Marion was not alone in his use of unconventional warfare, for this was America's only true civil war, and in such a conflict, guerrilla or unconventional forces almost naturally arise. But his operations kept the British and loyalists off-balance even when most of his little battles went against him, and paved the way for victory at Yorktown.

General Nathaniel Greene, Marion's supporter and superior as commander of the Southern Department, aptly summarized the victorious unconventional warfare in the South in homespun words that predated Mao Tse Tung or Che Guevara by almost two centuries:

There are few generals that has [sic.] run more often or more lustily than I have....But I have taken care not to run too far, and commonly have run as fast forward as backward, to convince our enemy that we were like a crab, that could run either way. We fight, get beat, rise and fight again."⁸

The U.S. Army employed little or no unconventional warfare during the War of 1812, although both sides utilized Indian auxiliaries. Between the early wars of the Republic, the Army did devote much of its energies to what could be termed civil affairs in its dealings with the Native Americans, as well as in its "counterinsurgent" Indian wars.

Yet by 1815, guerrilla warfare could boast of two outstanding victories on widely-separate fronts in Europe, victories that had contributed significantly to the defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte. Spanish partisans, from whom the very name "guerrilla" (little warrior) was derived, waged war without quarter against the despised French occupiers and their puppet Spanish forces. At the other end of the continent, Russian irregulars were instrumental, with the fierce Russian winter, in expelling Napoleon personally from Holy Mother Russia.⁹

The fact that Mexican authorities did not resort to extensive

⁸H. Rankin, Francis Marion: The Swamp Fox (New York: 1973); Henry Lumpkin, From Savannah to Yorktown: The American Revolution in the South (New York: 1987); John S. Pancake, This Destructive War: The British Campaign in the Carolinas, 1780-1782 (Tuscaloosa: 1985); Greene quote in D. R. Palmer, The Way of the Fox: American Strategy in the War for Independence, 1775-1783 (Westport, CN and London: 1975), 171.

⁹Arthur Campbell, Guerrillas (New York: 1968), 9-22, 23-24. R. B. Asprey. War in the Shadows (Garden City: 1975), 136-141, 154-158.

guerrilla warfare during the American invasion of their nation in 1846 is undoubtedly indicative of the demoralization of the country at the time. But the wise and humane General Order Number 20, drawn up by MG Winfield Scott even before he was appointed to command in the field in Mexico, served to defuse Mexican resentment toward the invading Yanquis. Scott insisted that Mexican civilians be treated with scrupulous courtesy and ordered all priests and magistrates saluted. These were not merely paper orders; Scott publicly hanged two members of his command who had violated Mexican women. By way of instructive contrast, MG Zachary Taylor, invading Mexico from the North, issued no such orders. His raw Texans were loosely disciplined, and Mexican outrage soon enough flared into troublesome and avoidable guerilla warfare throughout his campaign.¹⁰

Civil War

Despite this impressive heritage of special warfare, 19th century military thought in Europe and the United States was dominated by the conventional "big battalions" theories of Baron

¹⁰Paul M. Linebarger, Psychological Warfare (Washington, Combat Forces Press: 1954), 23-24; Marshall Andrews, "Psychological Warfare in the Mexican War," from William E. Daugherty and M. Janowitz, A Psychological Warfare Casebook, (The John Hopkins University, Operations Research Office (ORO), Bethesda: 1958); Daugherty and Andrews, A Review of U.S. Historical Experience with Civil Affairs, 1776-1954 (ORO: 1961), 71-88; R. H. Gabriel, "American Experience With Military Government," American Historical Review (July 1944); J. A. O'Brien, "Military Government of Mexico by American Forces Under General Winfield Scott," Army War College Study #51 (May 1943). Also published by Provost Marshal General's School as Training Packet #58, (Fort Gordon: n.d.)

Henri de Jomini and Karl von Clausewitz. Military planners and commanders on both sides of the American Civil War (those who indeed read such things) were particularly fascinated by the writings of Jomini, and when they considered guerrilla warfare at all, dismissed it as low-class. In the border states (the only place where the so-called Civil War indeed became a fratricidal struggle), adherence to the Union or the Confederacy came about, not through guerrilla operations, as had been the case in the South almost a century earlier, but through regular military campaigns or political coups d'etat.

Although the war itself saw little in the way of combat special operations, a significant exception can be found in the wartime career of the Confederate "Gray Ghost," John Singleton Mosby. Mosby was renowned for his daring and almost invariably successful lightning raids against Union forces. But he also should be remembered by Special Operations Forces for his development of the "Mosby Confederacy," a three-county semi-liberated territory in Virginia, just outside his enemy's capital. The sympathetic inhabitants of this "Confederacy" supplied Mosby's men with supplies, fodder, hiding places and intelligence. In return, Mosby protected them from predatory deserters, outlaws and raiders of both armies and dispensed justice. Mosby's operations and his own character bore a startling resemblance to Francis Marion, who, indeed, was Mosby's boyhood hero. Like Marion, Mosby was small, lithe and wiry and detested drunkenness. And like Marion, Mosby was more than just a raider or freebooter. His

"Confederacy" grew from his careful use of what today would be termed unconventional warfare and civil affairs.

By the end of the war Mosby's force, which never numbered more than 350 troopers, was credited with tying down no less than 50,000 Union soldiers. Generals Robert E. Lee and J. E. B. Stuart asserted that Mosby's was the only Confederate guerrilla unit that ever accomplished its overall mission. Mosby himself best summarized the mission of the partisan or guerrilla warrior:

As a line is only as strong as its weakest point, it was necessary for it to be stronger than I was at every point in order to resist my attacks.... To destroy supply trains, to break up means of conveying intelligence and thus isolating an army from its base, as well as different corps from each other, to confuse plans by capturing dispatches are the objects of partisan warfare.... The military value of a partisan's work is not the number of men killed or captured, but the number he keeps watching. Every soldier withdrawn from the front to guard the rear of an army is so much taken from its fighting strength."¹¹

On the Union side, the Army was deeply involved in Provost Marshall and Freedman's Bureau activities in reestablishing Federal authority. It performed practically every function that U.S. Army Civil Affairs would carry out in World War II and afterwards. The Army-run Freedman's Bureau looked after the affairs of the newly-freed slaves and even established America's first quasi-"social security system," deducting a portion of black employees' wages for the maintenance of their relatives

¹¹Quote from James J. Worsham and R. B. Anderson, "Mosby: The Model Partisan," Special Warfare (Winter, 1989), 38; V. C. Jones, Ranger Mosby (Chapel Hill: 1944); K.H. Siepel, Rebel, The Life of John Singleton Mosby (New York: 1983); J. D. Wert, Mosby's Rangers (New York: 1990), see particularly chapt. 7, "Life in Mosby's Confederacy."

unable to work.¹²

Frontier Campaigns

The end of the Civil War saw the largest Army involvement in U.S. civil affairs to date. During Reconstruction many Union commanders performed the difficult tasks of military government amongst their fellow Americans. The fact that the most bitter memories of "unreconstructed" Southerners were of Reconstruction rather than of the war itself could serve as a cautionary example for Army Civil Affairs personnel: Americans do not like Military Government for themselves, and are wary of it for others.¹³

In the decades between Appomattox and the blowing up of the Maine, many U.S. Army officers gained their first taste of combat in the numerous "little wars" on the Great Plains against the Native American. The frontier experiences of small unit actions, civic improvements, familiarity with other languages and cultures and the organizing of indigenous peoples into military formations called for skills quite similar to those of modern Special Forces. In fact, it could be said that, as a practical matter, the U.S.

¹²Peter Parish, The American Civil War (New York: 1975), 26-34. Time/Life Editors, The Civil War: Spies, Scouts, and Raiders: Irregular Operations (Alexandria, VA: 1985); Daugherty and Andrews, 9-56.

¹³James Sefton, The United States Army and Reconstruction, 1865-1877 (Baton Rouge: 1967); Otis Singletary, The Negro Militia and Reconstruction (1967); Daugherty and Andrews, 56-76; R. A. Coakley, The Role of Federal Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1789-1878 Army Historical Series (U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington: 1988), 268-334.

Army of the time was primarily a counterguerrilla constabulary.¹⁴

However, the Army's operations in the Great Plains Indian Wars should not be considered as a counterinsurgency program. As one recent authority on the topic has argued persuasively:

When Indians fought against the Army they fought as warriors. Although tactically they fought as guerillas ...they were not guerillas. They were not attempting to wear down the enemy by harassment, nor were they in a position to establish a secure base area or win over the civilian population living in the heartland or the army they confronted.¹⁵

Army forces on the Great Plains soon realized that they could not carry on the tracking of hostile bands without Native American help. Almost immediately after the Civil War the first Indian Scouts were enlisted to serve as guides and intelligence gatherers. They brought to the Army their traditional skills in tracking, fieldcraft, personal combat and physical hardiness. (More than one account of the time claimed that Indian Scouts on foot could keep up with mounted troopers!) After the last frontier closed in 1890, the Scouts primarily kept order on the reservations. But their heritage remained. The Indian Scouts' crossed arrows insignia was taken up in World War II by the

¹⁴Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891 (New York: 1973); Richard Ellis, "The Humanitarian Generals," The Western Historical Quarterly (April 1972); Norman Delbridge, "Modern Guerrilla Warfare and the Indian Wars of 1865-1892," U.S. Army War College Commentary (1970); James P. Tate, ed., "The American Military on the Frontier," Proceedings of the 7th Military History Symposium (Washington: 1976); C. R. Simmons, "The Indian Wars and US Military Thought, 1865-1890," Parameters (Spring 1992).

¹⁵John M. Gates, "Indians and Insurrectos: The Army's Experience with Insurgency," in L. J. Mathews and D. Brown, eds., The Parameters of War (Maclean, VA: 1987), 200.

Canadian-American First Special Service Force and was later incorporated into the Special Forces Collar Insignia and Distinctive Unit Insignia.¹⁶

However, the Army seemed to have lost the memory of its decades of experience in irregular warfare by the onset of the 1899-1902 Philippine Insurrection. Significant numbers of the Filipino elite opposed the transfer of their country's sovereignty from Spain to the United States in the wake of the Spanish-American War. Consequently, by February 1899, elements of the U.S. Army found themselves in combat against Philippine insurgents led by Emilio Aguinaldo.

The Army reacted conventionally to the initial conventional strategy of the Filipino resistance, inflicting heavy casualties and seemingly ending the insurrection. The war, however, had simply entered a new, more protracted phase, a guerrilla war designed to wear down American resolve in the Philippines and in the United States. In fact, this "dirty little war" did generate considerable opposition at home, with William Jennings Bryan twice running for the Presidency of the United States on a Democratic Party platform of "anti-Imperialism," and gathering the support of intellectuals and writers such as Mark Twain and William Dean Howells. But by 1902 the Army had succeeded in pacifying the Philippine people through civic improvements, a benevolent colonial government with the promise of eventual independence, an

¹⁶F. Downey, Fairfax, and J. N. Jacobsen, The Red/Bluecoats: The Indian Scouts, U.S. Army (Fort Collins, CO: 1973).

amnesty program, an early form of "psychological warfare" -- and counterinsurgency.¹⁷

However, the reforms initiated in the wake of the conventional incompetencies revealed by the Spanish-American War once again put the Army firmly on the side of weight and mass. Its frontier and Philippine irregular warfare lessons were lost.

¹⁷John M. Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902 (Westport, CN: 1973); Uldaricio Bacayon, The Philippine Campaigns (Manila: 1951); B. M. Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902 (Chapel Hill: 1989). Russell Roth, Muddy Glory: America's Indian Wars in the Philippines, 1895-1903 (New Haven: 1983), is also useful on the anti-war movement in the U.S. General Bruce Palmer, Jr., "wish[ed] that when I was the Deputy Chief of Staff for operation at the Department of the Army in 1964-1965, we had studied the U.S. Army's campaign in the Philippines during the insurrection there at the turn of the century," ltr to Military Review (January 1989), 103.

World War I and After

In World War I, the U.S. Army was not involved in unconventional warfare and conducted only small-scale civil affairs. However, the Propaganda Section of the American Expeditionary Force AEF produced extremely effective psychological warfare leaflets. The section composed a mere 20 leaflets, and those late in the war. But reproduced by the millions, and dropped by aircraft over the Kaiser's troops, they produced considerable despondency and defection. American leaflets avoided political issues as well as propaganda "stunts," concentrating instead on the enemy's warweariness, conditions in the trenches and the happy lot of a POW of the Americans. The Propaganda Section was scrupulous in seeing to it that what Secretary of War Newton Baker termed "education over the lines" was "absolutely honest." A particularly successful leaflet simply pointed out to German troops the fact that prisoners of the U.S. Army received the same rations as soldiers of the U.S. Army. These rations were then described in mouth-watering detail to enemy soldiers who had been living for months on a diet of kommisbrot (commissary bread), which they disgustedly claimed was made up of the sweepings of field bakery floors. (Modern nutritionists would undoubtedly praise kommisbrot's "high fiber content").

But, as in all of America's psywars, the simple surrender leaflet, promising good treatment, seemed to garner the most live enemy troops, judging from stockade interrogations. A tribute to the AEF's leaflet psywar came from none other than the Kaiser's

Chief of Staff, Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, who admitted that it had "poisoned" his troops.¹⁸

After the Armistice of November 1918, American forces found themselves involved in the Military Government of a section of the German Rhineland, without any planning beforehand. Not surprisingly, this occupation stumbled at its beginning. The Army determined to use tactical formations of the Third Army as the units of military government, and that officers of the Office in Charge of Civil Affairs (OCCA) would be unit commanders. The administration of the OCCA at the town and village level was usually assigned to a staff officer as additional duty, with a knowledge of German the only prerequisite for the job. Inexperienced and untrained officers tended to mete out disproportionately harsh punishments to cover themselves. But with the rotation of combat veterans (who only wanted to get home) the original Civil Affairs arrangements were transferred from the headquarters of combat units to the civil administrative centers at the German Kreis level, and the Army appointed a Kreis officer to replace the division, regiment or battalion OCCA officer. With this reorganization the more petty and harsh regulations were either abrogated or simply not enforced with the previous rigor;

¹⁸E. P. Lilly, "History of Psychological Warfare," draft (Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington: n.d.), chapt 1, 52-84. (Baker quote, 69); W. E. Daugherty, A Psychological Warfare Casebook, U.S. Army Tec Memo, Office of Operational Research (ORO) (Baltimore: 1958). (Hindenburg quote, 107). Adolph Hitler, who knew a thing or two on the subject, agreed with his old commander: "British and American War propaganda was psychologically efficient.", Mein Kampf, unexpurgated text (London, Melbourne: 1971), 108.

by now the Army also simply did not have the troops for such enforcement, and had to rely on the French, whom the Germans (with good reason) feared and detested. The end of the Army's first German occupation in 1923 left behind, if not deep respect (most Germans thought the Americans "naive"), at least a measure of goodwill.¹⁹

¹⁹Daugherty and Andrews, 183-193; [I. L. Hunt], "American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920," vol. 2, typescript, n.p., n.d., compiled by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, American Forces in Germany; United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919: American Occupation of Germany, vol. 2, reprint (Washington, Center of Military History: 1991); H. Coles and A. Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors, U.S. Army in World War II (Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington: 1964, 1968), 6-7.

WORLD WAR II

The OSS

The Army made no effort to institutionalize or even to recognize special warfare doctrine after 1918, although it did establish the first official U.S. Army military advisory effort in Latin America.²⁰ Thus, on the eve of World War II the U.S. Army possessed virtually no unconventional warfare capacities: not for guerrilla warfare, counterinsurgency, strike operations, psychological operations or civil affairs. The United States also lacked a unified intelligence gathering organization.

In June 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt persuaded Wall Street Republican lawyer, World War I Medal of Honor winner and political power from New York City, William ("Wild Bill") Donovan to create that intelligence organization. On 11 July 1941, he was appointed by Roosevelt as Coordinator of Information (COI). Donovan's original charter included the waging of psychological warfare and the gathering and analysis of information.²¹ But in the ensuing months the Army, the Navy and the State Department, far more familiar with the maze and manipulation of Washington's

²⁰James F. Lacy, Origins of the United States Army Advisory System: Its Latin American Experience, 1922-1941 (Ann Arbor: Xerox University Microfilms, 1977); Walter G. Hermes, "Survey of the Development of the Role of the U.S. Military Advisor," Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army (Washington: c. 1964), 6.

²¹Corey Ford, Donovan of the OSS (New York: 1970); Anthony Cave Brown, The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan (New York: 1982). The now-declassified O.S.S. files are accessioned in the National Archives. But the Donovan papers, in the U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, PA, remain classified.

bureaucracy, siphoned off many of the COI's original functions. Indeed, some Washington observers at the time wondered if the fledgling COI itself were doomed.

The COI might have languished indefinitely, but the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor cleared the way for Donovan to convince the President that his ideas would indeed work in the new global war thrust upon the nation.²² The indomitable Donovan, in that fateful December of 1941, urged the President to create a "guerrilla corps" independent of the Armed Forces and under the COI. Donovan was convinced that almost any modern nation could be fatally undermined by the combination of clandestine infiltration, sabotage, subversion and guerrilla warfare. Finally, in June 1942, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), directly responsible to the War Department but stripped of most of its psychological warfare responsibilities, emerged from the bureaucratic wars. Donovan could take considerable satisfaction in that the OSS had retained its charter for intelligence and, had indeed, received a new mandate to conduct guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines.²³

Armed with this new charter, the OSS undertook extensive unconventional warfare operations throughout the war. Among the most notable was the support of the D-Day invasion through aid to the French Resistance. The OSS sent three different groups into

²²Paddock, 7; Ian D. W. Sutherland, Special Forces of the United States Army 1952-1982 (San Jose, CA: 1990), 187.

²³A Detailed account of the COI/OSS bureaucratic wars can be found in Thomas F. Troy, Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (Frederick, MD: 1981), 43-153.

occupied France. Jedburgh Teams (named for the castle in Scotland where they had trained) were uniformed members of the U.S. armed forces who jumped into France on and after D-Day to coordinate resistance. Operational Groups (OGs), consisting of 356 U.S. Army French-speaking volunteers parachuted into France soon after D-Day to bolster and coordinate guerrilla activities. ²⁴

The OSS's OGs were the prototype of the future Army Special Forces. The OG structure and its operational concept corresponded closely with that of later Special Forces, emphasizing special reconnaissance and direct action as well as unconventional warfare that utilized indigenous personnel behind enemy lines. The basic unit of OG personnel consisted of four officers and thirty enlisted men forming a headquarters, and two sixteen-man sections, each operating as two squads. The OG personnel were area-oriented, cross-trained and language-qualified, and like the Jedburghs, were uniformed U.S. Army personnel.

In August 1944, the Table of Organization for the Operational

²⁴OSS/London: "Special Operations Branch and Secret Intelligence Branch War Diaries," Paul Kesaris, ed. (microfilm), (Frederick, MD: 1985); J. X. Larson, "Operations of the Fourth (French) Operation Group, Office of Strategic Services, in France, 17 Aug to 20 Sep 44...", monograph, U.S. Army Ground and General School (October 1949); "Operational Report, B Company, 2671st Special Reconnaissance Battalion Separate (Prov.)" (Grenoble, France: 20 September 1944.); S. J. Lewis, Jedburgh Team Operations in Support of the 12th Army Group, August 1944 (U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth KS: 1991); D. W. Hogan, Jr, U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II, (Center of Military History, Washington: 1992), 47-58; W. W. Irwin, "A Special Force: Origin and Development of the Jedburgh Project in Support of Operation Overlord," MMA&S thesis, USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth KS: 1991; A. Bank, From OSS To Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces (Novato, CA: 1986). This is COL Bank's autobiography.

Groups was enlarged and all OGs were placed under the 2671st Special Reconnaissance Battalion, Separate (Provisional). This World War II unit might thus logically be considered the ancestor of U.S. Army Special Forces. In the words of one authority, "The OG's [sic] were not Rangers...[although they shared some roles]...the distinction was simply that, while Donovan saw the Rangers as operating in front of the enemy, the OG's [sic] fitted into the pattern of OSS activities behind the enemy lines."²⁵ Of course, Rangers did operate on occasion behind enemy lines, but they did so without working with indigenous personnel and for only brief periods. By the spring of 1945, no less than 75 OG teams were assisting the French partisans as they rose in revolt, blocking the retreat lines of the Germans, capturing large numbers of prisoners and preventing the destruction of key facilities.

The Operational Groups also fought in Italy and the Mediterranean area. The OSS-led partisan forces cleared the German-held islands of Sardinia and Corsica, using them as bases for raids against the Italian mainland. They conducted raids along the Italian coast, directed air strikes and worked with Italian partisans.

²⁵Paddock, 27-28; Cave Brown, 412-16, 525, 571-72; Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins of the CIA (New York: 1983); Kermit Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS (New York: 1976), vol. 1, 223-25; vol. 2, 192-99, 204-07; "OSS Aid to French Resistance in World War II," folders 978, 981, 985, 988 in USAJFKSWCS Marquat Library; Donovan papers, Box #139; National Archives OSS collection, RG 226, Entry 91, Boxes 24-25. Paddock points out that an OG unit was almost the template for the later Special Forces A Detachment, and that the OSS and the British Special Operations Executive combined in 1944 to form a Special Forces headquarters, 27-28.

Operational Groups also infiltrated into German-occupied Greece, linked up with Greek guerillas and conducted unconventional warfare against the Germans. But in the end they were unable to prevent a destructive civil war between communists and rightist partisan bands that would last for over five years.²⁶

- Det 101 -

America's most extended guerrilla warfare of World War II took place in northern Burma. In that most forbidding terrain of mountainous jungle, OSS Detachment 101 rallied thousands of wiry Kachin hill tribesmen to harass Japanese occupation forces by blowing up bridges and railroad lines, ambushing convoys, shooting up supply dumps and taking prisoners for interrogation. The Japanese were never able effectively to counter these fierce guerrillas. Detachment 101, in contrast to some other guerilla units, also enjoyed cordial relations with the commanders of Allied conventional forces in the area, who particularly valued its timely and accurate intelligence and its rescue of downed airmen from almost certain death in the fetid jungle. Overall, however, the main mission of the detachment was that of intelligence gathering.

In the Allies' final campaign to clear the Burma Road to China, Detachment 101's 300 Americans and 3,200 assorted Burmese tribesmen were assigned the conventional military mission of clearing the approaches to that vital lifeline to Free China. In

²⁶Hogan, 28-33.

the words of its Presidential Unit Citation, Detachment 101

undertook and concluded successfully a coordinated 4-battalion offensive against important strategic objectives through an area containing approximately 10,000 battle-seasoned Japanese troops. Alternating frontal attacks with guerrilla tactics, the 'Kachin Rangers' [Det. 101] remained in constant contact with the enemy during the entire period and persistently cut him down and demoralized him.

For all this, Detachment 101 throughout its war against the Japanese lost only fifteen Americans and 184 Burmese guerrillas.²⁷

- The Alamo Scouts -

Although General Douglas MacArthur had imperiously barred the OSS from his Southwest Pacific jurisdiction, the U.S. still needed timely, accurate ground reconnaissance in the area and liaison with indigenous guerrillas. With these missions in mind, LTG Walter Krueger, commander of the U.S. Sixth Army authorized the

²⁷Roger Hilsman, American Guerilla (Washington, New York, etc: 1990). (Hilsman went on from the OSS to become Assistant Secretary of State for Asian Affairs and a significant source of President Kennedy's information and advice on insurgency and counterinsurgency.) William R. Peers and Dean Brelis, Behind the Burma Road: The Story of America's Most Successful Guerrilla Force (Boston: 1963); R. Dunlop, Behind Japanese Lines: With the OSS in Burma (New York: 1979); James S. Fletcher, "Jing Paw Rangers," Military History Review (October 1984); Roosevelt, War Report, vol. 2, The Overseas Targets, 369-392; James R. Ward, "The Activities of Detachment 101 of the OSS," typescript prepared for the Conference on the OSS, July 1991, at the National Archives on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the founding of the OSS, USASOC Historical Archives; OSS Detachment 101, Papers and Collections, 1942-45, MHI (Carlisle Barracks, PA); E. A. Marshall, "Born to Die," personal reminiscences of a Det 101 veteran, typescript (March: 1981); "Det 101" Association file. See also oral and videotaped interviews with Detachment 101 veterans conducted by USASOC Historians, Fort Bragg NC: 1991.

establishment in November 1943 of a small, elite force to pave the way for assault landings in the Southwest Pacific. This unit was named the Alamo Scouts, probably because General Krueger made his home in San Antonio, Texas.

The initial mission of the Alamo Scouts was a pre-assault reconnaissance of Los Negros Island in the Admiralty Islands. As a result of this first team's intelligence, targets could be pinpointed and the entire invasion more accurately planned. Los Negros proved the prototype for future Alamo Scout operations along the New Guinea coast and Pacific island operations.

All Alamo Scout operations had been of fairly short duration, usually only a few days, and using only U.S. troops. But with the liberation of the Philippines the Scouts' mission changed. In addition to advanced ground reconnaissance, they coordinated Filipino guerrilla actions behind Japanese lines, often in cooperation with Army operations, on missions now sometimes lasting for weeks or even months.

The Scouts' most famous and gratifying exploit was the rescue/raid on the Japanese prison camp at Cabanatuan. Between 27-29 January 1945 two Scout teams, C Company of the 6th Ranger Battalion, a platoon from 6th Army headquarters and an undetermined number of Filipino guerrillas converged upon the prison compound. On the evening of the 30th, a coordinated attack devastated the Japanese guards and opened the way for the rescue of all 511 prisoners. So meticulous was this operation that the Scouts actually remained in the area, burying their only fatali-

ties (two Rangers), and then twice more returned to collect documents and pay off local bullock cart drivers who had evacuated the wounded.

As a result of the Cabanatuan rescue, the veil of wartime secrecy was lifted from the Scouts. This raid was no fluke of good luck; four months earlier a Scout team had rescued sixty-six Dutch and Javanese civilians held by the Japanese in New Guinea.

Incredibly, in all of their nearly eighty highly dangerous missions, this elite group, numbering no more than about sixty enlisted men and ten officers, earned forty-four Silver Stars, thirty-three Bronze Stars, and four Soldier's Medals - and never lost a man. It was inactivated without ceremony in November 1945.²⁸

- 1st Special Service Force -

In the meantime, the official ancestor of today's U.S. Army Special Forces, the U.S.-Canadian First Special Service Force

²⁸F. B. Johnson, and C. Takevchi (ed.), Raid on Cabanatuan (Las Vegas: 1988); Michael King, Rangers: Selected Combat Operations in World War II, Leavenworth Papers (Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS: June 1985.) Lewis B. Hochstrasser, "They Were the First: The Story of the Alamo Scouts," typescript, n.d., U.S. Army Library, the Pentagon; Gibson Niles, "The Operations of the Alamo Scouts, (6th U.S. Army Special Reconnaissance unit), on Select Missions," U.S. Army Ground General School (1949), (copy in U.S. Army Library, the Pentagon). Les Hughes, "The Alamo Scouts," Trading Post (American Society of Military Insignia Collectors), April-June 1986; Gen Walter Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon: The Story of the 6th Army in World War II (Washington: 1953), 29, 49, 108, 177, 189, 237-39; George R. Shelton, "The Alamo Scouts," Armor, (September-October). Alamo Scouts Newsletter, I (1980); Eustace F. Nabbie, [Mayo Stuntz], "The Alamo Scouts," in Studies in Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, (MacLean, VA: n.d. See also collection of after-action reports, letters, etc. from Alamo Scouts in USASOC History Archives.

(FSSF), had been activated in July 1942 at Fort William Henry Harrison, Montana. This unit was a combined U.S.-Canadian force of 173 officers and 2194 enlisted men organized to conduct hit-and-run raids against vulnerable installations, such as the Rumanian oil refineries and German garrisons in Norway. Commanded by BG Robert T. Frederick, the FSSF recruited "lumberjacks, forest rangers, hunters, northwoodsmen, game wardens, prospectors, and explorers," seeking the right men for dangerous missions. They trained in the snows of the Rockies along the Continental Divide, learning skiing, demolitions, hand-to-hand combat and the operation of the Weasel (a military tracked snow vehicle.). But before the "Forcemen" had finished training, their original mission was cancelled and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had difficulty in determining just what missions to assign the unit. When the decision came to throw it into conventional combat the unit proved itself one of the toughest fighting forces of World War II.

Elements of the force fought in the frigid Aleutian Islands in August 1943 and were then transferred to the troop-starved Italian theater in November. There the Forcemen stormed Monte La Difensa (2-8 December), Monte Sammucro and Monte Majo (24 December 1943-9 January 1944), holding them against heavy odds.

In early 1944, the First Special Service Force was sent into the Anzio beachhead to hold a division-sized perimeter. During the Anzio operation, the Force picked up their nickname "The Devil's Brigade" in tribute to their fierce fighting in blackened faces. A diary entry, taken from the body of a German officer

read, "The Black Devils are all around us every time we come into line, and we never hear them." The Force went on to seize bridges south of Rome for the allied entry in June 1944. The last campaign of the Force, by now under the command of Colonel Edwin A. Walker, involved the seizure of three islands off the coast of the south of France to protect the allied landing in August 1944. The Force went on to seize the city of Menton, but as assault infantry they had been shot to pieces. Replacements of sufficiently high quality could no longer be found and thus the unit was disbanded near Menton well before the end of the war in Europe.

Judging from its missions, the FSSF must be seen as an antecedent of the U.S. Army Ranger Regiment, rather than of Special Forces. Still, the FSSF is in the official Special Forces lineage. Its crossed arrows and special knife are on the shoulder patch, crest, and collar branch insignia of today's U.S. Army Special Forces, and the FSSF's battle record remains an example and an inspiration for U.S. Special Operations Forces.²⁹

²⁹D. Burhans, The First Special Service Force, A War History of the North Americans (Nashville: 1978); Jack L. Kaplan, Jr., "Devil's Brigade: The Story of the First Special Service Force," Green Beret (November 1970); Robert H. Adelman and George Walton, The Devil's Brigade (Philadelphia: 1966). The date of the 1st SSF's disbandment, 5 December, has been commemorated ever since as "Menton Day."

- Philippine Guerillas -

Besides these official special operations units, a number of U.S. Army officers, on their own initiative and in the face of explicit orders to surrender, organized extensive guerrilla operations behind Japanese lines after the fall of the Philippines. LTC Russell Volckmann escaped to the mountains in the traditional guerrilla territory of northern Luzon, where he rallied, trained, equipped and led eventually no less than five Filipino regiments against the Japanese. To the south, LTC Wendell Fertig organized some 37,000 guerrillas who controlled 90 percent of the island of Mindanao by the end of the war. Upon General MacArthur's return, U.S./Filipino guerrilla units fought alongside conventional U.S. forces to win the final victory.³⁰ Both Fertig and Volckmann would play important roles in defining doctrine and roles of Army Special Forces during its initial years.

³⁰R.R. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington: 1951, reprint, 1982), passim; Cave-Brown, 412-16; Russell W. Volckmann, We Remained: Three Years Behind the Enemy Lines in the Philippines (New York: 1954); Philip Hawkins, Blackburn's Headhunters (New York: 1955); "The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines, General Headquarters; U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Military Intelligence Section," General Staff, Vol. I (1948); National Security Agency, "Messages Between U.S./Philippine Guerrilla Forces and HQ SWPA", (Washington: December 1942-November 1943), (six parts); L. S. Schmidt, "American Involvement in the Filipino Resistance Movement on Mindanao During the Japanese Occupation, 1942-45," MA thesis, Army Command and General Staff College (Fort Leavenworth: 1982).

