CIA Paramilitary Operations: Korea, 1950-51

From Veritas, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2013

During the Korean War, all American military services, United Nations (UN) forces, Korean military and civilian elements, and a fledgling Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) conducted special operations. To compound the surprise of North Korea’s invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950, neither General (GEN) Douglas A. MacArthur, his Far East Command (FEC), nor the CIA had developed strategic or tactical special warfare plans for the peninsula. Roles in behind-the-lines operations had not been defined by the military or the Agency.1 The only special warfare asset in Japan when war broke out was an Underwater Demolition Team (UDT-3) detachment. On temporary duty (TDY) from Coronado, CA, they were mapping the Japanese warships sunk off the beaches after WWII.2

General MacArthur had traditionally ‘stonewalled’ civilian agencies seeking to conduct paramilitary or intelligence operations in his theater. During World War II, he kept the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) out of the South West Pacific Area (SWPA). MacArthur did not want the CIA setting up shop in Korea, though the Agency had been running agents in Communist China and North Korea since 1947. And, the CIA shared considerable regional intelligence with FEC.3 Faced with the EUSA and depleted Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) divisions huddled in a loose defensive perimeter around Pusan by late summer in 1950, the FEC commander had reluctantly agreed to accept George E. Aurell as the CIA Special Operations (OSO) chief. The former consul of Yokohama, born and raised in Kobe, Japan, was a SWPA veteran (Nisei team chief). This endeared him to MacArthur’s ‘Bataan Gang.’ Multi-lingual Hans V. Tofte, an OSS Europe veteran, was chief of OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) in Japan.4 In this article CIA activities are untangled from the military special operations lore of the Korean War.

There are several purposes for this article. First it will correct (based on additional information), expand, and clarify “Soldier-Sailors in Korea: JACK Maritime Operations” published in 2006. Second, it will separate CIA covert and clandestine land and maritime operations (tactical and strategic) from the other special activities during the war. Third, it will show that a fluid combat situation permitted deep behind-the-lines operations in 1950-1951. And lastly, it will reveal the critical roles of military officers and sergeants detailed to the CIA.5

UDT-1 and UDT-3 frogmen train at Naga Beach near Camp McGill, Japan, 1950.

USMC and Navy UDT officers, seamen, and a CIA civilian case officer explain early paramilitary operations in Korea. The success of Navy-supported UDT/Marine demolition raids against coastal railways in August 1950 caused the Agency to emulate them. The early mission planning and preparation for paramilitary operations in Korea was done in Japan. While this article focuses on the first year of conflict, an understanding of the prewar intelligence situation in Korea is critical.

To begin, human intelligence (HUMINT) assets in South Korea were limited. With the exception of the small 971st Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) detachment in Seoul, Far East Command had no covert intelligence collection capability in Korea. Despite 971st CIC reports that North Korean divisions were integral to the Lee Hong-won Branch, 8th Chinese Route Army in Manchuria, Major General (MG) Charles A. Willoughby, the FEC G-2, ignored the implications.6

In mid-January 1951 CIA Director Walter B. Smith conferred with LTG Matthew B. Ridgway, new EUSA commander, and MG Charles A. Willoughby, FEC G-2 in Korea. — In mid-January 1951 (R) CIA Director Walter B. Smith (far right) conferred with (C) LTG Matthew B. Ridgway, new EUSA commander, and (L) MG Charles A. Willoughby, FEC G-2 in Korea.

Having reluctantly allowed the CIA to establish a post in Japan in the fall of 1950, General MacArthur kept the Agency ‘under close observation’ until its second director, retired GEN Walter Bedell ‘Beetle’ Smith, came to Tokyo. General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s former chief of staff in Tunisia, Italy, and Europe and ex-ambassador to Russia visited Japan and Korea in mid-January 1951 with the blessing of a frustrated President Harry S. Truman.7 After General MacArthur had downplayed the possibility of Chinese intervention, they had attacked en masse, forcing hasty withdrawals beyond Seoul. In the process two American infantry divisions were decimated. And, contrary to U.S. national policy, GEN MacArthur had publicly advocated using nuclear weapons.

Despite that schism Smith and MacArthur reached an accord in Tokyo; FEC would not interfere with Agency activities in-theater as long as the CIA established an escape and evasion (E&E) network to recover downed UN airmen. Before coming to Japan, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), ‘Beetle’ Smith, had told the Army and Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Agency would provide tactical intelligence to FEC and EUSA for the duration of hostilities.8 In return, the CIA was given freedom of action in Korea. Unlike FEC, that myopically focused on the peninsula war, the Agency directed global strategic intelligence missions against the Soviet Union and Red China.9 Regardless, MG Willoughby kept close tabs on the CIA.10

The Agency had done little to define its behind-the-lines operations anywhere.11 And, the U.S. military planners had not considered the use of friendly guerrillas against Communist flanks until early 1951. Desperate after being pushed out of Seoul again, guerrilla warfare (GW) offered the means to destabilize enemy rear areas and to relieve pressure on frontline UN units.12 EUSA staff officers promoted friendly guerrillas as a low cost force multiplier while the CIA developed its paramilitary programs in Japan.13

Danish-American Hans Tofte and his deputy, Colwell E. Beers, established a large CIA training and support facility (fifty acres) on Atsugi Air Force Base, a former Japanese Navy air station forty-seven miles south of Tokyo. His OPC (covert) operations were covered as the Far East Air Forces Technical Analysis Group (FEAF/TAG). George Aurell’s OSO intelligence activities (collection and espionage), directed from Yokosuka Naval Base (near Yokohama) by his deputy, OSS China veteran William E. Duggan, were accomplished under the cover of the Department of Army Liaison Detachment (DA/LD).14 The OSO chief had an office in the Dai Ichi building (GEN MacArthur’s FEC headquarters) next to Colonel (COL) Washington M. Ives, Jr., the administrative officer for MG Willoughby. But, Aurell was not Tofte’s superior; it was a cooperative relationship.15

OPC and OSO were separate, distinct entities overseen by their respective Far Eastern Desk chiefs in Washington. While generalities about missions were shared between Agency section chiefs, as a rule they compartmented specific activities. The OSO focused on strategic intelligence collection and espionage while OPC operations were largely paramilitary.16

The CIA, charged with establishing an E&E overland corridor across North Korea for downed fliers, created a maritime ‘safety net’ with contracted native smuggling/fishing fleets on each coast extending north to the Yalu River. Tofte needed military trainers with E&E expertise. When WWII veteran USMC Major (MAJ) Vincent R. ‘Dutch’ Kramer (U.S. Naval Group China), an Agency detailee, arrived from Taiwan, Tofte grabbed him to be his paramilitary operations chief. Kramer’s first mission was to organize a multi-service planning effort to fulfill the expectations of the air leadership in Naval Forces Far East (NAVFE) and FEAF.17

The resultant E&E plan satisfied the Air Force and Navy commanders because Tofte had provided very specific guidance. An island terminus off each coast would connect a guerrilla-operated E&E ‘rat line’ spanning the peninsula just below ‘MiG Alley’ along the Chinese-North Korean border. CIA command and control (C&C) teams on these two islands were to coordinate activities and arrange support via radio. Guerrilla base camps every twenty to twenty-five miles in the E&E corridor would protect the ‘rat line.’ In lieu of having airmen carry ‘blood chits’ (promissory notes), Tofte arranged to provide small gold bars for survival kits. Fishing fleets that smuggled contraband to the north were to be contracted to patrol both coasts and periodically check offshore islands for stranded UN flyers. In return Tofte could de-brief rescued airmen to improve the E&E system.19 It was up to MAJ ‘Dutch’ Kramer to turn the plan into reality.

The resourceful Marine went to Korea to recruit U.S. military veterans with special operations experience working with paramilitaries. With the dissolution of the OSS after WWII, most American military operatives returned to their parent services or civilian life. The CIA, like the Ranger Infantry Companies (Airborne) RICA formed for combat in Korea, and the Army’s new Special Forces, recruited OSS, Ranger battalion, Marauder, and paratroop veterans as well as USMC Para-Marines and Raiders, and Navy UDT for Agency ‘details.’ An ‘old boy’ network of former associates and personal connections was used to identify military personnel.20 Kramer found wounded EUSA Rangers in hospitals and visited newly arrived companies of Rangers.21 He also sought out old war buddies and UDT personnel while Tofte tackled the Koreans.

The multi-lingual Tofte was “a really brilliant, suave and sociable guy with an extensive Asian background,” recalled MAJ John K. Singlaub (JACK Chief of Staff). He worked ROKA connections to find young officers interested in special warfare.22 This produced Captain (CPT) Han Chul-min, a veteran intelligence officer born and raised in North Korea. Tofte enlisted him to recruit personnel for guerrilla operations and to arrange meetings with civilian maritime ‘entrepreneurs’—fishermen/smugglers that regularly worked the northern coasts.

CPT Han Chul-min screened North Korean refugees and enemy deserters kept in separate POW camps in Pusan for volunteers willing to be intelligence agents, guerrillas, and radiomen. Out-of-work Korea Telegraph Company radio and telegraph operators (some wanting to avoid ROKA conscription) were prime targets.23 Tofte believed that “the refugees were down-in-the-mouth, bored with nothing to do. Joining the guerrillas would give them a chance to get out, to eat three meals a day, to have something to do.”24 As the numbers grew, secure training sites had to be established for the new recruits.

The Agency facility on Atsugi AFB was ten miles from Camp Chigasaki near the FEC amphibious training base (Camp McGill) on Sagami Bay.25 There, for two weeks, CPT Han Chul-min and his cadre would be taught small unit infantry tactics, guerrilla warfare operations, intelligence collection, E&E rat line security, and radio communications. Tofte and Kramer with the help of six ‘press-ganged’ CIA junior case officers trained the guerrilla cadre.26

“I arrived in Japan on Christmas Day, 1950, after six weeks of training—yes, six weeks of a course that could have been titled, ‘How to Be a Spy in Occupied France.’ I was officially a ‘Case Officer/Paramilitary GS-5.’ I was one of eight GS-5s at the same level of innocence sent to do whatever we could. None of us had any significant military experience, but the Agency had no one better at the time,” commented John E. Cremeans, Jr.27 MAJ Kramer selected him to help with the guerrilla cadre training.

“I arrived in Japan on Christmas Day, 1950, after six weeks of training—yes, six weeks of a course that could have been titled, ‘How to Be a Spy in Occupied France.’ I was officially a ‘Case Officer/Paramilitary GS-5.’ I was one of eight GS-5s at the same level of innocence sent to do whatever we could. None of us had any significant military experience, but the Agency had no one better at the time,” — John E. Cremeans, Jr.

After the Koreans completed training they were flown back to Pusan where a refurbished Japanese military camp on Yong-do awaited. The island, connected by a causeway that edged Pusan harbor, was easily secured. The bay beaches could support small boat training. And, the camp was near the refugee camps and supply depots.

CPT Han Chul-min and his cadre got the recruits to Yong-do where they were clothed, equipped, and organized into groups to learn basic soldiering and receive orientations on a variety of weapons. The physically fit who satisfactorily completed the mini-basic training were formed into platoons. These groups were given marksmanship instruction, taught guerrilla tactics, trained in small rubber boat insertions, and coached on how to survive as E&E ‘rat line’ guides to the island terminals.28 As the volunteers grew into the hundreds MAJ Kramer pulled in U.S. military veterans to help with training.

‘Schmoozing’ at the various headquarters and officers’ clubs in Japan and Korea enabled the Marine major to recruit some of those who had conducted special warfare missions at the behest of GEN MacArthur.29 The FEC commander had been pressing the service headquarters in Tokyo “to conduct harassing and demolition raids against selected North Korean military objectives and execute deceptive operations in Korean coastal areas.” He wanted to disrupt enemy lines of communication and supply and reduce pressure on Pusan.30

Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, Commander, NAVFE, proposed to organize small ad hoc amphibious raiding parties to harass the enemy by attacking coastal supply lines. The nucleus of the raiders would come from the UDT-3 detachment in Japan. But, assigning UDT missions beyond the breaker line was a major naval employment change. Ground combat training was needed.31 “These were desperate times and every command was ready to try anything,” said UDT-3 Lieutenant junior grade (LTJG) George C. Atcheson, III. On 6 August 1950, NAVFE pulled his detachment off a beach survey in Japan and tasked it to destroy a railroad bridge on the southern coast near Yosu.32 The seaport had three rail bridges and a tunnel within three hundred yards of the ocean. Enthusiasm was insufficient to accomplish this raiding mission forty-five miles behind North Korean lines.

Illustration of PBM-5 Mariner flying boats — Illustration of PBM-5 *Mariner* flying boats

“A PBM-5 Mariner flying boat flew us to Sasebo. The Diachenko (APD-123) was weighing anchor as we scrambled aboard from the shuttle boat. Before we could settle in, a gunner’s mate passed out M1928A1 Thompson sub-machineguns [SMG]. Most of us had not fired a weapon since boot camp. Our assigned weapon was a diver’s knife. We got a thorough class in assembly, disassembly, and maintenance before spending a few hours on the fantail shooting at inflatable marker buoys,” recalled Seaman First Class Phillip E. Carrico.34

“The plan was to have an LCVP [Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel] ‘Higgins Boat,’ carry us, our ten-man rubber boat [RB-10], and the explosives within two hundred yards of the beach. LT Atcheson and Boatswain’s Mate [BM] Warren ‘Peekskill’ Foley were to be the scout swimmers. Just beyond the breakers, the two scouts slipped into the water with their SMGs. Atcheson, who was carrying a .45 automatic, tossed his SMG back into the boat while Foley struggled to shore with his. They discovered that the selected landing site was five yards of rocky ‘beach’ abutting a cliff-like railroad embankment twenty-five feet high,” said Carrico.35

BM Warren Foley, SM Phillip E. Carrico, and SM B. Johnson, UDT-3, pose with Thompson sub-machineguns aboard the USS Diachenko — L to R: BM Warren Foley, SM Phillip E. Carrico, and SM B. Johnson, UDT-3, pose with Thompson sub-machineguns aboard the USS *Diachenko* (APD-123) before the first raid.