During the Second World War the Army activated its first official Civil Affairs units. The Basic Field Manual on Military Government appeared eighteen months before Pearl Harbor, and the School of Military Government was established at the University of Virginia in May of 1942. But all of this was done either without the knowledge of or against the wishes of President Roosevelt. FDR strongly believed that civil affairs was a civilian matter and should be under the jurisdiction of a civilian agency, preferably the State Department. Secretary of War Henry Stimson finally convinced the President that experience had proved that only the Army could efficiently handle the millions of civilians U.S. troops would surely encounter in liberated Europe. On 1 March 1943, after the U.S. had been in the war for more than a year and the North African campaign was concluding, the U.S. Army Civil Affairs Division (CAD), a joint Army-Navy staff agency, was activated. Under the command of Major General John H. Hilldring, who would remain the CAD's only commander throughout the war, the division would provide Civil Affairs in liberated friendly territory and Military Government for occupied enemy areas.

At its peak the CAD enrolled 11,400 personnel (900 of whom were civilian) to oversee the affairs of no fewer than 80 million allied, enemy and cobelligerent civilians. Despite this vast disparity in numbers, U.S. Army Civil Affairs/Military Government detachments protected and assisted civilian populations and dealt with an infinite number of problems, ranging from

restoring sewage systems to prostitute control, food distribution and disarming armed teenage partisan bands (As well as providing A Bell for Adano), with great success. Proof of this success lies in the fact that the U.S. Army Civil Affairs Division faced no serious opposition, much less armed resistance at any time, in distinct and instructive contrast to the record of America's World War II enemies.³¹

One officer vividly summarized the often horrific conditions under which CAD troops had to operate, in a report made just after an enemy air raid had violently interrupted his mini-"council of state" in a small Italian city:

No water - epidemics; no food - riots; corpses - plague! I decide to bury the corpses first. A judgement more of the nose than of the head. The Podesta [mayor] said he needed a truck, which was reasonable, but there were no trucks available. A battle was going on - trucks were vital to success. A soldier said the city had two ambulances. Fine, fine! We'll use the ambulances. But no, the Sicilian will not use an ambulance for a hearse! He has a superstition against it. I was about to exert my power and make them use ambulances when a medical captain came in very upset and said that 20 corpses were lying next to his field hospital and, "for God's sake get them out." The CO troops gave me one truck for the burial of these corpses only. And I

³¹Coles and Weinberg, 66-69 and passim; Daugherty and Andrews, 222-96, 410-26; D. M. Gunn, "The Civil Affairs Detachment," Military Review (September 1945); H. Holborn, American Military Government, Its Organization and Policies (Westport, CN: 1947, 1974); Murray Dyer, et al., The Developing Role of the Army in Civil Affairs, ORO-T-398 (Chevy Chase, MD: June 1961), 58-70. G. S. Benson, "American Military Government in Italy", in Carl J. Friedrich and associates, American Experiences in Military Government in World War II (New York: 1948); See also After-Action Report, Third U.S. Army Headquarters G-5, (1945), for a thorough analysis of U.S. Army Civil Affairs in the ETO; and ltr from General Hilldring to Kent Roberts Greenfield (Chief Historian, Office of the Chief of Military History), 7 August 1950, summarizing accomplishments and philosophy of CAD.

secured some prisoners of war to dig graves and load the corpses and got the Padre to go to the graves. [But] the Padre insisted the corpses be put in wooden boxes. Captain said no, they were buried in the dark - a gruesome task. I arranged to have donkey carts collect the other corpses on the morrow, and retired.³²

One of the most gratifying of all CAD's works was the restoration of the looted art treasures of Europe to their rightful owners by the Division's Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives section (MFA). The Germans had fancied themselves as the "culture-bearers" of Europe, and this attitude, plus common cupidity, meant that MFA personnel located repositories in Germany and Austria bulging with everything from Goya paintings and Polish medieval altar pieces to French cathedral stained glass. The MFA experts validated the works and then returned them, all compliments of the U.S. Army. The MFA also protected historic structures and ruins from the depredations of combat as well as from the attentions of souvenir hunters and "Kilroy Was Here" graffiti types. To take just one example, chosen almost at random: "...the principal activity at the Central Collecting Point was...toward the checking and inventorying the 21 train carloads [!] of works of art shipped during the month to France from the depository at Neuschwanstein." One of the more unusual achievements was the protection of the remains of a forest

³²Coles and Weinberg, 192. See also C. R. S. Harris, Allied Military Administration of Italy, 1943-1945, History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series (London, HMSO: 1957). The nucleus of a post-war CA was preserved by the establishment of an Army Active Reserve Military Government Group in 1948 by a group of CAD veterans. A Bicentennial of Civilian Military Operations, Civil Affairs Association (Silver Spring, MD: 1976).

associated with the Platonic Academy of Lorenzo de' Medici and protected by Italian law as a National Monument since 1900, but now sadly depleted by the demands of Allied Army engineers for timber.³³ General Eisenhower may have had much of this in mind when he informed a group of CA officers on the eve of D-Day that they "were as modern as radar and just as important to the command."³⁴

Surprisingly, Germany's Wehrmacht, which had deployed highly developed unconventional forms of warfare such as glider forces, elite storm troops, as well as propaganda, surprise and shock tactics proved almost totally lacking in application for guerrilla warfare, although it enjoyed some counterguerilla successes. Throughout its annexed and conquered European empire the German Army only reluctantly and belatedly attempted to rally subject peoples against the Soviet enemy, and then almost always in conventional formations. A German report on anti-guerrilla operations in the Soviet Union neatly summarized the bankruptcy of that army's policy toward partisans: "To lock men, women, and

³³Report of the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas (Washington: 1946). (quote on p. 148). The CAD art experts were also needed to validate the treasures; many European dealers and curators presumably felt it their patriotic duty to pass off to the Germans as many forgeries as possible, thus diverting attention from the real items.

³⁴Daugherty and Andrews, 283. And yet Eisenhower, while still in Europe, recommended the early termination of Military Government for Occupied Germany., ibid., 312. See also R. W. Komer, "Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Mediterranean Theater" (Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington: n.d.) a massive and authoritative work, but unfortunately unattributed.

children into barns and to set fire to these, does not appear to be a suitable method of combating bands, even if it is desired to exterminate the population!"³⁵ And post-defeat German as well as Japanese resistance was precisely nil.

In the immediate post-war years the U.S. Army conducted what must be considered the most successful Military Government of modern times, in Germany, Austria and Japan. Building upon the lessons of the World War I Rhineland occupation, U.S. Army Military Government assumed the daunting tasks of educating for democracy and laying the groundwork for the physical and economic reconstruction of the former enemy nations. All of this went along with denazification and demilitarization and the search for and prosecution of war criminals. These tasks were neither easy nor quickly accomplished, but by about 1950, democracy had been established in the new Federal Republic of Germany and in Japan. These economic powerhouses, with their continued commitment to democracy, are today the best evidence of the success of post-World War II Military Government. (U.S. Military Government was also established in Austria and southern Korea, nations with somewhat uncertain status as victims or beneficiaries of aggression, but both developed as democracies with a strong

³⁵Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 1941-45 (London: 1957), 45 (exclamation mark in original); James Lucas, Commander: German Special Forces of World War II, (New York: 1985), *passim*; P. W. Blackstock, "German Psychological Warfare Against the Soviet Union," Daugherty, 263; E. Waldman, "German Occupation, Administration and Experience in the USSR," ORO-T-301, (1955); A. Alexiev, "Soviet Nationalities in German Wartime Strategy," Office of the Secretary of Defense, Director of Net Assessment, Contract Study by RAND Corporation (Santa Monica, CA: 1982).

economic base.)³⁶

U.S. Army PSYOP capacity during this global conflict expanded enormously beyond anything imagined in World War I. Even so, the Army activated its Psychological Warfare Branch of Army Intelligence only through the personal interest of the extremely influential Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy. Not surprisingly in this global war, dominated by what the prominent author Clare Booth Luce unkindly termed "globalony," the Army's Psychological Warfare Branch was only one of several federal government organizations, civilian and military, that engaged in psychological operations directed towards friends, enemies or neutrals outside the United States.

The U.S. Army in Europe fielded what was then termed "Psywar" through Mobile Radio Broadcast and Leaflet Companies controlled by the theater commanders. Overall direction in Europe was under the Psychological Warfare Branch (Italian/Mediterranean Theater) and the Psychological Warfare Division (European Theater of Operations) both of which were combined U.S./U.K. organizations with a large number of civilians from the O.S.S., as well as the Office of War Information, the (British Ministry of Information and the BBC. In the Pacific, General MacArthur's Far Eastern

³⁶B. Dastrup, Crusade in Nuremberg: Military Occupation, 1945-1949 (Westport, CN: 1985); R. Wolf, Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944-1952, Carbondale: 1984); J. C. Perry, Beneath the Eagle's Wings: Americans in Occupied Japan (New York: 1980); General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, "History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan, Introduction, 1945 through 1951," n.d., n.p.

Liaison Office (FELO) dominated military psywar, and emphatically barred the OSS and OWI as well as the British from significant participation. (Confusingly, FELO later became another Psychological Warfare Branch.) The Army's PSYWAR in World War II, with its tactical leaflets, loudspeakers and radio was highly developed and generally effective. Its leaflets, particularly the surrender/safe conduct passes, were often printed to resemble an official document (thus appealing to the German soldier's respect for authority) or elaborately engraved on one side to mimic enemy currency. (A violation of the Geneva Convention, and one that in later campaigns was circumvented by the device of repeating the serial numbers, rather than numbering them consecutively.)

U.S. Army psywarriors showed a keen knowledge of the enemy's psychology in two of the most successful leaflets of the European Theater. The first was the classic passierschein, a surrender leaflet that resembled a multi-lingual international treaty more than a mere leaflet. Signed by General Eisenhower himself, the passierschein convinced thousands of German soldiers that it was official, documented, U.S. policy to treat them well. Almost as effective was the Befehl ("order") leaflet directed at the obedient German soldier. The "order," again signed by General Eisenhower, was, of course, to surrender. As in World War I, American psywar leaflets were not necessarily designed to induce the enemy soldier to throw down his weapon immediately and surrender. More often, the idea was to cause him to doubt his leaders' promises of victory and to keep a copy on his person as

"insurance"; soldiers looking over their shoulders for a safe exit from the battlefield are presumably less likely to fight on to the death.³⁷

Naturally, these efforts worked in the field only against less motivated enemy troops such as the Germans in the closing months of the war or the Vichy French or Italians in North Africa. Most Japanese forces did not begin to deduce (or did not wish to deduce) until 1945 that events had developed, in the surrender broadcast words of the Emperor, "not necessarily to Japan's advantage," until after the massive fire raids of that year.

U.S. Army psywar got off to a slow start in the Pacific Theater with an "I Surrender" leaflet that could have had no appeal to soldiers who were hardly familiar with the word "surrender," whose Army had not lost a war in centuries and who

³⁷Lilly, chaps. 3-5; [R. Hollander], The Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Allied Expeditionary Force.... Bad Homburg (U.S Occupation Zone: October 1945); L. J. Margolin, Paper Bullets: A Brief Story of Psychological Warfare in World War II (New York: 1946); D. Lerner, Sykewar: Psychological Warfare Against Nazi Germany, D-Day to V-E Day (Cambridge, MA, London [1949]); Lerner, ed. Propaganda in War and Crisis (New York: 1951); Daugherty and Janowitz, passim; DA PAM 525-7-1, passim; Paul M. A. Linebarger, Psychological Warfare (New York: 1948, 2d ed: 1954); R. McClure, "Trends in Army Psychological Warfare", Army Information Digest, vol. 7, no. 2 (February 1952); 12th Army Group, Report of Operations (Final After Action Report), vol. 19, Publicity and Psychological Warfare Section, n.p., n.d.; S. Denlinger, "Psychological Warfare Branch, Narrative Report of Psychological Warfare in the Mediterranean Theater, typescript (n.p., n.d.; Ground General School, Tactical Psychological Warfare: The Combat Psychological Warfare Detachment (Fort Riley KS: September 1947); Propaganda Branch, Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, A Syllabus of Psychological Warfare (Washington: 1946); Hq. Fifth Army, Psychological Warfare Branch, Functions of the 5th Army Combat Propaganda Team. Other WW II PSYOP reports, etc. may be found in the USASOC History Archives.

were on the offensive anyway. A later "I Cease Resistance" leaflet brought in a few POWs toward the end of the war. But the most successful message was one directed against the Japanese civil urban population. This merely pictured a flight of the new "Superfortress" B-29s and the names of particular cities and the date on which they would be firebombed. The cities were then attacked on schedule. One authority claims that no less than eleven enemy cities were "shut down," severely curtailing war production. The American humanitarian reputation was enhanced and Japanese civilians were astonished and depressed that the Americans could "telegraph their punches" with impunity.³⁸

Conversely, German psywar could be fairly sophisticated in this conflict and might have enjoyed some success had the Allies been losing. (It was not German surrender leaflets, but rather those which showed battleweary G.I.'s how to malingering convincingly and thus get out of combat that worried U.S. commanders the

³⁸Harris, Lerner, passim; The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, "The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale" (Washington: 1947). Emperor's quotation from Perry, Beneath the Eagle's Wing, 6. See also A. H. Leighton, "Japanese Home Front Morale," in Daugherty and Janowitz, 502 and passim; "An Investigation of Individual Factors Relating to the Effectiveness of Psychological Warfare," ORO working paper (1952); W. A. Vatcher, "Combat Propaganda Against the Japanese in the Central Pacific," (n.p., n.d.), typescript; Office of Psychological Warfare, SWPA, "Report on Psychological Warfare Against Japan, Southwest Pacific Area, 1944-1945, typescript, n.p., n.d.; *ibid.*, "Basic Military Plan for Psychological Warfare Against Japan (Manila: 7-8 May 1945). For the "B-29" leaflet, etc., see Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, "Psychological Warfare", pt. 2, supplement no. 2, n.p., 189 and Daugherty and Janowitz, 259-262.

most).³⁹ In general, the psychological warfare conducted against "naive" U.S. troops by their "more sophisticated" enemies was often so clumsy as to be nearly laughable, in contrast to the professional product of U.S. Army psywar. U.S. troops in the field traditionally have put to good (if unintended) use the flimsy paper propaganda leaflets of their enemies.⁴⁰ And American soldiers, of course, have always been free to read the leaflets and listen to the broadcasts of their foes.

Post-War to War in Korea

Victory and the natural desire to return to pre-war normality resurrected the traditional American distrust of centralized government institutions. And with the death of President Roosevelt, the OSS had lost a good friend in high places. Franklin Roosevelt's successor, the former Missouri

³⁹ LTG Wm. Yarborough (Ret.) oral interview with USAJFKSWCS Command Historian, 12 December 1991.

⁴⁰ Illustrative examples of enemy printed propaganda are found throughout Linebarger. Should the point require further iteration, it could be noted that U.S. troops deserted as a result of enemy propaganda only once, during the Mexican War. See R. R. Miller, *Shamrock and Sword: The Saint Patrick Battalion in the U.S.- Mexican War* (Norman, OK: 1990) for the whole sorry story. Axis electronic propaganda found a far wider, if unforthcoming, audience than its printed counterparts, perhaps for no other reason than that its perpetrators had the wit to utilize the latest American pop music. Audio tape samples are to be found in USASOC History Archives, as well as of Glen Miller broadcasts to German troops. Nonetheless, as the Chief of Staff of the German Fourth Army on the Russian front put it: "Germany is however, not ripe for such kind of warfare and it is well that it is so....[The German's] sense for order, obedience and authority is too strong." Apparently Germany's touted "genius for war" goes only so far. "Security Information", interrogation typescript [1945].

National Guard officer, Harry Truman, despised the OSS as the "Oh, So Social," for its Eastern, Ivy League connections. The proudly plebeian Truman wasted no time in winding up the organization, and it disbanded in December 1945. The United States was now without any unconventional warfare or intelligence-gathering and analysis organization, although some OSS remnants somehow survived, scattered between the State and War Departments.⁴¹ Civil Affairs and psywar were more or less wound down to nearly nothing.

⁴¹Troy, 287-301; Paddock, 42-81; Marvin L. Jones, "Special Operations: A Step Child," USAF Air War College Professional Study No. 5960, (Maxwell AFB AL, April 1976), 13-15; R.D. Heinel Jr. warned, "Small Wars-Vanishing Act?" Marine Corps Gazette (March 1950). Also Albert E. Harris, "Partisan Operations," Military Review (August 1950).

- Korea, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs -

The sudden outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 found the Army with virtually no special operations capability, apart from a special Tactical Information Detachment, which was hurried into the combat zone.

On 30 August 1950, with the highly-motivated North Korean People's Army and its guerrilla cadres battering at U.S. Army and Republic of Korea troops precariously holding the Pusan Perimeter, an exasperated Secretary of the Army bluntly informed the Army Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, that "I am not at all satisfied" at the progress toward establishing an Army "psychological warfare" program.⁴²

Two days later, the Army approved the organizational concept and proposed strength for the re-created Psychological Warfare Division, Special Staff. Obviously, Secretary Pace's memorandum had proved effective. But the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW) was not activated until 15 January 1951, with BG Robert McClure as its head. The new Chief of Psychological Warfare privately noted that, "Even in time of grave emergency the Pentagon moves slowly."⁴³

The OCPW supervised psychological warfare operations in Korea by organizing, training and supporting leaflet, broadcasting and

⁴²Paddock, 85-86.

⁴³Ibid., 89. See also McClure papers, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks PA.

loudspeaker units in the field. This was a war in which ideology, and propaganda were vital both to armies and to civilian populations. To provide the qualified psywarriors for the Korean War and the Cold War, the Army established the Psychological Warfare Department as part of the Army General School at Fort Riley, Kansas.⁴⁴

General McClure created three divisions in OCPW: Propaganda, Unconventional Warfare and Support. The most significant feature of the new OCPW was its broad scope, covering not only psywar but also unconventional warfare.⁴⁵ That incorporation in all probability was a legacy of the OSS and General Donovan's earlier vision of an extensive special operations organization.

There could be little doubt as to the effectiveness of U.S. psychological operations in Korea. Although the Army's entire PSYOP apparatus had been almost entirely disbanded after World War II (presumably in the "atomic push-button age" there would be no need for such details), less than one month after the North Korean

⁴⁴Ibid., 83-116. At higher levels there had been an obscure psychological subcommittee of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) founded sometime in 1946-47. In March 1950, the National Security Council simply noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be responsible for all psychological warfare in military theaters in wartime. The JCS, in turn, spelled out a fairly definite mission for the fledgling U.S. Air Force's Psychological Warfare Division and for the Army, but did nothing to ensure that the latter Army had any such capacity or role. Almost coincidentally with the formation of the Army's Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) was established by Executive Order (1969). Jones, 13-20; Paddock, 40-68.

⁴⁵It should be emphasized that the term "psychological warfare" at the time also included unconventional warfare. *ibid.*, 131-40.

invasion, the Far East Command's Psychological Warfare section organized a Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group to conduct strategic propaganda in support of U.N. military operations. By 1951, the Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, successor to World War II's Tactical Information Detachment, was providing support on the tactical level. As in previous conflicts, the leaflet served the "footsoldier" of psychological warfare. Tens of millions were dropped from B-29 bombers as well as from tactical aircraft. The most successful leaflets, as in World War II, were probably the safe conduct/surrender passes signed by General MacArthur. Not only did large numbers of enemy troops avail themselves of this offer, but no fewer than 22,604 refused repatriation at war's end, a stunning propaganda defeat for the communist bloc.⁴⁶ Yet

⁴⁶S. Pease, Psywar: Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950-1953 (Harrisburg: 1992); L. A Kahn, An Investigation of Individual Factors Relating to the Effectiveness of Psychological Warfare, "ORO working paper (Washington: 1952), 95-100; K. K. Hansen, "PSYWAR in Korea", typescript (Washington, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 1960); Radio Operations Division, 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, "Report on Psywar Radio Operations in Conjunction with THE KOREAN BROADCASTING SYSTEM, August 1951-March 1952", n.d., n.p. Again, there is hardly a mention of U.S. Army psywar in the official histories of the Korean War. See W.G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, U.S. Army in the Korean War (Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington: 1966), 515 and passim, for non-repatriate POW's. For contemporary evaluations of U.S. Army PSYWAR in Korea see series of ORO studies carried out by W. Kendall, Henry Kissinger, et al., 1951-54. "U.N. Partisan Forces," "Propaganda Notes," 115-16. The 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group was organized early in the war in September 1950, and was the parent unit of today's 1st PSYOPS Battalion. A Korean psywar coup was the inducement of a North Korean MIG-15 jet fighter pilot to defect, with his aircraft, for a large cash reward -- "Operation Moolah." (The defector, however, somewhat spoiled the mutual congratulations by insisting that he had never heard of the offer!), Carl Berger, The Famous MIG Leaflet, "DA PAM 525-7-2. See also "1st Psyop Battalion," typescript, n.d.

Americans seemed only to notice the miserable 21 U.S. non-repatriates from communist prison camps, most of whom returned eventually to the horrors of capitalism, and the wildly-exaggerated tales of mass collaboration by American POWs in those camps.

By the end of the war in 1953, U.S. and U.N. Civil Affairs had operated, at one time or other, over most of the Korean peninsula. Army CA units had the satisfaction of administering Pyongyang, the only communist capital to fall to anti-communist military force. Civil Affairs was working for the first time on a large scale within a subsistence agrarian economy, where fertilizers and draft animals were more important than electricity, railroads, or telephone systems. In December 1950, both the Eighth U.S. Army's United Nations Civil Assistance Command Korea (UNCACK) and the United Nations Korean Rehabilitation Agency (UNKRA) were established. UNCACK worked closely with UNKRA and a host of other U.N. and U.S. as well as private relief agencies.

As in World War II, Civil Affairs in the combat zone remained under the control of corps and division headquarters. But for the first time in war, the U.S. Army found itself more involved with Civil Affairs than with Military Government. Behind the battle lines UNCACK had to work with a Republic of Korea government that was punctiliously observant of its sovereignty. Inflation, one of the major problems of the Republic of Korea civilian economy, was never solved, due to the inability of UNCACK and the South Korean

government to agree as to their respective powers. Nonetheless, the Republic of Korea economy and the U.S. war effort were immeasurably assisted by the activities of UNCAACK.

The competing mélange of U.N. and U.S. Army, and State Department Civil Assistance offices confused the picture. Not until one month before the armistice ending the Korean War were all military CA units put under the umbrella of the Korea United Nations Civil Assistance Command (UNCAC). And to the end of the war, Army commanders apparently could not grasp the war-winning possibilities of Civil Affairs, persistently regarding their activities as something akin to disaster relief. Many CA lessons from World War II were ignored and had to be relearned expensively and late in the game.

U.S. Army military government remained on a small scale in Korea, due to the functioning status of the ROK government, and was imposed only on towns in the immediate battle areas during the first year of the war. As the battle lines stabilized in 1951, residents were evacuated from these areas, although many civilians, even farmers, persisted in infiltrating as close as possible to the battle lines to make some sort of living, however dangerous, seemingly oblivious to unexploded ordnance and occasional enemy breakthroughs.⁴⁷

⁴⁷C. Darwin Stolzenbach, Henry A. Kissinger, Civil Affairs in Korea, 1950-1951, "ORO, Washington: 1952; Daugherty and Andrews, 409-52; USAJFKSWC, "Case Study of Civil Affairs Operations: Mid-Intensity Conflict," Korea Text 1 (Fort Bragg NC: n.d).

- Founding of U.S. Army Special Forces -

After the Army Chief of Staff had given his approval in late March of 1952, the Army activated the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina on 10 April 1952.⁴⁸ The new installation followed closely General McClure's concepts of psychological warfare, with its division into the provisional Psychological Warfare School, the 6th Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, a Psychological Warfare Board -- and the 10th Special Forces Group. The 10th was formally activated with COL Aaron Bank its first commanding officer. Colonel Bank had served as a Jedburgh team member with the OSS, and had even conducted discussions near the end of World War II in the Pacific with the young Vietnamese revolutionary, Ho Chi Minh.⁴⁹ (In 1986 Colonel Bank was appointed Honorary Colonel of the newly created Special Forces Regiment). Volunteers for the 10th SFG had to be at least twenty-one years old, airborne qualified or willing to become so, have a working knowledge of at least one language other than English, and be able to pass a battery of physical and psychological tests. Enlisted personnel had to acquire one or more basic occupational specialties: operations and intelligence, engineering, weaponry, communications and medical aid. The core

⁴⁸Department of the Army General Order No. 37 (14 April 1952), established the Psychological Warfare Center as a class 1 activity and installation, effective 10 April 1952. Paddock, 148-49, 195, 198.

⁴⁹Bank, 117-118.

of the initial group organization was the Operational Detachment, composed of fifteen men, and quite similar to the former OSS Operational Group. In fact, in the field, OGs had been termed "Special Forces."⁵⁰

Significantly, the mission of the 10th SFG was:

To infiltrate its component operational detachments to designated areas within the enemy's sphere of influence and organize the indigenous guerrilla potential on a quasi-military or a military basis for tactical and strategic exploitation in conjunction with our land, sea and air forces.⁵¹

What Army planners had in mind was the projected American military reaction to a Soviet invasion of Western Europe or of a Chinese communist incursion in Asia. Despite the Korean War, the threat to Europe loomed preeminent. Although the manuals drafted by former Philippine guerrilla Colonel Volckmann were useful, unconventional warfare doctrine for Europe was hammered out by the Center's OSS veterans, who included the 10th's commander, executive officer and intelligence officer.⁵² General Yarborough

⁵⁰"Aaron Bank" file, and letter, BG Volckmann, (21 March 1969); Paddock, 111-159, 180-85; Aaron Bank, "The Birth of the Green Berets, Gung Ho (December 1983); Col. Bank's autobiography, 111-159; Charles M. Simpson III, Inside the Green Berets: The First Thirty Years, A History of the U.S. Army Special Forces (Novato, CA: 1983); Department of the Army, Department Chief for Military Operations, "A Tentative Plan for Covert Operations in the European Theater of War" (Washington: 29 November 1950). Paddock, 111-59. Lineage of the 10th SFG and all other SF groups cited here drawn from "Lineage" file, USASOC History Archives.

⁵¹Paddock, 149, quoting from training circular of 13 May 1952.

⁵²"Bank" and "Volckmann" folders; also Volckmann studies, in USASOC Historical Archives. Guerrilla warfare planning for Europe can be found in National Archives, R. G. 319, Office of Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-58, Entry 153-57; (TS) Supplement,

would later state that "the most logical antecedent of Special Forces was the OSS." Colonel Bank pointed out that the operations envisioned for the new Special Forces Group were those of the old OSS: "The Jedburgh mission was the key factor in operational concepts and briefings," in those early days, and he recalled General Donovan telling the earliest SF volunteers, "You are the offspring of the OSS."⁵³

Across the globe, the new Army doctrine on unconventional warfare was being put into effect, not in Europe but on little islands off the west coast of Korea, with mixed results. Anti-communist North Korean partisans, termed the United Nations Partisan Infantry, Korea, under the control of U.S. Army cadre, conducted raids on the mainland, rescued downed U.N. airmen, conducted gunnery spotting and maintained electronic facilities. These so-called "Donkeys" were originally highly-motivated North

Annual Historical Review, Headquarters EUCOM-USAREUM(U), (1 November, 1950; January 1951-31 December 1952, and 1 January 1953-30 June 1954). Info used is UNCLASSIFIED; interview, MAJ (Ret) H. Brucker with Dr. S. J. Lewis, (Fayetteville NC: 31 May 1984); MAJ S. Antonelli, "History of Fort Bragg, 1918-67," unpublished historical study, prepared by Headquarters XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, 124-25; Simpson, 19-27; Bank autobiography, 150-51.

⁵³Yarborough 1975 oral interview, 21, and Yarborough introduction to G. T. Barker. A Concise History of Special Operations Forces with Lineage and Insignia (Fayetteville, NC: 1988), iv. Bank autobiography, 187. The authoritative Paddock flatly states: "The unit that evolved at Fort Bragg...was based on OSS concepts, not Ranger," 129. COL Bank emphatically agrees that Rangers were quite distinct in mission from Special Forces, autobiography, 155-56. See also S. Sarkesian, "The American Response to Low Intensity Conflict," in D.A. Charters and M. Tugwell, eds., Armies in Low Intensity Conflict (London, etc: 1989).

Korean refugees who had welcomed the U.N. forces' advance into their area. They then had to retreat south with those forces in late 1950, but they at first conducted their operations buoyed by the hope of imminent return to a liberated North Korea.

By late 1952, Special Forces had dispatched their first troops to Korea to work with the "Donkeys." But by then, with the interminable truce talks and the tacit rejection of the goal of an overthrow of the Pyongyang regime, the Korean partisans proved less enthusiastic. Towards the end of the conflict, some critics claimed that they enlisted basically for the relatively generous rice and clothing rations supplied by the U.S. Army, and that many were simply South Korean Army draft-dodgers. Still, it was the first time the new U.S. Army Special Forces had operated with indigenous forces behind enemy lines.⁵⁴

⁵⁴"U.N. Partisans in the Korean Conflict, 1951-52, A Study of Their Characteristics and Operations" (Project MHD-3, 8086 Army Unit, [AFFE] Military History Detachment (1954), USACMH, box 620, reel #57 (copy also in NARS); F.W. Cleaver, et al., (S)"U.N. Partisan Warfare in Korea, 1951-54"(U), Operations Research Office, (Chevy Chase, MD: 1956). Info used is UNCLASSIFIED. R. Paschall, "Special Operations in Korea," Conflict, VII:2; Paddock, 10, 109, 79-81; Donald Seibert and Glen Muggleberg, etc., papers and oral interviews, and 8240 Army Unit oral interviews, U.S. Army War College. A small detachment from the new-born SF, consisting of sixty officers, and fifteen enlisted members were sent to Korea, but their mission remains unclear. "UN Partisan Warfare in Korea(U). Info used is UNCLASSIFIED. Sutherland, 25-31; S. W. Darragh, "Hwanghe-do: The War of the Donkeys," Army (November 1984); E. Anderson, Banner Over Pusan (London: 1960) gives a personal narrative of service with U.N. Partisans), but must be read with caution. See also James S. Day, "Partisan Operations in the Korean War," M.A. thesis, University of Georgia, (1989); and Fred H. Buston, Salient Operational Aspects of Paramilitary Warfare in Three Asian Areas (ORO: 1953). The official history of the Korean War volume dealing with the period 1951-53, Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, barely mentions U.N. Partisans.

- From Korea to Kennedy -

After the Korean Conflict ended with a **status quo** armistice, the Special Forces community renewed its European orientation. In November 1953, in the wake of the uprising in East Germany, the 10th SFG split, with part deployed to Bad Toelz, Bavaria, to prepare for the possible activation and support of resistance movements in Soviet-occupied Europe, Africa or the Middle East. The new 77th SFG was established with those SF troops remaining at Fort Bragg.⁵⁵

Special Forces shunned publicity in those early years. But a New York Times reporter sensed a story in the green berets he had noticed on some rather reserved soldiers at an Airborne Association dinner in Washington, D.C. in July 1955. The enterprising reporter went to the Secretary of the Army, and, rather surprisingly, received permission to write a series of articles on the 77th. The two resulting Times articles featured SF soldiers, many from Eastern Europe, with their faces blacked out, undergoing tough training for their "liberation" mission, subsisting in the field occasionally on snakes and wearing their semi-unauthorized green berets. This relatively accurate story set the stage for other, far more sensational, accounts of the

⁵⁵Simpson, 41-42. By an odd coincidence, Bad Toelz had been the center of the stillborn Nazi "Werewolf" guerrilla conspiracy that had hoped in vain to continue resistance after the German surrender. Cave-Brown, 766-70. Also Bank autobiography, 187-89.