UDT-3 detachment minus BM Warren Foley after the 25 June 1950 raid. Standing, L to R: Jones, Akerson, Johnson, Nelson, Carrico; Kneeling L to R: McCormick, Austin, LT Atcheson. Note frayed bill on Atcheson’s utility cap from Austin’s sub-machinegun burst.

“Foley came back for us while LT Atcheson went looking for a way to get atop the embankment. There was just enough ‘beach’ to get the boat ashore and for us to hide in the shadows. With our backs pressed against the cliff we saw that the LCVP and the Diachenko were silhouetted on the water by the full moon. About that time an enemy patrol, riding a railroad handcar, came rattling out of the tunnel to investigate. We heard explosions and Foley took off, charging towards the tunnel to help the lieutenant. As he retreated back down the tracks, Atcheson fired at Foley thinking he was a ‘gook’ running towards him. Fortunately, he missed,” chuckled Carrico.36

“The North Koreans, however, were better shots and hit Foley twice [leg and hand] before he tumbled off the embankment. Atcheson, who, by then, was back and above our hiding spot, leaned over the edge of the embankment to whisper something. That’s when Seaman Austin cut loose on this suspected ‘gook’ with his Thompson. After getting his cap shot off by his own man, the lieutenant yelled at us to get Foley. We were compromised and had to get out of there quick. The guys manhandled Foley into the RB-10, laying him on top of the demolition packs. Then, we started paddling like madmen to reach the LCVP. That first mission was a bust, but we learned a lot. ‘Ole ‘Peekskill’ Foley was the first U.S. Navy casualty of the war,” recounted Seaman Carrico. “He got a Silver Star and a Purple Heart.”37 The lack of success at Yosu did not deter the admirals.

Within days NAVFE had organized a stronger raiding party and put it aboard the USS Horace A. Bass (APD-124). The ad hoc force, heading north along the East coast, was led by Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) D.F. ‘Kelly’ Welch, UDT-1. It consisted of twenty-five UDT seamen and sixteen Marines: Welch’s advance party, LT Atcheson’s detachment (UDT-3), and a USMC security element led by MAJ Edward P. Dupras, Jr., a WWII Marine Raider and U.S. Naval Group China veteran. Three of their five demolitions raids against bridges were successful.39 In contrast, attempts to destroy railroad tunnels with piles of 60 lb. TNT satchels proved to be exercises in futility, though the explosion at night was “a sight to behold” according to LTJG K.J. Christoph, UDT-1. The tunnels remained intact even when a North Korean ammunition train hiding inside added to the explosive power. “It simply blew a huge fart out both ends,” clarified LTJG George Atcheson, UDT-3.40

Luck ran out for the Navy-Marine raiding group when it attempted to reconnoiter the beaches near Kunsan. The North Koreans were alert and waiting. With two wounded and several bullet-riddled RBs, the UDT took cover in the water and withdrew. LT Atcheson was among the RB-10 crew that returned to rescue the Marine security detail left behind, none of whom could swim.41 When the ad hoc NAVFE raiding force returned to Japan, Atcheson became ‘borrowed help’ to MAJ Kramer. Capitalizing on the UDT-Marine successes, he wanted Atcheson to give small boat training to CPT Han Chul-min and the Korean guerrilla leaders.42

Everything began falling into place for training guerrillas in March 1951. MAJ Kramer took two of the junior case officers, John E. Cremeans and Charles Gillis, to Yong-do to handle the administration and logistics; from food to uniforms, armament, ammunition, and transportation. A total of seven Americans (military and civilians) supported the BLOSSOM project (E&E corridor). They taught advanced technical skills—marksmanship, demolitions, first aid, small boat operations, crew-served weaponry, and basic parachuting. An old friend of Kramer, USMC First Lieutenant (1LT) Thomas L. Curtis, joined LTJG Atcheson on Yong-do. LT Curtis was a ‘mustang’ officer (enlisted to warrant to battlefield commission) who was a highly decorated veteran of the Atlantic Fleet Scout–Observer Group and OSS in Greece and China.43

Between training classes MAJ Kramer and LT Atcheson arranged amphibious support with NAVFE. As air and/or naval delivery assets became available, guerrilla recruits were periodically pulled out of training to fill teams being inserted into North Korea to establish E&E basecamps.44 The USS Begor (APD-127), a Crosley-class high-speed transport destroyer, designed to carry UDT and Marine Raiders behind enemy lines for reconnaissance and demolition missions in WWII, was the ideal ship for these missions.

By April 1951, the guerrillas were practicing landings on the beaches of Yong-do using 36-foot LCPR and rubber boats from the Begor. Hans Tofte filmed these daylight exercises. After MAJ Kramer and LT Atcheson were satisfied with the proficiency of the guerrilla recruits, three twenty-five man groups re-embarked the APD and left for Yo-do at the mouth of Wonsan harbor. Under cover of darkness one element was inserted south of Wonsan and the others were put ashore at two different beaches considerably north of the seaport. The landing sites, close to heavily forested coastal areas, were familiar to the North Korean guerrillas. These three advance elements were the nucleus for establishing E&E rally point camps in the interior.45 UDT-3 aboard the Begor furnished scout swimmers and RB-10 coxswains because the guerrillas were carrying large quantities of supplies with them.46

The northernmost group, code-named CLOWN, called themselves the ‘White Tigers.’ They had one man killed on the way to their destination. Being deep in enemy territory meant that these elements received resupplies of food, ammunition, and radio batteries by air. More than two hundred guerrillas were dropped near the initial camps during the summer of 1951 to replace casualties and to create more inland E&E rally points. Inaccurate airdrops caused delays as the elements regrouped; leading to inadvertent enemy contacts, teams wandering lost for days, and long foot marches to base camps for the twenty-man reinforcement teams.47 Because UN aircrew recovery business was slow, CLOWN elements began collecting intelligence from sympathetic locals to attack police stations and security forces. Success prompted larger and more daring missions to include destroying bridges with explosives. The more they did, the more the irritated enemy sought to eradicate the ‘wild pigs.’48

A ‘White Tiger’ radio report that a large meeting of North Korean and Chinese military and Communist Party leaders was being held in Kapsan on 29 October 1951 to coordinate guerrilla eradication efforts put the guerrillas at great risk. But, the target was too lucrative for FEC to ignore. A large naval air attack was launched against industrial targets in Sokhyon, thirty-five miles southeast the day before the scheduled meeting. This decoy strike was to cover the major low-level attack on the Kapsan compound the next day. Unbeknownst to the Navy AD-4 Skyraider and F4-U Corsair pilots, the ‘White Tigers,’ decided to attack the local police station just before the scheduled TOT (time on target).49

Both missions were very successful. More than 44,000 pounds of ordnance (250, 500 and 1,000 pound bombs, aerial rockets, and machineguns) systematically flattened the four-acre complex. One wall was standing an hour later; only one bomb missed its target. The Navy pilots, all awarded Distinguished Flying Crosses, were condemned as the ‘Butchers of Kapsan’ in Radio P’yongyang broadcasts. While the ‘White Tigers’ freed fifteen young anti-Communists held captive by the police and suffered light losses, their involvement prompted extreme retribution.50

The attack was the ‘high water mark’ for the ‘White Tigers.’ Regular airdrops of supplies had pinpointed the guerrilla camps. Local informants were revealed, rounded up, tortured for specifics, and then executed by the Communists. An extremely harsh winter with heavy snowfalls in the mountains compounded the situation. Foot movement was hampered as North Korean security forces blocked avenues of escape. The groups split into small elements to break out and radio contact was lost. But, tracking the escapees in deep snow was relatively simple. CLOWN (‘White Tigers’), the key to maintaining the Agency E&E corridor, was a historical footnote by the end of February 1952.51 Still tasked with E&E despite the military stalemate and Armistice overtures, Hans Tofte continued to insert intelligence agents and guerrilla elements behind the lines.

By then, the North Korean government had reestablished tight population controls, linked military and home defense forces with communications, and had mandated night ‘guard duty’ by local citizenry. The peasants were already being tasked to repair roads, bridges, and railroads damaged by air and commando attacks. Constant coastal bombardment by the UN blockade ships destroyed any lingering local interest in supporting guerrilla elements.52 Internal security got tighter as the main line of resistance (MLR) between conventional forces became static.53

Though the CIA and EUSA infiltrated thousands of agents into North Korea to organize resistance and conduct guerrilla operations, success was nearly zero—whether they parachuted in, transferred to local boats offshore, or simply walked in overland.54 Both the Army and the Agency did much better collecting intelligence. Frustrated by the E&E guerrilla team failures to maintain an overland E&E corridor, Hans Tofte and MAJ ‘Dutch’ Kramer switched gears to address a strategic weapon that was plaguing UN naval forces.

The MWB engineer with BM William C. Warwick, Jr. was Seaman Samuel Hill. The two sailors are aboard the USS Perkins (DDR-877). The third MWB crew member was SM Marvin Curry. — The MWB engineer with BM William C. Warwick, Jr. (left) was Seaman (SM) Samuel Hill (right). The two sailors are aboard the USS *Perkins* (DDR-877). The third MWB crew member was SM Marvin Curry.

The Russian Navy at Vladivostok had sent military advisors to North Korea to supervise the arming and installation of floating mine fields to barricade Wonsan, Hungnam, and Chinnamp’o harbors and to harass UN naval ships blockading the peninsula. Sampans, loaded with mines on the shores of the Yalu River, delivered them nightly. With heavy timbers laid across the elevated stern of a sampan, four Russian M-26 contact mines could be delivered.67 Disruption of Communist coastal mining operations had strategic as well as tactical implications. After MAJ Kramer and Tofte discussed the feasibility with UDT LT Atcheson, they sought out daring U.S. Navy small boatmen and Army Ranger volunteers from NAVFE and FEC for a special mission.68

When an ancient South Korean patrol boat delivered five Rangers to the USS Perkins (DDR-877) in the late fall 1950, little did Boatswain’s Mate (BM) William C. Warwick, Jr. realize that he would ‘captain’ their boat for more than seven months. The Tsingtao/Shanghai Navy rescue mission (evacuating American citizens as the Red Army drove the Nationalists from the mainland in May 1949) veteran was reputed to be the best motorized whaleboat (MWB) coxswain in the Pacific fleet.69

>Navy Seaman Marvin Curry — Navy Seaman (SM) Marvin Curry, a full-blooded Seneca (Snipe Clan), Cattaraugus Territory, New York, spent two years detailed to the CIA. He assisted LTJG George Atcheson with small boat training and was part of Warwick’s MWB crew during the Agency attacks on Soviet sea mine distribution sites as far north as the Vladivostok harbor light tower.

BM Warwick ‘captained’ a wooden hull, twenty-six foot MWB (Mark 10 version) specially outfitted with a ‘hopped up’ 120 horsepower Gray Marine diesel engine equipped with muffled exhaust. Red-lit night navigation equipment was installed. The U.S. Navy provided transportation for the CIA raiders; first, a ‘piggy back’ ride aboard a blockade ship, and then a ‘stealth’ coastline insertion after a seaside underway launch of the MWB. Operating in North Korea, BMs Warwick and Marvin Curry and Seaman Sam Hill were responsible for camouflaging and guarding the MWB among the rocks along the coast. The seamen formed a perimeter defense and then ‘hunkered down’ to wait for the Rangers to return. After the raids, the seamen transported the Rangers back to base by ‘leap frogging’ along the coast at night, evading the enemy, and trying to avoid ‘triggering’ a floating Russian mine.70

The reality was that only the derailment of trains inside tunnels created sufficient chaos and wreckage to close major sections of the Hungnam-Kojo-Yangyang line for long periods.71 Navy UDT-3 and UDT-1 detachments had concentrated their raids on coastal trains, rail lines, bridges, and tunnels since the summer of 1950. Trains moving at night and tunnels were very difficult targets that required a lot of man-carried explosives. And, the enemy patrolled these vital supply lines in force.72 Regarding these as simple harassment missions, the CIA was eager to attack the source of the sea mine problem.

Cutting rail and rubbling the entrances of railroad tunnels were UDT nuisance targets. Collapsing railroad bridges disrupted traffic for weeks.

The demolition raids against the coastal railway were to ‘gear up’ the CIA team for its most ambitious and significant tasking—to attack the North Korean mine storage/loading facilities. Though the targets were more than two hundred miles from Nan-do, the Agency team chose not to risk alerting the enemy with a U.S. Navy vessel at the mouth of the river. Thus, they ‘leap-frogged’ their MWB at night along the coast at eight to ten knots an hour.73

Successful raids prompted Tofte and MAJ Kramer to plan a repeat in the spring. The maintenance crew of the destroyer tender USS Dixie (AD-14), berthed at Sasebo, installed a 200 HP Gray Marine diesel engine, larger fuel tanks, bilge pumps and sewed ‘survival suits’ for everyone. This time the CIA maritime raiders would also attack the heart of the problem—the sampan fleets loaded with mines.74

The USS Dixie (AD-14) provided maintenance support for Seventh Fleet destroyers and destroyer escorts assigned duty off the Korean peninsula during the war. — The USS *Dixie* (AD-14) (right rear) provided maintenance support for Seventh Fleet destroyers and destroyer escorts assigned duty off the Korean peninsula during the war. This was a floating repair facility with personnel and equipment aboard capable of performing emergency fourth echelon maintenance at sea. Its temporary rebuilding and repair work was sufficient for vessels (like the destroyers USS *Brush* and *Mansfield*) to limp back to the States for dry dock repairs, maintenance, and refitting. It also served as the flagship of the UN naval blockade commander and was a choice meeting place for special operations planners.