"Green Berets" in the decades ahead.⁵⁶

By the end of 1956 the unconventional warfare segment of the Psychological Warfare Center had become dominant, a change reflected in new titles: the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center, and the U.S. Army Special Warfare School. Colonel Volckmann remembered frankly that from the start:⁵⁷

Those of us who had worked on these programs were primarily interested in Special Forces and not Psychological Warfare and were very much opposed to have [sic] Special Forces association with and under the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg. We felt that there was in general a stigma connected with Psychological Warfare, especially among combat men, that we didn't care to have "rub off" on Special Forces....However, we lost that battle.⁵⁸

With the death of Stalin, the subsequent "thaw" in U.S.-Soviet relations and the rising power of Communist China, the

⁵⁶Anthony Leviero, "Army Trains Liberation Force to Fight Behind Enemy's Lines" (30 August 1955), and "Army's Toughest Trained in Wilds," New York Times (31 August 1955). An even earlier article, Frederick Wilkins, "Guerrilla Warfare," United States Naval Institute Proceedings (March 1954), dealt generally with the topic. Other early accounts are in D. B. Drysdale, "Special Forces," Marine Corps Gazette (June 1954); Melvin R. Blair, "Toughest Outfit in the Army," Saturday Evening Post (12 May 1956); J. C. Bubbell, "Army's Deadliest Soldiers," Readers Digest (July 1957) and Edson Raff, "Fighting Behind Enemy Lines," Army Information Digest (April 1956). (COL Raff was commander of the Psychological Warfare Center in 1956).

⁵⁷Beverley Lindsey, "A History of Special Forces," Veritas (July 1972), 6-9; "The Challenge," field catalog, John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance, (Fort Bragg NC: 1970), 19-20; unpublished historical study, "History," USASOC History Archives. Terminology change found in General Order No. 13, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg (11 February 1957). For early planning for Asian UW, see "U.S. Strategic Operations Force, Far East (Provisional)," Staff Study (Tokyo: 1 February 1957). Copy in Military History Institute.

⁵⁸Quoted in Paddock, 151.

Special Warfare Center and the School reoriented their interests more to the Pacific. Consequently, in April 1956 the Army secretly activated the 14th Special Forces Operational Detachment (Area) (Airborne) at Fort Bragg under the bland cover designation of the 8251st Army Unit. This sixteen-man detachment was given the mission of leading Asian resistance against any Chinese or Soviet thrust into Indo-China, Malaya, South Korea, etc. Three other similar small SF units were activated in Japan under the cover designation of the 8231st Army Unit and given a similar mission. These initial clandestine SF units came under the operational control of the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), activated on 24 June 1957 at Camp Drake, Japan, but transferred to the U.S. Pacific island bastion of Okinawa the following month. The 1st immediately began to organize mobile training teams to teach U.S. unconventional warfare tactics to cadres from or in Korea, the Philippines, the Republic of Vietnam, Taiwan and Thailand. And in October of that year, CPT Harry G. Cramer (USMA, 1946) was killed in an ambush training accident, the first SF soldier to die in Vietnam.⁵⁹ By 1960, members of the 7th SFG were also conducting ranger courses for ARVN troops, and Special Forces advisors concentrated on clandestine, paramilitary and special unit programs.⁶⁰

⁵⁹Shelby Stanton, Green Berets at War (New York: 1985), 19-20, 25-26; Sutherland, 209, 263-265; Francis J. Kelly, U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961-71 (Department of the Army, Washington: 1985.)

⁶⁰Ibid, 54-55; Simpson, 100-01.

Two years later, the Army also organized the first reserve SFG. On 1 June 1959, the highly-classified U.S. Special Forces Detachment (Provisional) was activated as an adjunct to the Hawaiian Reserve Training Battle Group. An initial cadre of thirteen officers and twenty enlisted men were called to active duty and carried out parachute training in the Republic of Korea.⁶¹

The Army's Combat Arms Regimental System of 1960 resulted in the activation of the 1st Special Forces at Fort Bragg to oversee the three existing SF groups, and in the designation of the 77th SFG(A) as the 7th SFG(A). Special Forces also then inherited, somewhat illogically, the lineage and honors of the World War II's 1st Special Service Force and Ranger battalions. The OSS Jedburghs, OGs and Detachment 101, as civilian-controlled units, were excluded.⁶²

In July of 1959, SF field training teams were covertly sent into Laos for technical training of the chaotic Royal Lao Army and to fill the gap left by French military withdrawal. Designated WHITE STAR mobile training teams, by 1961 they found themselves in combat with leftist Pathet Lao forces. Towards the end of the year the Central Intelligence Agency was also using WHITE STAR

⁶¹Stanton, 100-01.

⁶²Lindsey, "A History of Special Forces"; J. K. Mahon and R. Danysh, Army Lineage Series, Infantry, Part 1: Regular Army, Office of the Chief of Military History (Washington: 1972), 887-91; also updated lineage sheets for each SFG from Center of Military History, (18 April 1988), reflecting removal of Ranger lineage in 1986.

teams to train Meo tribesmen as guerrilla fighters. A promising partisan warfare venture with Kha tribesmen was aborted in 1962 when the Army's Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) took over the program in June and abandoned it by the fall of that year.

WHITE STAR had even less success with the lackadaisical government forces, Armee du Royaume, riddled as they were with corruption and favoritism. It was probably just as well that the Laotian princely warring factions in June 1962 agreed on a coalition government and the withdrawal of all foreign military forces. Still, a clandestine Special Forces presence, supported by the CIA's Air America, continued to work with Meo tribes until the end of the Second Indochina War.⁶³

The Berlin Crisis of 1961 led the Army to recall several reserve Army psychological warfare companies to active duty at

⁶³Ronald H. Spector, United States Army in Vietnam, Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941-60 (Washington: 1983), 349-55; James Lawton Collins Jr., The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army, 1950-72 (Washington: 1975), 38-39; Oudone Sananikone, The Royal Lao Army and U.S. Army Advice and Support (Center of Military History, Washington: 1978); "CINCPAC Command History," (Honolulu: 1966), vol. 2, 13-14, 18-20; R. Paschall, "White Star in Laos," in A. Isaacs, Pawns at War: Cambodia and Laos (Boston: 1989); Sutherland, 217-19; John T. Little, "Outline of a Civil Assistance Program," Hq, WHITE STAR Mobile Training Team, Vientiane, Laos, (22 September 1961), copy in Army Military History Institute. LTC Little's classic study served as a model for similar efforts in Vietnam and was endorsed by BG Edwin Lansdale, the assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations). B. Fall, "Laos (1945-62)", in eds. D. M. Condit, B. H. Cooper, et al., Challenge and Response, supplement, (September 1988), 96-127. See also WHITE STAR interviews on file with the Military History Institute and USAJFKSWCS/USASOC Historians. D. S. Blaufarb, Organizing and Managing Unconventional Warfare in Laos, 1962-70, Rand-R-919-ARPA (Santa Monica, CA: 1972).

Fort Bragg. Other special operations units remained with the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg: the new 5th SFG(A), the 7th SFG(A), the 1st and 13th Psychological Warfare Battalions, the Special Forces Training Group and the 22nd Special Warfare Aviation Squadron.⁶⁴ And in March of that year, President John F. Kennedy called for "a greater ability to deal with the guerrilla forces, insurrections and subversion...."⁶⁵

After the 10th had established itself in Germany, an almost bizarre variety of headgear began to distinguish these individualistic troops in the field: hunter and snow caps, cowboy and sock hats, even straw hats -- and green berets. But the green beret soon crowded out all other head coverings. As early as 1954, the group's commander, COL William Eckman, had approved the green beret for wear within his command, and by the following year it was an integral part of the uniform for all occasions. Back at Fort Bragg, the commander of the Psychological Warfare Center began his campaign to gain Army-wide official approval. But COL Edson Raff's request, also in 1954, was flatly denied by U.S. Army Field Forces. By 1961 SF soldiers at Fort Bragg stowed their green berets in footlockers and donned them only when in the field; apparently, wearing the beret at Fort Bragg was a court martial offense. The conventional army in that era of the

⁶⁴"A History of Special Forces," U.S. Army 1st Special Operations Command, Public Affairs Office, n.d., 3.

⁶⁵U.S. Army Special Warfare Center Historical Report, (1962), 1-9. "Special Budget Message," Congressional Record, vol. 16 (March 1961), 38.

starched "Ridgway Cap" remained extremely suspicious of elite outfits and distinctive clothing, preferring to keep everything strictly "uniform."

But this state of affairs would change with the new president. In September of 1961, President John F. Kennedy's senior military aide, MG Chester V. Clifton, arrived to arrange for Kennedy's first and only visit to Fort Bragg and Special Forces. General Clifton told the center's commander, BG William P. Yarborough, of the President's growing interest in counterinsurgency warfare and of his desire to see SF troops in their green berets. When BG Yarborough replied that the headgear was banned on post, General Clifton told his old West Point classmate that he would take up the matter with the President. By no coincidence the Department of the Army on 25 September 1961 mandated the wearing of the green beret for the Presidential visit of 12 October. And on the evening of the 12th, BG Yarborough received a telegram from President Kennedy affirming that the green beret would remain a "mark of distinction in the trying times ahead."⁶⁶

Even before the President's visit, Fort Bragg had witnessed

⁶⁶Yarborough, 1975 interview, vol. 2, 10-14. Also Yarborough, "Birth of the Green Berets," Gung Ho (December 1983); Series of articles in USAJFKSWC journal Veritas (October 1970; January, May 1971; January-February 1976); R. D. Bishop, "U.S. Army Special Forces Become 'the Green Berets': The Kennedy Connection," The Drop (official journal of the SF Association, Winter, 1985); Sutherland, 321-29. Extensive "Green Beret Authorization" folder, USASOC History Archives. See also the meticulously organized and amusingly illustrated "After Action Report: Project Warn," detailing the Presidential visit.

the activation of the 5th SFG(A) and on 15 January the Special Warfare School had been raised to the status of a Class One activity. That year saw a rapid expansion of Special Forces. In addition, the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, created a Special Warfare Board that called for an increased reliance upon SF to counter communist-led or inspired "wars of liberation." In response, the Special Warfare Center established the Military Assistance Training Advisor (MATA) course in February to train military personnel as advisors, primarily for duty in South Vietnam. That summer the center also created its Senior Officer Counterinsurgency and Special Warfare Orientation course to familiarize general officers, senior colonels and high-ranking civilian officials with counterinsurgency.⁶⁷ During the year the 5th SFG(A), reinforced by the 2d Civil Affairs, the 536th Engineers, and the 801st Intelligence Corps detachments, expanded to its full complement of 1,187 personnel.⁶⁸ The Vietnam buildup was beginning, and Special Forces, until then considered by most of the Army an irritating "odddity, were becoming almost fashionable in some political and military circles, beginning with

⁶⁷The original four-week instruction course provided instruction in the following areas: The Republic of Vietnam and the Vietnamese language, physical training, counterinsurgency theory and tactics, psychological operations, general subjects and specialized training in selected military skills. USASOC History Archives. (For a less positive view of early SF training see oral interview, COL Charlie Beckwith with USAJFKSWCS Command Historian, 19 September 1988).

⁶⁸Lindsey, "History of Special Forces," SWCS historical report, (1962), 19-26, 32-36, 53; also Dr. S. Lewis "U.S. Army Special Operations: A Historical Survey," SWCS Historical Supplement (Fort Bragg NC: 1983), 28.

the White House.⁶⁹ Reflecting the new interest in counterinsurgency, particularly in South Vietnam, the 5th SFG(A) began deploying training detachments in August 1962 to that embattled nation on six-months temporary duty. But Latin America was not neglected in that busy year; the 7th SFG(A) deployed Mobile Training Teams (MTT) to a number of those nations: Bolivia, Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombia and the Dominican Republic. More clandestinely, counterinsurgency forces were dispatched to Latin American nations thought to be at extreme risk, particularly Colombia, Peru and Guatemala.

The 8th SFG(A) was activated on 1 April 1962 at Fort Gulick, Panama Canal Zone, and was soon involved in operations against Latin American leftist guerrillas.⁷⁰ Some 52 anti-subversive missions were carried out in 1965 alone, and possibly more than 400 between 1966 and 1968. Special Forces soldiers were involved in the 1968 capture and death of the Cuban revolutionary Ernesto

⁶⁹S. Sarkesian, "Organizational Strategy and Low Intensity Conflict," in F. A. Barnett and B. H. Tover, eds., Special Operations in U.S. Strategy (Washington: 1984), 267. General Yarborough recalls of Special Forces that, "The first recognition that I was aware of was from the President of the United States." Yarborough 1975 interview, vol. 2, 2. The best contemporary statement of the Kennedy administration's view of insurgency is found in W. W. Rostow, "Guerrilla Warfare in Underdeveloped Areas," Airman (May 1962), quoted in T. N. Greene, The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him (New York: 1962), 22-36. See also L. Norman and J. Spore, "Big Push in Guerrilla War," Army (March 1962); findings of the Howse Board, "A Study to Inquire into All Aspects of Special Warfare Operations," Final Report, Continental Army Command, Special Warfare Board (Fort Bragg NC: 28 January 1962); and Report of the CONARC Special Warfare Board, SWB-S-16-62, January 1962 (the "Howze Board".)

⁷⁰"SWCS Historical Report," (1962), 57-58.

"Che" Guevara in the wilds of south central Bolivia, and at least 28 U.S. troops were killed in counterinsurgency operations in Latin America between 1966 and 1968. As a result of such U.S. counterinsurgency support to friendly Latin American governments, insurgency in the area dropped precipitously until the coming to power of Nicaragua's Leninist Sandinista government in 1979.⁷¹

Although the 7th SFG(A) deployed Military Training Teams (MTTs) to Liberia, its major effort focused on Laos. Members of the 7th operated MTTs in Laos on six-month rotations, conducting military training programs for the Royal Laotian Army and government supported paramilitary and tribal groups, as did the WHITE STAR teams. Detachments from the 7th also began successful Civic Action programs with Laotian tribal groups before the change of government in 1962 led to the withdrawal of Special Forces, and, supposedly, all foreign troops.⁷²

⁷¹W. A. Kirkbride, Special Forces in Latin America: From Bull Simons to Just Cause (n. p: 1991); J. J. Waghelstein, "A year of Revolutionary Warfare and its Application to the Bolivian Adventure of Che Guevara," (Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth KS: 1973); Waghelstein, "Post-Vietnam Counterinsurgency Doctrine," Military Review (May 1985); L. C. Smith, "Military Action in Central America," ibid. (January 1969).

⁷²Shelby Stanton, Special Forces at War, An Illustrated History, Southeast Asia, 1957-75 (Charlottesville: 1990), 21-33; Lindsey, "A History of Special Forces"; SWCS Historical Report (1962), 19-26, 32-36; Research Analysis Corporation Technical Memorandum, RAC-T-435, "Case Study of Counterinsurgency, Operations in Laos, 1955-62" (MacLean, VA: 1964); Alfred J. Kraemer, E. C. Stewart, "Cross-Cultural Problems of U.S. Army Personnel in Laos and Their Implications for Area Training" (Human Resources Research Office, Washington: 1964); John W. Depaw, "U.S. Military Civic Action and Civil Affairs in Vietnam, 1962-66" (Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA: October 1988) and O. Sanaikone, The Royal Lao Army

Special Forces' expansion continued through 1963; the 6th SFG(A) was activated on 1 May and the 3rd SFG(A) on 5 December. The Center and School established a language training program and began construction of a new headquarters and academic building, later named Kennedy Hall.

The assassination of President Kennedy deprived Special Forces of their most powerful advocate. In recognition of the president's strong interest in SF, the Kennedy family requested that a contingent from the center serve as Honor Guard during the president's funeral and burial. And it was during these ceremonies that Center Sergeant Major, Francis J. Ruddy, spontaneously tossed his green beret onto the young president's grave.⁷³

and U.S. Army Advice and Support (U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington: 1978, 1979, 1981). A good outline of Special Forces' organization and operations in Vietnam can be found in Leroy Thompson, The U.S. Army In Vietnam (New York: 1990), 95-116. See also the 5th SFG(A)'s official publication, the well-researched and illustrated Green Beret, for these years.

⁷³Sutherland, 222-23; Barry Sadler, I'm a Lucky One (New York: 1967), 85-87.

Vietnam Epic

From 1963 on, Special Forces focused on South Vietnam, where their troops had served since 1957. Although SF personnel served throughout the Republic of Vietnam, they were increasingly deployed in the highlands to work with the "Montagnards,"⁷⁴ aboriginal Mon-Khmer or Malayo-Polynesian tribespeople who centuries before had been driven into the mountains by the Vietnamese. The Republic of Vietnam contained perhaps 700,000 Montagnards from some twenty-two tribal groups, most of whom hated the flatland south Vietnamese and their Republic of Vietnam almost as much as they despised the north's Communist-led Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Special Forces' work with these disaffected tribes would result in one of the few undoubted success stories of the Vietnam War.⁷⁵

The Central Intelligence Agency had identified the Montagnards as potential anti-communist allies. The agency realized that the French had treated the Montagnards fairly well,

⁷⁴French term meaning simply "mountain people." They were derisively termed "moi" -- savages -- by the flatlands Vietnamese. Their own name is usually "Dega."

⁷⁵U.S. Army Special Warfare School, "Montagnard Tribal Groups of the Republic of Vietnam" (Fort Bragg: 2d ed, 1964); Smithsonian Institution War Background Studies #19, The Peoples of French Indochina (Washington: 1944); G. C. Hickey, "The Highland People of South Vietnam: Social and Economic Development" (RAND Corporation, for the Central Intelligence Agency, Santa Monica, CA: 1967); U.S. Joint Publications; Research Service, Montagnard Tribes of South Vietnamese Highlands (Saigon: September 1961, reissued, July 1962); (S) "The U.S. Special Forces CIDG Mission in Vietnam," (U) SORO (Washington: 1964). Info used is UNCLASSIFIED. Stanton, Green Berets at War, 73; Kelly, 20-24; DePauw, "U.S. Military Civic Action and Civil Affairs in Vietnam, 1962-66," passim.

or at least had left them alone, and that they would thus generally prove friendly to Caucasians. The first Civil Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) camp had been established by Detachment 113 from 1st Special Forces at the Rhade tribal village of Buon Enao, to the northeast of Ban Me Thuot in February, 1962. The program was soon expanded to outlying villages. By July 1963, it had proved so successful that it was turned over from its CIA sponsors to U.S. Army Special Forces (Vietnam). By that date the CIDG had been extended to 879 villages throughout Vietnam. Roughly 70 A Detachments, nine B Detachments, and one control C Detachment, had trained 52,636 hamlet militia, 10,904 strike force soldiers, 515 village medical workers, 946 trail watchers, and 3,803 mountain scouts. Each fighting CIDG camp was protected and led by one SF A Detachment and one Vietnamese Detachment. Communist forces could no longer count on sanctuary in the Highlands or along the maze of communications lines that went by the generic name of the "Ho Chi Minh Trail."⁷⁶

⁷⁶Stanton, Special Forces at War, 34-88; USAJFKSWC Historical Report, (1964), 2-7, 81; Research Analysis Corporation Technical Memorandum RAC-T-477, "U.S. Army Special Operations Under the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups Program in Vietnam, 1961-64" (McLean VA: 1966); Simpson, 95-113, 119, 217; Kelly, 43-74 and passim; Hq., USAS (Provisional) Vietnam, "Civilian Irregular Defense Group Project Outline", 7 March 1964; R. A. Shackleton, Village Defense: Initial Special Forces Operations in Vietnam (New York: 1977); Jeffrey C. Clark, Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965-73, U.S. Army in Vietnam (Center of Military History Washington: 1988), 69-74; Frederick H. Stires, The U.S. Special Forces CIDG Mission in Vietnam: A Preliminary Case Study in Counterpart and Civil-Military Relationships (SORO, Washington: 1964); Cao Van Vien, et al, The U.S. Advisor, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Indochina Monographs (Washington: 1983); 5th SFG(A) reports, monthly command summaries, histories, etc. The Modern Military Field Branch,

A former commander of 5th SFG(A) aptly described the mission, and the fate, of the CIDG program as:

A story of teaching the Vietnamese how to shoot, build a farm, care for the sick, or run agent operations. It was working with the religious and ethnic minorities of Vietnam: the Montagnards, the Cambodians, the Hoa, and the Cao Dai. The program was both praised and reviled by Americans and Vietnamese and was on the verge of being destroyed many times -- not by the Viet Cong, but by its creators, the American command, and by early 1971 it had disappeared from the scene.⁷⁷

COL Robert Rheault was not exaggerating the U.S. Army command's resistance to the CIDG program or to SF in general. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1960-62, General Lyman Lemnitzer, believed that the Kennedy administration "was oversold on the importance of guerrilla warfare." And no less than three successive Army Chiefs of Staff recorded their disdain of the SF way of war: GEN George Decker, Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA),

National Archives, contains extensive CIDG material.

⁷⁷COL R. Rheault, "The Special Forces and the CIDG program," in Scott Thompson and D. D. Frizzel, The Lessons of Vietnam (New York: 1977), 247. The nearly-identical quote is also found in Simpson, 101-102. See also the views of another 5th SFG(A) commander, COL Francis Kelly, passim; Walter Hermes, "Survey of the Role of the U.S. Army Military Advisor" (Office of Chief of Military History, Washington: n.d.); Donald Duncan, "A Case Study in a Special Operations Advisory Project (Project Delta), 5th SFG [sic.]," unpub., No. 2105, (Center of Military History, Washington: n.d.) An authentic flavor of U.S. Army Special Forces Vietnam can be found in Robin Moore's semi-fictional The Green Berets (New York: 1965). The same cannot be said of the 1968 Hollywood film of the same title. See also W. Stires, "U.S. Special Forces CIDG Mission in Vietnam" and Lance E. Booth, "An Historical Survey: Gypsies of the Battlefield, the CIDG Program in Vietnam and its Evolutionary Impact," U.S. Army War College Studies Program Paper (Carlisle Barracks, PA), 1992.

1960-62, asserted that "Any good soldier can handle guerrillas." His successor, GEN Earle Wheeler, 1962-64, concluded that "The essence of the problem in Vietnam is military." The most detailed critical appraisal came from GEN Harold K. Johnson, CSA, 1964-68, who later expressed his "horror" that an organization "supposedly highly mobile, disdainful of fixed installations, innovative.... was building fortifications out of the Middle Ages...." GEN Johnson further characterized SF troops as "fugitives from responsibility" who (unkindest cut!) "tended to be nonconformists, couldn't quite get along in a straight military system...."⁷⁸

Yet it was at one of these "fortifications out of the Middle Ages" that CPT Roger H.C. Donlon of the 7th SFG(A) earned the first Medal of Honor awarded since the Korean War. Donlon's A Detachment and Montagnard tribesmen, at a cost of 57 dead, fought off two battalions of North Vietnamese regular troops in a fierce five-hour battle on 6 July 1964 at Camp Nam Dong.⁷⁹

Special Forces also worked with minority groups other than the Montagnards. The 46th SF Company served in Thailand, while other SF troops worked with the Kampucheas (ethnic Cambodians) and still others assisted anti-communist Laotians. In the Republic of

⁷⁸General Wheeler quote from Clarke, 198-99. Remainder of CSA quotes from Howard Lee Dixon, Low Intensity Conflict: Overview, Definitions, and Political Concerns (Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict Langley AFB VA: 1989), 16. (Note that these are quotes from three successive CSA.)

⁷⁹Roger H. Donlon, Outpost of Freedom (New York: 1965); Stanton, Green Berets, 93-94; Kelly, 56; Maitland, et al., 140-42.

Vietnam, SF units advised and led ethnic Chinese (Nungs) and the Cao Dai and Hoa sects, a number of whom served in "strike forces."⁸⁰

As the CIDG program and America's involvement in counterinsurgency in the Republic of Vietnam expanded, the entire 5th SFG(A), beginning in August 1964, was deployed to South Vietnam. The 5th established its headquarters in the coastal city of Nha Trang.⁸¹

From the start of the program, Special Forces had no intention of passively resisting communist attacks, and soon prepared to take the war to the enemy. Quick reaction forces, called Mike Forces after COL Michael "Iron Mike" Healy, commanding officer of the 5th proliferated and operated out of group and detachment C levels. Even more far-ranging than the Mike Forces, the Mobile Guerrilla Forces were created by the 5th in late 1966 to attack the enemy deeper in his own territory, using guerrilla tactics of stealth and surprise. Each Corps Tactical Zone organized its Mobile Guerrilla Force composed of a 150-man Mike Force company and a 35-man reconnaissance platoon, all under the command of the standard SF Detachment A.⁸²

⁸⁰Ibid., 49-50; Simpson, 121-122; Stanton, Green Berets, 86. A basic source for the 5th SFG(A) in Vietnam are its after-action reports/lessons learned, 1965-70, Modern Military Field Branch, National Archives, Suitland, MD.

⁸¹Stanton, Green Berets, 106.

⁸²Stanton, Special Forces at War, 153-57, and passim. Ibid, 229, 260, 264-69; Simpson, 68, 216, 230, and passim; Kelly, passim.

The coordinating body for offensive field teams outside the 5th's control was the Military Assistance Command Vietnam/Studies and Observation Group (MACV/SOG), directly accountable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the President's Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities. Established in February 1964, SOG was an ultra-secret joint and combined unit. At its peak, it carried on its rolls about 2,000 U.S. and 8,000 indigenous personnel. The cutting edge of SOG were the Reconnaissance Teams (RTs), and their attack back-up Hatchet Forces, as well as the Search-Locate-Annihilate-Mission (SLAM). Both units, which included many SF personnel, were composed of rapid reaction forces that attacked enemy bases and set up ambushes, raided prison camps, rescued downed airmen, conducted psychological operations and kidnapped or neutralized key enemy cadre.⁸³

The Greek letter projects -- DELTA, SIGMA, OMEGA, and GAMMA carried out similar projects, but unlike SOG, drew the bulk of their personnel from the 5th. DELTA, the most famous of the "Greeks," was composed of from twelve to sixteen RTs of two SF troopers and four indigenous personnel, plus six to twelve Roadrunner teams, usually composed of four indigenous personnel. The Roadrunners, masquerading as enemy guerrillas, reported back to base on their findings and called in Army of the Republic of

⁸³Stanton, Special Forces at War, 253-88; Sutherland, 305-10; Maitland, et al, 138-44; Simpson, 154-68; C. F. Reske, MAC-V-SOG, Command History, Annex B, vol. 1, "The Last Secret of the Vietnam War (Sharon Center, OH: 1990).

Vietnam (ARVN) Rangers for the kill. The other Greek letter projects concentrated on intelligence gathering, but also attacked targets of opportunity. Most reconnaissance and "killer" missions in Vietnam spent up to sixty percent of their tours on operations in the field.

Still, for all of their effectiveness, the four Greek letter projects and the SF CIDG program had all been phased out or turned over to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam by early 1972. But MACV/SOG continued its classified missions through Thailand based 46th SF company, until the final collapse of the Republic of Vietnam in the spring of 1975.⁸⁴

The organization of the U.S. Army Special Forces A Detachment in Vietnam had not greatly varied from the successful pattern established by the Operational Groups of the OSS in World War II. The A Detachment was subordinate to the B Detachment, which consisted usually of up to six officers and seventeen enlisted men.⁸⁵ But it was the A Detachment which worked directly with the CIDG tribespeople, training and protecting them, giving them

⁸⁴"Appendix A, Summary of MACVSOG Documentary Study," n.d., n.p., USASOC History Archives; MACV-SOG Official History, SOG Section (Center of Military History, Washington: 1970). Maitland, et al, 126-51. COL Charlie Beckwith, (C)interview(U), Military History Institute, 1988. Info used is UNCLASSIFIED. Sutherland, 283-86; Donald G. Blackburn oral history interview, MHI, vol. 2 (1983); U.S. Army Concept Team in Vietnam, Joint Research and Test Activity, (S)"Employment of a Special Forces Group,"(U) (20 April 1966). Info used is UNCLASSIFIED; Donald W. Duncan, "A Case Study in a Special Operations Advisory Project (Project Delta)," 5th SFG(A), (February 1965), Copy in USASOC History Archives.

⁸⁵Sutherland, 41-43.

tangible help toward a better life, leading them into battle and sharing their hopes and miseries.

The relationship between the tribespeople and SF was put to a severe test in the Autumn of 1964 when the resentment traditionally felt by the Montagnards against the Saigon government boiled over into open revolt. Several government troops were killed, but SF soldiers negotiated an end to what could easily have escalated into a civil war within a war.⁸⁶

Along the shallow waterways of the lower Mekong River Delta, SF opened waterborne offenses against enemy logistics and strong points, using airboats and a motley collection of sampans and small engineer boats manned primarily by CIDG personnel. An SF airboat Mobile Assault Force, A-404, was established in June 1968 as a Delta-wide response unit. Under its "Jolly Roger" insignia it wreaked havoc with its recoilless rifles and .50 caliber machine guns. In one memorable engagement of October 1969, elements of the web-footed fleet waded into sixteen enemy vessels, inflicting heavy losses with no casualties of their own. The airboats were undoubtedly noisy, difficult to maintain and demanded an extensive logistics tail. But A-404's boats could nonetheless extend allied power into contested areas "anywhere

⁸⁶Collins, 53-55; Stanton, Green Berets at War, 97-101; "SWC Historical Report, 1964"; 2-7; H. Sochurek, "Americans in Action in Vietnam, How coolness and Character Averted a Bloodbath When Mountain Tribesmen Rose in Revolt," National Geographic, (January 1965); Maitland, et al, 150-56; Kelly, 63-64.

there was a heavy dew."⁸⁷

Meanwhile, Fort Bragg was the scene of major construction which transformed the Special Warfare complex on Smoke Bomb Hill. Already, in honor of the assassinated President who had taken a personal interest in special warfare, the Special Warfare School had been renamed the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare.⁸⁸ On 29 May 1965, Senator Robert Kennedy dedicated John F. Kennedy Hall, and reflected on the emphasis upon SF counterinsurgency urged by President Kennedy a few years earlier:

This new kind of war is won, not when a great battle results in the death of many enemies. It is won on the day no one dies, because your work has isolated the insurgents, stripped them of their support and thus rendered them harmless.⁸⁹

Special Forces - and America's - involvement in the nation's longest unconventional war were reaching a climax. Committing a \$100 million annual budget to Vietnam operations, based upon 83 camps and 2,700 SF soldiers to lead, advise, and control 63,000 indigenous personnel, Special Forces claimed an annual 10,000

⁸⁷Stanton, Special Forces at War, 222-23. D. Brown, "Terrors of the Delta: Mekong Delta Poses Unique Problems for D Company," The Green Beret (September 1969, December 1970).

⁸⁸Department of the Army General Order 19, (1 Jun 64). According to General Yarborough, the same SF SGM who had first tossed his green beret onto the grave of President Kennedy, actually walked into the office of the Secretary of Defense, The Honorable Robert S. McNamara, and talked him into a financial contribution for a memorial to the late President, as well as the change of name. Yarborough, Gung Ho, 33.

⁸⁹Antonelli, 140; Veritas (9 June 1965); Lewis, 31. An informative history of the Special Warfare Center (later, "and School") is found in Sutherland, 224-45.

enemy "body count" at a cost of about 80 SF troops killed per year. A total of 630 SF personnel were listed killed in action and 81 were posted missing in action in Southeast Asia.⁹⁰

- Vietnam PSYOP and Civil Affairs -

U.S. Army PSYOPS and Civic Action in Vietnam tended to operate effectively because, perhaps paradoxically, they lacked the overpowering resources of conventional army units. Further, PSYOP and Civic Action were close to their target audiences and were thus often able to determine fairly accurately how to influence and protect what was primarily a village, agrarian people. In addition, each SF A Detachment in 1966 was augmented by a PSYOP officer and noncom, who also shared responsibility for Civic Action.

The year 1966 saw the activation of the 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG) on 1 January. Although preceded in the field by the 6th PSYOP Battalion, the 4th POG became the principal military psychological operations arm in the Republic of Vietnam, from Saigon down to the hamlet level. Of the three media employed--- radio, loudspeakers, and leaflets--- the latter, as in previous U.S. wars, was by far the most effective against the

⁹⁰Comments of BG Joseph C. Lutz, Commanding General, 1st Special Operations Command (Airborne), in Barnet and Tovar, 49-50. See also "Casualty Information System, 1961-81 (Machine-Readable Records)," Records of the Adjutant General's office, RG 407, National Archives; S. Adolph and S. Sherman, database SF casualty printout, (Houston, TX: 1988). The JFK Plaza, Smoke Bomb Hill, Fort Bragg, NC, has incomplete casualty listing. The Vietnam Veterans Memorial, Washington, DC, has fairly complete records.

enemy and accounted for about 95 percent of the 4th's efforts.