Sea trials off a destroyer escort (DE), designated as their ‘mother ship,’ confirmed the readiness of the refurbished MWB for combat. The CIA team assault tactics were validated against a pair of sampans discovered dumping mines. With a Ranger kneeling on each side of the bow with 30.06 cal. M-1918 Browning Automatic Rifles (BAR), two others standing over them with M-1 .30 cal. Garand rifles, and the sergeant in the cockpit with another Garand, BM Warwick steered his MWB straight at each sampan. They did not have to wait to engage at five hundred yards because the North Korean crews began firing small arms. Both assaults triggered mines that blew the wooden vessels to smithereens in violent explosions. It took longer to locate the mines already set adrift and to detonate them with rifle fire. Still, they could not have had a better ‘trial by fire’ rehearsal for their upcoming mission.75

Installation of a mount for a .50 cal. machinegun on the bow followed. A gunner’s mate was added to the Navy crew for that weapons system. BM Warwick convinced the DE captain that a ten knot night seaside launch would mask the MWB in the ship’s radar silhouette. That tactic increased the odds for mission success.76 Instead of ‘bee lining’ back to the loitering DE afterwards, the CIA MWB would head due south hugging the coastline for 250 miles into South Korea. The DE, postured well beyond the international waters line, was to serve as a decoy. Again, the CIA raiders succeeded.77 In the meantime, the Navy blockade ship captains devised their own defensive measures.

USS Mansfield with the bus-sized mine hole in its bow. — USS *Mansfield* with the bus-sized mine hole in its bow.

UN destroyers and DEs, assigned ‘flycatcher patrol’ (searching for North Korean mine-carrying sampans) on dark-of-the-moon nights, would slip in quietly and ‘light them up’ with searchlights, training every gun on the suspicious vessel. During the day, the Navy used their MWBs to eliminate floating mines.78 Thus, the mine destruction techniques practiced by BM Warwick and the CIA raiders were promulgated in the Seventh Fleet. By then, Hans Tofte and MAJ ‘Dutch’ Kramer had started creating an East coast guerrilla maritime raiding force.

The USS Mansfield sailed back to Bremerton, Washington with its ‘blunted bow.’ — The USS *Mansfield* sailed back to Bremerton, Washington with its ‘blunted bow.’

So, what did the CIA paramilitary activities accomplish in Korea during the first year of the war? Despite the training of hundreds of guerrillas and expenditure of considerable resources, the E&E corridor south of ‘MiG Alley’ for downed UN airmen never became functional and was not used. The CIA commitment to establish E&E command and control (C&C) centers on islands on each coast never materialized. The gold bars for the aircrew E&E kits were distributed by Hans Tofte; most probably became expensive souvenirs. The ‘offshore safety net’ provided by smuggler/fishing fleets under contract did not work. Radios were not furnished. Thus, the CIA had no regular means of communication and hence, little control over the contracted assets. On the West coast the guerrilla-held islands enabled forward posting of Air Force rescue aircraft and boats to reduce ‘May Day’ response time and extend air-sea searches.

The local population did not support the E&E corridor guerrillas. It was a very rugged, inhospitable living environment deep behind the lines. Naval and air bombardment and guerrilla destruction of infrastructure did not endear either with the local populace; the peasants were the repairmen and village guardsmen. The absence of experienced American advisors to insure discipline and mission focus left bored guerrilla leaders to their own devices. Dependency on aerial resupply also contributed to self-destruction. Airdrops pinpointed guerrilla camps for North Korean military and security forces.

“Despite abysmal results, we had to continue trying. The presence of guerrilla elements behind the lines, regardless of how long they lasted, served to disrupt lines of communication and harassed the North Korean military. Agents had to be inserted if tactical intelligence was to be collected. We still had the covert E&E mission. Paramilitary operations were and still are high risk business,” remarked MG John K. ‘Jack’ Singlaub.79 While Tofte sent back glowing reports, few guerrillas made it back alive. “The E&E teams were lost or slaughtered,” stated Tim Weiner in Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. “The Agency’s paramilitary operations were not only ineffective but probably morally reprehensible in the number of lives lost.”80

All in all, a lot of CIA money, time, energy, and thought were dedicated to paramilitary operations and the return was miniscule and illusory. Thousands of Korean volunteers gave their lives trying to accomplish impossible missions behind the lines. The dearth of Asian linguists and culturally aware personnel in CIA employ (or in the U.S. military) who knew anything about Communist-imposed internal social controls ensured that a seemingly callous destruction of Korean intelligence agents and guerrillas continued throughout the war. Despite everything paramilitary successes in that first year of the Korean War were few, but the CIA had the vast majority.

Special thanks to those who contributed time, photos, and documents for this article: the Korean War veterans; the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center; the CIA History Office; USAF historian Dr. Forrest L. Marion; Mr. Joseph C. Goulden, and Mr. John B. “Barry” Dwyer.

ENDNOTES

Colonel Rod Paschall, “Special Operations in Korea,” Conflict, 7:2 (1987), 156. During the Korean War there was only strategic and tactical intelligence. ^[return]
Phillip E. Carrico (UDT-3), interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 1 February 2013, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date; Letter, George Atcheson (UDT-3) to John B. Dwyer, July 1958, cited in Dwyer, Commandos From the Sea: The History of Amphibious Special Warfare in World War II and the Korean War (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1998), 237; U.S. Navy. Mobile Training Team Able. Troop Training Unit, Amphibious Training Command, Pacific Fleet, Letter, SUBJECT: Report of Team Operations for the Period 24 July 1950 to 7 November 1950 (ComPhibGruOne letter, file AT6-3/35/ceb Serial 007) dated 6 August 1950, hereafter cited as MTT Able Report. ^[return]
John K. Singlaub, Hazardous Duty: An American Soldier in the Twentieth Century (NY: Summit Books, 1991), 164; Ben S. Malcolm, White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1996), 129. ^[return]
James C. McNaughton, Nisei Linguists: Japanese Americans in the Military Intelligence Service during World War II (Washington, DC: Department of Army, Center of Military History, 2007), 84. ^[return]
Charles H. Briscoe, “Soldier-Sailors in Korea: JACK Maritime Operations,” Veritas (2006) 2:2, 6-19; Retired MG John K. Singlaub, interview by Briscoe, 9 January 2013, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date; Central Intelligence Agency, “CIA in Korea: 1946-1965, Volume III,” 529, 531. Abbreviated copy provided by CIA. ^[return]
Retired LTC Chester E. Carpenter, 971st CIC Det and TLO, 8240th AU, Korea, interview by Briscoe, 1 April 2006, Fort Bragg, NC, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date. LTC Carpenter estimated a corps of several divisions was being trained by the Red Army. This was no surprise because large numbers of Koreans fled the peninsula to join Mao Tse-tung against the Japanese during WWII. ^[return]
Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War (NY: Times Books, 1982), 467; Richard B. Finn, interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy, 8 April 1991, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project at www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/.Finn.%20Richard%20B.toc.pdf accessed 2/12/2013, hereafter cited by name and date. ^[return]
Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War, 475. ^[return]
MAJ Steven A. Fondacaro, MMAS thesis, “A Strategic Analysis of U.S. Special Operations during the Korean Conflict, 1950–1953,” U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS (19 May 1988), 42; Malcolm, White Tigers, 129–130. ^[return]
Finn interview, 8 April 1991. ^[return]
Paschall, “Special Operations in Korea,” 156. ^[return]
Major Shaun M. Darragh, “Where Special Operations Began: Hwanghae-do: The War of the Donkeys,” Army (November 1984), 68. ^[return]
John P. Finnegan, “The Evolution of US Army HUMINT: Intelligence Operations in the Korean War,” Studies in Intelligence, 44: 2 (2000), 85. ^[return]
Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War, 467; “George Emanuel Aurell in Schutz/Ferris Family Ancestry” at http://wc.rootsweb.ancestry.com/cgi-bin/igm.cgi?op=GET&db=c77,&id=I107 accessed 12/18/2012; Singlaub interview, 9 January 2013. ^[return]
Singlaub interview, 9 January 2013. ^[return]
In actuality there were multiple CIA programs going on simultaneously in the Far East during the Korea War. Four of them were: OPC paramilitary activities in Korea directed from Japan; OSO strategic intelligence collection from Japan; Western Enterprises strategic intelligence and paramilitary operations from Taiwan; and the Philippines. China Air Transport (CAT) aircraft supported them. The CIA training facility on Saipan was used by all. John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, Publisher, 2006), 133, 139. ^[return]
Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War, 468-470; Vincent Kramer, interview by Kurt Piehler and Maureen Prado, 21 February 1993, Rutgers University Oral History Archives, 36 at http://oralhistory.rutgers.edu/donors/30-interviewees/interview-html-text/459-kramer-vincent accessed 1/7/2013, hereafter cited by name and date. Air rescue, while practiced sparingly in WWII, was still in its infancy when the Korean War broke out on 25 June 1950. Far East Air Force had nine H-5 (the 1944/5 vintage Sikorsky RH-5) helicopters in Japan [3rd Air Rescue Squadron (ARS)]. The Grumman SA-16 Albatross, twin propeller-driven amphibians, did not get to Japan until late July 1950. Forrest L. Marion, That Others May Live: USAF Air Rescue in Korea, The U.S. Air Force in Korea (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2004), 2, 3, 21; “S-51/HO3S-1/H-5F, G, H Helicopter,” Sikorsky Product History at http://www.sikorskyarchives.com/S-51.php accessed 1/15/2013. ^[return]
“Valor Awards for Vincent R. Kramer: Military Times Hall of Valor” at http://militarytimes.com/citations-medals-awards/recipient.php?recipientid=5687 accessed 2/15/2013; “Rutgers University Queens Guard Precision Rifle Drill Team – Colonel Vincent R. Kramer” at http://www.queensguard-rutgers.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14 accessed 1/22/2013. ^[return]
Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War, 468-469. ^[return]
Retired COL John F. Sadler, interviews by Briscoe, 15 October 2003 and 3 March 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date; retired MAJ Caesar J. Civitella, interview by Dr. Kenneth Finlayson and Briscoe, 19 January 2001, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date; retired MAJ Herbert A. Brucker, interview by Briscoe, 14 November 2005, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date. ^[return]
Eugene G. Piasecki, “Eighth Army Rangers: First in Korea,” Veritas, 6:1, 43. ^[return]
Singlaub interview, 25 January 2008; Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War, 469. ^[return]
Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War, 469. ^[return]
Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War, 469. ^[return]
Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War, 468–69. This proved convenient because in between Korean coastal demolition raids, the U.S. Navy Underwater Demolition Team (UDT-3 and UDT-1) detachments were billeted there. Phil Carrico, “Frogmen in Korea: Bits and Pieces from the Forgotten War” at http://www.weblube.com/PhilCarricoFirst InlandRaid.html accessed 1/10/2013 ^[return]
Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War, 469; Lee Wha Rang, The US CIA Young-do Partisans (Seoul: PROCOM Publishers, 2001) at http://www.kimsoft.com/2003/Young-doPartisans.htm accessed 10/13/2003; John E. Cremeans, Jr., “The Role of the USS Begor (APD-127) in Clandestine Operations in North Korea, 1950-51,” 2 at http://www.ussbegor.org/seaStories49.htm accessed 11/6/2012; Dr. Joe F. Leeker, Air America Japan – Since the Days of CAT.” 22 at www.utdallas.edu/library/collections/speccoll/Leeker/history/Japan.pdf accessed 2/12/2013. Three CAT C-46 Commandos entered service in Hans Tofte’s OPC air delivery operations in July 1950, followed by a CAT Cessna 195 in September 1950. These CAT C-46s probably wore “night colors.” ^[return]