The U.S. PSYOP effort fell under the control of the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), headed by the United States Information Service (USIS) chief. Nonetheless, Allied PSYOP in Vietnam suffered from a lack of coordination and from duplication of effort. In fact, such operations were conducted by no less than nine PSYOP organizations at least nominally under JUSPAO: the U.S. Embassy Mission PSYOP Committee, Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), U.S. Army Vietnam, the 4th and 7th PSYOP Groups, Force Commanders/Senior Advisors, U.S. Naval Forces Vietnam and the 7th U.S. Air Force. Not surprisingly, PSYOP in Vietnam was sometimes termed a "Many Splintered Thing."⁹¹

Yet for all of this clumsiness and overlapping, the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong found themselves on the receiving end of some of the most extensive and efficient Psychological Operations to date. In 1969 alone, for example, no less than ten and one-half billion leaflets were distributed solely by JUSPAO.

In the field, the 4th POG hammered home the themes of Allied might, of Soviet and Chinese imperialism, of the good life and rehabilitation of the POW. Most Allied propaganda to enemy troops

⁹¹"PSYOP in Vietnam: A Many Splintered Thing", in DA PAM No. 525-7-1, The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of Military Application, vol. 1 (Washington: April 1976).

was centered on the Chieu Hoi defector program.⁹²

Some of the more effective leaflets were those photo copies of the actual "self-criticism" diaries kept by VC cadre later killed or defected, outlining their occasional "impure thoughts", but more importantly, their wartime misery, homesickness or battleweariness. The leaflets containing these subversive sentiments were then dropped over the cadre's unit. Army PSYOP leaflets also drove home the terrible VC cadre losses suffered in the Tet offensive. (In the United States, of course, Tet was reported as something close to a modern-day Pearl Harbor.)

Tactical PSYOP was directed in this war, for the first time on any large scale, toward the civil population, emphasizing communist atrocities, land reform, village defense, family appeals to enemy troops, health measures and Vietnamese traditions, to name simply some of the most prominent themes. Also for the first time, television was used on the tactical level, and was directed primarily toward the civil population, although it was impossible to draw the line completely between the civil and the military in

⁹²For U.S. PSYOP in Vietnam, see R. W. Chandler, The War of Ideas: The U.S. Propaganda Campaign in Vietnam (Boulder: 1981); R. D. MacLaurin, Military Propaganda: Psychological Warfare and Operations (Washington: 1966). Also 525-7-1,-2; H. D. Lattimer, U.S. Psychological Operations in Vietnam, monograph on National Security Affairs, Brown University (Providence, RI: 1973); and U.S. Army Special Warfare Combat Developments Agency, "Cold War Psychological Operations in Developing Countries" (Fort Bragg NC: December 1962). Finally, see JUSPAO /7th Group Master Files, which contain many (most?) of the actual leaflets used by U.S. PSYOP in Vietnam. In addition to the 6th and the 4th, elements of the 7th POG as well as the complete 8th and 10 PSYOP Battalions served in Vietnam. Army Concept Team in Vietnam, "Employment of US Army Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam" (San Francisco [1969]); Stanton, Vietnam Order of Battle, 237-38.

Vietnam. Once JUSPAO had established the tv network, it was careful to have its programs produced and broadcast by the Government of Vietnam, to avoid any "foreign" taint, although JUSPAO did pressure the Vietnamese authorities to keep the propaganda message relatively low-key. Featuring for the most part music, cultural themes, women's affairs and news, as well as messages from VC defectors, the programming had reached something like 81 percent of South Vietnam's villages by 1971.

Whatever the opinion in the West, the enemy certainly seemed to believe in the effectiveness of Allied PSYOP. A high-level captured enemy document admitted that "These efforts surely influence our troops....For this is a dangerous and wicked scheme by the enemy."⁹³ And the VC's Liberation Radio broadcast a warning that "In order to defeat the enemy's psywar, it is necessary to be constantly offensive on the ideological front....No matter how crafty his tricks may be, it is necessary to be thoroughly aware of his vile nature."⁹⁴

⁹³W. Stockton, Jr., "Handbook: Intelligence for Psychological Operations," Prepared for the Combat Developments Division, U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance (Fort Bragg NC: 11 April 1975).

⁹⁴Cuu Long, "To Defeat the Enemy's Psywar," in "Some Problems on the Ideological Task in the South Viet-Nam People's Liberation Armed Forces," U.S. Mission in Vietnam, Vietnam: Documents and Research Notes, #94 (n.p.) The Communist Party Committee of Military Region I complained frankly enough that "In the psywar and 'Open Arms' programs,...the enemy has been positively active and has achieved certain definite results among the people and among our armed forces, especially the guerilla forces and regional troops." Hammong Roph, "The Chieu Hoi Program Poses Threat of Special Dimensions," DA Pam 525-7-2, vol. 2. See also W. Stockton, Jr., "Handbook," 145, 152; and JUSPAO Planning Office, Psyops in Vietnam: Indications of Effectiveness (Saigon:

Special Forces were particularly successful in their Psychological Operations directed toward the Montagnards. Their PSYOPS were more a matter of deeds than of words. In addition to the bonds formed by SF troopers living amongst the tribespeople, Vietnamese and SF organized combined CIDG Civil Affairs/PSYOP teams that went out into the countryside, conducting face-to-face meetings with the tribes, conducting sick calls, distributing school supplies and health kits, organizing athletic contests and generally demonstrating their concern for this previously neglected and despised people.

Another indication of the effectiveness of Allied PSYOP was, of course, the Chieu Hoi ("Open Arms") program, which garnered no less than 200,000 lower-level defectors over the years. Many of them were organized into the Kit Carson Scouts, where they made excellent soldiers and scouts, utilizing their knowledge of the land, language and culture of their people. And it was a further tribute to the effectiveness of the program and its psychological underpinnings that such defectors could be armed and let loose into the countryside. And it should also be noted that the effectiveness of SF and Army PSYOP in general was considerably enhanced after 1967, when instruction in this specialty was handed over to the USAJFKSWCS.⁹⁵

May 1967) for similar examples.

⁹⁵The Chieu Hoi program is found throughout DA Pam 525-7-1. See also Army Concept Team in Vietnam, "Employment of U.S. Army Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam" (San Francisco: 7 June 1969). SF PSYOPS may also be found in the CIDG material referenced above.

While PSYOP in the Republic of Vietnam often proved successful, the same could not be said about strategic PSYOP operations against North Vietnam. The Allies littered the North with billions of leaflets emphasizing such themes as the legitimacy of the South Vietnamese government, the good life in the south and the historic Vietnamese resistance to China, and scattered toys and novelties over the countryside. The "Voice of Freedom" thoughtfully programmed its prime time from 2200 to 0100 hours, after weary workers and peasants had completed their labors for the socialist commonwealth and their obligatory evening indoctrination lectures. But this Allied PSYOP apparently enjoyed only marginal success. It was hard to argue against the sirens warning of yet another raid by U.S. "air pirates," and JUSPAO leaflets warning the population to stay away from target areas could do little to deflect civilian resentment.

In summary, it could be said that the United States had more or less won the tactical PSYOP war in South Vietnam, but lost it worldwide. Images of screaming napalmed children, of VC terrorists shot dead on the spot or of flattened workers' housing in Hanoi proved far more memorable than JUSPAO accounts of land reform or of happy POWs, however true these themes were or how efficiently presented.

Despite widespread realization of the importance of "the other war", the conventional U.S. Army did not make pacification a high priority concern until May 1967, when the CORDS program was taken over by MACV from civilian control. The most effective CA

was that carried out by Special Forces in the CIDG program. Three regular Army Civil Affairs companies, the 2d, 29th and 41st, also shouldered the burden throughout the U.S. involvement in the war. As was the case in Korea, they were working in a primarily subsistence agrarian society, and like the Korean conflict, this was an ideological war. The CA troops were deeply involved in practically every aspect of the civil life of the South Vietnamese people, from agricultural improvements (where they spread the "Green Revolution") to medical care and police advising; if anything, here was a wider range of activities than even the innumerable works of the CAD in World War II Italy. Civil Affairs troops also used their own PSYOP assets in their wide-ranging operations. According to the Army's Vice Chief of Staff these units were "worth their weight in gold."⁹⁶ In many ways it now seems apparent that the so-called "other war", both PSYOP and CA, was indeed well on its way to being won by 1970, but this was not the picture given out, for whatever reasons, by the media in the United States and around the world. Certainly throughout the war, when allied firepower was supposedly "destroying" the fabric of

⁹⁶"Operational Reports: Lessons Learned," 2d, 29th, 41st CA companies, for January, April, July, 1968. Quote by Gen Bruce Palmer Jr. to 23d Annual Civil Affairs Association Meeting (Chicago: 25 April 1970); De Pauw, "U.S. Military Civic Action and Civil Affairs in Vietnam," 45. S. Stanton, Vietnam Order of Battle, 237-38. Shakleton, 116-21; DePauw, *passim*. William R. Berknas, "Civil Affairs in Vietnam," U.S. Army War College, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: 1973). See also John M. Urbanchuk, "Employment of the 29th Civil Affairs Company in the Republic of Vietnam - 1969," Course paper, CA Advanced Officers course, U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance, (Fort Bragg NC: March 1976); Kelly, 59-63.

Vietnamese life, there were no "Boat People", who later fled a Vietnam finally at peace, unified, socialized and free from the accursed "running dogs of American imperialism."⁹⁷

Although the war in Southeast Asia continued to dominate activity at the JFK Center, the facility also deployed MTT's to the Congo, Guinea, Mali, Iran, Canada and Thailand. In addition, the 7th SFG(A) deployed a significant number of troops to the Dominican Republic in the 1965 intervention, and the 42nd CA Company was flown in four days after the initial U.S. landings. There they initiated stability operations to bring the Dominican economy, police and legal systems, welfare, schools, government and parts of the island's infrastructure back to something approaching normality.⁹⁸ In addition, the 1st PSYWAR Battalion provided support for the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), the State Department and other U.S. governmental agencies that pooled assets and personnel for the U.S. psywar effort on the island.

⁹⁷The "traditional" interpretation of supposed U.S. insensitivity to the "other war" can be found in Francis Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake (Boston: 1972), and more currently, Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie, John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (New York: 1989). The best argument for U.S. measured success is in William Colby, Lost Victory (Chicago: c. 1989).

⁹⁸For the Dominican Republic see Lawrence A. Yates, Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-66, Leavenworth Papers, #15, (Fort Leavenworth KS: 1988); Bruce Palmer, Jr., Intervention in the Caribbean: The Dominican Crisis of 1965 (Lexington, KY: 1989); and Lawrence Greenberg, United States Army Unilateral and Coalition Operations in the 1965 Dominican Republic Intervention (Center of Military History Washington: 1987); U.S. Army Civil Affairs School, "Peace Keeping in the Dominican Republic" (Fort Gordon GA: 1967), and After-Action Reports of the 42nd CA Co and associated material in the USASOC History Archives.

Cooperation between the agencies was cordial, and, in fact, USIA .
made its Award for Distinguished Service to the 1st PSYWAR
Battalion.⁹⁹

⁹⁹B. H. Cooper, "Teamwork in Santo Domingo," Art and Science, vol. 1; W. J. Moulis, "Key to a Crisis," Military Review (February 1966). (The London Observer, reporting on U.S. psywar troops in the Dominican Republic, concluded that this was indeed an historic occasion: "It marks the first time they have been used in what military jargon calls a 'battle situation.'" [!]) (issue of 3 July 1965).

The Post-Vietnam Draw-Down

On 10 January 1969, the Army renamed the JFK Center the U.S. Army JFK Center for Military Assistance, and the U.S. Army Special Warfare School was redesignated the U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance (IMA).¹⁰⁰ The IMA remained under the Continental Army Command and was integrated into the Army school system. A record number of students graduated that year: 2,873 officers, 116 foreign officers, and 9,621 enlisted men. The following year, construction began on a six-story office facility next to the headquarters building, which would become Bryant Hall, which along with Kennedy Hall, became home to the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School and the 1st Special Warfare Training Group(A).¹⁰¹

The U.S. government, however, had already decided to reduce American involvement in the Vietnam War by withdrawing its forces and turning over greater responsibilities to the Republic of Vietnam. The Army had never taken unconventional warfare all that seriously, and the expansion of its Special Forces had been primarily the result of the interest of the late President Kennedy.

¹⁰⁰HQ, Third U.S. Army, General Order No. 124 (27 June 1969).

¹⁰¹"United States Army Institute for Military Assistance History, 1951-73" (Fort Bragg NC: n.d.), 22-24, typescript. Bryant Hall was named for SFC William M. Bryant. Bryant was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for enabling his CIDG company (321st CIDG Company, 32d Mobile Strike Force Bn, B-36 Detachment to escape by his attacking several enemy positions until he was killed on 24 March 1969 in Long Khan Province. Sutherland, 628-29; "Bryant" file, USASOC History Archives.

The last large-scale operation of Army Special Forces in the Vietnam war was the 1970 rescue/raid on the North Vietnamese camp holding U.S. POW's at Son Tay, North Vietnam. The raid was an outstanding operational success, catching the enemy completely by surprise. A furious but one-sided fire fight at a nearby facility killed a large number of unidentified enemy troops, at no cost to the raiders, and opened the way to the prison. Inside the compound walls more than fifty guards were killed - but no prisoners were found; all American captives had been removed several months before because of flooding in the area.

This intelligence failure at the highest levels has ever since cast a pall over the Son Tay raid. But the North Vietnamese were shocked by the operation. Where might the unspeakable imperialists strike next? And the raid did induce the enemy to treat its American captives with somewhat less calculated brutality.¹⁰²

The 5th SFG(A) returned early in 1971 from the Republic of Vietnam, the most decorated unit of its type in the war. Special Forces in Vietnam had earned 17 Medals of Honor, one

¹⁰²The best account of the Son Tay raid is still Benjamin Schlemmer's The Raid (New York, London: 1976). See also videotape of Son Tay seminar addressed by principal participants in the raid's planning and execution, (29 March 1988) and video and oral tapes made by USASOC Command Historians with raid veterans on occasion of 20th anniversary of the raid, Fort Walton Beach, FL, November 1990, and copies of official records and reports, all in USASOC History Archives. See also "Bombing Operations and the Prisoner of War Rescue Mission in North Vietnam," Hearings before the committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 96th Congress, Second Session (Washington: 24 November 1970); Isaacs, The Secret War, 150-84.

Distinguished Service Medal, 90 Distinguished Service Crosses, 814 Silver Stars, 235 Legions of Merit, 46 Distinguished Flying Crosses, 232 Soldier's Medals, 4,891 Air Medals, 6,908 Army Commendation Medals and 2,658 Purple Hearts. The 5th was awarded a Presidential Unit Citation, and a Meritorious Unit Commendation. Subordinate units of the 5th also received U.S. decorations. Detachment A-101 was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation, and Detachment C-4, Detachments B-40-43 and 16 A Detachments received the Navy Meritorious Unit Commendation.¹⁰³

The aftermath of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War signaled massive troop reductions and the transition to the Volunteer Army. The 3d SFG(A) was inactivated in December 1969, the 6th in March 1971, the 8th in June 1972, and the 1st in June 1974.¹⁰⁴

Perhaps in compensation, the U.S. Army Civil Affairs School was transferred to Fort Bragg from Fort Gordon, Georgia, on 15 September 1971, assigned to the IMA, and the following April was made an integral part of the IMA/CMA. The IMA/CMA welcomed the arrival of the 95th Civil Affairs Group on July 1971, officially confirming the long association of Civil Affairs with Special

¹⁰³Sutherland, 270-71.

¹⁰⁴Veritas (March 1971); Fayetteville Observer (11 March 1971). "The Green Berets Come Home," Newsweek (13 October 1969). Newsweek could claim that U.S. Army SF had gone "From Legend to Liability," (24 August 1970). By November of 1970, U.S. News and World Report could ask, "Whatever Happened to the Green Berets in Vietnam?" (2 November 1970), and an Air Command and Staff College Research Paper plaintively wondered about "Special Operations: Is Anyone Listening?" H. W. Cullers, (May 1979). Another USAF study of 1976 branded "Special Operations -- a Step Child," #5960, Air War College (Air University Maxwell AFB AL: 1976).

Operations.¹⁰⁵

The Army now focused its primary attention and resources on that least likely but supposedly most dangerous of war possibilities - a Warsaw Pact blitzkrieg through Central Europe. By August 1982 all reference to counterinsurgency had been removed from the Army's basic fighting manual, FM 100-5, Operations. Special Forces were now considered a "dead-end" career field, and the Army established two Ranger battalions, which undercut SF prestige and assumed some of its functions.¹⁰⁶

Meanwhile, back at the schoolhouse, a major Army reorganization in 1973 resulted in further changes for the Institute, with the Army placing the IMA under the newly created Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The IMA received the Combat Developments Command Special Operations (CDCSO) Agency which became an integral part of the institute on 1 July 1973. On 1 October, the Civil Affairs and Security Assistance School (CASAS) were combined, creating three separate schools within the IMA: CASAS, the SF school and the PSYOP school. The following year

¹⁰⁵U.S. Third Army General Order 195 (15 September 1971); U.S. Third Army General Order 271 (1 April 1972).

¹⁰⁶Dunn, 106; R. Doughty, The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76 (Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth KS: 1979), 40; Howard D. Graves, "U.S. Capabilities for Military Interventions," in eds. S. Sarkesian and William L. Scully, U.S. Policy and Low Intensity Conflict (New Brunswick, NJ: 1981), 74-75. As late as December of 1988, the newly-appointed Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, the Hon. Charles Whitehouse, could assert that "LIC is the highest probability of U.S. involvement and the area in which we are the least prepared.", in Caleb Baker, "Experts: Improve Low Intensity Conflict Structure," Defense News (12 December 1988).

the MATA course evolved into the Foreign Area Officer Course, training students to serve as advisors and attaches in foreign countries for which they had a specialized knowledge.¹⁰⁷

During the following decade TRADOC instituted a number of reorganizations which affected the IMA/USAJFKSWCS. In 1976 the command instituted a new model for all Army schools, under which the IMA's CASAS and Psyop School combined to form the School of International Studies (redesignated the Special Operations and International Studies Department in 1988). Subsequent TRADOC school reorganizations brought about additional realignments in time to handle the increasing student loads from the later 1980's on. In the one most far-reaching, the Center for Military Assistance was redesignated on 1 June 1982 as the 1st Special Operations Command (Airborne) (SOCOM), and assigned to U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), which was responsible for all activities of Special Operations Forces units. In addition, the Army Chief of Staff approved IMA as an independent TRADOC activity under the title of U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center (Provisional), effective June 1983. The designation (Provisional) was dropped officially from the USAJFKSWC, effective 1 October 1983.¹⁰⁸

In conformity with TRADOC School Model 83 guidelines, the

¹⁰⁷Continental Army Command General Order No. 27 (1 March 1973); U.S. Army TRADOC General Order No. 205 (1 November 1973); "IMA History" folder, USASOC History Archives.

¹⁰⁸USAJFKSWCS Regulation 10-1, "Organization and Functions" (1 November 1987), 1-4, 1-5.

USAJFKSWC on 1 June 1984 was reorganized once again with the elimination of the Directorate of Training Developments and Doctrine. Specified doctrine and training development functions were now within the new Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD). Doctrinal and training developments came under the training elements, such as the Special Forces School and the School of International Studies. Slots were also established in 1984 for a Center and Special Forces professional military historian, as well as for a Proponency Office for Specialty Code/Career Management Field 18 and MOS 96F, and the offices of Inspector General, Staff Surgeon, Public Affairs and Chaplain, all as exceptions to the HQ TRADOC School Model C.¹⁰⁹

In yet a further reorganization, on 1 October 1985, the USAJFKSWCS became the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), with the establishment of six training departments in place of the Special Forces School and the School of International Studies. In addition, the positions of Command Judge Advocate and Deputy Assistant Commandant were created. This reorganization provided primarily for the expansion of the center and school to accommodate anticipated increases in students with no compromise in quality of instruction. The positions of Safety Officer and School Psychologist were approved

¹⁰⁹USAJFKCMA, Permanent Orders 118-8 (30 September 1982); Memorandum of Understanding between the Commander, TRADOC, and the Commander, FORSCOM (27 July 1983); USAJFKSWC Regulation 10-1 (Draft), (1 October 1983); and Hq, U.S. Army TRADOC, sub: TRADOC Regulation 10-X (Draft), Organization and Functions, School Model 83.

by TRADOC and the USAJFKSWCS NCO Academy was established in 1987.¹¹⁰

Revitalization

Yet the history of the PSYWAR School/SWC/JFKSWC/IMA/JFKSWC (Prov)/JFKSWCS and U.S. Army SF is much more than one of organization and reorganization. The failed Iran hostage rescue mission of April 1980 and the seizure of power by of no less than eight hostile Marxist-Leninist regimes through unconventional warfare in Asia, Africa, and Central America between 1975 and 1980 provoked a renewed interest in Special Operations Forces.¹¹¹ The advent of the Reagan Administration in early 1981, as well as the emergence of credible anti-Leninist guerrilla forces in Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique and Afghanistan encouraged a more forceful anti-communist U.S. response in international affairs and a heightened awareness of the deficiencies in current U.S. Special Operations Forces. In a keynote address before a top-level symposium at the National Defense University in early 1983, Secretary of the Army, John O. Marsh, echoed President Kennedy's

¹¹⁰"Concept Plan," cover letter to U.S. Army TRADOC (22 November 1985, from Commander, USAJFKSWC, and joint message form Commander, USAJFKSWC to Commander, TRADOC (9 December 1985).

¹¹¹A comprehensive analysis of U.S. involvement in Low Intensity Conflicts of the 20th century, and overall observations can be found in John M. Collins, et al., Low Intensity Conflicts, 1899-1990, a study by the Congressional Research Service, prepared at the request of the Readiness Subcommittee of the House of Representatives (Washington: 10 September 1990). For the context of general Army renewal in the 1980s, see J. Romjue, The Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s Army (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, VA: 1993).

summons of two decades past by calling for a renewed commitment to the "twilight battlefield" of low intensity conflict. Secretary Marsh, however, was addressing an Army that had by then abolished the very words "insurgency" and "counterinsurgency (as well as "lessons learned") from its official lexicon.¹¹² (As early as January 1981, the Army had published FM 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict, but that manual concentrated on counterinsurgency.)

Perhaps the turning point for U.S. Special Operations Forces and the Special Warfare Center (and reminiscent of the Kennedy encouragement) was the personal interest expressed in 1983 by President Reagan to the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Edward C. Meyer. The CSA in turn tasked the SWC Commandant, BG Joseph C. Lutz, to prepare an analysis of current and future needs for revitalizing Special Operations Forces. BG Lutz responded with an interim Mission Area Analysis in July. In the words of General Lutz's successor, COL David L. Pemberton, "CSA action was decisive." Army Special Operations Forces were to comprise

¹¹²Secretary of the Army quote from Barnett and Tovar, 24; United States Military Posture for FY 1985: "The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff" (Washington: 1986), 9. See also Dennis Vetock, Lessons Learned: A History of U.S. Army Lessons Learning (U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 1988); Noel C. Koch, "Why We Must Rebuild Our Special Operations Forces," Defense (July 1983); S. Goose, "America's Secret Soldiers: The Buildup of U.S. Special Operations Forces" Defense Monitor, vol. 14, 2:7; D. Baratto, "Special Forces in the 1980's, A Strategic Reorientation," Military Review (March 1983); Ross Kelly, Special Operations and National Purpose (Lexington, Massachusetts; Toronto: 1989), 3-4; M. D. Pearlman, "The Fall and Rise of Low Intensity Conflict Doctrine and Instruction," Military Review (September 1988). For anti-Leninist guerilla movements, see Michael Radu, The New Insurgencies: Anti-Communist Guerillas in the Third World (New Brunswick, NJ; London: 1990).

Special Forces, Rangers, Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs, Special Operations Aviation and Special Mission units. All Special Operations Forces (SOF) worldwide were to be commanded by General Lutz under the 1st Special Operations Command (Airborne). Here was "the first positive initiative to enhance special operations forces in the past ten years."¹¹³

Proof that the nation had indeed shaken off much of its post-Vietnam "malaise" could be seen in the widespread public support for the Grenada operation, URGENT FURY, the October 1983 rescue of endangered U.S. citizens and a small island nation hijacked by a sinister gang of Leninists. Within two days of the airborne landings on 15 October, initial cadre of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion had begun to restore and administer the island's run-down "socialized" infrastructure.

In Operation URGENT FURY, all of the armed services involved utilized Psyops resources. Elements of the Army's 4th Psychological Operations Group distributed leaflets giving the population guidance and information, and a newly-deployed 50kw transmitter ("Spice Island Radio") broadcast news and entertainment throughout the island. Loudspeaker Operations were particularly effective in convincing enemy troops to cease resistance and civilians to keep out of the way and then to

¹¹³"Commander's General Remarks," U.S. Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, "Manpower Survey Report," for USAJFKSWC, U.S. Army TRADOC (Fort Monroe VA: 17 November 1983), 5. For another good overview of this revitalization, see W. C. Broadhurst, "Revitalization of Army Special Operations Forces," thesis, Air Command and Staff College, Air University (Maxwell AFB AL: April, 1987).

cooperate with the U.S. and Caribbean peacekeeping forces.¹¹⁴

Also in 1983, TRADOC had published a two-volume study, Low Intensity Conflict, which broadened the scope of low intensity conflict well beyond that of the earlier Army manual of the same title. The study analyzed the many "instrumentalities" available to U.S. forces within the spectrum of conflict, ranging from diplomacy through guerrilla warfare, military assistance, counter-terror, insurgency and revolution.

The following year, SF NCOs received the separate Career Management Field 18, the SF Warrant Officer Program Military Occupational Specialty 180 was created, and SF was recognized for the first time as an officer career field with the institution of Specialty Code 18 (which became FA 18 in 1984).

Following on these initiatives, the 1st Special Forces Group(A) was reactivated at Fort Lewis, Washington, in 1984.¹¹⁵ Evidence of renewed joint service command appreciation of Low Intensity Conflict came with the establishment of the Army-Air

¹¹⁴B. R. Pirnie, "Operation Urgent Fury: The United States Army in Joint Operations," (Center of Military History, Washington: 1986; paper copy briefing slides, HQ 82nd Airborne Division; HQ, U.S. Forces Caribbean, "Disaster Area Survey for Grenada" (4 November 1983; 96th CA Bn, "Civil Affairs Lessons Learned in Grenada," (24 November 1983), all in USASOC History Archives; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, (S)Operation URGENT FURY Assessment(U) (Fort Monroe, Virginia); C. R. Bishop, E. K. O'Brien, (S)"FORSCOM/ARLANT Participation in Operation Urgent Fury- Grenada, 1983(U)" (HQ, U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia: 1 April 1985). Info used is UNCLASSIFIED; U.S. Navy Joint Task Force 120, (S)Operation Urgent Fury: Executive Summary of Lessons Learned(U) [Norfolk, Virginia: 1983]. Info used is UNCLASSIFIED.

¹¹⁵"1st Group" folder, USASOC Historical Archives.

Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, activated in January 1986, and its subsequent publication of several influential documents.¹¹⁶ But it was not until February 1986 that the Army laid the foundation for its LIC doctrine and definition in U.S. Army Operational Concept for Low Intensity Conflict, TRADOC PAM 525-44, an extension of TRADOC PAM 525-34 of July 1984 and a major departure from FM 100-20 of 1981. In addition, FC 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict (16 July 1986), updated FM 100-20. The Army also showed its concern with the joint aspects of LIC operations, presumably as a result of the Grenada operation, through its 1986 Joint Low Intensity (JLIC) Project Final Report, a volume critical of the U.S. military's inability to understand, organize, execute or sustain conflict in a LIC environment. More positively, the report provided a final version of the Low Intensity Conflict mission categories: insurgency and counterinsurgency, combating terrorism, and peacetime contingency operations.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶Philip S. Yang, "Psychological Strategies for Low Intensity Conflict," Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (Langley Air Force Base, Virginia: 1988). See also FC, Low Intensity Conflict, (16 July 1986), and TRADOC PAM 525-34, U.S. Army Operational Concepts for Special Operations Forces, (Fort Monroe, Virginia: 26 July 1984), and TRADOC PAM 525-44, Military Operations: U.S. Army Operational Concept for Low Intensity Conflict (Fort Monroe, Virginia: 10 February 1986.)

¹¹⁷Congressional Record, House, (14 October 1986), H10194; Collins, 15-16. For high-level defense policy conclusions for the late 1980's and early 1990's, see the various reports of the Commission on Long-Term Strategy, chaired by F. C. Iklé and Albert Wholstetter (Department of Defense, Washington: 1988), particularly Prepared for Low Intensity Conflict: Supporting U.S. Strategy for Third World Conflict, (Report by the Regional Conflict Working Group, June, 1988). Also H. T. Koren, Jr., "Congress Wades into Special Operations," Parameters, (December 1988). See R. L. Rylander's authoritative "ASD-SOLIC: The

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (amended PL 99-433) authorized the most far-reaching organizational change in special operations assets since the end of the Second World War. Those sections of the act which pertained to SOF mandated a new four-star unified Combatant Command, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), for about 10,000 U.S. Army Rangers, Special Forces and other Army SOF assets, U.S. Navy Seals, Air Force SOF and an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict.¹¹⁸

A steady, ten-year buildup of Special Operations Forces continued through the 1980's, raising the number of SF groups from three to five active and four reserve by 1991.¹¹⁹ A long-sought

Congressional Approach to SOF Reorganization," Special Warfare (Spring, 1989), and W. Furr, R. L. Zelms, LIC Key Speeches, 1984-89 (Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (Langley AFB: September 1989).

¹¹⁸J. P. Nichol, Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict: U.S. Progress and Problems, Issue Brief IB 90091, Congressional Research Service (Washington: 18 May 1990). See also Broadhurst, "Revitalization of Army Special Operations Forces," student paper, Air Command and Staff College (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: [April 1987]). An excellent account of the rebuilding of SOF is found in W. G. Boykin, The Origins of the United States Special Operations Command [USSOC, McDill AFB], n.d.

¹¹⁹The Honorable Casper Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, "Opening Statement Before the Armed Services Committee," U.S. Senate (5 February 1987), Department of the Army Strategy/Posture Overview, FYs 1988-89; John M. Collins, Green Berets, Seals and Spetsnaz: U.S. and Soviet Special Military Operations (Washington, London, etc: 1987). See interview with the Honorable Caspar Weinberger, Defense Weekly (22 June 1987); and his "Phenomenon of Low Intensity Warfare," Defense Issues, II (1986); Noel C. Koch, J. Michael Kelly, "Two Cases Against a Sixth Service...for Special Ops," Armed Forces Journal International (October 1985); (Sen.) William S. Cohen, "Fix for a SOF Capability That is Most Assuredly Broken," ibid., (February 1987). James Adams, Secret Armies: Inside the American, Soviet, and European

SF goal was achieved when the Department of the Army announced on 21 April 1987 that it would establish SF as a separate Army officer career branch to strengthen combat efficiency and the professional development of the SF leadership corps. The new branch went into effect on 19 June, with appropriate ceremony at the Special Warfare Plaza, Fort Bragg, on 11 September 1987.¹²⁰

Civil Affairs received similar recognition when the Army Civil Affairs Corps was activated on 16 June 1989 and incorporated into the Army Regimental System. The Regimental Home Base was Fort Bragg and the Home Base Commander the Commanding General of the USAJFKSWCS.¹²¹

Earlier, in 1987, the Department of the Army had authorized the Crossed Arrows collar insignia and Jungle Green as the Special Forces Branch color.¹²² In addition, the Army awarded, on 9 April 1987 the SF Tab to former officers and enlisted soldiers who had

Special Forces (New York: 1987), 203-210. See also transcript, end-of-tour oral interview, BG James Guest, outgoing Commandant/Commander, USAJFKSWCS, with USAJFKSWCS Command Historian, 27 October 1988); Glenn M. Harned, "Army Special Operations Forces and the Air/Land Battle," MMA thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, (Fort Leavenworth KS: 1985).