Cremeans, “The Role of the USS Begor (APD-127) in Clandestine Operations in North Korea, 1950-51,” 2-3. Cremeans was a June 1950 graduate of Williams College who accepted a CIA employment offer after being classified 1-A by his Draft Board. He got six weeks of training before joining seven others bound for Japan. ^[return]
Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War, 130; George C. Atcheson, III (UDT-3),interview by Briscoe, 3 March 2006, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date; Lee Wha Rang, The US CIA Young-do Partisans. ^[return]
Cremeans, “The Role of the USS Begor (APD-127) in Clandestine Operations in North Korea, 1950-51,” 5. ^[return]
U.S. Navy Commander, Naval Forces, Far East (COMNAVFE) message DTG 270344Z July 1950 to CTF 90 via Operations Order (OPORDER) 11, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. ^[return]
Cdr. Francis Douglas Fane and Don Moore, Naked Warriors: The Story of the U.S. Navy’s Frogmen (NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1956), 239. ^[return]
Fane and Moore, Naked Warriors, 239. ^[return]
“MacArthur Aide Lost at Sea, US Says,” The Pittsburgh Press (PA), 18 August 1947, 1; “Hunt for Atcheson,” Miami Daily News, 18 August 1947, 1-2; “Atcheson Lost in Airplane’s Crash at Sea,” The Milwaukee Journal, 18 August 1947, 1, 3; Phillip E. Carrico (UDT-3), interview by Briscoe, 30 January 2013, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date; George Atcheson, The Peking Incident (NY: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1973), 436; Fane and Moore, Naked Warriors, 237; “Valor Awards for George C. Atcheson, III: Silver Star - Military Times Hall of Valor,” at http://militarytimes,com/citations-medals-awards/recipient.php accessed 2/15/2013. ^[return]
Carrico interviews, 30 January 2013 and 13 February 2013; Carrico, Exploits of Navy Frogmen in Korea: Pioneers of U.S. Naval Special Warfare (Hemphill, TX: Dogwood Press, 2004), 11-14. ^[return]
Carrico interviews, 30 January 2013 and 13 February 2013; Carrico, Exploits of Navy Frogmen in Korea, 11-14. ^[return]
Carrico interviews, 30 January 2013 and 13 February 2013; Carrico, Exploits of Navy Frogmen in Korea, 11-14. ^[return]
Carrico interviews, 30 January 2013 and 13 February 2013; Carrico, Exploits of Navy Frogmen in Korea, 11-14; Fane and Moore, Naked Warriors, 240. ^[return]
Carrico interview, 30 January 2013. ^[return]
Fane and Moore, Naked Warriors, 240-242; “MAJ Edward P. Dupras, Jr., Silver Star,” citation for 12-25 August 1950 raids at http://www.koreanwar-educator.org/topics/silver_star/p_silver_star_citations_d.htm accessed 2/15/2013. ^[return]
Letter, Rear Admiral K.J. Christoph, Jr. to John B. Dwyer, May 1994, and Letter, George Atcheson to John B. Dwyer, October 1985, cited in Commandos From the Sea, 240, 241. ^[return]
Fane and Moore, Naked Warriors, 243. ^[return]
Letter, George Atcheson to John B. Dwyer, July 1985, cited in Dwyer, Commandos From the Sea, 237. LTJG Atcheson was later recruited by MAJ Vincent R. ‘Dutch’ Kramer to train the guerrillas supporting the CIA E&E network in North Korea. Boat training was conducted on Yong-do. Atcheson interview, 3 March 2006. ^[return]
MAJ Robert E. Mattingly, unpublished U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College Paper, “Herringbone Cloak – GI Dagger Marines of the OSS,” (Quantico, VA: USMC Developmentand Education Command, 1979), 103;“Thomas L. Curtis, Warrant Officer, USMC, Silver Star” at http://militarytimes.com/citations-medals-awards/recipient.php?recipientid=35929 accessed 2/15/2013. ^[return]
Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War, 469-470. ^[return]
Cremeans, “The Role of the USS Begor (APD-127) in Clandestine Operations in North Korea, 1950-51,” 4, 5. ^[return]
Carrico interviews, 30 January 2013 and 13 February 2013; Carrico, Stories of Navy Frogmen in Korea, 57-60; UDT-3, aboard the Begor, had already done a reconnaissance of the West coast islands south of Wonsan for TF Leopard, EUSA Guerrilla Command. ^[return]
Cremeans, “The Role of the USS Begor (APD-127) in Clandestine Operations in North Korea, 1950-51,” 6,7, 10, 11; Lee Wha Rang, The US CIA Young-do Partisans, 33, 45, 53, 54. ^[return]
Cremeans, “The Role of the USS Begor (APD-127) in Clandestine Operations in North Korea, 1950-51,” 6,7, 10, 11. ^[return]
Christopher Pontrelli, “The ‘Butchers of Kapsan,’” Naval History Magazine, October 2007, 21:5 at http://www.usni.org/magazines/navalhistory/2007-10/butchers-kapsan accessed 11/7/2012. ^[return]
Pontrelli, “The ‘Butchers of Kapsan,’” 5. ^[return]
Pontrelli, “The ‘Butchers of Kapsan,’” 5. ^[return]
Michael E. Haas, In the Devil’s Shadow: U.N. Special Operations During the Korean War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 178. ^[return]
Haas, In the Devil’s Shadow, 178. ^[return]
Sadler interviews, 3 March 2011 and 18 November 2011. ^[return]
Edward J. Marolda, Mine Warfare,” Selected Naval Documents: Korean War at http://www.history.navy.mil/wars/korea/minewar.htm accessed 2/5/2013; “Pirate and Pledge – Korean Documentary” at http://www.kmike.com/pledge.htm accessed 2/5/2013; Andrew S. Erikson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and William S. Murray, “Chinese Warfare: A PLA Navy ‘Assassin Mac’ Capability,” Chinese Maritime Study No. 3 (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2009), 6 at www.usnwc.edu/cnws/cmsi/default.aspx accessed 2/5/2013. ^[return]
MG V.A. Zolotarev, V.A. Yaremenko, A.N. Pochtarev, and A.V. Usikov,Russia (USSR) in Local Wars and Regional Conflicts in the Second Half of the 20th Century, 11 at http://korean-war.com/russianregionalconflicts.html accessed 9/24/2012; Tamara M. Melia, “Damn the Torpedoes”: A Short History of U.S. Naval Mine Countermeasures, 1777-1991, Contributions to Naval History series, No. 4(Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1991),77; Roy E. Appleman, Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur, 2nd edition (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2009), 28. ^[return]
“Mining Action Report” from “USS Mansfield (DD-728) Mine Incident” at http://web.meganet.net/kman/nfmine.htm accessed 2/26/2013. ^[return]
The Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships at http://www.hazegray.org/danfs/ accessed 1/31/2013, hereafter cited as DANFS. ^[return]
Cdr. David D. Bruhn, Wooden Ships and Iron Men: The U.S. Navy’s Ocean Minesweepers, 1953-1994 (Westminster, MD; Heritage Books, 2006), xxi;“DD-723” and“DD-722” at DANFS accessed 2/11/2013; “USS Ernest G. Small (DD-838)” at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_G._Samll_(DD-838) accessed 2/11/2013; “USS Magpie (AMS-25)” at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Magpie_(AMS-25) accessed 2/11/2013; “USS Sarsi (ATF-111” at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Sarsi_(ATF-111) accessed 2/11/2013; Melia, “Damn the Torpedoes,” 73; Erikson, Goldstein and Murray, “Chinese Warfare,” 6. ^[return]
Melia, “Damn the Torpedoes,” 76; Erikson, Goldstein and Murray, “Chinese Warfare,” 6. ^[return]