¹²⁰Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs (21 April 1987); USAJFKSWCS Bulletin (June 1987); Defense Week (22 June 1987), (interview with the Honorable John O. Marsh, Secretary of the Army); Ltr of approval, HQDA, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel to Commander, TRADOC (22 May 1987); Ltr of approval HQDA, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel to commander, TRADOC (22 May 1987).

¹²¹US. Army GO 22, effective 16 Jun 89.

¹²²Msg, DAPE, (28 January 1987); Ltr of Approval to Commander, TRADOC (22 May 1987). (The official designation is actually "bottle green," #80156).

served in any one or more of the following units at the times specified:

The 1st Special Service Force, August 1943 - December 1945.
OSS Detachment 101, April 1942 - September 1945.
Any OSS Jedburgh Detachment, May 1944 - September 1945.
Any OSS Operational Group, May 1944 - September 1945.
Army Unit 8240, June 1950 - July 1953 (Korean War U.N. Partisans).

Soldiers with wartime service since 1952 who were unable or not required to undergo formal instruction also qualified if they were awarded the prefix/suffix "3," enlisted Skill Qualifying Indicator "S," or Additional Skill Indicator "5G." They also had to have served at least 120 consecutive days as a company-grade officer or enlisted member of a SF A Detachment, Mobile Strike Force, SF reconnaissance team, or SF Special Operation unit and have been awarded a Combat Infantryman's Badge (CIB) or Combat Medical Badge (CMB) for that service.¹²³

The Center and School initiated a significant improvement in the SF training program in June 1988. It extended training from one day short of twenty-one weeks to a full six months, including a new three-week Special Forces Selection and Assessment segment, and expanded Field time from sixty-three to 100 days. The assessment phase, now temporary duty instead of permanent change of station, tested candidates psychologically and physically. Thus, the unsuitable candidate could be removed before he even entered the SF Qualifying course. The Army, the Special Warfare

¹²³Army Personnel Bulletin (July 1987); Army News Release, No. 87-4-1 (9 April 1987).

Center and the candidate benefited from this early determination of his fitness.

Faced with an increasing student body, the Center and School drew up a long-range \$27.7 million construction plan, CAMPUS 2005 (originally CAMPUS 2000) to deal with anticipated problems of overcrowded facilities and inadequate structures. Camp MacKall was transformed by the razing of unsightly "temporary" structures (that had, in fact, been around since World War II) and their replacement by new facilities. Other projects programmed by CAMPUS 2005 were the academic facility, completed in 1992, a vertical wind tunnel, a Logistics Support Facility and a combat diver complex at Key West, Florida.¹²⁴

By the early 1990's, every SFG at full strength now had the capacity to establish a SF Operating Base, assisted by company and battalion headquarters, known as Detachments A and B. Cross-trained experts in each twelve-man A Detachment (fifty-four per group at full strength) intensively trained in five fundamental specialties: light weapons, demolitions, field communications, combat intelligence and paramedical support. Although their main purpose was to develop, organize, equip, train and direct indigenous military and paramilitary forces in unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, they could also stage raids, ambushes and sabotage. In short, "force multiplication," rather than the brute application of power, was what U.S. Army SF did

¹²⁴CAMPUS 2000/2005 material in USASOC History Archives, supplied by USAJFKSWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine.

best.¹²⁵

Another significant SOF reorganization saw the establishment of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) on 1 December 1989. This three-star command was the Army component of the joint service USSOCOM, and as such commanded all Army SOF in the Continental United States, exercised operational control of all Army Reserve Component SOF, coordinated training guidance for National Guard Army SOF with the Army National Guard Bureau and provided, through the theater commanders, training, guidance and standards to overseas-based Active Component SOF. The following year, the new, two-star U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) which included all Active and Reserve Component CA and PSYOP units, was established as a Major Subordinate Command (MSC) of USASOC. The new command had a unique chain of command, which did not include any continental army command or FORSCOM, reflecting the unique mission of USACAPOC. That is, special operations working as much or more in peacetime operations within low intensity conflict environments, as in supporting a conventional forces commander. The other USASOC MSC, the U.S. Army Special Forces Command (USASFC), assumed command of

¹²⁵HQ, USSCOM, "USASOC Implementation Plan," (Fort Bragg NC: n.d. [1989]). Collins, 23-24 and passim; Hans Halberstadt, Green Berets: Unconventional Warriors (Novato, CA: 1988) passim; Baratto, "Special Forces in the 1980's." Still, it could be pointed out that the mandated Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict was not appointed until more than two years after passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and that the required deputy assistant to the president for Low Intensity Conflict and the Board for Low Intensity Conflict had yet to be established in the early 1990s.

all AC and RC SF units (except for National Guard units, unless federalized.) In June of 1990, General Order No. 8 mandated USASOC's assuming responsibility for the Center and School, although operational control remained with TRADOC. In the end, a rather convoluted, time-consuming and at times controversial process had, more or less, united the functional specialties of Active and Reserve Component Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations under their own command, and through that command to the joint USSOCOM. It could be said that U.S. SOF now seemed able finally to "speak with one voice."¹²⁶

JUST CAUSE

The effectiveness of the renewal and reorganizations of Special Operations Forces was put to the test in December 1989 with Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama. Special Operations Forces fought superbly and organized resistance was over within twenty-four hours.

In a textbook example of SOF joint operations, A Company, 3d Battalion, 7th SFG(A), commanded by MAJ Kevin M. Higgins, secured

¹²⁶R. Stewart (USASOC Command Historian), Memo for dist., sub: "Synopsis of the First Year of Activation of USASOC," 17 January 1991; "Army Special Forces under Revised Command Structure," The Static Line (February 1991); Director, Joint Force Integration Office, Memo for dist., sub: "Functional Relationships Between Special Warfare Center and School, United States Army Special Operations Command, and Training and Doctrine Command," 2 January 1990; BG Joseph C. Hurteau, MAJ R. Hayner, "USACAPOC: One Step Closer to the 'Total Army,'" Special Warfare (March 1992). See also USASOC brochures, U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC PAO, Fort Bragg NC: 29 August 1990) and The USASOC Charter (4th POG, Fort Bragg NC: n.d.).

and held the vital Pacora River Bridge. While SF troops blocked enemy reinforcements heading toward the bridge, an Air Force NCO contacted an orbiting AC-130 Spectre gunship, which then gave precise and effective fire support and infra-red illumination, halting threatening enemy movement.

MAJ Gilberto Perez, commander of Company A, 1st Battalion of the 7th, utilized the "Ma Bell" technique to secure western Panama. Basically, MAJ Perez, coordinating with the 2d Brigade, 7th Infantry Division (light) successively telephoned each commander of a Panamanian military base (or cuartel) and "invited" him to come to a nearby airfield to discuss surrender terms. The U.S. and Panamanian commanders would then fly over the cuartel to see that the troops had indeed surrendered. If they had failed to do so, a AC-130 Spectre gunship would provide a fire demonstration into a nearby wooded area. This awesome example of destruction was sufficient to make surrender a quick and honorable option. Then Major Perez would repeat the procedure for the next cuartel. Casualties for either side in this sweep were one man lightly wounded.¹²⁷

¹²⁷DA, Soldiers in Panama: Stories of Operation JUST CAUSE, Office of the Chief of Public Affairs (Washington: 1990); "Inside the Invasion," Newsweek (25 June 1990); LTC C. Weldon, II, "Real Time Response: Army Reservists Serve in Panama Operation," Army Reserve Magazine, vol. 36, No. 2, deals extensively with CA units which served in both JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY. Copies of classified after-action reports of SF, CA and PSYOPS are filed with the Department of Evaluation and Standardization, USAJFKSWCS; Center for Army Lessons Learned, Bulletin 90-9, vols. 1-3, Operation JUST CAUSE Lessons Learned (Fort Leavenworth KS: 1990); "Panama Operation JUST CAUSE," Current News, Special Edition, pt. 1, no. 1827, and pt.2, no.1828 (DOD, Washington: 19 February 1990); audio taped interviews with JUST CAUSE CA, PSYOP and 7th

Another SF "surgical" operation was the disabling of the TV 2 repeater complex at Cero Azul. An 18-man team consisting of troops from the 3d of the 7th SFG(A) and the 1109th Signal Battalion lifted off in two MH-60 helicopters at 0045 on 19 December 1989, just as the shooting phase of JUST CAUSE began. Arriving over the target, the team fast-roped down past tall trees and dense brush and cleared the station buildings with explosives. The troopers found evidence of two enemy soldiers on the site, but noted dryly that it appeared they had "recently departed in a hasty manner." The team quickly shut down the facility and removed essential components from the transmitter, then conducted local patrols, made a through search of the facility, seized documents, cleaned their weapons, ate and slept. They exfiltrated by MH-60 after about 13 hours on the site.

But that was not the end of the story. Two days later, the team was ordered to redeploy to the station, this time to put it back on the air. Soon after their arrival they were warned by an American citizen of a 300-man enemy element planning to attack their position that night. The team called in an AC-130 Spectre gunship, which fired ten rounds from its 105mm cannon into the apparent assembly area, and "No further activity was observed." Later that morning, two soldiers from the 1st PSYOPS Battalion arrived with VHS tapes, and by 1030 TV 2 was back on the air under

SFG(A) veterans (incl. MAJ Higgins) by USASOC Command Historian; "Civil Affairs in Operation JUST CAUSE, Special Warfare (Winter 1991).

new management.¹²⁸ A major PSYOP consideration was the large number of civilians, both U.S. and Panamanian, who might find themselves in danger, and who had to be given information and calmed. In fact, about 50 percent of all leaflets disseminated during JUST CAUSE combat operations were directed to civilians. Many of these products, such as newsheets and posters, proved so popular that enterprising Panamanians made off with them to resell to their fellow citizens.¹²⁹

Civil Affairs troops found themselves carrying out a wide variety of tasks, many of them, as usual, more or less unforeseen. For example, CA soldiers quickly assumed the full operation of Torrijos International Airfield. An even more gratifying task was the establishment of a large Displaced Civilians camp in Panama City to care for those whose lives had been suddenly disrupted by war. By 19 January 1990, the administration of the camp would be assumed by the Panamanian Red Cross. One of the unanticipated tasks of CA soldiers was the expeditious restoration

¹²⁸"After Action Report: TV 2 Tower (Team 3), 18-26 Dec 90," 3d Bn, 7th SFG(A), n.d.

¹²⁹COL Walko, oral interview with author; Walko, "Just Cause/CA/PSYOP/Promote Liberty" folder, USASOC History Archives; USSOCOM, Psychological Operations Support to Operation Just Cause, USSOCOM History Archives; LTG Stiner, open briefing, Fort Bragg Officers Club, 15 February 1990, tape in USASOC History Archives; D. C. Waller, The Commandos: The Inside Story of America's Secret Soldiers (New York, London, etc: 1994), 287; USSOCOM, Psychological Operations in Panama (MacDill AFB: 1994); USSOCOM, Directorate of Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs, J9, Psychological Operations in Panama During Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty (MacDill AFB: March 1994); D. P. Walko, "Psychological Operations in Panama (JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY)," in J. Moynihan, Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies, USSOCOM (MacDill AFB: December 1992).

to Panamanian civilians of their automobiles which had been "hot-wired" and used by U.S. troops for various purposes.¹³⁰

After 31 January 1990, the Panama SOF mission changed from the JUST CAUSE combat phase to PROMOTE LIBERTY, in which SOF elements worked to restore the Panamanian economy and democracy, and to establish an effective, civilian-controlled Panamanian defense force.¹³¹

That busy year 1990 also saw the reactivation of the 3rd Special Forces Group(A) on 29 June 1990 at the JFK Special Warfare Plaza at Fort Bragg. The 3rd had been deactivated in December of 1969, as one of the first results of the "Vietnamization" of the war. The reactivated group, which was oriented toward Africa and the Caribbean, reached its full strength of about 1,300 troops in 1991.¹³²

¹³⁰Personnel from 96th CA Bn, taped oral interview with USAJFKSWCS Command Historian, 20 April 1990. D. K. Meyer, "Civil Affairs in Panama: Is CA a Viable Asset for Future Conflicts?", Air War College Associate Studies research report (Randolph AFB, Texas: November 1990.)

¹³¹J. Greenhut's "To Promote Liberty: Army Reserve Civil Affairs in the Invasion of Panama, December 1989-April 1990," typescripts has generated some controversy. See also 96th CA Battalion paper briefing slides, S-3 digest of tasks, memoranda, after-action observations, etc., in "1990: Civil-Military Operations" folder; GEN M. R. Thurman paper briefing slides; anon. "Operation Just Cause," typescript, all in USASOC History Archives; E. F. Dandar, Jr. "Civil Affairs Operations," in Bruce W. Watson and Peter G. Tsouras, eds., Operation Just Cause (Boulder, etc., 1991).

¹³²Stewart, 7; Fayetteville Observer (7 March, 28 June 1990).

- Special Forces in El Salvador, 1980-92 -

The U. S. Special Forces role in the long-term insurrection in El Salvador began with a low-key survey mission in 1981 to assess the security of U. S. interests in that country. The situation had been deteriorating since the military coup of 15 October 1979 against another military government. Successive military and civilian **juntas** had not been able to cope with the situation. In October 1980, the FMLN (Farabundo Marti Liberacion Nacional) was formed and in November and December, respectively, radio broadcasts (Radio Liberacion and later Radio Venceremos) from Nicaragua and weapons deliveries from Vietnam moved the insurrection into high gear. In January, 1981, the FMLN launched their "final offensive" to overthrow the government. Its failure drove the insurrection into the countryside and led to a series of attacks on military units, power lines and other elements of the national infrastructure.¹³³

As a response, the U. S. Army began training El Salvadoran units, using a variety of methods. The such unit was the Atlacatl Immediate Reaction Battalion (IRB) in 1981, trained by a Mobile Training Team from 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group(A) stationed in Panama. Another battalion (Ramon Bellosa) was trained by Special Forces personnel at Fort Bragg the following

¹³³One valuable source of anecdotal evidence (consisting mainly of oral interviews with participants) on the early days of the El Salvadoran insurrection is Max Manwaring and Court Prisk, El Salvador at War: An Oral History National Defense University, Washington: 1988.)

year. In 1983, the U. S. also established a Regional Military Training Center (RMTC) in Honduras to train Salvadoran units without having to bring them to the United States. Training teams from the 7th SFG(A) rotated through the RMTC to conduct training in marksmanship, communications, first aid, patrolling, small unit tactics and a host of other basic skills. The RMTC trained El Salvadoran troops and Honduran troops (not simultaneously since the two countries nourish a mutual enmity) from 1983 to 1985, while awaiting the construction of a new military training facility in El Salvador.¹³⁴

In late 1984, under the direction of U. S. advisors, the El Salvadoran military established the Central de Entrenamiento Militar de la Fuerza Armada (CEMFA) in La Union. The U.S. advisors, members of the OPATT (Operations, Plans and Training Team) under the U. S. Military Group (MILGP) El Salvador, helped develop Programs of Instruction (POI), trained the trainers for the units, and directly led classes in patrolling, weapons, demolitions, first aid, communication, leadership, intelligence and even basic staff planning operations. The majority of the advisors were Special Forces-trained personnel on six month TDY rotations. The CEMFA would take recruits from units across the country and teach them basic military skills and a few more advanced skills. In addition to U. S. Army-like basic training,

¹³⁴A quick summary of the theory behind Special Forces advisory efforts--comparing Vietnam and El Salvador--is the Master of Military Arts and Sciences thesis by Major Mark Meoni, "The Advisor: From Vietnam to El Salvador", Fort Leavenworth, KS: 1992.

the CEMFA trainers, under the watchful eye of Special Forces and advisors from Army branches, also conducted classes on the use of mortars, .50 cal machine guns, 106 and 90 mm recoilless rifles, claymores, commando and sniper operations. The CEMFA mission was vital to training the El Salvadoran Army which expanded from a road-bound, poorly-led 8,000-man outfit before 1980 to a hard-hitting counterinsurgency force of 54,000 by 1987.¹³⁵

In addition to training Salvadoran soldiers and officers in the United States, Honduras and the CEMFA, Special Forces advisors were sent to each of the six Brigade Headquarters in the six military zones of El Salvador. Regular teams of advisors (generally no more than 2-3 officers and NCOs) lived, worked and trained with Brigade soldiers for six months to a year. It was not possible to send more to each location because in 1981 an agreement between the government of El Salvador and the U. S. State Department limited the number of official advisors in country to 55. Many sites would have only a single officer or NCO assigned, making close cooperation with his El Salvadoran counterparts a matter of life or death. Probably close to 200 Special Forces personnel were assigned as OPATT advisors from 1981-1992 with an additional 2-300 SF soldiers rotating through El Salvador as part of MTTs. Exact figures are difficult to come by, but probably another 1000 SF soldiers were assigned to additional

¹³⁵Oral interview with LTC Ralph Hinrich by USASOC Command Historian. LTC Hinrich was Latin American manager for the Security Assistance Training Management Office (SATMO) of the USAJFKSWCs. He was also the head of the CEMFA in 1986 and of the Senior OPATT in San Salvador, 1990-91.

El Salvador-related training missions at Fort Bragg, Fort Benning (School of the Americas), Panama and Honduras over the course of the conflict.¹³⁶

Initially all advisors served six-month TDY tours, but this duty was expanded into a one year Permanent Change of Station (PCS) tour sometime in 1984. Brigade Headquarters (called cuartels) were located (from east to west) in Santa Anna, San Salvador, near Chalatenango, San Vicente, Usulután and San Miguel. Other training sites were scattered throughout the Brigade zones of operations and OPATT advisors would often travel to and from such sites on a daily basis. In almost every case, due to the strict rules of engagement, the OPATT advisors would return to the cuartel each evening.¹³⁷

For political reasons, the U.S. Command Authorities had to enforce strict rules of engagement (ROE). In addition to prohibiting nighttime movement or remaining in an exposed training site overnight, the other ROEs included: do not fire unless fired upon, do not accompany El Salvadoran units on combat operations, maintain continuous communications with MILGP in San Salvador

¹³⁶Some 180 Special Forces cadre were assigned to the 1982 training mission of the Ramon Bellosó battalion at Fort Bragg. Five hundred is probably a conservative figure, but the lack of complete after action reports or any other form of documentation except for oral history interviews makes any numbers difficult to pin down.

¹³⁷Oral history interviews with OPATT advisors by USASOC Command Historian: SGM Humberto Fraire, MSG Adolpho Reyes, MAJ Frank Pedrozo, MAJ Simeon Trombitas, MAJ Kevin Higgins, MSG Rafael Lopez, SFC David Chacon, MAJ Wayne "Pat" Richardson. USASOC History Archives.

(even during an attack on the cuartel), and carry only personal protection weapons. The propaganda cost of an American killed on patrol with an El Salvadoran unit was too great to permit any such risks. However, many advisors would conduct final training patrols at the conclusion of reconnaissance training classes which would, of necessity, include movements through enemy territory. With no front line it was not possible to avoid all risks. However, with few exceptions, advisors carefully avoided incidents. It was often up to each advisor to define exactly how the ROE applied to his situation. Given the general maturity and professionalism of the Special Forces officer and NCO, such definition was seldom a problem.

There were times, of course, when the strict adherence to the rules of engagement was not enough. The fight often came to the advisor. Given the nature of guerrilla war, an attack could occur at any cuartel at any time. In the most publicized incident, which led to the death of a Special Forces Sergeant, the guerrillas ("Gs" as they were called), attacked the Headquarters of the 4th Infantry Brigade in El Paraiso, Chalatenango. The attack occurred at 0200 on 31 March 1987 and included the use of demolitions, effective infiltration by well-trained assault squads and the use of indirect fire, primarily from mortars. Sixty-four El Salvadoran soldiers were killed and seventy nine wounded. A soldier of the 3rd Battalion, 7th SFG(A), SFC Gregory A. Fronius, was killed while attempting to organize the resistance to the

attack.¹³⁸ In 1988 a similar attack on the 4th Brigade cuartel found the El Salvadorans and their U. S. advisors more prepared. Despite some initial success in penetrating the wire, the ESAF forces and U. S. advisors Major James Parker, SSG Michael Roth, CPT Gilberto Aguiar, SFC Mario Orozco-Torres and 1LT Byron Castleman, fought back and by dawn the El Salvadorans had recaptured the camp. At least 11 enemy guerrillas were killed at the cost of 17 friendly KIA and 31 WIA.

In another instance, the cuartel and a nearby training area in Zacatecoluca, La Paz were attacked four times in a six month period. MSG Humberto Fraire had just been assigned to an Engineer battalion in January, 1989. The district had been quiet for months, but within two weeks the "Gs" hit. Coming from the east, they blew up power poles, infiltrated snipers through the streets and buildings toward the cuartel (which was in the center of the town), mopped up the Observation and Listening Posts (OP/LP) and began firing into the cuartel. They also began firing their rampas, a type of homemade mortar bomb, into the cuartel along with RPG-7 anti-tank rounds. MSG Fraire did not retreat to the "safety" of his vulnerable second-floor quarters, and at any rate his Motorola communications set did not work when plugged into the connection in his room. Instead, MSG Fraire began coordinating the resistance and, when things looked grim, personally began firing M-79 illumination rounds over the heads of the defenders.

¹³⁸Account taken from Wayne A. Kirkbride, Special Forces in Latin America: From Bull Simons to Just Cause, Newport News, VA:

The newly illuminated battlefield exposed the "Gs" to a deadly fire from the defenders. By dawn the attack had been repelled at the cost of about 12 El Salvadorans killed. Returning to his quarters, MSG Fraire saw where numerous rounds had gone through his room. He had been safer out on the perimeter walls than he would have been if he had hunkered down in his quarters. This was just the first of four attacks against this cuartel and a nearby former cotton mill which had been turned into a training installation.¹³⁹

Neither the risks nor the relative safety of the Special Forces advisors in El Salvador should be overstated. Since the advisors were prohibited from engaging in direct combat operations, the majority of their time was spent in cuartels, training areas or in supporting the MILGP in San Salvador in relative safety. However, as in any guerrilla war, security was never assured. Most advisors admitted to the fact that they never felt completely safe. The day in and day out tension left them each at a high pitch of readiness at all times. They were assigned bodyguards to help ensure their survival. However, the cuartels could be (and were) hit at any time. Advisors had to stay alert and never drop their guard. It was a combat environment despite the determination for political reasons that El Salvador not be named a combat zone. SFC Fronius, MSG Fraire and most of the other advisors working by themselves surrounded by

¹³⁹Oral History Interview with SGM Fraire by USASOC Command Historian at HQ, 2/7th SFG(A), Fort Bragg, NC, 4 February, 1993.

guerrillas or potential guerrillas would have disagreed with that determination.¹⁴⁰

How successful was the Special Forces and U. S. advisory effort in El Salvador? The facts speak for themselves. The professional training imparted to the El Salvadoran military led to ultimate success on the battlefield. Despite military setbacks and the increase of international support to the enemy (including weapons from Nicaragua and Cuba and unhelpful diplomatic recognition from France and Mexico), the El Salvadoran military fought back and beat the guerrillas to a standstill. When the final "final" offensive of the FMLN was launched in 1989, the El Salvadoran military faced a few minor defeats, but rallied and decimated the rebels. The FMLN was forced to seek victory through a political solution; a military victory was no longer an option for them. Special Forces had helped make that victory possible. The cost in killed was small, in wounded, minor, but in terms of lives changed because of the imminence of combat, Special Forces soldiers and their families paid a price.

DESERT TRIUMPH

The year 1991 saw Special Forces, Civil Affairs and PSYOP personal only beginning to absorb the lessons of Panama and El Salvador when they were ordered once again into harm's way in Southwest Asia. In response to Iraq's blatant invasion of

¹⁴⁰In contradiction to the ruling that El Salvador was not a combat zone, all advisors were awarded imminent danger pay.

neighboring Kuwait, the National Command Authorities deployed a diverse and highly-professional assortment of Special Forces, CA and PSYOP units to the Persian Gulf: the 3rd, 5th and 10th SF Groups, as well as the 4th POG and the 96th CA Battalion, along with several reserve CA units and individual RC PSYOP augmentees. Long before the opening of the ground offensive, Special Operations Command Central(SOCCENT) held responsibility for a 60,000 square mile area right up on the Iraqi border.

The primary mission of SF in the defensive phase of the Gulf War, Operation DESERT SHIELD, was that of Coalition Warfare. Using their language and cultural expertise and sensitivities, SF troopers worked with nearly every battalion of the Coalition forces, establishing rapport with U.S. forces, reconstituting the remnants of the Kuwaiti Army and providing a wide range of training, particularly for the Pan Arab forces. Their instruction ranged from light infantry tactics, through close air support missions, armored warfare and nuclear/biological/chemical defense (with a Czech chemical warfare team!), all of which had to be taught within the confines of widely differing cultures and customs. In addition, the SF communications system provided an efficient means of reporting information in the two Arab corps.

SF and Saudi forces patrolled the border with occupied Kuwait and later penetrated into Kuwait and Iraq itself, searching for high value targets, pinpointing Iraqi command-and-control facilities and lines of communication, as well as 13 early warning border positions. Special Forces continued these missions more

deeply behind enemy lines in the ground combat phase of Operation DESERT STORM. Finally, the organization of Special Forces was once again validated, as SF teams were split to serve each coalition battalion, with SF company and battalion staffs providing necessary SF command and control while serving with brigade and division as advisory teams and providing the link from the Arab commands to advisory teams at Corps level.¹⁴¹

Both Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations arrived on the scene too late to make the maximum use of their combat multiplier assets. Reserve CA units did not begin to arrive until 132 days after mobilization, and did not come in any strength until the war had actually begun. CA planners were excluded from the CINC's war plans until late in the process. The root of the problem seemed to stem from the Army's unfounded belief that it would operate in an environment virtually empty of civilians. Experienced CA officers could have corrected that notion early on.

Nonetheless, well before the war started, CA planners were working with the Kuwaiti government-in-exile and the U.S. State Department in the Kuwaiti Task Force to rebuild and administer that nation after its liberation. They also administered \$5

¹⁴¹R. Stewart, (S)"Army Special Operations in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm"(U) (Fort Bragg NC: [1992]). Info used is UNCLASSIFIED. USAJFKSWCS DOES, (S)"U.S. Army Special Operations Lessons Learned 'Desert Shield/Storm'(U)" (Fort Bragg NC: [1991]). Info used is UNCLASSIFIED; Army Lessons Learned, (C)"Operation Desert Storm," vol. 1, "Strategic," vol. 2, "Operational"(U) (Fort Leavenworth KS: [1991]. Info used is UNCLASSIFIED; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (Washington, April, 1992), 541. See also extensive oral and video tapes of interviews conducted by the USASOC Command Historians with DESERT SHIELD/STORM SOF veterans.

billion of Saudi host nation support for Coalition forces.

Civil Affairs soldiers were attached to every ground maneuver unit, including those of the Marines. They provided support for civilians in theater and aided other civilians affected by the war. They gave classes on area cultural sensitivities to U.S. troops, thereby defusing dangerous enemy propaganda which proclaimed that the American and European forces were the "new crusaders" and the "enemies of Islam." In the field, CA troops informed commanders of historical, religious and cultural sites, thus preventing any serious damage and depriving Iraq of useful "incidents."

Civil Affairs troops demonstrated on occasion a better understanding of the differences between Displaced Civilians(DC) and Enemy Prisoners of War(EPW) than did U.S. Military Police. In at least one case, CA troops were able to defuse a potentially riotous situation in which detained Kurds, Iraqi Army Reservists and Regulars and Republican Guards had been mingled promiscuously.

The Combined Civil Affairs Task Force (CCATF) and the KTF, moved quickly into Kuwait City as the town was being liberated on 28th February. It found a city that had been "trashed" by the Iraqis but not destroyed. The CCTF restored basic services from 1 March to 3 May 1991, working with the Kuwaiti Army and governmental officials.

Civil Affairs troopers soon found some important differences between the attitudes of Kuwaitis and those Civil Affairs might expect to find at, say, a disaster site in the U.S. The Kuwaitis

were determined to make the Palestinians, who had done so much of the day-to-day work in peacetime, pay for their supposed support of the Iraqis. Civil Affairs fought a constant battle to see to it that Palestinians received water, food and electricity in roughly the same amounts and at roughly the same time as that provided to the Kuwaitis. In several instances, CA soldiers directly intervened to prevent human right abuses of the hapless Palestinians, some of whom, it later transpired, had actually worked with the Kuwaiti resistance against the Iraqi occupation forces.

Closely tied to the Palestinian problem was the fact that Kuwaitis had rarely engaged in any type of manual labor -- that was reserved for "uncitizens", such as the Palestinians. Civil Affairs troops had to walk a fine line between "getting the job done anyway we can" and respecting the prevailing Kuwaiti predisposition to have someone else do the dirty work. Matters were also not helped by the fact that Kuwait had never suffered a major natural disaster in modern times, and thus had no record of working together in adverse circumstances. But the job was done. Despite the horrendous and well-publicized oil fires, Kuwait City was restored in about two months and it is unlikely that any resident of that city went very hungry or thirsty, even in the earliest days of liberation.¹⁴²

¹⁴²LTC C. Sahlin (CO, 96th CA Bn.) oral interview with USASOC Command Historian, 7 Aug 91; "Civil Affairs in the Persian Gulf War: A Symposium Proceedings" (Fort Bragg NC: 1991), contains J. R. Brinkerhoff, "Waging the War and Winning the Peace: Civil Affairs in the War with Iraq," and after-action reports of each CA

Like Civil Affairs, Army PSYOP was late on the scene, and would have been even later had the Commander-in-Chief, CENTCOM (CINCCENT), General Schwarzkopf not sent a blistering memo back to Washington, complaining of "bungling bureaucrats," etc. The problem lay in the approval of the PSYOP campaign plan by the National Command Authorities, an approval that consumed an unconscionable amount of time that was used to some effect by Baghdad's own psychological operations machine.

Once the plan was approved and personnel were in place, one of the most effective PSYOP campaigns in military history began to work on the Iraqi soldier and on the area population. From November, 1991 to January, 1992, both Department of Defense (DOD) and non-DOD agencies such as the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), the U.S. Information Service (USIS), various information agencies in the area, and the Departments of State, Commerce and Energy (coordinated through DOD) concentrated their efforts on generating global, regional and Arab support for the Anti-Saddam Hussein coalition. The 4th POG, under the operational control of the CINCCENT exercised operational control of all U.S. PSYOP assets in theater. The PSYOP soldiers deployed into the area of operations as either Loudspeaker and Liaison Officer (LNO) teams attached to tactical maneuver brigades, or as complete PSYOP units.

unit involved; Chief of Staff, USACAPOC, Memorandum for Commander, USACAPOC, sub: Lessons Learned from Desert Shield, 15 April 1991; USAJFKSWCS DOES, "U.S. Army Special Operations," passim. See also extensive taped oral interviews with DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM CA soldiers, and the CA in the Persian Gulf War Archives in the Special Collections Department, National Defense University, Washington.

A pioneering strategic U.S. PSYOP product was the fifteen-minute video entitled "Nations of the World Take a Stand," produced for the USIA. Reproduced in four languages, this video emphasized that the civilized world, Islamic as well as non-Islamic, was arrayed against Saddam. Agents smuggled 200 copies into Baghdad itself.

Two days after the opening of the air war, the clandestine Voice of the Gulf (VOG) began operations. The VOG featured music, news and PSYOP appeals, carried over three AM and two FM stations transmitted by three ground stations and one airborne EC 130 VOLANT SOLO platform, manned almost entirely by Pennsylvania Air National Guardsmen. To the end, the fiction was maintained that the VOG was a purely Arab station, a deception that probably had much to do with the fact that EPWs maintained that this station was the third most listened to, after the long-established BBC and Radio Monte Carlo.

One of the earliest and one of the most effective of the U.S. PSYOP efforts was directed by the CINC himself. This was the famous "B-52" broadcasting, leaflet and bombing campaign, a campaign directed at six specific Iraqi military units, carefully chosen because of their morale and leadership. Radio broadcasts and leaflet drops informed an enemy division, by name, that it would be bombed the next day and urged its troops to leave the area. The next day, U.S. Air Force heavy B-52 bombers duly hit the target unit. Soon after, U.S. PSYOP broadcasts and leaflets reminded the stunned survivors of what had hit them and

solicitously repeated the message "for the last time." The final B-52 strike, unhindered and on schedule, could be counted on to produce heavy defections. The B-52 bombing was bad enough; but the fact that the Americans could, as in the "B-29" leaflet of World War II, alert and warn individual enemy formations with impunity destroyed what was left of their morale after the bombs had hit.

Other early leaflets stressed Arab brotherhood and peace as opposed to Saddam's machinations. A particularly effective example (judging from EPW interrogations) showed coalition Arab forces sitting down to a dinner with their Iraqi brothers. Prominently displayed in the feast were bananas; Iraqi love of that fruit, unrequited due the UN embargo, could now be indulged.

Later, on the eve of battle, U.S. PSYOP emphasized the death-dealing technology of the coalition. U.S. leaflets played on Iraqi fear of the Stealth fighter - "The Plane Nobody can See," featuring enemy soldiers and equipment being blasted by the phantom fighters.

U.S. PSYOP planners also showed a commendable knowledge of their target audiences by playing upon the recent Iran-Iraq War. One such leaflet featured a taxi with a flag-draped casket tied to the roof driving past a startled Iraqi soldier, a grim reminder of how so many of the dead of that bloody war had returned to their homes. Another leaflet poked fun at "Irans's Growing Air Force" - referring to those Iraqi warplanes that had mysteriously flown to sanctuary in hated Iran.

Coalition PSYOP personnel were soon distributing that classic leaflet appeal, the safe conduct pass. Most of these played upon the enemy's homesickness and warweariness, and many leaflets that emphasized such themes or the evils of Saddam, also urged surrender (or "rescue," in recognition of enemy sensibilities).

Several leaflets also added to the CINCCENT deception plan, emphasizing the probability of a spearhead Marine Corps assault on the beaches of Kuwait. This ploy diverted enemy attention from General Schwarzkopf's planned "end run" to the west.

Both print and electronic media avoided any denigration of the Iraqi soldier; he was always portrayed as a decent, brave fellow who had been misled by his leaders but who would be received by the coalition forces with the dignity he deserved.

For the first time on any significant scale, U.S. PSYOP troops now continued to work with the enemy after his surrender. The Reserve Component(RC) 13th PSYOP Battalion served as the first screening level to EPWs, supporting the 8000th MP Brigade at one Marine and four Army Corps EPW cages. Teams from the 13th successfully conducted an EPW pacification and cooperation campaign by identifying English-speakers, informal group leaders, disguised officers, cooperative EPWs, intelligence officers and agitators. Using their area skills and sensitivities, teams from the 13th acted as a liaison between the prisoners and the MPs in forwarding information to corps and PSYOP intelligence, and in the pre-and post-testing of PSYOP leaflets and broadcasts. Finally, 13th troopers helped to keep the EPWs tranquil, providing large-

screen video entertainment for good behavior: no cooperation, no video tonight. The 13th had to resort to more threatening means of control on a very few occasions, calling in at least once fearsome ground-attack A-10 fighter-bombers to make pre-arranged low passes over the camps, cowing unrest that threatened to get out of hand.

On the day following the cease-fire on 28 February, a CENTCOM constituted PSYOP task force provided operational and tactical PSYOP support for Task Force Freedom, which had been ordered to conduct liberation and consolidation operations in Kuwait City. The PSYOP task force operated in the city for one month, assessing Kuwaiti morale, distributing public service announcements and leaflets warning of unexploded ammunition. It also fell to PSYOP and as well as CA troops to protect third country nationals, particularly Palestinians, a thankless duty not appreciated by the vengeful Kuwaitis.

The bulk of PSYOP troops had barely completed redeployment when twenty-nine members of the 6th PSYOP Battalion found themselves deployed from Saudi Arabia to support Combined Joint Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT. This force was deployed to aid Kurdish tribespeople being brutalized by Saddam. One of the first tasks of this PSYOP contingent was to draw up and distribute leaflets encouraging the Kurds to come down out of the mountains to the camps that the task force and other agencies were establishing. Some PSYOP leaflets outlined safe routes to the camps, while others graphically illustrated the dangers lurking

just off those escape routes in the form of antipersonnel mines scattered indiscriminately across the countryside. In the camps themselves, PSYOP troops drew up and distributed new leaflets dealing with camp governance and housekeeping. Special Operations Forces and their foreign counterparts, governmental and non-governmental, were ultimately responsible for the saving of tens of thousands of lives in an almost-textbook example of humanitarian assistance. By the middle of July 1991, virtually all coalition forces had redeployed from Northern Iraq and U.S. PSYOP and CA in Southwest Asia came to an end.¹⁴³

Any balance sheet on the Gulf War would have to conclude that Special Forces, CA and PSYOP performed well above expectations, more than fulfilling their roles as combat multipliers. Undoubtedly their greatest asset lay in their cultural

¹⁴³Oral interviews: COL A. Normand, 4th POG CO, with USASOC Command Historian, 10 October 1991; COL L. Dunbar, 4th POG CO, 29 July 1991; LTC J. Jones, 8th POB, Washington, 20 September 1991, with USASOC Assistant Command Historian; USAJFKSWCS DOES, "U.S. Army Special Operations Lessons Learned"; USAJFKSWCS DOTD, "PSYOP Lessons Learned from DESERT STORM," n.d.; (S)Memo for Commander, USASOC, from Chief of Staff, USACAPOC, sub: "Lessons Learned from DESERT SHIELD, 15 Apr 91; info used is UNCLASSIFIED; (S)Memo, 4th POG to USAJFKSWCS DOES, sub: "After Action Report for Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM," 3 June 1991. info used is UNCLASSIFIED; G. W. Rudd, "Operation PROVIDE COMFORT: One More Tile in the Mosaic, 6 Apr - 15 Jul 1991" (Center of Military History, Washington: n.d.); Civil Affairs in the Persian Gulf War contains PSYOP material. For each U.S. leaflet composed during the Gulf War, see D. Johnson, PSYOP: The Gulf Paper War (Titusville, FL: 1992). See also USAJFKSWCS DOES, "Operation Provide Comfort: Lessons Learned, Observations," draft (Fort Bragg, NC: 27 November 1991); USAJFKSWCS DOTD CA/PO/SOIS Development Branch, "Psyops Lessons Learned from DESERT STORM," (Fort Bragg: n.d.); also oral interviews with wide selection of PSYOP personnel. Most of the PSYOP leaflets used in the Gulf War are on file in the USASOC History Archives.

sensitivities, even though the Capstone alignments of many SOF units were ignored.

But opinion is unanimous that RC SOF in particular could have done even more if introduced in force earlier. Other findings and "Lessons Learned" were: that SOFs' initial deployment was hampered at the theater and corps level by an incomplete understanding of and support to their missions, that the language problem was still a long way from resolution (SOF in theater relied overwhelmingly on native speakers) and that there was considerable tension between AC and RC units which was exacerbated by the question of whether RC CA and PSYOP should meet SOF standards for deployment. In addition, the senior leadership of many CA units exhibited some serious deficiencies as ill-coordinated initial planning and lack of initiative resulted in duplication of effort and disagreements over assigned duties. The main PSYOP deficiencies seemed to lie in the field of dissemination rather than conception and execution of their products. All SOF units suffered from a lack of adequate transportation, particularly in the absence of HMMWVs. (But then, everyone in DESERT STORM wanted HMMWVs.) A large-scale information-gathering effort began immediately after DESERT STORM in the SOF community to identify these deficiencies and put them to rights. That community seemed to make a conscientious effort to avoid any complacency in the wake of America's overwhelming victory in the Gulf War.

Prospects

The "implosion" of the Soviet Union soon after the Gulf War accelerated a reorientation of U.S. military priorities away from the Soviet threat that had already been under way during the later 1980's. But the world in many ways remained as dangerous a place as it had been in the most threatening days of the Cold War; the end of the Soviet challenge actually caused increased uncertainty as to the relative threat posed by disorder in its successor states, as well as by militant religious fundamentalism, by narco-terrorism and by rogue regimes such as Saddam Hussein's or North Korea's Kim Il Sung. Several committed Leninist regimes remained in power, still dreaming the militant utopian fantasies often first heard decades ago on campuses in the West. In addition, SOF found itself involved in numerous politically-delicate humanitarian assistance efforts after PROVIDE COMFORT, from the aiding of Haitian migrants in Cuba, and the pacification of war-torn Somalia, to relief operations in the wake of Hurricane Andrew in Florida. How, if at all, and to what extent should the United States military respond to these challenges? How much can it do in a time of the most severe reductions in funding and personnel since the end of the Vietnam War? To what extent should SOF concentrate on the non-combat aspects of LIC?

These are not easy questions, and they and their answers may well be overtaken by events, as is so often the case. But it seems fairly certain that whatever form future conflicts may take,

the U.S. Army will still have need of the special combat
multiplying abilities of Special Forces, Civil Affairs and PSYOP.

U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES LINEAGE AND HONORS

1ST SPECIAL FORCES¹

Constituted 5 July 1942 in the Army of the United States as the 1st Special Service Force, a combined Canadian-American organization, to consist of the First, Second and Third Regiments and Service Battalion.

Activated 9 July 1942 at Fort William Henry Harrison, Montana.

Disbanded 6 January 1945 in France.

Reconstituted (less Service Battalion) 15 April 1960 in the Regular Army; concurrently consolidated with the 1st Ranger Infantry Battalion (activated 19 June 1942), 2d Infantry Battalion (activated 1 April 1943), 3d Ranger Infantry Battalion (organized 21 May 1943), 4th Ranger Infantry Battalion (organized 29 May 1943), 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion (activated 1 September 1943) and 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion (activated 20 January 1941) to form the 1st Special Forces, a parent regiment under the Combat Arms Regimental System.

(Former 1st Ranger Infantry Battalion, 2d Infantry Battalion, and 3d, 4th, 5th and 6th Ranger Infantry Battalions withdrawn 3 February 1986, consolidated with the 75th Infantry, and consolidated unit redesignated as the 75th Ranger Regiment - hereafter separate lineage).

Withdrawn 16 April 1988 from the Combat Arms Regimental System and reorganized under the United States Army Regimental System with Headquarters at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT

World War II

- *Aleutian Islands
- *Naples-Foggia
- *Anzio
- *Rome-Arno
- *Southern France (with arrowhead)
- *Rhineland

Vietnam

- *Advisory
- *Defense
- *Counteroffensive
- *Counteroffensive, Phase II
- *Counteroffensive, Phase III
- *Tet Counteroffensive
- *Counteroffensive, Phase IV
- *Counteroffensive, Phase V
- *Counteroffensive, Phase VI
- *Tet 69/Counteroffensive
- *Summer-Fall 1969

¹U.S. Army Center of Military History, 18 April 1988, USASOC History Archives; J.K. Mahon, R. Danysh, Infantry, Part 1, Regular Army, Army Lineage Series (Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington: 1972).

*Winter-Spring 1970
*Sanctuary Counteroffensive
*Counteroffensive, Phase VII

*Indicates earned honors.

DECORATIONS

*Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1966-1968.
*Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1968.
*Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered PACIFIC AREA.

1ST SPECIAL FORCES GROUP, 1ST SPECIAL FORCES

Constituted 5 July 1942 in the Army of the United States as the 2d Company, 1st Battalion, First Regiment, 1st Special Service Force, a combined Canadian-American organization.

Activated 9 July 1942 at Fort William Henry Harrison, Montana.

Disbanded 6 January 1945 in France.

Reconstituted 15 April 1960 in the Regular Army; concurrently consolidated with Company B, 1st Ranger Infantry Battalion (activated 19 June 1942), and consolidated unit redesignated as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces.

Consolidated 30 September 1960 with Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Special Forces Group (constituted 14 June 1957 in the Regular Army and activated 24 June 1957 in Japan), and consolidated unit designated as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Special Forces Group, (organic elements concurrently constituted and activated 4 October 1960).

Group inactivated 30 June 1974 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Activated 1 September 1984 at Fort Lewis, Washington.

(Former Company B, 1st Ranger Infantry Battalion, withdrawn 3 February 1986, consolidated Company N, 75th Infantry, and consolidated unit redesignated as Company N, 75th Ranger Regiment - hereafter separate lineage).

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT

World War II

- *Aleutian Islands
- *Naples-Foggia
- *Anzio
- *Rome-Arno
- *Southern France (with arrowhead)
- *Rhineland

DECORATIONS

*Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered PACIFIC Area.

*Philippine Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered JULY - AUGUST 1972.

5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP, 1ST SPECIAL FORCES

Constituted 5 July 1942 in the Army of the United States as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 1st Battalion, Third Regiment, 1st Special Service Force, a combined Canadian-American organization.

Activated 9 July 1942 at Fort William Henry Harrison, Montana.

Disbanded 6 January 1945 in France.

Reconstituted 15 April 1960 in the Regular Army; concurrently consolidated with Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion (activated 1 September 1943), and consolidated unit redesignated as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 5th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces.

(Organic elements constituted 8 September 1961).

Group activated 21 September 1961 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

(Former Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion, withdrawn 3 February 1986, consolidated with former Headquarters and Headquarters Companies 1st, 3d, 4th and 6th Ranger Infantry Battalions, former Headquarters and Headquarters Service Company, 2d Infantry Battalion, and Headquarters, 75th Infantry and consolidated unit redesignated as Headquarters, 75th Ranger Regiment - hereafter separate lineage).

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT

World War II

- *Aleutian Islands
- *Naples-Foggia
- *Anzio
- *Rome-Arno
- *Southern France (with arrowhead)
- *Rhineland

Vietnam

- *Advisory
- *Defense
- *Counteroffensive
- *Counteroffensive, Phase II
- *Counteroffensive, Phase III
- *Tet Counteroffensive
- *Counteroffensive, Phase IV
- *Counteroffensive, Phase V
- *Counteroffensive, Phase VI
- *Tet 69/Counteroffensive
- *Summer-Fall 1969
- *Winter-Spring 1970
- *Sanctuary Counteroffensive
- *Counteroffensive, Phase VII

DECORATIONS

*Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1966-1968.

*Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1968.

*Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1964-1969.

*Republic of Vietnam Civil Action Honor Medal, First Class, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1968-1970.

6TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP, 1ST SPECIAL FORCES

Constituted 5 July 1942 in the Army of the United States as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 2d Battalion, Third Regiment, 1st Special Service Force, a combined Canadian-American organization.

Activated 9 July 1942 at Fort William Henry Harrison, Montana.

Reconstituted 15 April 1960 in the Regular Army; concurrently consolidated with Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion (see Annex) and consolidated unit designated as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 6th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces. Activated 1 May 1963 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. (Organic elements constituted 30 October 1963 and activated in December 1963 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

ANNEX - Constituted 16 December 1940 in the Regular Army as Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 98th Field Artillery Battalion. Activated 20 January 1941 at Fort Lewis, Washington. Converted and redesignated 25 September 1944 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion. Inactivated 30 December 1945 in Japan.

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT

World War II

Algeria-French Morocco
(with arrow-head)
Tunisia
Sicily (with arrow-head)
*Naples-Foggia (with arrow-head)
*Anzio (with arrow-head)
*Rome-Arno
Normandy (with arrow-head)

*Northern France
*Southern France (with arrow-head)
*Rhineland
Ardennes
Central Europe
*Aleutian Islands
*New Guinea
*Leyte (with arrow-head)
*Luzon

DECORATIONS

Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered EL GUETTAR
Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered SALERNO
Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered POINTE DU HOE
Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered SAAR RIVER AREA
*Philippine Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered 17 OCTOBER 1944 TO JULY 1945 96th Ranger Infantry Battalion cited; DA GO 47, (1950).

7TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP, 1ST SPECIAL FORCES

Constituted 5 July 1942 in the Army of the United States as the 1st Company, 1st Battalion, First Regiment, 1st Special Service Force, a combined Canadian-American organization.

Activated 9 July 1942 at Fort William Henry Harrison, Montana.

Disbanded 6 January 1945 in France.

Reconstituted 15 April 1960 in the Regular Army; concurrently consolidated with Company A, 1st Ranger Infantry Battalion (activated 19 June 1942), and consolidated unit redesignated as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 7th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces.

Consolidated 6 June 1960 with Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 77th Special Forces Group (constituted 16 September 1953 in the Regular Army and activated 25 September 1953 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina), and consolidated unit designated as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 7th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces (organic elements constituted 20 May 1960 and activated 6 June 1960).

(Former Company A, 1st Ranger Infantry Battalion, withdrawn 3 February 1986, consolidated with Headquarters and Headquarters Company 1st Battalion, 75th Infantry, and consolidated unit redesignated as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment - hereafter separate lineage).

Home Area: Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth United States Armies.

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT

World War II

- *Aleutian Islands
- *Naples-Foggia
- *Anzio
- *Rome-Arno
- *Southern France (with arrowhead)
- *Rhineland

DECORATIONS

Companies A, B, and C, 3d Special Forces Battalion, each entitled to:
Army Superior Unit Award, Streamer embroidered LATIN AMERICA 1985-1986.

8TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP, 1ST SPECIAL FORCES

Constituted 5 July 1942 in the Army of the United States as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 1st Battalion, First Regiment, 1st Special Service Force, a combined Canadian-American organization.

Activated 9 July 1942 at Fort William Henry Harrison, Montana.

Disbanded 6 January 1945 in France

Reconstituted 15 April 1960 in the Regular Army; concurrently consolidated with Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Ranger Infantry Battalion (see Annex) and consolidated unit designated as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 8th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces. Activated 1 April 1963 at Fort Gulick, Canal Zone (organic elements concurrently constituted and activated).

ANNEX - Constituted 27 May 1942 in the Army of the United States Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Ranger Battalion. Activated 19 June 1942 at Carrickfergus, Northern Ireland. Redesignated 1 August 1943 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Ranger Infantry Battalion. Disbanded 15 August 1944 in the United States.

Reconstituted 1 September 1948 in the Army of the United States as Headquarters Company, 1st Infantry Battalion; concurrently, activated at Fort Gulick, Canal Zone. Inactivated 4 January 1950 at Fort Gulick, Canal Zone. Redesignated 24 November 1952 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Ranger Infantry Battalion and allotted to the Regular Army.

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT

World War II

Algeria-French Morocco
(with arrow-head)

Tunisia

Sicily (with arrow-head)

*Naples-Foggia (with arrow-head)

*Anzio (with arrow-head)

*Rome-Arno

Normandy (with arrow-head)

*Northern France

*Southern France (with arrow-head)

*Rhineland

Ardennes

Central Europe

*Aleutian Islands

*New Guinea

*Leyte (with arrow-head)

*Luzon

DECORATIONS

*Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered EL GUETTAR
(1st Ranger Battalion cited, WD GO 56, 1944)
*Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered SALERNO
(1st Ranger Battalion cited, WD GO 41, 1947)
Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered POINTE DU HOE
Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered SAAR RIVER AREA

9TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP, 1ST SPECIAL FORCES

Constituted 5 July 1942 in the Army of the United States as the 3d Company, 1st Battalion, First Regiment, 1st Special Service Force, a combined Canadian-American organization.

Activated 9 July 1942 at Fort William Henry Harrison, Montana.

Reconstituted 15 April 1960 in the Regular Army; concurrently consolidated with Company C, 1st Ranger Infantry Battalion (see Annex) and consolidated unit designated as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 9th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces. Withdrawn 14 December 1960 from the Regular Army and allotted to the Army Reserve (organic elements concurrently constituted) Group activated 1 February 1961 at Little Rock, Arkansas. Inactivated 31 January 1966 at Little Rock, Arkansas.

ANNEX - Constituted 27 May 1942 in the Army of the United States, Company C, 1st Ranger Battalion. Activated 19 June 1942 at Carrickfergus, Northern Ireland. Redesignated 1 August 1943 as Company C, 1st Ranger Infantry Battalion. Disbanded 15 August 1944 in the United States.

Reconstituted 1 September 1948 in the Army of the United States, Company C, 1st Infantry Battalion; concurrently, activated at Fort Gulick, Canal Zone. Inactivated 4 January 1950 at Fort Gulick, Canal Zone. Redesignated 24 November 1952 as Company C, 1st Ranger Infantry Battalion and allotted to the Regular Army.

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT

World War II

Algeria-French Morocco
(with arrow-head)
Tunisia
Sicily (with arrow-head)
Naples-Foggia (with arrow-head)
*Anzio (with arrow-head)
*Rome-Arno
Normandy (with arrow-head)

*Northern France
*Southern France (with arrow-head)
*Rhineland
Ardennes
Central Europe
*Aleutian Islands
*New Guinea
*Leyte (with arrow-head)
*Luzon

DECORATIONS

- *Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered EL GUETTAR
(1st Ranger Battalion cited, WD GO 56, 1944)
- *Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered SALERNO
(1st Ranger Battalion cited, WD GO 41, 1947)
- Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered POINTE DU HOE
- Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered SAAR RIVER AREA

10TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP, 1ST SPECIAL FORCES

Constituted 5 July 1942 in the Army of the United States as the 4th Company, 2d Battalion, First Regiment, 1st Special Service Force, combined Canadian-American organization.

Activated 9 July 1942 at Fort William Henry Harrison, Montana.

Disbanded 6 January 1945 in France.

Reconstituted 15 April 1960 in the Regular Army; concurrently consolidated with Company A, 2d Infantry Battalion (activated 1 April 1943), and consolidated unit redesignated as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 10th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces.

Consolidated 30 September 1960 with Headquarters and Headquarters company 10th Special Forces Group (constituted 19 May 1952 in the Regular Army and activated 11 June 1952 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina), and consolidated unit designated Headquarters and Headquarters company 10th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces (organic elements concurrently constituted and activated 20 March 1961).

(Former Company A, 2d Infantry Battalion, withdrawn 3 February 1986, consolidated with Company A, 75th Infantry, and consolidated unit redesignated as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment - hereafter separate lineage).

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT

World War II

- *Aleutian Islands
- *Naples-Foggia
- *Anzio
- *Rome-Arno
- *Southern France (with arrowhead)
- *Rhineland

DECORATIONS

None

11TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP, 1ST SPECIAL FORCES

Constituted 5 July 1942 in the Army of the United States as the 5th Company, 2d Battalion, First Regiment, 1st Special Service Force, a combined Canadian-American organization.

Activated 9 July 1942 at Fort William Henry Harrison, Montana.

Disbanded 6 January 1945 in France.

Reconstituted 15 April 1960 in the Regular Army; concurrently consolidated with Company B, 2d Infantry Battalion (activated 1 April 1943), and consolidated unit redesignated as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 11th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces.

Withdrawn 14 December 1960 from the Regular Army and allotted to the Army Reserve (organic elements concurrently constituted).

Group activated 1 March 1961 with Headquarters at Boston, Massachusetts.

(Location of Headquarters changed 22 March 1963 to Staten Island, New York; changed 31 March 1973 to Fort George G. Meade, Maryland).

(Former Company B, 2d Infantry Battalion, withdrawn 3 February 1986, consolidated Company P, 75th Infantry, and consolidated unit redesignated as Company P, 75th Ranger Regiment - hereafter separate lineage).

Home Area: First, Second, and Fourth United States Armies.

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT

World War II

- *Aleutian Islands
- *Naples-Foggia
- *Anzio
- *Rome-Arno
- *Southern France (with arrowhead)
- *Rhineland

DECORATIONS

None

12TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP, 1ST SPECIAL FORCES

Constituted 5 July 1942 in the Army of the United States as the 6th Company, 2d Battalion, First Regiment, 1st Special Service Force, a combined Canadian-American organization.

Activated 9 July 1942 at Fort William Henry Harrison, Montana.

Disbanded 6 January 1945 in France.

Reconstituted 15 April 1960 in the Regular Army; concurrently consolidated with Company C, 2d Infantry Battalion (activated 1 April 1943), and consolidated unit redesignated as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 12th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces.

Withdrawn 14 December 1960 from the Regular Army and allotted to the Army Reserve (organic elements concurrently constituted).

Group activated 24 March 1961 with Headquarters at Chicago, Illinois.

(Location of Headquarters changed 19 January 1964 to Oak Park, Illinois; changed 1 September 1970 to Arlington Heights, Illinois).

(Former Company C, 2d Infantry Battalion, withdrawn 3 February 1986, consolidated with Company A, 75th Infantry, and consolidated unit redesignated as Company A, 75th Ranger Regiment - hereafter separate lineage).

Home Area: Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth United States Armies.

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT

World War II

- *Aleutian Islands
- *Naples-Foggia
- *Anzio
- *Rome-Arno
- *Southern France (with arrowhead)
- *Rhineland

DECORATIONS

NONE

13TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP, 1ST SPECIAL FORCES

Constituted 5 July 1942 in the Army of the United States as the 1st Company, 1st Battalion, Second Regiment, 1st Special Service Force, joint Canadian-American organization.

Activated 9 July 1942 at Fort William Henry Harrison, Montana.

Disbanded 6 January 1945 in France

Reconstituted 15 April 1960 in the Regular Army; concurrently consolidated with Company A, 1st Ranger Infantry Battalion (see Annex) and consolidated unit designated as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 13th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces. Withdrawn 14 December 1960 from the Regular Army and allotted to the Army Reserve (organic elements concurrently constituted). Group activated 1 March 1961 with Headquarters at Jacksonville, Florida. Headquarters and Headquarters Company Inactivated 15 April 1966 at Jacksonville, Florida; organic elements inactivated 21 January 1966.

ANNEX - Organized 21 May 1943 in North Africa as Company A, 3d Ranger Battalion (Provisional). (Constituted 21 July 1943 in the Army of the United States as Company A, 3d Ranger Battalion.) Redesignated 1 August 1943 as Company A, 3d Ranger Infantry Battalion. Disbanded 15 August 1944 in the United States.

Reconstituted 25 October 1950 in the Regular Army as 3d Ranger Infantry Company. Activated 28 October 1950 at Fort Benning, Georgia. Inactivated 1 August 1951 in Korea. Redesignated 24 November 1952 as Company A, 3d Ranger Infantry Battalion.

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT

World War II

Algeria-French Morocco
(with arrow-head)
Tunisia
Sicily (with arrow-head)
*Naples-Foggia (with arrow-head)
*Anzio (with arrow-head)
*Rome-Arno
Normandy (with arrow-head)

*Northern France
*Southern France (with arrow-head)
*Rhineland
Ardennes
Central Europe
*Aleutian Islands
*New Guinea
*Leyte (with arrow-head)
*Luzon

Korean War

*First UN counteroffensive
*CCF spring offensive
*UN summer-fall offensive

DECORATIONS

Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered EL GUETTAR
(1st Ranger Battalion cited, WD GO 56, 1944)

*Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered SALERNO
(1st Ranger Battalion cited, WD GO 41, 1947)

Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered POINTE DU HOE

Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered SAAR RIVER AREA

*Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered
UIJONGBU CORRIDOR (3d Ranger Infantry Company cited; DA GO 20, 1953)

*Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered
KOREA (3d Ranger Infantry Company cited; DA GO 33, 1953 as amended by
DA GO 41, 1955).

17TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP, 1ST SPECIAL FORCES

Constituted 5 July 1942 in the Army of the United States as the 5th Company, 2d Battalion, Second Regiment, 1st Special Service Force, a combined Canadian-American organization.

Activated 9 July 1942 at Fort William Henry Harrison, Montana.

Disbanded 6 January 1945 in France

Reconstituted 15 April 1960 in the Regular Army; concurrently consolidated with Company B, 4th Ranger Infantry Battalion (see Annex) and consolidated unit designated as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 17th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces. Withdrawn 14 December 1960 from the Regular Army and allotted to the Army Reserve (organic elements concurrently constituted). Group activated 3 April 1961 with Headquarters at Boise, Idaho. (Location of Headquarters changed 1 September 1961 to Seattle, Washington.) Inactivated 31 January 1966 at Seattle, Washington.

ANNEX - Organized 29 May 1943 in North Africa as Company B, 4th Ranger Battalion (Provisional). (Constituted 21 July 1943 in the Army of the United States as Company B, 4th Ranger Battalion.) Redesignated 1 August 1943 as Company B, 4th Ranger Infantry Battalion. Disbanded 24 October 1944 at Camp Butner, North Carolina.

Reconstituted 2 November 1950 in the Regular Army as the 8th Ranger Infantry Company. Activated 20 November 1950 at Fort Benning, Georgia. Inactivated 1 August 1951 in Korea. Redesignated 24 November 1952 as Company B, 4th Ranger Infantry Battalion.

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT

World War II

Algeria-French Morocco (with arrow-head)	*Northern France
Tunisia	*Southern France (with arrow-head)
Sicily (with arrow-head)	*Rhineland
*Naples-Foggia (with arrow-head)	Ardennes
*Anzio (with arrow-head)	Central Europe
*Rome-Arno	*Aleutian Islands
Normandy (with arrow-head)	*New Guinea
	*Leyte (with arrow-head)
	*Luzon

Korean War

- *First UN Counteroffensive
- *CCF Spring Offensive
- *UN Summer-Fall Offensive

DECORATIONS

Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered EL GUETTAR
Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered SALERNO
Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered POINTE DU HOE
Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered SAAR RIVER AREA
*Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered
KOREA (8th Ranger Infantry Company cited; DA GO 33, 1953 as amended by
DA GO 41, 1955)

19TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP, 1ST SPECIAL FORCES

Constituted 5 July 1942 in the Army of the United States as the 1st Company, 1st Battalion, Third Regiment, 1st Special Service Force, a combined Canadian-American organization.

Activated 9 July 1942 at Fort William Henry Harrison, Montana.

Disbanded 6 January 1945 in France.

Reconstituted 15 April 1960 in the Regular Army; concurrently consolidated with Company A, 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion (activated 1 September 1943), and consolidated unit redesignated as Headquarters, 19th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces.

Withdrawn 1 May 1961 from the Regular Army and allotted to the Army National Guard; concurrently group organized from existing units in Utah with Headquarters at Fort Douglas.

Reorganized 1 April - 1 May 1963 to consist of elements in Utah and Montana; location of Headquarters changed 1 April 1963 to Salt Lake City, Utah.

Reorganized 3 January - 25 February 1966 to consist of elements in Utah, Montana, Maryland, Rhode Island, New York, and West Virginia.

Reorganized 1 December 1967 - 1 March 1968 to consist of elements in Utah, Montana, Maryland, Rhode Island, New York, West Virginia, and Colorado.

Reorganized 1 September 1972 - 1 February 1973 to consist of elements in Utah, Montana, New York, West Virginia, and Colorado.

Reorganized 1 April 1975 to consist of elements in Utah, Montana, West Virginia, and Colorado

Reorganized 28 February - 1 March 1979 to consist of elements in Utah, Montana, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and Colorado.

Reorganized 1 October 1979 to consist of elements in Utah, West Virginia, Colorado, and Rhode Island.

(Former Company A, 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion, withdrawn 3 February 1986, consolidated with Company G, 75th Infantry, and consolidated unit redesignated as Company G, 75th Ranger Regiment - hereafter separate lineage).

Home Area: Utah, West Virginia, Colorado, and Rhode Island.