Within weeks of invading South Korea, the North Koreans were receiving railcar loads of mines from Russia. They included very sensitive magnetic mines that reacted to wooden hulled vessels. Experienced Soviet mine warfare officers and sailors personally helped mine the ports of Wonsan and Chinnamp’o with contact, magnetic, and controlled mines while instructing the North Koreans in mine warfare techniques. Mines were also delivered to In’chon, Haeju, Kunsan, and Mokpo. Melia, “Damn the Torpedoes,” 71, 75; LCDR Jason D. Menarchik, “North Korean Protective Mine Warfare: An Analysis of the Naval Minefields at Wonsan, Chinnampo and Hungnam During the Korean War,” unpublished thesis, April 2010, U.S. Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, 9, 17. ^[return]
Carrico interview, 30 January 2013. ^[return]
Russ Eoff, Bill Tobin, and John Kelly, “UDT Operations in Korea: Wonsan” at http://www.navyfrogmen.com/UDTKorea3.html accessed 2/5/2013. ^[return]
Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June-November 1950): United States Army in the Korean War (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2000), 635. ^[return]
Melia, “Damn the Torpedoes,” 77. ^[return]
Appleman, Disaster in Korea, 32-33. ^[return]
Menarchik, “North Korean Protective Mine Warfare,” 14. ^[return]
When the Ranger Infantry Companies (Airborne) were disbanded in the summer of 1951, most of the soldiers and sergeants were assigned to the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (ARCT), the FEC reserve in Japan. After combat garrison duty and winter training in central Japan, the ‘rear area’ had little appeal. Since the Rangers were ‘rank heavy’ their integration into the 187th ARCT infantry units ‘bumped’ a lot of veterans from leader positions. The Rangers were not warmly welcomed. These factors were enough for some Rangers to ‘volunteer for extremely hazardous, highly classified missions behind enemy lines.’ Atcheson interview, 3 March 2006; Singlaub interview, 21 March 2012. CIA OSO North Korean agents had penetrated the Soviet naval base at Vladivostok as part of the local work force that performed menial labor and stevedore duties. In addition to reporting on Russian aircraft and ship movements, they unloaded and loaded equipment, supplies, and munitions (naval sea mines). Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War, 470; Briscoe, “’Do what you can!’ U.N. Civil Assistance, Chinnamp’o, North Korea, November-December 1950,” Veritas 6:1, 108. Providing Rangers for special duty assignments was common. Major Jack T. Young, the Ivanhoe Security Force (ISF) commander, 2nd Infantry Division (ID), arranged for specialized training from the 1st Ranger Infantry Company (Airborne). Second Lieutenant (2LT) William M. Cole and several NCOs presented classes in care and operation of Soviet, Chinese, and Japanese weapons as well as raiding and sabotage operations. They also helped MAJ Young conduct a guerrilla warfare course for the 5th, 7th, and 8th ROK Army (ROKA) Division junior leaders in X Corps. Retired MSG L. Carl Heesch, interview by Briscoe, 12 December 2005, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date; Heesch, “The Ivanhoe Security Force”; HQ, Ivanhoe Security Force, 2nd U.S. Infantry Division, APO 248 letter 4 July 1951 SUBJECT: Training, COL Jack T. Young Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; ISF letter dated 4 July 1951, SUBJECT: Training; HQ X Corps, APO 909, CG OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE Classified Message, SUBJECT: Extension of Guerrilla Training dated 19 June 1951, Young Collection. “The North Korean Navy, with the help of Soviet sailors, managed to lay more than 3,000 Soviet-made mines in coastal areas. These mine fields significantly reduced the activities of the American Navy.” Zolotarev, Yaremenko, Pochtarev and Usikov, Russia (USSR) in Local Wars and Regional Conflicts in the Second Half of the 20th Century, 11;Appleman, Disaster in Korea, 28; 1st Lt. Charles A. Rogers, “QM Operations 1st Cavalry Division, Korea,” Quartermaster Review, July-August 1951, 1 reprinted at http://www.qmmuseum.lee.army.mil/korea/1steava_qm.htm accessed 12/29/2009. ^[return]
William C. Warwick, Jr., A Sailor Comes Home (Booneville, NC: Whitline Ink, 2008), 129-144; Warwick, Sampan Blockade: A Sailor’s Story of Survival (Carolina Beach, NC: Slap Dash Publishing, 2010), 192-195. “Boatswain’s Mates train and supervise personnel in all activities relating to marlinspike, deck, and boat seamanship, and oversee the maintenance of the ship’s external structure and deck equipment. They act as petty officers in charge of small craft and may perform duties as master-at-arms, serve in or take charge of gun crews, and manage control parties.” “List of United States Navy ratings” at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_States_Navy_ratings accessed 11/9/2012. ^[return]
Retired Chief Warrant Boatswain Marvin Curry, interview by Library of Congress, 27 May 2004, Veterans History Project, AFC 2001/001/B170-Mall #255; Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War, photo section; retired CDR John E. Conjura, “How did the U.S.S. Little Rock came to be at the Buffalo and Erie County Naval and Military Park,” at http://www.usslittlerock.org/Little_Rock_in_Buffalo.html accessed 4/9/2013; Warwick, Sampan Blockade, 6. Navy Seaman (SM) Marvin Curry (25 July 1933 – 24 July 2010) was a full-blooded Seneca (Snipe Clan) from Cattaraugus Territory, New York. He attended Burgard Vocational School, Buffalo, NY, before enlisting in the Navy on 2 October 1950. Curry volunteered for a two year ‘shore’ detail with the CIA after meeting his infantryman brother Wilbur in Korea. He assisted LTJG George C. Atcheson, III, with small boat training and was part of Warwick’s MWB crew during the Agency attacks on the Soviet sea mine distribution sites on the East coast of North Korea. He retired 31 October 1970 as a Chief Warrant Boatswain (CWO-2). SSG Wilbur ‘Chief’ Curry, Jr., B Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was killed in action at Ia Drang, Vietnam, on 15 November 1965. ^[return]
Paschall, “Special Operations in Korea,” 163–64. ^[return]
Carrico, “Frogmen in Korea: Bits and Pieces from the Forgottten War” at http://www.weblube.com/PhilCarricoFirst InlandRaid.html accessed 1/10/2013. ^[return]
Warwick, Sampan Blockade, 23; Blizzards on 8 January 1951 forced U.S. Navy Task Force (TF) 77 aircraft carriers to suspend close air support (CAS) missions for X Corps in eastern Korea. Continued severe winter weather caused 5th Air Force to also cancel CAS. Far East Air Force (FEAF) flew the lowest daily number of sorties since July 1950. “Air War Korea, 1950-53,” AIR FORCE Magazine (October 2000), 44-45. ^[return]
Warwick, Sampan Blockade, 95, 101-102, 103. ^[return]
Warwick, Sampan Blockade, 134-137. ^[return]
Warwick, Sampan Blockade, 141-142. ^[return]
Warwick, Sampan Blockade, 144, 145,149, 161. ^[return]
Warwick, Sampan Blockade, 185-186, 199-204, 207; Thomas F. Fosmire, interview by Briscoe, 6 September 2005, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited by name and date. ^[return]
Singlaub interview, 9 January 2013; Sadler interview, 18 April 2012. ^[return]
Tim Weiner, A Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (NY: Anchor Books, 2008), 63, 61. ^[return]

CIA Paramilitary Operations

Korea, 1950 -1951

ENDNOTES