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT

World War II

- *Aleutian Islands
- *Naples-Foggia
- *Anzio
- *Rome-Arno
- *Southern France (with arrowhead)
- *Rhineland

Headquarters Company (Salt Lake City, Utah) additionally entitled to:

World War II - AP

- Bismarck Archipelago
- Luzon (with arrowhead)
- Southern Philippines

Company A (North Providence Rangers, East Greenwich, Rhode Island), 2d Special Forces Battalion, additionally entitled to:

Revolutionary War

- Rhode Island 1777
- Rhode Island 1778

Civil War

- Bull Run
- Peninsula
- Manassas
- Fredericksburg
- Chancellorsville
- Gettysburg
- Wilderness
- Spotsylvania
- Cold Harbor
- Petersburg
- Shenandoah
- Appomattox
- Virginia 1863

DECORATIONS

Headquarters Company (Salt Lake City, Utah) entitled to:

Philippine Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered 17 October 1944 to 4 July 1945

20TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP, 1ST SPECIAL FORCES

Constituted 5 July 1942 in the Army of the United States as the 2d Company 1st Battalion, Third Regiment, 1st Special Service Force, a combined Canadian-American organization.

Activated 9 July 1942 at Fort William Henry Harrison, Montana.

Disbanded 6 January 1945 in France.

Reconstituted 15 April 1960 in the Regular Army; concurrently consolidated with Company B, 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion (activated 1 September 1943), and consolidated unit redesignated as Headquarters, 20th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces.

Withdrawn 8 July 1961 from the Regular Army and allotted to the Army National Guard; concurrently group organized from existing units in Alabama with Headquarters at Homewood.

Reorganized 15 February - 22 September 1963 to consist of elements in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi; location of Headquarters changed 15 April 1963 to Birmingham, Alabama.

Reorganized 15 January - 1 March 1966 to consist of elements in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and North Carolina.

Reorganized 1 December - 1 August 1968 to consist of elements in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi.

Reorganized 1 September - 1 October 1972 to consist of elements in Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Rhode Island, and Maryland.

Reorganized 15 September 1978 - 1 April 1979 to consist of elements in Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, and Maryland.

(Former Company B, 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion, withdrawn 3 February 1986, consolidated with Company I, 75th Infantry, and consolidated unit redesignated as Company I, 75th Ranger Regiment - hereafter separate lineage).

Home Area: Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, and Maryland.

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT

World War II

*Aleutian Islands
*Naples-Foggia
*Anzio
*Rome-Arno
*Southern France (with arrowhead)
*Rhineland

Headquarters Detachment (Huntsville, Alabama), 1st Special Forces Battalion, additionally entitled to:

*Korean War

First UN Counteroffensive
CCF Spring Offensive
UN Summer-Fall Offensive
Second Korean Winter
Korea Summer-Fall 1952
Third Korean Winter
Korea, Summer 1953

Company B (Mobile, Alabama), 1st Special Forces Battalion, additionally entitled to:

World War II - EAME

Ardennes-Alsace
Central Europe

DECORATIONS

Headquarters Detachment (Huntsville, Alabama), 1st Special Forces Battalion, entitled to:

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered KOREA

Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered KOREA 1950-1952

Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered KOREA 1951-1954

24TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP, 1ST SPECIAL FORCES

Constituted 5 July 1942 in the Army of the United States as the 6th Company, 2d Battalion, Third Regiment, 1st Special Service Force, a combined Canadian-American organization.

Activated 9 July 1942 at Fort William Henry Harrison, Montana.

Disbanded 6 January 1945 in France

Reconstituted 15 April 1960 in the Regular Army; concurrently consolidated with Company C, 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion (see Annex) and consolidated unit designated as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 24th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces. Withdrawn 14 December 1960 from the Regular Army and allotted to the Army Reserve (organic elements concurrently constituted). Group activated 6 January 1961 at Fort DeRussy, Hawaii. Inactivated 31 January 1966 at Fort DeRussy, Hawaii.

ANNEX - Constituted 16 December 1940 in the Army of the United States as Battery C, 98th Field Artillery Battalion. Activated 20 January 1941 at Fort Lewis, Washington. Converted and redesignated 25 September 1944 as Company C, 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion. Inactivated 30 December 1945 in Japan.

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT

World War II

Algeria-French Morocco
(with arrow-head)
Tunisia
Sicily (with arrow-head)
*Naples-Foggia (with arrow-head)
*Anzio (with arrow-head)
*Rome-Arno
Normandy (with arrow-head)

*Northern France
*Southern France (with arrow-head)
*Rhineland
Ardennes
Central Europe
*Aleutian Islands
*New Guinea
*Leyte (with arrow-head)
*Luzon

DECORATIONS

Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered EL GUETTAR
Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered SALERNO
Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered POINTE DU HOE
Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered SAAR RIVER AREA
Presidential Unit Citation (Army), Streamer embroidered CABU
(Company C, 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion cited; WD GO 26, 1945)
*Philippine Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered 17 OCTOBER
1944 TO 4 JULY 1945 (6th Ranger Infantry Battalion cited; DA GO 47,
1950).

**SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AWARDS, CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION
CREDITS AND UNIT CITATIONS**

SPECIAL FORCES AWARDS AND CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDITS¹

Headquarters & Headquarters Company, Others: (F) PHILPUC —
Jul & Aug 72

1st Special Forces Support Battalion, Others: (F) PHILPUC —
Jul & Aug 72

2nd Special Forces Battalion, Others: (F) PHILPUC —
Jul & Aug 72

5th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces:

Presidential Unit Citation — 1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 68

Meritorious Unit Commendation — 31 Jan 68 - 31 Dec 68,

DA GO 70, 69

RVN Gallantry Cross w/Palm — 1 Oct 64 - 17 May 69,

DA GO 59, 69 RVN Civil

Action Honor Medal, FC — Jan 68 - 24 Sep 70, DA GO 48, 71

Forward Operations Base #3 (Khe Sanh), Command and Control
Detachment (Da Nang)

Presidential Unit Citation — 20 Jan-1 Apr 68,

DA GO, 17, 69, amended DA GO 45, 68

Joint Combined Coordination Detachment

RVN Civil Actions Honor Medal FC — 30 Apr 68 - 24 Sep 70,

DA GO 48, 71

Luong son Detachment

Presidential Unit Citation — 25 Aug 66 - 4 Apr 67, DA GO

2, 73

Vietnam Recondo School

RVN Civil Actions Honor Medal, FC — Jan 68-24 Sep. 70,

DA GO 48, 71

Special Operations Augmentation, Command and Control Center

RVN Civil Actions Honor Medal, FC — 30 Apr 68 - 24 Sep 70,

DA GO 48, 71

Special Operations Augmentation, Command and Control North

RVN Civil Actions Honor Medal, FC — 30 Apr 68 - 24 Sep

70, DA GO 48, 71

¹DA PAM 672-3, Unit Citation and Campaign Participation Credit Register, January 1960 to February 1986 (Headquarters, DA, Washington: 29 January 1988).

RVN Gallantry Cross w/Palm — 18 May 69 - 16 Nov 70, DA GO
42, 72
Company D

RVN Gallantry Cross w/Palm — 18 May 69 - 16 Nov 70,
DA GO 42, 72, Others: (N)MUC — 1 Jan - 31 Oct 69,
DA GO 11, 73

Detachment A-101

Presidential Unit Citation — 20 Jan-1 Apr 68
DA GO 17, 69 amended DAGO 45, 68 which amended
DA GO 30, 68

Detachment A-149

Others: (N)MUC — 1 Jan-31 Oct 69,
DA GO 11, 73

Detachment A-245

Valorous Unit Award — 1 Apr-8 May 70,
DA GO 43, 72

Detachment A-322

RVN Gallantry Cross w/Palm — 18-25 Aug 68
DA GO 43, 69

Detachment A-401

Others: (N)MUC — 1 Jan-31 Oct 69,
DA GO 11, 73

Detachment A-402

Others: (N)MUC — 1 Jan-31 Oct 69,
DA GO 11, 73

Detachment A-403

Others: (N)MUC — 1 Jan-31 Oct 69,
DA GO 11, 73

Detachment A-404

Others: (N)MUC — 1 Jan-31 Oct 69,
DA GO 11, 73

Detachment A-405

Others: (N)MUC — 1 Jan-31 Oct 69,
DA GO 11, 73

Detachment A-411

Others: (N)MUC — 1 Jan-31 Oct 69,
DA GO 11, 73

Detachment A-412

Others: (N)MUC — 1 Jan-31 Oct 69,
DA GO 11, 73

Detachment A-414
Others: (N)MUC — 1 Jan-31 Oct 69,
DA GO 11, 73

Detachment A-415
Others: (N)MUC — 1 Jan-31 Oct 69,
DA GO 11, 73

Detachment A-416
Others: (N)MUC — 1 Jan-31 Oct 69,
DA GO 11, 73

Detachment A-421
Others: (N)MUC — 1 Jan-31 Oct 69,
DA GO 11, 73

Detachment A-431
Others: (N)MUC — 1 Jan-31 Oct 69,
DA GO 11, 73

Detachment A-432
Others: (N)MUC — 1 Jan-31 Oct 69,
DA GO 11, 73

Detachment A-433
Others: (N)MUC — 1 Jan-31 Oct 69,
DA GO 11, 73

Detachment A-442
Others: (N)MUC — 1 Jan-31 Oct 69,
DA GO 11, 73

Detachment A-502
RVN Civil Actions Honor Medal, FC — Jan 68-24 Sep 70,
DA GO 48, 71

Detachment A-503, 7th Mobile Strike Force Company
Valorous Unit Award — 4 Mar-4 Apr 68,
DA GO 59, 69

Detachment B-20, 1st Battalion Strike Force Company
Valorous Unit Award — 3-11 Apr 70,
DA GO 43, 72

Detachment B-20, 4th Battalion Strike Force
Valorous Unit Award — 8-29 Apr 70,
DA GO 43, 72

Detachment B-36
RVN Gallantry Cross w/Palm — 7 Jun 69-9 Feb 70,
DA GO 53, 70

Detachment B-40,
Others: (N)MUC — 1 Jan-31 Oct 69,
DA GO 11, 73

Detachment B-41,
Others: (N)MUC — 1 Jan-31 Oct 69,
DA GO 11, 73

Detachment B-42,
Others: (N)MUC — 1 Jan-31 Oct 69,
DA GO 11, 73

Detachment B-43
Others: (N)MUC — 1 Jan-31 Oct 69,
DA GO 11, 73

Detachment B-51
RVN Civil Actions Honor Medal, FC — Jan 68-24 Sep 70,
DA GO 48, 71

Detachment B-52
Valorous Unit Award — 4 Mar-4 Apr 68,
DA GO 59, 69, amended DAGO 5, 69
RVN Gallantry Cross w/Palm — 15 May 64 - 16 Aug 68,
DA GO 21, 69; 18 May 69-31 Jul 70, DAGO 42, 72,
RVN Civil Actions Honor Medal, FC — Jan 68-24 Sep 70,
DA GO 48, 71

Detachment B-53
RVN Gallantry Cross w/Palm — 18 May 69 - 16 Dec 70,
DA GO 42, 72,
RVN Civil Actions Honor Medal, FC - 23 Jan 68 - 24 Sep 70
DA GO 48, 71

Detachment B-55
Valorous Unit Award — 23-28 Aug-4 Apr 68,
DA GO 48, 71,
RVN Gallantry Cross w/Palm - 18 May 69 - 30 Dec 70,
RVN Civil Actions Honor Medal, FC — 23 May-24 Sep 70,
DA GO 48, 71

Detachment B-57
RVN Civil Actions Honor Medal, FC — 28 Feb 68-Apr 70
DA GO 48, 71

Detachment C-4,
Others: (N)MUC — 1 Jan-31 Oct 69,
DA GO 11, 73

23d Mobile Strike Force Company
Valorous Unit Award — 31 Jan-25 Feb 68,
DA GO 43, 70,

DA GO 11, 73

23d Mobile Strike Force Company
Valorous Unit Award — 31 Jan-25 Feb 68,
DA GO 43, 70,

26th Mobile Strike Force Company
Valorous Unit Award — 31 Jan-25 Feb 68,
DA GO 43, 70

USA Vietnam Individual Training Group/Forces
Armée Nationale Khmer (FANK) Training Command
Meritorious Unit Commendation — 24 Feb 71 - 30 Nov 72

Vietnam Recondo School 5th Special Forces Group,
1st Special Forces,
RVN Gallantry Cross w/Palm — 18 May 69-30 Dec 70,

USA Special Forces Epidemiological Survey Team
(Airborne), Presidential Unit Citation — 1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 68,
Meritorious Unit Commendation — 31 Jan-31 Dec 68,
RVN Gallantry Cross w/Palm — 30 Jun 67 - 17 May 69,
RVN Civil Actions Honor Medal, FC — Jan 68-24 Sep 70

Studies and Observation Group,
Meritorious Unit Commendation — 8 Mar 65 - 31 Aug 67,
1 Sep 67 - 31 Oct 68, 1 Nov 68 - 30 Jun 70

Special Operations Augmentation Command and Control Central,
RVN Gallantry Cross w/Palm — 18 May 69 - 31 Dec 70,

Special Operations Augmentation Command and Control North,
RVN Gallantry Cross w/Palm — 18 May 69 - 31 Dec 70,

Special Operations Augmentation Command and Control South,
RVN Gallantry Cross w/Palm — 18 May 69 - 31 Dec 70,

**U.S. ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES: ORDER OF BATTLE
VIETNAM¹**

U.S. Army Special Forces, Vietnam, Provisional: Sept 62 -- Sept 64
(had control of U.S. Army Special Forces in Vietnam)

5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces: 1 Oct 62 --
March 71 (successor to USASFVP)

Company A, 5th Special Forces Group, C-3 Operations Detachment,
Nov 64 - 1 Jan 71

Company B, 5th Special Forces Group, C-2 Operations Detachment,
Nov 64 - 15 Jan 71

Company C, 5th Special Forces Group, C-1 Operations Detachment,
Nov 64 - 11 Nov 70

Company D, 5th Special Forces Group, C-4 Operations Detachment,
Nov 64 - 16 Dec 70

Company E, 5th Special Forces Group, C-5 Operations Detachment,
Nov 64 - 31 Mar 71

Special Operations Augmentation, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne):
24 Jan 68 -- 1 Mar 71.

B-50 Detachment, Project OMEGA (Special Recon) Aug 66 -- Jun 72

B-51 Detachment (Vietnamese Special Forces Training Center):
Apr 64 -- Mar 71

B-52 Detachment, Project DELTA (Special Recon) 15 May 64 -- 30 Jun
70

B-53 Detachment, (Special Missions Advisory Force), Feb 64 -- Feb 71

B-55 Detachment, (5th Mobile Strike Force Command), 11 Feb 64 --
30 Dec 70

B-56 Detachment, Project SIGMA (Special Recon), Aug 66 -- 2 May 71

B-57 Detachment, Project GAMMA (Intelligence Collection): Jun 67 --
31 Mar 70

Military Assistance Command Vietnam Studies and Observation Group
(MACV-SOG): 16 Jan 64 -- 30 Apr 72

¹Shelby Stanton, Vietnam Order of Battle (Washington: 1984),
237-253.

U.S. Army Vietnam Individual Training Group (VITG), Forces Armée
Nationale Khmer Training Command (FANK): 1 Nov 70 -- 30 Dec 72

4th Psychological Operations Group 1 Dec 67 -- 2 Oct 71

7th Psychological Operations Group 20 Oct 65 -- 1 Dec 67

6th Psychological Operations Battalion, 7 Feb 66 -- 30 Jun 71

7th Psychological Operations Battalion, 1 Dec 67 -- 21 Dec 71

8th Psychological Operations Battalion, 1 Dec 67 -- 26 Jun 71

10th Psychological Operations Battalion, 1 Dec 67 -- 15 Apr 71

19th Psychological Operations Company, 19 Dec 66 -- 1 Jan 68

244th Psychological Operations Company, 19 Dec 66 -- 1 Jan 68

245th Psychological operations Company, 19 Dec 66 -- 1 Jan 68

246th Psychological Operations Company, 19 Dec 66 -- 1 Jan 68

2nd Civil Affairs Company, 6 Dec 66 -- 27 Jul 71

29th Civil Affairs company, 24 May 66 -- 26 Dec 71

41st Civil Affairs company, 26 Dec 65 -- 28 Feb 70

4th PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS GROUP¹

Constituted 7 November 1967 in the Regular Army as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 4th Psychological Operations Group.

Activated 1 December 1967 in Vietnam

Inactivated 2 October 1971 at Fort Lewis, Washington

Activated 13 September 1972 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT

Vietnam

Counteroffensive, Phase III
Tet Counteroffensive
Counteroffensive, Phase IV
Counteroffensive, Phase V
Counteroffensive, Phase VI
Tet/69 Counteroffensive
Summer-Fall 1969
Winter-Spring 1970
Counteroffensive, Phase VII
Consolidation I

DECORATIONS

Meritorious Unit Commendation, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1967-1968.

Meritorious Unit Commendation, Streamer embroidered SOUTHWEST ASIA.

¹USASOC History Archives.

96TH CIVIL AFFAIRS BATTALION¹

Constituted 25 August 1945 in the Army of the United States as the 96th Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment. Military Government Group

Activated 26 August 1945 at the Presidio of Monterey, California

Inactivated 25 January 1949 in Korea

Redesignated 10 May 1967 as the 96th Civil Affairs Group and allotted to the Regular Army

Activated 25 August 1967 at Fort Lee, Virginia

Reorganized and redesignated 26 November 1971 as the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion.

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT

Grenada
Defense of Saudi Arabia
Defense and Liberation of Kuwait
(Other campaigns to be determined)

DECORATIONS

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered
SOUTHWEST ASIA.

¹USASOC History Archives.

**CIVIL AFFAIRS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS UNITS
CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION AND
UNIT CITATIONS, VIETNAM**

Campaigns:

Vietnam Advisory Campaign, 15 Mar 62 - 7 Mar 65

Vietnam Defense Campaign, 8 Mar 65 - 24 Dec 65

Vietnam Counteroffensive, 25 Dec 65 - 30 Jun 66

Vietnam Counteroffensive, Phase II, 1 Jul 66 - 31 May 67 (Arrowhead authorized only for members of the 173d Airborne Brigade who participated in landing in the vicinity of Katum, RVN, between the hours of 0900-0907, inclusive on 27 Feb 67)

Vietnam Counteroffensive, Phase III, 1 Jun 67 - 29 Jan 68

Tet Counteroffensive, 30 Jan 68 - 1 Apr 68

Vietnam Counteroffensive, Phase V, 1 Jul 68 - 1 Nov 68

Vietnam Counteroffensive, Phase VI, 2 Nov 68 - 22 Feb 69

Tet 69 Counteroffensive, 23 Feb 68 - 8 Jun 69

Vietnam Summer-Fall 1969, 9 Jun 69 - 31 Oct 69

Vietnam Winter-Spring 1970, 1 Nov 69 - 30 Apr 70

DA Sanctuary Counteroffensive, 1 May 70 - 30 Jun 70

Vietnam Counteroffensive, Phase VII, 1 Jul 70 - 30 Jun 71

Consolidation I, 1 Jul 71 - 30 Nov 71

Consolidation II, 1 Dec 71 - 29 Mar 72

Vietnam CEASE-FIRE, 30 Mar 72 - 28 Jan 73

Units:

1st Civil Affairs Battalion

Others: (F)PHLIPUC — Jul-Aug 72 DA GO 54, 74

2d Civil Affairs Company

Meritorious Unit Commendation — 19 Nov 66 -

29 Feb 68, DAGO, 54, 68; 1 Mar 68 - 31 May 69,

DA GO 39, 70; 1 Jun 69 - 31 Jul 70,

DAGO 43, 72 RVN Civil Actions Honor Medal FC — 1 Mar 68 - 31 May 69;

DA GO 37, 70

6th Platoon
RVN Gallantry Cross w/Palm — 23 Mar - 31 Aug 68, DA GO 48, 71
7th Platoon
RVN Gallantry Cross w/Palm — Aug 67 - Jan 68, DA GO 48, 71
8th Platoon
RVN Gallantry Cross w/Palm — Aug 67 - Jan 68, DA GO 48, 71
9th Platoon
RVN Gallantry Cross w/Palm — Aug 67 - Jan 68, DA GO 48, 71

Headquarters and Headquarters Company

4th Psychological Operations Group
Meritorious Unit Commendation ---- 1 Dec 67 31 Dec 68, DA GO 36, 70
RVN Civil Actions Honor Medal FC-1 ---- 1 Dec 61- 1 Nov 70, DA GO 6,
74

29th Civil Affairs Company

Meritorious Unit Commendation — 9 Mar 70 - 8 Apr 71, DA GO 20, 73; 9
Apr - 1 Dec 71, DA GO 20, 73
RVN Gallantry Cross w/Palm — 1 Mar - 9 Oct 71, DA GO 6, 74
Others: (N) NUC — 12 Jun 66 - 30 Jun 68, DAGO 32, 73
3d, 4th, 5th, and 6th Platoons
Others: (N) PUC — 29 Mar 66 - 31 Mar 67, DA GO 59, 69
4th Platoon
Valorous Unit Award — 22 Apr - 20 Aug 67, DA GO 43, 72
7th Civil Affairs Platoon
RVN Gallantry Cross w/Palm — 18 Apr - 31 Aug 71 and 6 - 19 Sep
71, DA GO 6, 74

41st Psychological Operations Detachment

Meritorious Unit Commendation ---- Apr - 31 Dec 67 31 Dec 68, DA GO 36, 70

41st Civil Affairs Company

Meritorious Unit Commendation — 1 Jan - 31 Dec 67, DA GO 54, 68; 12
Jun - 31 Dec 66, and 1 Jan - 31 Jul 68, DA GO 45, 69
RVN Gallantry Cross w/Palm — 1 Aug 65 - 16 Apr 71, DA GO 54, 74
RVN Civil Actions Honor Medal, FC — 1 Jan 68 - 13 Sep 69, DA GO 43,
70

Vietnam Advisory Team 1

Valorous Unit Award — 22 Apr - 20 Aug 67, DA GO 43, 72

Team 4

Presidential Unit Citation — 25 Aug 66 - 4 Apr 67, DA GO 2, 73

Team 9

RVN Gallantry Cross w/Palm — 1-31 Jul 66 and 9 Dec 66 - 18 Jan 67,
DA GO 21, 69

51st Civil Affairs Company

Meritorious Unit Commendation — 9 Mar 70 - 8 Apr 71, DA GO 20, 73

51st Civil Affairs Platoon

Valorous Unit Award — 1 - 31 Oct 67, DA GO 39, 70

54th Civil Affairs Company

Meritorious Unit Commendation — 9 Mar 70 - 8 Apr 71, DA GO 20, 73

Civilian Irregular Defense Group, Dak Seang

Valorous Unit Award — 1 Apr - 8 May 70, DA GO 43, 72

Civilian Irregular Defense Group, Camp Plateau Gi

207th Company

Valorous Unit Award — 1-23 Apr 70, DA GO 43, 72

3d Psychological Operations Detachment

Meritorious Unit Commendation — Oct 68 - Jun 70, DA GO 37, 72

Headquarters and Headquarters Company,

6th Psychological Operations Battalion

Meritorious Unit Commendation — Feb 66 - Apr 67 DA GO, 17, 68; 1 Dec 67, 31 Dec 68 DA GO 36, 70

RVN Civil Actions Honor Medal, FC — 1 Dec 67 - 1 Nov 70, DA GO 6, 74

Company B, 5th Field Detachment

RVN Gallantry Cross w/Palm — 1 Mar - 30 Oct 70, DA GO 55, 71

Remarks: Attached, 11th Armored Cavalry

7th Psychological Operations Group

Meritorious Unit Commendation — Oct 65 - Mar 67, DA GO 43, 67; 1 Apr 67 - 30 Sep 68, DA GO 59, 69; Oct 68 - Jun 70, DAGO 37, 72; May 72 -

Jan 73, DA GO 10, 75

Augmentation 7th PSYOP Group, Japan

Meritorious Unit Commendation — Oct 68 - Jun, 70, DA GO 37, 72

Augmentation, 7th PSYOP Group Okinawa

Meritorious Unit Commendation — Oct 68 - Jun 70, DA GO 37, 72

Augmentation, 7th PSYOP Group, Taiwan

Meritorious Unit Commendation — Oct 68 - Jun 70, DA GO 37, 72

8th Psychological Operations Group

Meritorious Unit Commendation — 1 Dec 67 - 31 Dec 68, DA GO 36, 70

RVN Civil Actions Honor Medal, FC — 1 Nov 67 - 30 Jun 71, DA GO 6, 74; 1 Dec 67 - 1 Nov 70, DA GO 6, 74 (Attached, 4th PSYOP Op)

15th Psychological Operations Detachment

Meritorious Unit Commendation — Oct 68 - June 70, DA GO 37, 72

16th Psychological Operations Company

Meritorious Unit Commendation — Oct 68 - Jun 70, DA GO 37, 72

24th Psychological Operations Detachment

Meritorious Unit Commendation — Oct 68 - Jun 70, DA GO 37, 72

26th Psychological Operations Company

Meritorious Unit Commendation — Feb 66 - Apr 67, DA GO, 17, 68

38th Psychological Operations Detachment
Meritorious Unit Commendation — 30 Apr - 31 Dec 68, DA GO 36, 70

40th Psychological Operations Detachment
Meritorious Unit Commendation — 30 Apr - 31 Dec 68, DA GO 68, DAGO
36, 70

41st Psychological Operations Detachment
Meritorious Unit Commendation — 30 Apr - 31 Dec 68, DA GO 36, 70

244th Psychological Operations Detachment
Valorous Unit Award — 4-31 Oct 67, DA GO 39, 70
Meritorious Unit Commendation — Oct 68 - Jun 70, DA GO 37, 72

245th Psychological Operations Company
Meritorious Unit Commendation — Feb 66 - Apr 67, DA GO 17, 68
RVN Gallantry Cross w/Palm — 1-31 Jul 66 and
9 Dec 66 - 18 Jan 67, DA GO 21, 69

Team B
Presidential Unit Citation — 25 Aug 66 - 4 Apr 67, DA GO 2, 73
Headquarters and Headquarters Company,
245th Supply and Service Battalion
Meritorious Unit Commendation — 1 Jan 67 - 31 Dec 68, DA GO 75, 69

246th Psychological Operations Company
Meritorious Unit Commendation — Feb 66 - Apr 67, DA GO 17, 68

USA Psychological Operations Company
Meritorious Unit Commendation — Oct 68 - Jun 70, DA GO 40, 72

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES, CIVIL AFFAIRS, PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND
MISCELLANEOUS UNIT CITATIONS AND CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDITS, WWII - VN

UNIT	*CAMPAIGNS	DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION (DUC)	MERITORIOUS UNIT COMMEN- DATION (MUC)	A - Assault Landings F - Foreign Unit Awards N - Navy Unit Awards O - Occupation Credit R - Remarks
2d Mobile Radio Broadcasting Unit	-----25, 26, 30, 32, 34-----			O - 2 May 45- 18 Jan 46, Germany
2d Civil Affairs Units Claims Team No. 2	---30, 32-----			O - 8 May - 30 Jun 1945, Germany
Philippine Civil Affairs Unit No. 2	-----13, 14, 15-----			F-56, 7 Dec 41 - 10 May 42 or 17 Oct 44 - 4 Jul 45, DA GO 47-50
1st European Civil Affairs Regiment	-----32			
Headquarters Detachment and Company G	-----30, 32			
Company H	-----30, 32, 34			
Headquarters and Service Company and Company K, and CA	-----32, 34			
Detachment A1A1 Detachment A2L1 and Company L	-----32-----			25 Aug 44 - - 1 Jan 4 GO 11, Hqs Southern Lines of Communication, 10 Feb 45

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES, CIVIL AFFAIRS, PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND
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UNIT	*CAMPAIGNS	DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION (DUC)	MERITORIOUS UNIT COMMEN- DATION (MUC)	A - Assault Landings F - Foreign Unit Awards N - Navy Unit Awards O - Occupation Credit R - Remarks
1st Filipino Infantry Regiment	-----13, 15-----			F-56, 7 Dec 41 - 10 May 42 or 17 Oct 44 - 4 Jul 45, DA GO 47-50
Civil Affairs Sec Headquarters	-----14-----			F-56, 7 Dec 41 - 10 May 42 or 17 Oct 44 - 4 Jul 45, DA GO 47-50
3d European Civil Affairs Regiment	-----25, 26, 32, 34-----			R-25 Campaign, Co E, DP8 Co F & Det FLD-3 only R-26 Campaign, Co A, B, DP-8 Co F, Det 1513, Co I, Det FLD-3, Det E113, Co I only R-34 Campaign, Co A, B, D, E, H and Det FLD-3 only O - 20 May-15 Aug 45, Germany
3d Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company	-----25, 26, 30, 32, 34-----			O - 2 May - 31 Oct 45, Germany

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MISCELLANEOUS UNIT CITATIONS AND CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDITS, WWII - VN

UNIT	*CAMPAIGNS	DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION (DUC)	MERITORIOUS UNIT COMMEN- DATION (MUC)	A - Assault Landings F - Foreign Unit Awards N - Navy Unit Awards O - Occupation Credit R - Remarks
Philippine Civil Affairs Unit No. 3	-----13, 14, 15-----			F-56, 7 Dec 41 - 10 May 42 or 17 Oct 44 - 4 Jul 45, DA GO 47-50
4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company	-----25, 34-----			F-57, 19 Sep 50 - 31 Jul 52, DA GO 41-55
Philippine Civil Affairs Unit No. 4	-----13, 14, 15-----			F-56, 7 Dec 41 - 10 May 42 or 17 Oct 44 - 4 Jul 45, DA GO 47-50
Philippine Civil Affairs Unit No. 5	-----13, 14, 15-----			F-56, 7 Dec 41-10 May 42 or 17 Oct 44 - 4 Jul 45, DA GO 47-50
Philippine Civil Affairs Unit No. 6	-----13, 14, 15-----			F-56, 7 Dec 41 - 10 May 42 or 17 Oct 44 - 4 Jul 45, DA GO 47-50
Philippine Civil Affairs Unit No. 8	-----13, 14, 15-----			F-56, 7 Dec 41 - 10 May 42 or 17 Oct 44 - 4 Jul 45, DA GO 47-50

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 MISCELLANEOUS UNIT CITATIONS AND CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDITS, WWII - VN

UNIT	*CAMPAIGNS	DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION (DUC)	MERITORIOUS UNIT COMMEN- DATION (MUC)	A - Assault Landings F - Foreign Unit Awards N - Navy Unit Awards O - Occupation Credit R - Remarks
Philippine Civil Affairs Unit No. 9	-----13, 14-----			A - Simara Island, 12 Mar 45, WD GO 109 - 46, Det A - Mindoro Island, 15 Dec 44, WD GO 109-46 F-56, 7 Dec 41- 10 May 42 or 17 Oct 44 - 4 Jul 45, DA GO 47-50
Philippine Civil Affairs Unit No. 11	-----14, 15-----			A - Nasugbu Point, Luzon, PI, 31 Jan 45, WD GO 109-46 F-56, 7 Dec 41 - 10 May 42 or 17 Oct 44 - 4 Jul 45, DA GO 47-50
12th Philippine Civil Affairs Unit	-----13, (14), 20-----			A - Nasugbu Point, Luzon, 31 Jan 45, WD GO 109 -46, Det only F-56, 7 Dec 41 - 10 May 42 or 17 Oct 44 - 4 Jul 45, DA GO 47-50 R-(14) Campaign, Det only

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A - Assault Landings
 F - Foreign Unit Awards
 N - Navy Unit Awards
 O - Occupation Credit
 R - Remarks

UNIT	*CAMPAIGNS	DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION (DUC)	MERITORIOUS UNIT COMMEN- DATION (MUC)	
Philippine Civil Affairs Unit No. 13	-----13, 20	-----	-----	F-56, 7 Dec 41 - 10 May 42 or 17 Oct 44 - 4 Jul 45, DA GO 47-50
14th Philippine Civil Affairs Unit	-----13, 20	-----	-----	F-56, 7 Dec 41 - 10 May 42 or 17 Oct 44 - 4 Jul 45, DA GO 47-50
15th Philippine Civil Affairs Unit	-----13, 20	-----	-----	F-56, 7 Dec 41- 10 May 42 or 17 Oct 44 - 4 Jul 45, DA GO 47-50
Philippine Civil Affairs Unit No. 16	-----13, 14	-----	-----	F-56, 7 Dec 41 - 10 May 42 or 17 Oct 44 - 4 Jul 45, DA GO 47-50
17th Philippine Civil Affairs Unit	-----13, 20	-----	-----	A - Macajalar Bay, Mindanao, PI 10 May 45, WD GO 109-46 F-56, 7 Dec 41 - 10 May 42 or 17 Oct 44 - 4 Jul 45, DA GO 47-50

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 MISCELLANEOUS UNIT CITATIONS AND CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDITS, WWII - VN

UNIT	*CAMPAIGNS	DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION (DUC)	MERITORIOUS UNIT COMMEN- DATION (MUC)	A - Assault Landings F - Foreign Unit Awards N - Navy Unit Awards O - Occupation Credit R - Remarks
Philippine Civil Affairs Unit No. 18	-----14-----	-----	-----	F-56, 7 Dec 41 - 10 May 42 or 17 Oct 44 - 4 Jul 45, DA GO 47-50
Philippine Civil Affairs Unit No. 19	-----13, 14-----	-----	-----	F-56, 7 Dec 41 - 10 May 42 or 17 Oct 44 - 4 Jul 45, DA GO 47-50
20th Philippine Civil Affairs Unit	-----14-----	-----	-----	F-56, 7 Dec 41 - 10 May 42 or 17 Oct 44 - 4 Jul 45, DA GO 47-50
Philippine Civil Affairs Unit No. 21	-----13, 14-----	-----	-----	F-56, 7 Dec 41 - 10 May 42 or 17 Oct 44 - 4 Jul 45, DA GO 47-50
Philippine Civil Affairs Unit No. 22	-----14-----	-----	-----	F-56, 7 Dec 41 - 10 May 42 or 17 Oct 44 - 4 Jul 45, DA GO 47-50

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 MISCELLANEOUS UNIT CITATIONS AND CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDITS, WWII - VN

UNIT	*CAMPAIGNS	DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION (DUC)	MERITORIOUS UNIT COMMEN- DATION (MUC)	A - Assault Landings F - Foreign Unit Awards N - Navy Unit Awards O - Occupation Credit R - Remarks
Philippine Civil				
Affairs Unit No. 23	-----13, 20-----			F-56, 7 Dec 41 - 10 May 42 or 17 Oct 44 - 4 Jul 45, DA GO 47-50
24th Philippine Civil				
Affairs Unit	-----13, 20-----			F-56, 7 Dec 41 - 10 May 42 or 17 Oct 44 - 4 Jul 45, DA GO 47-50
25th Philippine Civil				
Affairs Unit	-----13-----			F-56, 7 Dec 41 - 10 May 42 or 17 Oct 44 - 4 Jul 45, DA GO 47-50
Philippine Civil				
Affairs Unit No. 26	-----13, 20-----			F-56, 7 Dec 41 - 10 May 42 or 17 Oct 44 - 4 Jul 45, DA GO 47-50
27th Philippine Civil				
Affairs Unit	-----13, 14-----			F-56, 7 Dec 41 - 10 May 42 or 17 Oct 44 - 4 Jul 45, DA GO 47-50

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 MISCELLANEOUS UNIT CITATIONS AND CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDITS, WWII - VN

UNIT	*CAMPAIGNS	DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION (DUC)	MERITORIOUS UNIT COMMEN- DATION (MUC)	A - Assault Landings F - Foreign Unit Awards N - Navy Unit Awards O - Occupation Credit R - Remarks
Philippine Civil Affairs Unit No. 28	-----13	-----	-----	F-56, 7 Dec 41 - 10 May 42 or 17 Oct 44 - 4 Jul 45, DA GO 47-50
Philippine Civil Affairs Unit No. 29	-----13, 20	-----	-----	F-56, 7 Dec 41 - 10 May 42 or 17 Oct 44 - 4 Jul 45, DA GO 47-50
30th Philippine Civil Affairs Unit	-----13, 20	-----	-----	F-56, 7 Dec 41 - 10 May 42 or 17 Oct 44 - 4 Jul 45, DA GO 47-50
6637th Civil Affairs Regiment	-----37	-----	-----	
6822d Psychological Warfare Detachment	-----25, 26, 34	-----	-----	O - 2 May-31 Oct 45, Germany
6824th Civil Affairs (Austria)	-----	-----	1 Aug 45- 1 Mar 46 GO 128, Hqs, US Forces in Austria, 31 Dec 46, Hqs & Hqs Co only	O - 15 Aug-31 Oct 45, Germany

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MISCELLANEOUS UNIT CITATIONS AND CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDITS, WWII - VN

UNIT	*CAMPAIGNS	DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION (DUC)	MERITORIOUS UNIT COMMEN- DATION (MUC)	A - Assault Landings F - Foreign Unit Awards N - Navy Unit Awards O - Occupation Credit R - Remarks
5th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company	-----25-----			O - 5 Jul-31 Oct 45, Germany
30th Military Govern- ment Headquarters	-----			O - 15 Nov 45-5 Mar 46 Japan
Office of the Provost Marshal, Tacloban, Office of Psychological Warfare Det, USAFPAC	---29-----			F-56, 7 Dec 41-10 May 42, 17 Oct 44 - 4 Jul 45, DA GO 47-50
101st Office of Strategic Services Unit Det	-----5, 12-----	8 May-15 Jun 45 WD GO 7-46	-----	A - Lawksawk, Burma, 9 Apr, 13 Apr, and 11 May 45, WD GO 109-46 A - Heshi Burma, 23 Apr 45, WD GO 109-46 A - Rangoon Burma, 2 May 45, WD GO 109-46 A - Mongkung Burma, 11 Apr 45, WD GO 109-46 A - Ramree Island, Burma, 27 Jan 45, WD GO 109-46 A - Indaw, Burma, 2 May 45, WD GO 109-46

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UNIT	*CAMPAIGNS	DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION (DUC)	MERITORIOUS UNIT COMMEN- DATION (MUC)	A - Assault Landings F - Foreign Unit Awards N - Navy Unit Awards O - Occupation Credit R - Remarks
OSS Germany	-----			O - 15 Aug-30 Sep 45, Germany
404th Office of Strategic Services	-----5-----			A - Malaya, 6 Dec 44 and 18 May 45, WD GO 109-46 A - Rangoon, Burma, 2 May 45, WD GO 109-46 A - Akyab, Burma, 3 Jan 45, WD GO 109-46 A - Ramree Island 21 Jan 45, WD GO 109-46 A - Thailand, 28 May 45, WD GO 109-46
Psychological Warfare Detachment, USAF, Pac	-----13-----			F-56, 7 Dec 41 - 10 May 42 or 17 Oct 44 - 4 Jul 45, DA GO 47-50
Luzon Forces, USAFFE	-----18-----	7 Dec 41 - 10 May 42 WD GO 22-42, as amended by DA GO 46-48		F-56, 7 Dec 41 - 10 May 42 or 17 Oct 44 - 4 Jul 45, DA GO 47-50

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UNIT	*CAMPAIGNS	DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION (DUC)	MERITORIOUS UNIT COMMEN- DATION (MUC)	A - Assault Landings F - Foreign Unit Awards N - Navy Unit Awards O - Occupation Credit R - Remarks
Mindanao Forces, USAFFE	---18-----	7 Dec 41----- - 10 May 42 WD GO 22-42, as amended by DA GO 46-48		F-56, 7 Dec 41 - 10 May 42 or 17 Oct 44 - 4 Jul 45, DA GO 47-50
Psychological Warfare Division, G-3 Section, Headquarters Eighth USA	-----			F-57, 28 Jun 50 - 28 Apr 52, DA GO 86-52
Psychological Warfare Section, General Head- quarters, Far East Command	-----			F-57, 28 Jun 50 - 28 Apr 52, DA GO 86-52
6822d Psychological Warfare Detachment	-----25, 26, 34-----			O - 2 May - 31 Oct 45, Germany
Military Government (Augmentation British Commonwealth Division)	-----47, 48-----			R-47, Campaign dates 10 Jan - 30 Apr 53
Forward Echelon, Head- quarters European Civil Affairs Division	----- (30)-----			(30) Campaign, Forward Echelon Det, Hqs Co Fwd Echelon Plat PC
European Civil Affairs Division	----- (32), (34)-----			O - 20 May - 31 Oct 45, Germany

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES, CIVIL AFFAIRS, PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND
 MISCELLANEOUS UNIT CITATIONS AND CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDITS, WWII - VN

UNIT	*CAMPAIGNS	DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION (DUC)	MERITORIOUS UNIT COMMEN- DATION (MUC)	A - Assault Landings F - Foreign Unit Awards N - Navy Unit Awards O - Occupation Credit R - Remarks
European Civil Affairs	Medical Group -----32, 34			R - (32) campaign, Repl Tng Bn; Hq & Hq Co & Svc Co R - (34) campaign, Hq & HQ Co & Svc Co
Civil Affairs Detach- ment (ETO)	-----			R - Information in Office of the Adjutant General
Alamo Scout Team	-----13-----			A- Leyte, 20-22 Oct 44, WD GO 109-46
8240th Army Unit: Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activi- ties in Korea	-----45, 46-----			F-57, 19 Sep 50 - 31 Jul 52, DA GO 41-55 R-45, Campaign dates 15 Feb-30 Apr 52 R-46, Campaign dates 1 May-26 Sep 52 R - 8240 Combined Comd for Recon Activities in Korea, redesignated 8242 AU Combined for Recon Activities in Korea, 27 Sep 52

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MISCELLANEOUS UNIT CITATIONS AND CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDITS, WWII - VN

UNIT	*CAMPAIGNS	DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION (DUC)	MERITORIOUS UNIT COMMEN- DATION (MUC)	A - Assault Landings F - Foreign Unit Awards N - Navy Unit Awards O - Occupation Credit R - Remarks
Civil Affairs Detach- ment, USAFFE	-----14-----			F-56, 7 Dec 41 - 10 May 42 or 17 Oct 44 - 4 Jul 45, DA GO 47-50
UN Partisan Infantry, Korea	-----			F-57, 11 Jul 52 - 1 Oct 53, DA GO 24-57 R - 8240th AU UN Partisan Inf Korea redesign 8240 AU Far East Liaison Det Korea 28 Sep 53
8242d Army Unit, Combined Command for Recon- naissance Activities	-----46, 47, 48-----			F-57, 11 Jul 52 - 1 Oct 53, DA GO 24-54 R-46, Campaign dates 27 Sep - 30 Nov 52 R - Unit redesignated from 820th AU, Combined for Recon Activities in Korea 27 Sep 52
8201st Army Unit Korean Civil Assistance Command	---48-----			F-57, 19 Sep 50 - 31 Jul 52, DA GO 41-55 F-57, 10 Dec 50 - 30 Sep 53, DA GO 45, 54

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UNIT	*CAMPAIGNS	DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION (DUC)	MERITORIOUS UNIT COMMEN- DATION (MUC)	A - Assault Landings F - Foreign Unit Awards N - Navy Unit Awards O - Occupation Credit R - Remarks
				R-48, Campaign dates 1-27 Jul 53
UN Civil Assistance Command, Korea	-----41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48			F-57, 19 Sep 50 - 31 Jul 52, DA GO 41-55 F-57, 11 Jul 52 - 1 Oct 53, DA GO 24-54 R-41, Campaign dates, 4 Nov-24 Jan 51 R-48, Campaign dates, 1 May - 30 Jun 53 R - Unit was awarded ROK PUC. Period 1 Oct 53 - 30 Nov 55
3d European Civil Affairs Regiment	-----			R - Redesignated 3d M.I. Government Regiment
2677th Office of Strategic Services Regiment	-----35			
8239th Army Unit, 4th Broadcasting Company	-----45, 46, 47, 48			R-45, Campaign dates 18 Jan - 30 Apr 53
Korean Civil Assistance Command, Korean Communication Zone	-----			F-57, 11 Jul 52 - 1 Oct 53, DA GO 24-54

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 MISCELLANEOUS UNIT CITATIONS AND CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDITS, WWII - VN

UNIT	*CAMPAIGNS	DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION (DUC)	MERITORIOUS UNIT COMMEN- DATION (MUC)	A - Assault Landings F - Foreign Unit Awards N - Navy Unit Awards O - Occupation Credit R - Remarks
Office of Strategic Services, Hq & Hq Det -----7				
1st Special Forces Group				
1st Special Forces -----			-1 Jan 72 - 31 Jan 73 amended DA GO 22, 76	
2d Civil Affairs Company -----			-19 Nov 66 - 29 Feb 68 DA GO 54, 68 1 Mar 68 - 31 May 69 DA GO 39, 70 1 Jun 69 - 31 Jul 70 DA GO 43, 72	----- R - 6th Platoon RVN Gallantry Cross w/Palm, 23 Mar - 31 Aug 68, DA GO 48, 71 7th Platoon RVN Gallantry Cross w/Palm, Aug 67-Jan 68 DA GO 48, 71 8th Platoon RVN Gallantry Cross w/Palm, Aug 67-Jan 68 DA GO 48, 71 9th Platoon RVN Gallantry Cross w/Palm, Aug 67-Jan 68 DA GO 48, 71
3d Psychological Operations Detachment -----			-Oct 68 - Jun 70 DA GO 37, 72	

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MISCELLANEOUS UNIT CITATIONS AND CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDITS, WWII - VN

UNIT	*CAMPAIGNS	DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION (DUC)	MERITORIOUS UNIT COMMEN- DATION (MUC)	A - Assault Landings F - Foreign Unit Awards N - Navy Unit Awards O - Occupation Credit R - Remarks
HHC, 4th Psychological Operations Group	-----	-1 Dec 67 - 31 Dec 68 DA GO 36, 70	-----	R - RVN Civil Actions Honor Medal, FC - 1 Dec 67 - 1 Nov 70 DA GO 6, 74
5th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces	-----	-31 Jan-31 Dec 68 -- DA GO 70, 69	--	R - Pres Unit Citation 1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 68 DA GO 45, 69 superseded DA GO 48, 68 RVN Gallantry Cross w/Palm, 1 Oct 64 - 17 May 69, DA GO 59, 69 RVN Civil Actions Honor Medal, FC - Jan 68 - 24 Sep 70, DA GO 48, 71
7th Psychological Operations Group	-----	-Oct 65 - Mar 67---- DA GO 43, 67 1 Apr 67 - 30 Sep 68 DA GO 59, 69 Oct 68 - Jun 70 DA GO 37, 72 May 72 - Jan 73 DA GO 10, 75	----	R - Augmentation - Japan, Oct 68-Jun 70 DA GO 37, 72 Okinawa, Oct 68-Jun 70, DA GO 37, 72 Taiwan, Oct 68 - Jun 70, DA GO 37, 72

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UNIT	*CAMPAIGNS	DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION (DUC)	MERITORIOUS UNIT COMMEN- DATION (MUC)	A - Assault Landings F - Foreign Unit Awards N - Navy Unit Awards O - Occupation Credit R - Remarks
7th Special Forces Group (Airborne)	-----			R - 3d Bn, Army Superior Unit Award, 1 Mar 85 - 1 Sep 86, DA GO 30, 87
8th Psychological Operations Battalion	-----		1 Dec 67 - 31 Dec 68 DA GO 36, 70	R - RVN Civil Actions Honor Medal, FC, 6 May 68 - 15 Jan 71 DA GO 51, 71
10th Psychological Operations Battalion	-----		1 Dec 67 - 31 Dec 68 DA GO 36, 70	R - RVN Civil Actions Honor Medal, FC, 1 Dec 67 - 1 Nov 70 DA GO 6, 74
HHC, 14th Psychological Operations Battalion	-----		Oct 68-Jun 70 DA GO 37, 72	
15th Psychological Operations Detachment	-----		Oct 68-Jun 70 DA GO 37, 72	
16th Psychological Operations Company	-----		Oct 68-Jun 70 DA GO 37, 72	

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UNIT	*CAMPAIGNS	DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION (DUC)	MERITORIOUS UNIT COMMEN- DATION (MUC)	A - Assault Landings F - Foreign Unit Awards N - Navy Unit Awards O - Occupation Credit R - Remarks
18th Psychological Operations Company	-----	Oct 68-Jun 70 DA GO 37, 72		
23d Mobile Strike Force Company, 5th Special Forces Group	-----			R - Valorous Unit Award 31 Jan - 25 Feb 68 DA GO 43, 70
24th Psychological Operations Detachment	-----	Oct 68-Jun 70 DA GO 37, 72		
26th Mobile Strike Force Company, 5th Special Forces Group	-----			R - Valorous Unit Award 31 Jan - 25 Feb 68 DA GO 43, 70
26th Psychological Operations Company	-----	Feb 66-Apr 67 DA GO 17, 68		
29th Civil Affairs Company	-----	9 Mar 70----- - 8 Apr 71 DA GO 20, 73		R - RVN Gallantry Cross w/Palm, 1 Mar - 9 Oct 71, DA GO 6, 74 (N) NUC, 12 Jun 66 - 30 Jun 68, DA GO 32, 73

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UNIT	*CAMPAIGNS	DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION (DUC)	MERITORIOUS UNIT COMMEN- DATION (MUC)	A - Assault Landings F - Foreign Unit Awards N - Navy Unit Awards O - Occupation Credit R - Remarks
				3d, 4th, 5th, 6th Plt (N) PUC, 29 Mar 66 - 31 Mar 67, DA GO 59, 69 4th Platoon, Valorous Unit Award, 22 Apr - 20 Aug 67, DA GO 43, 72 7th CA Plt, RVN Gallantry Cross w/Palm, 18 Apr - 31 Aug 71 and 6-19 Sep 71, DA GO 6, 74
38th Psychological Operations Detachment	-----		30 Apr-31 Dec 68 DA GO 36, 70	
39th Psychological Operations Detachment	-----		30 Apr-31 Dec 68 DA GO 36, 70	
40th Psychological Operations Detachment	-----		30 Apr-31 Dec 68 DA GO 36, 70	
41st Civil Affairs Company	-----		1 Jan-31 Dec 67---- DA GO 54, 68 12 Jun-31 Dec 66 and 1 Jan-31 Jul 68 DA GO 45, 69	R - RVN Gallantry Cross w/Palm, 1 Aug 65 - 16 Apr 71, DA GO 54, 74 RVN Civil Actions

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UNIT	*CAMPAIGNS	DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION (DUC)	MERITORIOUS UNIT COMMEN- DATION (MUC)	A - Assault Landings F - Foreign Unit Awards N - Navy Unit Awards O - Occupation Credit R - Remarks
				Medal, FC, 1 Jan 68 - 13 Sep 69, DA GO 43, 70 Vietnam Advisory Team 1, Valorous Unit Award, 22 Apr - 20 Aug 67, DA GO 43, 72 Team 4, Pres Unit Citation, 25 Aug 66 - 4 Apr 67, DA GO 2, 73 Team 9, RVN Gallantry Cross w/Palm, 1-31 Jul 66 and 9 Dec 66 - 18 Jan 67, DA GO 21, 69
41st Psychological Operations Detachment	-----		30 Apr-31 Dec 68 DA GO 36, 70	
51st Civil Affairs Company	-----		9 Mar 70 - 8 Apr 71 DA GO 20, 73	
51st Civil Affairs Platoon	-----		1-31 Oct 67 DA GO 39, 70	

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UNIT	*CAMPAIGNS	DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION (DUC)	MERITORIOUS UNIT COMMEN- DATION (MUC)	A - Assault Landings F - Foreign Unit Awards N - Navy Unit Awards O - Occupation Credit R - Remarks
53d Civil Affairs Company	-----	1 May-30 Nov 69 DA GO 53, 70	R - RVN Civil Actions Honor Medal, FC, 1 Oct 69-15 Dec 70 DA GO 24, 72	
54th Civil Affairs Company	-----	9 Mar 70 - 8 Apr 71 DA GO 20, 73		
244th Psychological Operations Company	-----	Feb 66-Apr 67 DA GO 17, 68	R - (N) PUC, 5-21 Apr 67, DA GO 32, 73 (N) NUC, 6 May 65 - 30 Nov 67, DA GO 32, 73 Detachment (N) PUC 1 Dec 66 - 31 Mar 67 DA GO 59, 69	
244th Psychological Operations Detachment	-----	Oct 68-Jun 70 DA GO 37, 72	R - Valorous Unit Award 4-31 Oct 67, DA GO 39, 70	
246th Psychological Operations Company	-----	Feb 66-Apr 67 DA GO 17, 68		

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UNIT	*CAMPAIGNS	DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION (DUC)	MERITORIOUS UNIT COMMEN- DATION (MUC)	A - Assault Landings F - Foreign Unit Awards N - Navy Unit Awards O - Occupation Credit R - Remarks
Special Operations Augmentation Command and Control Central	-----			R - RVN Gallantry Cross w/Palm, 18 May 69 - 31 Dec 70, DA GO 42, 72
Special Operations Augmentation Command and Control North	-----			R - RVN Gallantry Cross w/Palm, 18 May 69 - 31 Dec 70, DA GO 42, 72
Special Operations Augmentation Command and Control South	-----			R - RVN Gallantry Cross w/Palm, 18 May 69 - 31 Dec 70, DA GO 42, 72
USA Psychological Operations Company	-----		Oct 68-Jun 70 DA GO 37, 72	
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam	-----		8 Mar 65 - 31 Aug 67 DA GO 10, 68 1 Sep 67 - 31 Oct 68 DA GO 37, 70 1 Nov 68 - 30 Jun 70 DA GO 51, 71	

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UNIT	*CAMPAIGNS	DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION (DUC)	MERITORIOUS UNIT COMMEN- DATION (MUC)	A - Assault Landings F - Foreign Unit Awards N - Navy Unit Awards O - Occupation Credit R - Remarks
Studies & Observation Group	-----		-8 Mar 65 - 31 Aug 67 DA GO 10, 68 1 Sep 67 - 31 Oct 68 DA GO 37, 70 1 Nov 68 - 30 Jun 70 DA GO 51, 71	
* 5.	Central Burma (29 Jan - 28 Jan 45)		* 32.	Northern France (25 Jul - 14 Sep 44)
* 12.	India-Burma (2 Apr 42 - 28 Jan 45)		* 34.	Rhineland (15 Sep 44 - 21 Mar 45)
* 13.	Leyte (17 Oct 44 - 1 Jul 45)		* 37.	Southern France (15 Aug - 14 Sep 44)
* 14.	Luzon (15 Dec 44 - 4 Jul 45)		* 41.	CCF Intervention (3 Nov 50 - 24 Jan 51)
* 15.	New Guinea (24 Jan 43 - 31 Dec 44)		* 42.	First UN Counteroffensive (25 Jan 51)
* 18.	Philippine Islands (7 Dec 41 - 10 May 42)		* 43.	CCF Spring Offensive (22 Apr - 8 Jul 51)
* 20.	Southern Philippines (27 Feb - 4 Jul 45)		* 44.	UN Summer-Fall offensive (9 Jul - 27 Nov 51)
* 25.	Ardennes-Alsach (16 Dec 44 - 25 Jan 45)		* 45.	Second Korean Winter (28 Nov 51 - 30 Apr 52)
* 26.	Central Europe (22 Mar - 11 May 45)		* 46.	Korean Summer-Fall, 1952 (1 May - 30 Nov 52)
			* 47.	Third Korean Winter (1 Dec 52 - 30 Apr 53)
			* 48.	Korea Summer, 1953 (1 May - 27 Jul 53)

* From DA PAM 672-1, Unit Citations and Campaign Credit Register (Washington, July, 1981).

U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES HOLDERS OF THE MEDAL OF HONOR¹

** CPT Roger H.C. Donlon ***5 Dec 64; ****6 Jul 64	7th SFG(A)	NY
CPT Charles Q. Williams 9 Jun 66; 9 Jun 65	5th SFG(A)	SC
* 1LT George K. Sisler 6 Jul 68; 7 Feb 67	MACV/SOG	MO
CPT Drew Dix 16 Jan 69; 31 Jan 68	SEAL MACV/SOG	CO
SFC Fred W. Zabitosky 7 Mar 69; 19 Feb 68	MACV/SOG	NJ
* MSG Charles E. Hosking, Jr. 23 May 69; 21 Mar 67	5th SFG(A)	NJ
* SFC Eugene Ashley, Jr. 18 Nov 69; 7 Feb 68	5th SFG(A)	NC
* SGT Gordon Yntema 2 Dec 69; 18 Jan 68	5th SFG(A)	MD
* SP5 John Kendenburg 7 Apr 69; 13 Jun 68	MACAV/SOG(A)	NY
* SFC William M. Bryant 16 Feb 71; 24 Mar 69	5th SFG(A)	NJ
CPT Robert L. Howard 2 Mar 71; 30 Dec 70	MACV/SOG	AL
SSG Franklin Miller 15 Jun 71; 5 Jan 70	MACV/SOG	NC
* SGT Brian L. Buker 16 Dec 71; 5 Apr 70	5th SFG(A)	ME
SGT Gary B. Beikirch 15 Oct 73; 1 Apr 70	5th SFG(A)	NY
*1LT Loren D. Hagen	USA TNG ADV GP	ND

¹Stanton, Green Berets at War, Appendix B; Sutherland, Special Forces; USASOC History Archives.

6 Sep 74; 7 Aug 71

SSG Jon R. Cavaiani
12 Dec 74; 4 Jun 71

USA TNG ADV GP ENG

MSG Roy Benavidez
24 Feb 81; 2 May 68

5th SFG(A) TX

SFC Randall David Shughart
23 May 94; 3 Oct 93

USASFC PA

MSG Gary Ivan Gordon
23 May 94; 3 Oct 93

USASFC ME

- * Posthumously (10)
- ** Rank at time Medal of Honor earned
- *** Date of award
- **** Date of action for which award made

"WHAT DID YOU SAY YOUR NAME WAS?"
Center and School Designations

CENTER

"Psychological Warfare Center," transferred from Fort Riley, Kansas, Spring of 1952, Special Warfare, Center, 10 April 1952

"U.S. Army Special Warfare Center" 1 January 1957

"U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare," 1 June 1964

"U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare (Airborne)" 1 November 1964

"U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance," 8 May 1969

"U.S. Army 1st Special Operations Command (Airborne) (Provisional)" 1 October 1982

"U.S. Army 1st Special Operations Command(Airborne)," 1 October 1983

"U.S. Army Special Operations Command," 1 December 1989

SCHOOL

"Psychological Warfare School," 20 October 1952

"U.S. Army Special Warfare School" 1 January 1957

"U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance," 16 May 1969

"U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center (Provisional)," 1 April 1983

"U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center," 1 Oct 1983

"U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School," 15 May 1986

¹Historical Data Cards, U.S. Army Institute of Heraldry.

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USAJFKSWCS & SPECIAL OPERATIONS INSIGNIA



Emblazoned on the shield forming the crest is the Special Forces motto "De Oppresso Liber", which can be translated to mean "From oppression we will liberate them." Attached to the shield are two crossed arrows once used by the 1st Special Service Force as collar insignia and symbolizing the Special Forces' role in unconventional warfare. The knife is of the pattern issued to the 1st Special Force Service.

Approved, DA, 8 July 1960.

SPECIAL FORCES DUI**



The Special Forces Patch is worn by members of Special Forces units around the world. The arrowhead shape represents the craft and stealth of America's first warriors—the Indians. An upturned dagger represents the unconventional warfare missions of Special Forces. The lightning bolts represent blinding speed and strength. There are three bolts for the three methods of infiltration—land, sea, and air. The gold represents constancy and inspiration, and the background of teal blue represents Special Forces' encompassing of all branch assignments.

Patch approved, 22 Aug 1955; "Airborne" tab approved, 20 Nov 1958.

SPECIAL FORCES SSI



The black, white and gray of the background are symbolic of the three different phases of activity. The black also refers to the subversive nature of Special Operations. The torch is the classic symbol of light, learning, liberty, and truth. The Trojan Horse is universally recognized as a symbol of subversive activity. It also represents the Knight in chess, the only piece capable of moving indirectly and of striking from and within enemy territory. The motto is "Veritas et Libertas"—Truth and Liberty.

Originally approved, DA, 28 Nov 1952.

USAJFKSWCS DUI

- * *Shoulder Sleeve Insignia*
- ** *Distinctive Unit Insignia*



USAJFKSWCS SSI

The lamp in the center of the shield refers to the US Army Special Warfare Center and School and the three prime areas of instruction for which the School is responsible: Psychological Operations, Foreign Internal Defense, and Unconventional Warfare. The unconventional outline of the lamp, in simulating the shape of the Greek letter "Psi", refers symbolically to the tongues of flame implying the spoken and written words of psychological warfare. The two crossed arrows refer to the 1st Special Service Force and to frontier American warfare.

Approved 22 October 1962.



4th PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
GROUP (AIRBORNE) DUI

The quatrefoil shape symbolizes the measurement of intelligence, so essential to PSYOP. The four lobes allude to the unit designation, and the number of battalions assigned. The gray, white, and black of the quatrefoil represent the three basic PSYOP media. The gold and red colors and the bamboo wreath commemorate the Republic of Vietnam.



USACAPOC DUI

The chess knight typifies the capabilities of the Command, implying both overt and covert missions. It is inscribed on the base with a nebuly line, the traditional heraldic symbol for clouds, indicating the unit's airborne capabilities. The globe is divided black and white to represent the unit's ability to deploy and operate world-wide night and day, as well as reflecting the multifaceted nature of the unit's mission as a combat force and a peacekeeping presence. The sword, chess knight and fasces suggest the three major components of the Command's mission: Special Operations, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs functions. Silver connotes eminence and red signifies action and valor.



**US ARMY
SPECIAL OPERATIONS
COMMAND DUI**

The stylized spearhead alludes to the shoulder sleeve insignia worn by the 1st Special Service Force and recalls the heritage and traditions that the US Army Special Operations Command will perpetuate. The unsheathed dagger symbolizes total military preparedness and has long been associated with Army special operations forces. The gold wings surrounding the spearhead and symbolizing the Command's airborne and aviation missions are raised to denote combat readiness. Attached below the shield is a black and gold motto scroll bearing the Command's motto SINE PARI (Without Equal) in gold letters.



**US SPECIAL OPERATIONS
COMMAND SSI**

The SSI is adapted from the USSOCOM official seal. Black alludes to Special Operations performed under cover of darkness. The color gold represents the quality of excellence as demonstrated by the command in the nation's defense. The spearhead suggests the fighting capabilities of the Command. The bands on the spearhead refer to the forces assigned from the Army, Navy and Air Force. The braided border encircling the shield represents strength through joint service cooperation.



**JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS
COMMAND (Unofficial)**


PREDECESSOR INSIGNIAS



1ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS
COMMAND (AIRBORNE) SSI




1ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS
COMMAND (AIRBORNE) DUI




Oval



5th ARMY OSS SSI



OSS OPERATIONAL GROUP
(CO D, 5th ARMY)



Collar Insignia



CBI SSI



OSS DETACHMENT 101 SSI



SSI

FROM: Geoffrey T. Barker, A Concise History of U.S. Army Special Operations Forces with Lineage and Insignia (Fayetteville, NC:1988); C.B. Smyth, Special Forces in Southeast Asia: U.S. Special Forces Vietnamese Special Forces Irregular Forces (Glendale, CA:1978); Correspondence; USASOC Archives: L. Martin, H. W. Snyder, and H. J. Snyder, Guide to U.S. Army Special Forces Insignia, 1952-1987 (Larchmont, NY:1987); Ian Sutherland, Special Forces of the United States Army, 1952-1982, (San Jose, CA:1990).

FROM OPPRES

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